22 Ga. App. 337 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1918
Lead Opinion
A motion to dismiss the bill of exceptions in this case was made upon tlie grounds, (1) that it was not presented within the time prescribed by law, as the judgment complained of was rendered on May 4, 1917, at chambers, and the bill of exceptions was certified on June 4, 1917, more than 30 days from the date of the decision at chambers, “and therefore, under the provisions of section 6152 of the Civil Code (1910), was not certified within the time prescribed by law;” and (2) that no sufficient assignment of error is contained in the recital in the bill 'of exceptions that the appellant, “being dissatisfied with the ruling and desiring to except to the Court of Appeals, says that the court erred in not granting said motion to open said default and to set aside the said judgment.”
Again, in the case of Patterson v. Beck, 133 Ga. 701 (66 S. E. 911), may be found a full discussion (also by Mr. Justice Lump-kin) of this identical question, and various apparent conflicts in the rule that the “bill of exceptions shall specify plainly the decision complained of and the alleged error” (Civil Code, § 6139) are reconciled. In that case the following language, used in Mutual Building & Loan Asso. v. Glessner, 99 Ga. 747, 748 (27 S. E. 187), is quoted with approval: “But where a judge trying the case upon the law and the facts disposes of it in a single judgment with which the losing party is dissatisfied, the latter in excepting to it ought certainly to give some intimation of what the error consisted. Simply saying, in effect, that such a judgment was wrong, without stating any ground or reason v/hy it was so, opens a broader field of investigation than our law, which requires all errors to be plainly and distinctly set forth, authorizes. It was never contemplated that this court should search around in a loose and general way to discover errors not brought to its attention with, at least, a reasonable degree of clearness and perspicuity.” It was held in the Patterson case, supra,' that the motion to’ dismiss must be overruled because it was distinctly shown that there was' no controversy about facts, that only one question of law was submitted to the court, and that the court decided it adversely to the contentions of the plaintiff in error, and entered a judgment against him, and that he excepted and .assigned this as error. In
In Kimball v. Williams, 108 Ga. 812 (33 S. E. 994), it was said: “This case was submitted to the presiding judge for decision without the intervention of a jury. A judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiffs. The defendant’s bill of exceptions makes no lawful assignment of error, the only attempt to .do 'so being as follows: ‘To which ruling and judgment the said defendant excepted and now assigns the same as error.’ This language is entirely too general, and does not properly present any question for determination by this court. Accordingly, the writ of error must be dismissed. See Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Anderson, 102 Ga. 551 [38 S. E. 282], and cases there cited; Peavy v. Atkinson, 108 Ga. 167 [33 S. E. 956]. The rule laid down in the above-cited eases is none the less applicable because this ease was submitted upon an agreed statement of facts. The statutory requirement that alleged errors shall be plainly and distinctly pointed out is imperative and applies to all cases.” In Wheeler v. Worley,
In the case now under consideration a motion to open a default and to set aside a judgment against a garnishee was made, which set out in detáil certain reasons why it was contended that the judgment against the defendant in an attachment proceeding was void and illegal, and also alleging certain facts urged by the movant as a good and sufficient legal excuse for the failure of the
Even a superficial consideration of the motion to set aside, as outlined above, and of the judgment rendered in the attachment proceeding and in the garnishment proceeding, will clearly demonstrate that at least two main contentions were raised, namely, (a)
Plainly evidence was introduced in support of the motion to set aside, though, in the absence of any brief of evidence in the bill of exceptions itself, we do not know what that evidence was, and therefore it could not be determined by this court, under a proper exception, wliQther any or. all of the grounds of the motion were supported or defeated by the evidence considered by the court in arriving at the judgment complained of, outsi.de of this particular ground of the motion to set aside the judgment, which might possibly be determined from the pleadings and from the recitals of fact in the various judgments réndered. Whether the plaintiff in error, in the general exception taken to the overruling of his motion, is assigning error upon the finding of the court on the issues of fact presented therein, or is assigning error exclusively on the issues of law raised thereby, can only be surmised. The duty rested upon the plaintiff in error to indicate specifically to this court wherein he asserted the trial court erred in overruling his motion to set aside the judgment against him; and since that motion raises issues both of law and of fact, and the judgment recites that after hearing evidence the same is overruled, etc., by no possible process of reasoning or divination can we determine from the general exception presented to us whether the plaintiff in error is complaining as to the rulings on questions of law or as to the findings of fact. We can not say, from the exception taken, that the plaintiff in error intended to assign error only upon the rulings on the questions of law raised in the record, as in some cases in which a- somewhat general assignment of error has been hel,d sufficient where a question of law only was submitted to the cdurt, and the court decided adversely to the contention of the plaintiff in error and entered a judgment against him, and error was gen
Writ of error dismissed.
Rehearing
ON MOTION TOR REHEARING.
The motion for a rehearing is based on the assumption that in dismissing the writ of error, on the ground that the assignment of error was too general as to the judgment complained of, the court- “overlooked a material fact.” The alleged fact is, that “there were two motions made in the court below, upon which two separate judgments were rendered, to the overruling of which exception was made,”—one a motion to open a judgment by default, addressed to the discretion of the judge and depending on evidence outside of the record; the other a motion “based on the record of the judgment” and presenting questions of-law only. It is contended that the assignment of error can be treated as applying to the latter independently of the former, and as to the latter is sufficient; and the plaintiff in error asks that it be allowed to amend the bill of exceptions so that the assignment of error shall apply to the judgment on the latter motion only.
It is not true that -the bill of exceptions excepts to judgments on two separate and distinct motions. Error is assigned on but one judgment. The bill'.of exceptions,, after stating the case in which the plaintiff in error was garnishee, says that the .garnishee filed its “motion to open a judgment in default, rendered against it for having failed to answer a summons of garnishment served upon it in the said case, and set aside said judgment against it as having been improperly rendered, and that, after bearing argument thereon, the court overruled said motion to open said default and refused to set aside judgment, on May 4, 1917.” And
We will add, however, that even if the questions of law raised could be considered independently of any question of fact, we think an affirmance should result.
Motions to amend, and for rehearing, denied.