7 Colo. App. 301 | Colo. Ct. App. | 1896
delivered the opinion of the court.
Mary Kelly, the appellee, had been for some years the owner of a lot in the city of Aspen. Taxes were assessed on it from time to time, until the assessment for the year 1888, which amounted to fifty odd dollars, was levied and left unpaid. The following year the property was advertised for sale under the statute and bought in by the county, which
The errors assigned do not justify a reversal of the judgment. That the sale was void seems to have been clearly settled by the supreme court. Dyke v. Whyte, 17 Colo. 296; Morris et al. v. St. Louis Nat. Bank, 17 Colo. 231; Mitchell v. Arkell, 3 Colo. App. 253.
The Dyke Case is put on the precise ground that since, under the statute, the county had a right to acquire title to all the property, subject to the tax, by simply bidding the amount levied on it, as contradistinguished from the right of the purchaser, who is only permitted to acquire a title to so much of it as will be taken by the bidder in satisfaction of the lien, it must exactly pursue the statute in order to acquire the title. The theory of the law is that full opportunity must be given to private bidders, since, if a sale can be effected to them, the rights of the taxpayers are more fully protected than in those cases where the county itself becomes the purchaser. Under these circumstances, it must appear the property was offered and reoffered, and only finally bid in by the county at the conclusion of the tax sale, when all bids have ceased, and there are no persons or parties willing to make an offer on the unsold property. This is undoubtedly the correct construction of the statute, and is likewise the law of the state. The court did not err, therefore, when it adjudged the sale invalid.
We discover no error in the computation of the interest, which the owner was bound to pay in order to entitle her to be reinvested with the title and to a removal of the cloud. Those sections which are referred to as providing means and methods of redemption are inapplicable to cases of this description. We cannot see that the court made a mistake in
We are not inclined to disturb the judgment because of the distribution of costs, or the action which the court took in dismissing the case as to part of the defendants. The abstract is not full enough to enable us to reach a definite or satisfactory conclusion on the subject, and since, in equity cases, the matter of costs rests largely with the judge who tries the cause, we are not inclined to disturb the judgment, where we are not clearly satisfied a radical error has been committed and a wrong done to one or the other of the litigants.
Perceiving no error in the record, we must affirm the judgment, which is accordingly done.
Affirmed.