Charles Samuel Martin v. United StatesCharles Samuel Martin v. United States
An information in four counts was filed in the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii charging appellant, Charles Samuel Martin, with violating section 7203 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (
Appellant raises several points for the first time on appeal concerning, inter alia, the conduct of the trial, which we do not feel merit discussion. 2 Suffice it to say that a careful review of the record reveals that appellant did an excellent job of representing himself and that the court was solicitous throughout the course of the trial to protect his rights. The issues that we shall consider are (1) whether the evidence supports the verdict, and (2) whether the sentence was cruel and unusual.
It is clear that appellant had reportable income in the years in question and failed to file returns in those years. Appellant contends, however, that there was insufficient evidence to show that his failure to file was “willful." In this regard, “willful” for the purpose of
Appellant was born on December 10, 1911. He graduated from Wichita University in 1940, majoring in psychology, and has done substantial post-graduate work at the University of Hawaii since that time. Prior to 1960 he had never filed a federal income tax return. There can be no doubt that he was aware of
Appellant contends that his sentence of four weeks confinement is cruel and unusual punishment, because it will result in possible loss of his Army reserve status. The sentence, however, was within the terms of the statute. That as an incident of his sentence the Army may take administrative action to divest him of his commission has no effect on the validity of the statute or the sentence rendered thereunder. Since it is well settled that a sentence that falls within the terms of a valid statute cannot amount to a cruel and unusual punishment, 6 appellant’s contention is without merit. Further, it is clear that this court has no control over a sentence which is within the limits allowed by statute. 7 While we are not unsympathetic with appellant’s plea that he faces possible loss of Army reserve retirement pay benefits built up over many years, this is not a matter within our province. Appellant still may bring this to the attention of the district court by filing a motion therein for reduction of sentence within the time prescribed by Rule 35, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 8
An examination of the entire record discloses that appellant was fairly tried and that he was accorded all rights to which he was entitled.
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
. His gross income for those years was as follows:
1955 $2,330.91
1956 1,989.21
1957 1,900.42
1958 1,525.05
. Typical of the lack of merit in these points is the contention that appellant should have been allowed to read to the court Exhibits A1 through A35, which were letters and files offered in evidence by appellant. The district court admitted these exhibits in evidence, but stated to appellant that it was not necessary for appellant to read them to the court. The court said, “I will read them.” We see no error in this procedure.
.
“Any person required * * * to make a return (other than a return required under authority of section 6015 or section 6016) * * * who willfully fails to * * * make such return >s * * shall, in addition to other penalties provided by law, be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than 1 year, or both, together with the costs of prosecution.
. See Abdul v. United States,
. See United States v. Cirillo,
. See Pependrea v. United States,
. Ibid.
. Appellant filed the following three motions with this court: (1) a motion to dismiss the charges against him on the basis that they are unsupported and unsubstantiated; (2) a motion to modify the sentence on the basis that it was cruel and unusual; and (3) a motion to dismiss on grounds of unconstitutionality. While it was inappropriate to file these motions with this court, we nevertheless have examined the contentions contained therein. We have concluded in this opinion that there was sufficient evidence to support his conviction of the crime charged and that the sentence he received was not cruel and unusual. His further contentions in the third motion that he was deprived of due process of law by virtue of the requirement of excessive bail and that he was deprived of a speedy and public trial are without merit.