Case Information
*1 Before W OOD Chief Judge F LAUM T INDER , Circuit Judges .
F LAUM Circuit Judge
. Gerald Charleston, former medi cal student, brought § action after University Illinois College Medicine unprofession al conduct. advances procedural due process, substantive process, equal protection university, administrators, clinical instructors. The court his constitutional at Rule 12(b)(6) stage. It found that Charleston did not plead sufficient facts to establish that he had protected property interest in his continued education at school, nor to demonstrate singled out Charleston unfavorable treatment. We affirm.
I. Background assume following facts, taken
complaint, be true. In fall was beginning his fourth year at University Illinois College of Medi ‐ cine Chicago. He had finished his Obstetrics and Gynecol ‐ ogy clinical rotation previous June. September, two preceptors, Dr. Ralph Kehl and Dr. Nan ‐ cy Wozniak, submitted complaint College Medi ‐ cine asking required repeat rota ‐ tion. Kehl and Wozniak’s complaint alleged committed errors his written work (including plagia rism patient histories and other reports), he did complete quizzes until one week after rotation’s conclusion, case log did required physi cian signatures, spent four weeks rotation without preceptor, perform well enough pass. Kehl Wozniak’s complaint warded College Medicine Urbana Champaign Student Progress Promotions Committee (which will call “the Student Progress Committee”), which held meet ing October discuss it. permitted attend Student Progress Committee meeting. He was, however, permitted submit letter regarding precep tors’ allegations. Upon review Charles ton’s letter, Student Progress Committee recommended ‐ Charleston be assigned mentor to ensure make similar mistakes in future clinical rotations. At point, Charleston states, matter was resolved.
However, without notice Charleston, Kehl and Wozni ‐ ak’s complaint and letter forwarded another decision ‐ making body, College of Medicine Urbana Champaign Executive Committee (we’ll call it “the Executive Committee”). Accompanying was new letter from James Hall, Associate Dean Student Affairs College of Medicine. Hall alleged back Charleston had acted “unprofessionally” while serving teaching assistant School of Molecular and Cellu ‐ lar Biology. never opportunity address Hall’s allegation. He maintains was false. On October Executive Committee disregarded Student Pro ‐ gress Committee’s earlier recommendation instead de cided should school entirely. appealed Executive Commit tee’s decision (it clear whom), but dismissal upheld. He then appealed College Committee Stu dent Promotions, which also voted dismiss him. Charles ton appealed once more (again, clear whom), but avail. dismissal made final January 2011. filed § action federal court Board Trustees University Illinois, University Illinois Chicago Chancellor Paula Allen Meares, Associate Dean Hall, Dr. Kehl, Dr. Wozniak, other unknown defendants. He claimed violated Fourteenth Amendment equal protection rights. He also brought law breach con tract intentional infliction emotional distress claims. asked for money damages and an injunction re quiring the defendants “to cease all unlawful unconsti tutional acts they currently engage in.”
The defendants moved dismiss for failure state claim. opposed motion, asked in the al ternative for leave amend complaint. The district court granted motion all Charleston’s federal claims with prejudice; court declined exercise sup plemental jurisdiction over state law claims. It address Charleston’s request amend complaint. appeals.
II. Discussion
We review district court’s Rule 12(b)(6) de novo. To state claim for relief, must provide more than “abstract recitations elements cause action conclusory legal statements.” Brooks Ross 2009). Instead, plausible claim must include “factual content” sufficient allow court “to draw reasonable inference defendant liable for misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft Iqbal U.S. (2009). can draw such inferences facts cluded Charleston’s complaint.
*5 5 13 ‐ 2081 A. Due process claims
First, alleges a procedural due process claim based process which medical school him. There are two steps any procedural due process analysis. First, court must identify protected property or liberty interest at stake. Second, must determine what is due under circumstances. Omosegbon v. Wells, 335 F.3d 668, 674 (7th Cir. 2003). The court found that claim failed at first step. agree. insists that has a protected property inter est in continued education at University Illinois College Medicine. However, our circuit has rejected proposition an individual has a stand alone property interest in an education at state university, including a graduate education. Bissessur v. Ind. Univ. Bd. Trs. (7th Cir. 2009); Williams Wendler 2008). It cannot case, rea soned, “that any student who is suspended college suffered deprivation constitutional property,” part 13 ‐ 2081 because this “would imply that a student who flunked out would have a right a trial type hearing whether his tests papers graded correctly and a student who was admitted would right a hearing why he admitted.” Williams , F.3d at 589. But see Gorman Univ. R.I. , F.2d (1st Cir. 1988) (recognizing general “interest pursuing an education,” including university education); Flaim Med. Coll. Ohio , F.3d 2005) (affirming that Due Process Clause is “implicated” by university disciplinary decisions).
Instead accepting stand alone interest, we ask whether student has shown that he has legally protected entitlement continued education at university. Bis sessur at 601–02; Williams , F.3d at 589–90. could establish he this legitimate enti tlement pleading existence an express implied contract with school. See Bissessur at 601. For instance, could point an agreement between himself school would be only good cause. Id. we held Bissessur is enough student merely such implied contract existed. Id. 603. Instead, student’s complaint must specific about source implied contract, exact promises university made student, promises student made return. id. 603–04. maintains met standard. Having reviewed complaint closely, disagree. All alleges viola tion university’s “Student Disciplinary Policy” “University Statutes.” describe spe cific promises made through *7 7 ‐ disciplinary policy, nor does identify these “University Statutes” their contents.
Rather, seems to be claiming school promised him procedures set out in university’s disci plinary policy. See Complaint, ¶ (“Defendant failed to comply with its own policies due process protections set forth in its Student Disciplinary Policy by forwarding a of academic dishonesty, i.e., plagiarism [Student Progress Committee] without intermediate review of a Student Discipline Subcommittee.”); Complaint, ¶ (“Defendant failed comply with its own policies due protections set forth in Student Disciplinary Poli cy failing allow Plaintiff a hearing, be present defend himself allegations against him, confront witnesses against him address any evidence presented him.”). have rejected similar an “interest contractually ‐ guaranteed process” many times, see, e.g. Park v. Indiana University School Den tistry 828, (7th Cir. 2012), but we will be clear once more: plaintiff does have federal constitutional right state mandated process. Olim Wakinekona, U.S. 250–51 (1983) (“Process is an end self. … The State may choose require procedures … but making choice State create independent substantive right.”); Osteen Henley 1993) (“As tirelessly but unavailingly remind counsel court, violation state law (for purposes case student judicial code may treated state law) is denial process, even if law confers procedural right.”). Like other student plaintiffs before him, all alleges school con ferred certain procedural rights. It may been unfair for the university not follow own procedures Charleston’s case, but it unconstitutional.
That does conclude the matter, though. In his reply brief, Charleston introduces a new account where im ‐ plied contract with the university came from: the decision first committee reviewed the complaints Charleston remain medical school only re ‐ ceive a mentor. His new theory is when Student Progress Committee issued sanction, “accepted” it, agreement formed between medical school would be dismissed. When school nonetheless moved forward with preceptors’ complaints new allegation As sociate Dean Hall, says, “breached” their “original agreement.” Needless say, theory implied contract come across on face complaint; nor advance below. waiv er aside, complaint’s allegations (and brief ing appeal) repeatedly describe Student Progress Committee’s decision “recommendation” only. A rec ommendation can hardly be basis binding contract between parties. therefore find failed identify
property interest stake. As such, there need us proceed second step procedural due process analysis.
For similar reasons, may dispose sub stantive due process claim. “Unless governmental practice encroaches fundamental right, substantive requires only practice rationally related legit imate government interest, alternatively phrased, *9 9 13 2081 practice neither arbitrary nor irrational.” Lee v. City of Chi. , 330 F.3d 456, 467 (7th Cir. 2003). rational basis anal ysis presupposes individual has a property interest can deprive of. See Bissessur , 581 F.3d 603 (dismissing student’s procedural substantive due process claims when student failed to plead existence of an implied contract, student’s “constitutional claims are derivative of rights he alleges promised him”).
Nor has pled a substantive due process claim based on a fundamental right. See Washington v. Glucksberg , U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (holding Due Process Clause “provides heightened protection government inter ference with certain fundamental rights liberty inter ests”). he has a fundamental right “all benefits privileges a public higher education.” He has no such thing. For one, Supreme Court has dis claimed existence fundamental right education generally, see San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodri guez , U.S. 35–37 (1973); accordingly, our circuit has disclaimed existence fundamental right graduate education specifically, see Galdikas Fagan F.3d 688–89 (7th Cir. 2003), abrogated other grounds Spiegla Hull 2004). offers reason reconsider either our interpretation San An tonio our own precedent. Nor can he claim fundamental right pursue profession choosing. Park (no right follow particular career). Thus, 13 2081 affirm of substantive claim well.
B. Equal protection “class of one” claim
We come now third constitutional claim: university’s violation of rights under Equal Pro tection Clause. assert based membership protected group; instead, advances an equal protection “class of one” claim. His alleges “the actions of De fendants were result personal animus Plaintiff, said actions denials taken without any rational basis.”
Our circuit settled standard for “class one” claims—that is, state official denied dividual equal protection laws simply singling individual out special treatment. See Del Marcelle Brown Cnty. Corp. , F.3d 2012) ( en banc ). need return debate case, however, because cannot satisfy even least demanding standard could apply. Park at (applying two standards derived lead dissenting opinions Del Marcelle ). The Del Marcelle dissenters would require showing “plaintiff victim intentional dis crimination … hands state actor,” “the actor lacked rational basis so singling out plaintiff.” Del Marcelle (Wood, J., dissenting); see also Vill. Willowbrook Olech U.S. (2000) *11 11 13 2081 ( per curiam ). has properly pled either these elements.
One way to allege intentional discrimination is to show the state treated similarly situated individuals more fa ‐ vorably. Park , F.3d at 833; see also Olech , U.S. at 564. That seemed chosen method (we use the past tense because too will change, see below). His com ‐ plaint alleges he “retaliated against, harassed, dis ‐ ciplined against, intimidated, the medi ‐ cal school, all … differently than those similarly situated medical students subjected [Student Progress Com ‐ mittee] review process.” saying magic words enough: must offer “further factual enhance ‐ ment.” Iqbal U.S. 678. And complaint tells us noth ing about these “similarly situated students.”
On appeal, offers “Dr. Li” who al so failed turn required quizzes for their OB/GYN ‐ rotation time, but who nonetheless escaped sanction. Of course, Charleston needed mention Dr. Li in his actu ‐ al complaint. But it would made a difference if he had, because the accusations against Charleston sole ‐ ly concern his quizzes. was also accused of com ‐ mitting plagiarism in his patient paperwork, failing obtain physician signatures his case log, spending four weeks of the rotation without preceptor, and performing well enough in rotation pass. Moreover, he was accused acting unprofessionally teaching assistant. Park (finding “no reason suppose” other dental students “comparable” plaintiff where plain ‐ tiff was accused significantly more academic profes sional misconduct). As case Park difference in Dr. Li’s alleged culpability defeats plau sible inference school intentionally discriminated former. It also defeats inference school’s disparate treatment two students irra tional.
Once again, however, has proposed new theory defendants’ liability his reply brief. Aban doning Dr. Li “similarly situated students” angle, now maintains can plead his class one claim by alleging that, because Student Progress Committee already addressed Dr. Kehl Dr. Wozniak’s about performance during rotation, Ex ecutive Committee’s subsequent lacked rational basis. waived argument failing embrace opposition motion dismiss initial brief. even if overlooked this, new theory still viable equal protection claim. Assuming Student Progress Committee’s de cision conclusively settled university’s response to preceptors’ allegations—and again, Charleston’s consistent use term “recommendation” to describe commit tee’s decision suggests that we should assume such thing—we still have Associate Dean Hall’s allegation that acted unprofessionally as teaching assistant. The fact that disciplinary committees responded more harshly upon receiving new complaint does show that administrators reacted irrationally. True, maintains Hall’s allegation false (an assertion that we must credit stage), but plead administrators knew false nonetheless dis missed him basis. allegations amount to claim poor reasons dismissing him—but poor is same irrational. Rather, “[i]t is entirely rational … permit actors make individual ized decisions when very nature their job take wide variety considerations into account.” Del Marcelle (Wood, J., dissenting).
Thus, affirm equal pro tection claim.
C. Denial leave amend
Finally, argues district court should have granted leave amend complaint. requested leave amend opposition defend ants’ 12(b)(6) motion; court address request order.
Federal Rule Civil Procedure provides leave amend should “freely” given “when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). However, “district courts broad discretion deny leave amend” where “the amendment would futile.” Arreola v. Godinez F.3d 788, (7th Cir. 2008). will only reverse denial if court abused discretion. Stanard Nygren (7th Cir. 2011).
Preferably, district court would addressed its reasons granting leave amend on record. Re ‐ gardless, making his request, Charleston offered no sug ‐ gestions all about how he would cure complaint’s de ‐ ficiencies. Under these circumstances, court abuse its discretion denying Charleston second chance. Indep. Trust Corp. Stewart Info. Servs. Corp. 943–44 2012) (finding no abuse discre tion where plaintiff “did offer any meaningful indi cation how it would plead differently” motion amend).
If there any doubt on score, has eliminated it appeal. In explaining (in his reply brief) how he would amend allegations if given chance, Charles ton offered that would plead “more succinctly” show was basis letter Associate Dean Hall, Hall’s allegation both vague false, never had oppor tunity address letter’s allegations confront Hall, had already been sanctioned Student Progress Committee, acceptance those sanctions had concluded matter, rational basis. Virtually all infor mation already complaint, however. And none sustains constitutional claims. If only pro poses rehash original allegations, find abuse discretion district court.
III. Conclusion A FFIRM judgment court.
[1] The district court ruled Charleston’s federal claims for money damages against board university officials their official capacities barred sovereign immunity. It also found, as an alternate ground for decision on substantive claim, qualified immunity barred suit claim officials their individual capacities. (Charleston asked injunction remedy particular claim.) As we ul timately dismiss each pleadings, do reach court’s immunity determinations.
[2] argues Supreme Court’s decision Goss Lopez U.S. (1975), recognized student’s protected interest her public education. misreads Goss . The Supreme Court found Ohio high school students case “plainly legitimate entitlement public education” only because an Ohio state statute promised young residents education . Id. at (citing Ohio code, which required local authorities provide free education all residents between five twenty one). “Having chosen extend right an education [high school students] generally,” Ohio could then deprive students right without process. Id. 574. Here, point an Illinois statute promises education school. Thus, Goss inap posite.
[3] Actually, substantive portion states only “clearly established” right education, but brief appeal indicates meant “fundamental.”
[4] call Del Marcelle dissenting opinion’s standard least de manding because require plaintiff plead facts establish ing state actor’s illegitimate motive or subjective ill will toward plaintiff. Compare Del Marcelle (Posner, J., lead opinion) (requiring plaintiff show “he victim discrimination intentionally visited him actors who knew should known they justification, based their public duties, singling out unfavorable treatment” (emphasis omitted)); Hilton City Wheeling 2000). If required plead illegitimate motive, however, done so. His contains only naked assertion offi cials’ actions “were result personal animus” toward him—he fers nothing, other than mere fact Hall’s writing letter university’s reacting it, establish officials harbored some personal hostility toward him.