Charles Richard Riley v. James M. Dorton

113 judicial than a determination con- Sekula, (quoting operation F.3d 457 Southern 39 F.E.R.C., struing applying and a statute to a case Co. v. Cal. Edison hand”). result, (9th Cir.1985)). interpretation question rule As her had “If the 783 impact. existing prohibited law or no retroactive explains merely clarifies or interpretive.” it will be deemed regulations, (3d Sullivan, F.2d 62 Cir.

Bailey 885 v. V. 1989). interpretive if the statu A rule is also passed Congress the LLRW Act to ad- fully operative have been tory scheme would recurring problems with dress nation’s regulations regulation and without sought Congress waste. nuclear to address to used merely published standards be problem through the construction of new Mining adjudication. American agency facilities, carefully spurred disposal Admin., Safety & Health Congress v. Mine series of incentives and crafted standards. (D.C.Cir.1993). 1106, 1108-09 in requirement These standards culminated descriptions These characterize dispose be of “all” waste. that states able Secretary’s action in the current case. years prepare In it had to to meet the seven imposed obligation dispose Act LLRW Congress’s requirements and in the Secretary’s notice of “all ... waste.” The years require- it to meet the twelve had intended simply publicized the standards she ments, develop failed to Commission 2021e(d)(2)(B)(iv), § applying when to use beyond options a short-term contract with existing law re clarifying her view of what original one of the nation’s facilities. addition, Secretary had the quired. Secretary sufficiency of this evaluated . power payment to make determinations permissible reading contract based of the escrow account her role trustee wanting. and it the Act found Under Chev- 2021e(d)(2)(A). would pursuant She ron, judgment court this cannot substitute its if even have made these decisions therefore Secretary’s. will re- for the We therefore publicized in the not her standards she had decision and remand verse the district court’s such, Register. ruling her was As Federal instructions enter for the with and interpretive exempt notice Secretary. requirements. comment also the Secre The district court held in procedurally as an

tary’s position invalid rulemaking. The court of retroactive stance largely it this reached conclusion because Secretary’s publication that the believed interpretation promulgated a new rule her RILEY, Richard Charles applied to a contract that could Plaintiff-Appellant, rulemaking is in 1992. Retroactive formed v. impermissible, see Bowen presumptively DORTON, Defendant-Appellee. M. James 204, 208, Hosp., Georgetown Univ. 468, 471-72, 102 L.Ed.2d 94-7120. No. Landgraf v. Prod see also USI Film Appeals, States Court 1483, 1505, United

ucts, 244,-, S.Ct. Fourth Circuit. retroactivity con L.Ed.2d but to this case. The Secre cerns are irrelevant Argued May ruling interpretive. tary’s It therefore Aug. Decided rights obligations; it existing not alter did existing rights merely clarified what those Granted; In Banc Rehearing always Man obligations had been. See 10,1996. Opinion Oct. Vacated Commissioner, 297 Equip. hattan Gen. Co. 80 L.Ed.

(1936) agency interpret (explaining that rule in its more ing a statute “is no retroactive Lisa,

ARGUED: Gregory C. Student Counsel, Appellate Litigation Clinical Pro- gram, Georgetown University Center, Law DC, Washington, Appellant. for Joseph Paul Jr., Rapisarda, County Attorney, County of Henrico, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee. ON Goldblatt, BRIEF: Director, Steven H. Finn, Ellen R. Supervising Attorney, Ajay K. Gambhir, Counsel, Student Appellate Litiga- tion Program, Clinical Georgetown Universi- ty Center, DC, Law Washington, Appel- for Moore, III, lant. James T. County Assistant Attorney, County Henrico, Richmond, Vir- ginia, Appellee. for WILKINSON, Before Judge, Chief MICHAEL, Judge, NORTON, Circuit United Judge States District for the District Carolina, of South sitting by designation. Reversed by published and remanded opinion. Judge MICHAEL wrote the majority opinion, in which Judge NORTON joined. Judge Chief WILKINSON wrote a dissenting opinion.

OPINION

MICHAEL, Judge: Circuit Dorton, Charles R. sued James M. police detective, under 42 U.S.C. al- H5 Richmond, ride to During the 90-minute used excessive Dorton that Detective leging intimidating and in- Dorton made interrogation after against him force Riley. sulting Dorton threat- comments De- granted court district his arrest.1 woods, tie him to to take into the ened summary judg- Dorton’s motion tective to Dorton and leave him die. a tree there only de minimis Riley suffered ment because might Riley angry an mob be told next We the detective. hands of at the jail up him before waiting outside the to beat proceedings for further and remand reverse addition, Dorton make it inside. he could required to plaintiff § is not because “stupid” of Riley’s family and “bunch called physical force was when serious show country hicks.” dumb of custodial in the course against him used County delivery Upon his to the Henrico interrogation. Riley put in an headquarters, was face Dorton interrogation room to Detectives I. Riley’s behind hands were cuffed and Ross. Riley, Dor- According to Detective his back. court’s district review the We ton novo, judgment de view grant of during his up again insults] [with started light in the facts and inferences ing “the me, asking you interrogation, and he was nonmoving party,” favorable to most know, my know, things like you different Ents., Inc. v. Southern Riley. Donmar here sister, whore, things and like is she a fat N.C., F.3d Nat’l Bank of know, that, just trying get to me you and Cir.1995). job weigh the to “It is not our breakdown. to evidence, many affidavits favor count how to Well, anyway, a few more re- he makes him, many oppose or to how plaintiff and of the blue he like that. Then out marks hard to believe.” stories seem disbelieve you looks just says do what scum know Cir. Gray Spillman, v. like, eyes and I him in the and looked dead omitted). 1991) (internal For sum citation you in the mirror I him have looked asked then, we must judgment purposes, mary lately. facts, by Riley following described view angered Detec- (Emphasis supplied.) This affidavits, as true. deposition and his in chair, Dorton, “jumped up” from his who tive in the authorities Riley tip was wanted Riley, pointed to and stuck the over went charges rape County, Virginia, on of Riley’s Henrico left nostril. pen quarter up inch of a He was arrested Riley, related offenses. Dorton According and Detective to 31, 1993, by Detective ink my open on March with the rip to Norfolk nose “threatened case, an- Dorton, this and up the defendant in in the corner to throw me pen, threatened officer, Riley up.” Ross. Detective Detective and me other of the room beat scratching him police department Riley, briefly slapped to the Dorton then taken causing Riley’s head fingernails in Detective and placed he was his where Norfolk with The quarter turn. transport eighth to the Hen- to police car for move Dorton’s face, Riley’s did not Safety Department but County raised welts Public blow rico urged Ross then skin. Detective in the either Detective break the Once car Richmond. saying “we’re Riley stop, of Dorton to Ross informed or Detective Dorton up in any Rodney King stuff have going have coun- and to right to remain silent inju- permanent Riley sustained no here.”2 sel. law, injured suit party in an action pertinent part: provides in Section 1983 proper for redress. equity, proceeding or other statute, who, any Every person of under color custom, ordinance, any usage, regulation, of or Rodney King videotaped in 1991 arrest Columbia, Territory District of or the national Angeles State or much Los received any during subjected, subjects, degree citizen force used or causes be attention. person under 18 within convicted or other led two officers of the United States arrest King’s constitutional deprivation violating § jurisdiction to the 242 for thereof U.S.C. Newton, 2 rights See Jim under color law. any rights, privileges, immunities secured or Fol- laws, Guilty, Acquitted; Calm Guarded be liable to shall the Constitution Officers claims, however, ry He suspect from the incident. does not sustain serious in- psy- incident has caused him jury. that the severe Gray Spillman, 93-94 distress, chological including nightmares, (4th Cir.1991) de- (applying longstanding pression anxiety. principle that the use of force “in the course custodial violates the fifth rights did not waive of his and fourteenth amendments of the Constitu- any incriminating make statements tion”).4 interrogation. complaint filed a De Our sister circuits that have considered the Dorton, claiming tective use excessive question unanimously agree with granted force. The district court the detec Spillman: summary judgment, tive’s motion for holding physical [T]he use of against violence a minimum, “Given de albeit undoubt person presence police who is in the of the edly injuries discomforting, plaintiff, of the interrogation, custodial poses who no no applica viable claim for the unreasonable others, threat safety to their or that of tion of force exists.” The district court re who does not otherwise initiate action entirely lied on our decision in Norman v. which reasonably would pru- indicate to a (4th Cir.1994) (en Taylor, bane), 25 F.3d 1259 police dent officer that the use of force is denied,-U.S.-, 909, 130 cert. 115 S.Ct. justified, is a constitutional violation. (1995) (holding L.Ed.2d 791 prison that a Reed, (5th 345, Ware v. 709 F.2d Cir. generally may bring inmate not a 1983); 190, May, accord Wilkins v. 872 F.2d predicated claim Eighth on the Amendment (7th Cir.1989), denied, cert. 493 U.S. right to be pun free from cruel and unusual (1990); 107 L.Ed.2d 752 ). ishment if his Riley is de minimis (10th Teeples, Rex v. Cir.), 753 F.2d appeals, arguing that Taylor Norman v. does denied, cert. 106 S.Ct. apply not because his claim is based on his see also Weaver v. Bren Fifth and Fourteenth pro Amendment due ner, (2d Cir.1994); 40 F.3d Cooper v. rights prohibit cess the use of force Cir.1992), Dupnik, 1244-45 during police interrogation. denied, rt. 113 S.Ct. ce 407, 121 (1992). L.Ed.2d II. Detective rule, Dorton’s counsel con recognized in Gray and the cases argument at oral ceded cited physical above—that no force is consti- record, light read tutionally most fa permissible during interrogation— Riley, Riley vorable to shows that was struck is based on the process right “due to be free undergoing while he was interrogat custodial [police] from designed conduct to overcome Riley’s § ion.3 1983 claim must survive the accused’s produce will and involuntary an summary judgment unjustified because no incriminating statement.” Weaver v. Bren- physical may ner, force be suspect used a 40 F.3d at process 536. The due viola- during custodial interrogation, even if complete tion is force, with the use of even if Case, Times, King

lows Verdicts in Apr. L.A. nating response. important Id. An factor in 1993, A1; States,-U.S.-, Koon v. United test, however, applying the perceptions is "the (1996). 116 S.Ct. 135 L.Ed.2d 392 suspect.” Id. Riley 3. described his encounter with the detec- Riley appeared pro se in the district court and interrogation. According tives as an neither he nor Dorton’s counsel cited trying get detectives were him "breakdown” Spillman judge. to the district See Model Rules using "good cop/bad cop” were interroga- 3.3(a)(3) (lawyer Professional Conduct Rule technique. tion activity may interroga- Police must legal "disclose to the authority tribunal tion even if suspect never ask the controlling jurisdiction question. Innis, lawyer known to the Rhode Island v. 301-02, directly position to be adverse to the the client counsel”); by opposing and not disclosed test of whether Model conduct 7-23; amounted objective Code of is an Professional one: Conduct EC Va.Code were the part 7-102(3) “words Responsibility or actions on the of the Professional DR & EC police” reasonably likely to elicit some incrimi- 7-20.

H7 Id.; Taylor, 25 F.3d 1259 Dup Norman v. Cir. Cooper v. is no confession. there , — 1994) (en --, banc), nik, cert. F.2d at denied does argues that there is Dorton apply the Norman defen not here. Unlike “suffered, here because no violation (a prison guard), Detective Dorton had dant Appel most, injuries.” Brief of de minimis justification legitimate for the use of force. no wrong. sug “The at 10. That is lee (a plaintiff And unlike the Norman convicted interrogee’s constitutional gestion that prisoner), Riley asserts Fifth and Fourteenth only if transgressed he suf rights are rights physical Amendment to be free demonstrates fers[serious] during the course of custodial interro abuse misconception of the fifth and fundamental Eighth than an Amendment gation, rather amendments, indeed, if our fourteenth pun right to be free from cruel and unusual justice.” Gray, 925 F.2d system criminal during imprisonment after convic ishment suspect’s constitu Police can violate at 93. tion. Fourteenth the Fifth and rights tional under sign leaving a “visible without Amendments long that so as a In Norman we held or scars.” any beating, such as bruises guard legitimate rationale prison has some York, 401, 403, 65 v. New 324 U.S. Malinski against prisoner, of force a for the use (1945). 781, 782, 1029 89 L.Ed. S.Ct. “generally Eighth Amendment claim should context, In the custodial any sustained the not lie where injuries is severity plaintiffs § Norman, of a 1983 the 25 F.3d plaintiff is de minimis.” damages, only question of to the Norman, relevant example, for the at 1263.5 In may nominal dam plaintiff be awarded and a prisoner-plaintiff on the thumb guard hit the physical if attorney’s even his ages and fees keys trying to large with a set of brass while Gray, 925 F.2d at 93- injury is de minimis. in prison against smoking rule a enforce a is available under n. 1. Such relief 94 & addition, the area. Id. at 1260. restricted Merely suppressing good § 1983 for reason. yelling making noise and prisoner had been resulting any from coercive confession at during inmates roll call. Id. at other adequately protect not conduct does 1261.6 against rule of the detainee. The rights however, case, Detective Dorton In this interro unjustified force in custodial use of justification for the use of legitimate had no absolute, and it must be honored gation is posed Riley handcuffed and any force. was Moreover, not moment of arrest. from the Dorton has come security risk. Detective no physical force every will succumb to detainee Riley that was with no evidence forward deny to It would be odd indeed and confess. necessary good or- violating any to the rule remedy simply § because suspect a a 1983 Detective Dorton of the station house. der strength persist will to he has good “in a faith claim that he acted being does not he is refusing to confess while discipline,” see maintain or restore effort to around. smacked present upon by the dissent all only 6. The cases relied recognized even with de min- 5. Norman presented physical injury prisoner could recover if in Norman v. a similar to those imis facts 699, imper Culbertson, challenged conduct resulted "in an Taylor. v. 984 In Jackson pain” “of or was otherwise 1993) curiam), infliction of (5th example, missible (per a 700 Cir. repugnant of mankind.” to the conscience a sort jail in the pretrial detainee had started a fire Norman, (quoting Hudson v. at 1263 n. 4 25 F.3d extinguisher by sprayed with a fire had been McMillian, 1, 10, 112 S.Ct. 503 U.S. put Obvi guard out the fire. who had come to (internal (1992) quotation 117 ously, violation the court found no constitutional omitted)); Benjamin, v. see also Williams marks upon by of the cases relied there. None 1996) 756, (“courts 2 Cir. 77 F.3d 762 n. remotely similar to present even dissent facts finding wary of force that uses should be is, here, presented none involve those 'merely' de pain not to be min inflict but intentionally an offi pretrial struck detainee 1233, ”); Chicago, F.3d 1236 v. 6 imis Wilson of a temper the course who lost his cer 1993) ("even right a murderer has a Cir. interrogation. custodial J.), torture") (Posner, cert. de be free from -U.S.-, nied, 128 L.Ed.2d 470 118 Albers, 312, 320-21, Connor,

Whitley v. 106 ham v. 395 n. 109 (1986) L.Ed.2d S.Ct. 89 251 S.Ct. 1871 n. Glick,

(quoting v. Johnson 481 F.2d Wolfish, accord Bell v. (2d Cir.), denied, 535-39, cert. 1861, 1871-74, 60 L.Ed.2d (1973)). (1979); Cobb, Nor S.Ct. does F.2d at 788-89. Pre- Dorton claim he hit Detective order trial detainees are protec- entitled to broader threatening quell a disturbance the securi tion than would be available under house, ty see Eighth of the station Rankin Kle- pretrial Amendment alone because a (5th Cir.1993). Indeed, venhagen, presumed detainee is innocent of crime Dorton’s counsel conceded oral proven guilty until he is after a fair trial or argument summary judg that the record on by knowing voluntary guilty plea. See ment, light Bell, in the 535-36, when read most favorable 441 U.S. at 1872-73. Riley, distinction, believe, demonstrates Detective Dorton This why we is Norman simply cop “a who lost his cool.” See did not Spill- venture to overrule Barre, F.Supp. Indeed, Courville v. Town man. primarily Norman relied (D.Mass.1993) (unprovoked slap may Eighth Amendment cases and did not even only be excused because it resulted Gray. cite relating Norman cited no case injury). de minimis The sole motive for pretrial right detainee’s to be free from Riley’s use of single force here was verbal being force while interrogated. insult to Detective Dorton. We have held rights Because asserts pre- of a consistently provocation that mere verbal trial interrogee, 1983 claim survives justifies never the use of force an officer summary judgment, though even he has not custody. person Miller v. demonstrated the existence of serious or Leathers, Cir.1990) 913 F.2d lasting physical injury.7 (en banc) (inmate), denied, cert. 498 U.S. 111 S.Ct. 112 L.Ed.2d 1100 III. Cobb, United States v. 905 F.2d (4th Cir.1990) recognize We that detainee), (pretrial cert. denied, S.Ct. is, best, solution of crime at a difficult and (1991). requiring arduous task determination and persistence part responsible of all A more fundamental distinction between charged officers duty with the of law en- this case and Norman is the difference be And, certainly, forcement. we do not sought tween the protected. interests to be mean suggest that all dulyA prison convicted protected inmate is suspects witnesses and impermissible. is primarily by Eighth prohi Amendment’s questioning Such undoubtedly is an essen- against bition cruel and punish unusual tial in tool effective law enforcement. Whitley, 327, 106 ments. U.S. S.Ct. at detainee, pretrial by contrast, 1087. A Haynes is Washington, 514-15, protected by both Fifth (1963). Amendment’s protection against compelled must, however, self-incrimina We apply the longstanding tion and the Fourteenth Amendment’s recognized rule Gray and reverse the protection against “excessive force that award to Detective punishment” amounts to course, before trial. Gra- Dorton.8 Of the detective will have a Riley's deposition testimony put and Contrary affidavits suggestion, post to the dissent’s see into issue whether Detective Dorton in fact stuck today our prolif- decision will not "fuel[] a nose, pen Riley's a rip open, threatened to it eration of frivolous lawsuits." We are slapped support argu- then him. reaffirming of its longstanding a up rule that to now summary judgment ment proper, legitimate has not thwarted law enforcement ac- says [say] Indeed, dissent juiy that we "never how a unjustified tivities. "no force in- might conceivably plaintiff worthy find terrogation” of belief.” unquestioned has been the rule in [Riley’s]testimony Post at 121. every "Whether or not one of the five other circuits that have had credibility should be believed is a determination occasion to consider cases like this one. There is that is Spillman, not for us to good make.” why a urged by reason the standard 925 F.2d at 95. That is for trier of fact. unacceptable dissent is interroga- for custodial account, by any an Appellant, is incessant a trier of fact to convince opportunity full replete complainer; the record is with evi- unjustified force used no that he report any of his unbridled resolve to words, dence Dorton will Riley. In other discomfort, physical psychological no mat- “obey[ed] that he to show have the chance trifling, personnel. how to medical In the ter enforcing Spano the law.” See the law while arrest, requested following his he York, months v. New for a stream of medical attention 1205-06, We know ailments, including hangnail, ingrown a inconvenient and discomfit- that trials can be toenail, nose, chill, runny dizzy spells, a trial convinced that a is ing, but we are groin, “knot” his broken skin between his whether required here to determine toes, back, neck, ear, and soreness process were exceeded. of due bounds throat, complained and left thumb. He court is re- judgment of the district losing to soak his foot after he needed versed, for further and the ease is remanded toenail, awake, kept that his cellmate him opinion. proceedings consistent with this pain prevented him from his back REMANDED. REVERSED AND relinquishing his bottom bunk a fellow “only” leg injury. inmate who had suffered WILKINSON, Judge, dissenting: Chief sought authorization to re- He even medical instances when officers There are underwear instead of briefs be- ceive boxer clearly overstep their bounds and must (which thigh of a mole on his medical cause There brought to account. This is not one. staff, examination, after deemed unaffected eases, hand, an action on the other when are undergarments). his choice of against police officers will seri damages Appellant’s psychological list of difficulties integrity of the law ously interfere with the is no less extensive. In his dozens of mental function. This is such a case. enforcement sessions, complained being health he de- much, recognized court find The district years having cry- pressed for several and of that under our recent en ing appropriately day. expressed ing spells once or twice a He Taylor, in Norman v. banc decision fear of harassment other inmates and Cir.1994) (en banc), cert. de teasing found it difficult to deal with their —nied, -, being taunting. frequently reported He of the sheer absence L.Ed.2d discouraged by legal of his de- the course injury required any real the en evidence of faced, fense, potential he the the sentence against plain try summary judgment the of offenses, pos- his and the societal reaction to judgment. tiff. I would affirm its grew outcome of his eventual trial. He sible hearing testimony of certain angry after the I. witnesses, about conflicts be- and he worried summary judgment call of do not The rules family. girlfriend and his More tween his credulity degree embodied the for the of once, urges. suicidal His than he related majority opinion, lest Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 forfeit psychological many complaints and emotional ease entirely gatekeeping its function. This report that “Mr. troubles led examiners to summary judgment. The record is made for will,” Riley and to can turn on tears appellant Riley’s to bear out fails enjoys making ma- suggest that he “rather injury any as a allegation that he suffered get nipulative gestures and threats to atten- fact, In consequence interrogation. his of tion,” deny.” “he did not assessment emerges Riley opposite conclusion —that this, expect injury all of one would perceived has Given at one time or another any once about complained have least every aspect post-arrest of his deten- sense, psychological discomfort suffered physical or except interrogation. In no tion his interrogation. But then, a result of his to have carried his can he be said at Henrico Health Services Administrator demonstrating a constitutional vio- burden of detained, Jail, County appellant was where lation. gees, long marks. as the leave no give to hit interro- so tion: it would license any complaints by Mr. “mental” discomfort. “found no record And that he did not medical or mental health staff counseling to either seek treatment or after the inter- in, to, injury discomfort nose or that, [his] or rogation by indicates even own his ex- allegations.” relates to his shoulders which standards, any psychological treme discom- any record of She also “found no concerns negligible. Riley’s fort was constitutional by alleged related to the threats” Detective claim, result, by as a should be barred Nor- among Riley’s Dorton scores of mental man, which holds that “an excessive force Riley’s testimony, health sessions. own generally claim any should not lie where fact, specifically complained is that he never plaintiff sustained is de minim- any from the incidents he now is.” Id. at 1263.1 (the handcuffing, identifies in this suit not, contends, majority Norman is as the face, threats, pen slap to his and the brought limited claims of excessive force nose). short, Riley compiled has prisoners Eighth convicted under the chronic, singular record as a uninhibited Amendment. While the decision undoubted- yet complained complainer, he never once ly claim, Eighth involved an Amendment about the which he now asserts language its primarily thus refers to that injury. him caused substantial provision, I requirement plain- read its summary judgment rule was devel inju- tiffs demonstrate more than de minimis oped precisely arising with deal claims ry apply to all excessive force actions. appellant’s such a context. than Other own applied Other courts have a de minimis stan- allegations, bald the record contains no evi dard to excessive force actions outside of the indicating any injury dence that he suffered Eighth Amendment, including claims—like interrogation. any If sort from the Riley’s by pretrial detainees under —asserted thing, Riley’s bringing penchant process the due clause. See Jackson Cul- slightest physical psychological discomfort bertson, (5th Cir.1993) (per 984 F.2d 699 staff, to the attention of medical and the curiam). Court, moreover, Supreme has conspicuous complaints absence of such supported requirement such process in due suggests regarding interrogation, cases, commenting that while “the state can- any injury possibly now could not he asserts physically punish not hold and an individual caused ac have been Dorton’s except in process accordance with due interrogation. appel tions Since law,” is, course, “[t]here a de minimis lant has failed to come forward with suffi imposition level of with which Constitu- cient of an essential evidence element of his tion Ingraham is not concerned.” Wright, claim, summary judgment properly en 651, 674, 1401, 1414, Corp. tered him. See Celotex v. Ca trett, 2548, 2552, Holmes, White v. Any suggestion contrary to the in (8th Cir.1994) 277, F.3d (requiring 280-81 Spillman, Cir.1991), 925 F.2d 90 cannot entry summary judgment of in excessive apply case, to the circumstances of this force action where no evidence connected where indisputably the facts and record dem- of). complained to incident any injury onstrate that any and suffered force used was no assuming Even more than de minimis . that did suffer some Otherwise, physical psychological injury allegation form of or the barest of excessive interrogation, unquestion- interrogation, the force an producing even if minimis, ably resulting and no confession only de thus insufficient under and in some 1259, (and Taylor, give Norman v. form psychological of discomfort even By wholly rise to an excessive action. unsupported by force his own the factual rec- account, ord), any physical contact automatically lasted less than would survive thirty primarily seconds and caused him proceed and to trial. 56 is Rule majority dissenting posi- opposed The that the psychological contends injury. I would police give tion "would a license to hit interro- apply any type a de minimis threshold to of gees, long police so as the leave no marks.” This injury, physical psychological. whether or physical is incorrect. Nowhere do I insist on as principal lips.” it from his own Culombe v. Connecti easily of the so eluded. “One not cut, 582, 1860, summary judgment rule is to 81 S.Ct. purposes of (1961) factually dispose unsupported Frankfurter, (opinion isolate defenses, ... it should be J.). claims or offsetting important Yet this concern is way it to accom- interpreted in a that allows one, equally significant acknowledged “the Celotex, 477 U.S. at plish purpose.” this police questioning need for as a tool for the claim, 323-24, Appellant’s at 2553. 106 S.Ct. effective enforcement of criminal laws.” understood, square- court falls as the district Bustamonte, Schneckloth v. U.S. category. ly within this 2041, 2046, 93 S.Ct. 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). There is a balance to be struck majority’s response this Finally, interests, between these two Moran v. Bur majority in- claim is instructive. The never bine, jury might conceivably find forms us how a simply says plaintiff worthy of It 89 L.Ed.2d 410 one that “cannot be

this belief. any go simply by wholly subordinating must to trial over bald assertion. resolved one we majority disputes the rec- opposing never endless set of considerations to the other.” complaints. It never plaintiffs Culombe, ord of trivial 367 U.S. at 81 S.Ct. at 1870. plaintiff sought medical atten- suggests that, however, just majority opinion does any arising from sort for harm tion unnecessarily ushering appellant’s meritless interrogation. It even contends never expense claim to trial at the of effective law plaintiff suffered more than de minimis enforcement. only injury. It psychological already important There are two checks police brutality wheels out stock rhetoric of tipping place prevent the balance from too position. supra p. 117 support of its See government in the interro- far on the side of (discussing suspect’s “being smacked gation setting. The first is the well-estab- (such around”); supra give n. “would rule process prohibits rule that due use lished long police interrogees, hit so a license to through of confessions obtained coercion. marks”). general no leave Such Arizona, See, Mincey e.g., applicable and some- rhetoric is sometimes Jackson v. events, poor times not. In all it is a substi- Denno, par- discerning at whether a tute for look avail- The second is the deserving ticular case is of a trial.2 ability damages action where is of a there

II. evidence, just than un- some concrete more unjustified injury at supported allegations, of proceed to Allowing suits of this sort to law officials. Both the hands of enforcement trial, despite despite Norman and Rule extracted confession and evi- of these —an will visit harmful effects objective injury provide indication dence general. process and on law enforcement — Neither, however, pres- excess. is sure, process requires govern- To be due Appellant made no state- ent here. produce against a defen- ment to evidence officers, interest his interro- “by independent ment dant labor of its And, above, there is no expedient forcing gation. as discussed simple, cruel statements, believing his claim majority's in other the defendant’s 2. The reliance on five cases one,” 8, pointed gun head supra had at his are "like this n. is circuits that interrogation. The three other cases misplaced this cases are not at all "like —those inapposite. the noncon are Two reaffirm involved a factual record that so one.” None manifestly proposition coer plaintiff's allega that use of unlawful troversial calls into doubt attempting viola- exposes insubstantiality obtain a confession is of his cion in tions and Brenner, case, process. F.3d Teeples, Weaverv. 40 v. 753 F.2d 840 tive of due claims. In one Rex denied, 967, 527, (2d Cir.1994); (10th Cir.), Cooper Dupnik, v. 963 474 U.S. 106 S.Ct. 536 cert. denied, 1220, (9th Cir.), 332, (1985), taped transcripts cert. of F.2d 1244-45 (1992). 407, 953, suspect L.Ed.2d 332 interrogation divulged had 113 S.Ct. that the another, jury legal validity in attorney. of repeatedly The third involved asked for an structions, (7th Cir.1989), showing necessary to not the factual May, cert. Wilkins v. 872 F.2d 190 Reed, denied, summary judgment. Ware 110 S.Ct. survive 493 U.S. 1983). judge suppressed Cir. L.Ed.2d 752 the district stead, injury remedy from the interro- exists to real abuses law evidence he suffered anything, officials, if the record refutes gation; enforcement documented the sort such claim. sorely lacking of evidence of that is message here. This was the central of our By requirement with dispensing opinion Taylor, in Norman v. 25 F.3d at relying only injury and on bald as- requirement the reason for its injury, majority psychological sertions plaintiffs alleging excessive force show more police interroga- subjects every instance of injury. message than de minimis This is a Every suit. tion to a section 1983 instance my colleagues is lost on fine in the psycholog- police questioning entails some majority.3 judgment I would affirm the subject. ical its That is the discomfort for the district court. very interrogation, and also to nature of purpose. Consequently, some extent its if

plaintiffs can survive only flimsy allegations psycho- based here, logical type presented trauma of the completely empty Rule will be a vessel least, this context. At the some other evi- injury, psychological dence of such as a doc- staff, complaint umented to medical should Otherwise, required. prospect of at- America, UNITED STATES of torney’s fees excessive force actions will Plaintiff-Appellee, produce lawyer’s day, fueling prolif- field alleging eration of frivolous lawsuits in- some police question- distinct form of Eugene LANDRUM, Richard ing. Defendant-Appellant. interroga The result will be that effective No. 95-6043. tion, a vital tool in arsenal of law enforce Moran, ment, see 106 S.Ct. Appeals, United States Court of substantially compromised will be as Fourth Circuit. struggle to prospect officers avoid the Argued May 1996. damages Constitution, of a action. The moreover, nothing will become more than a Aug. Decided filing dignitary vehicle for tort actions against state law enforcement officials. The process good

due clause is not a code of manners, however; nor is it a substitute all, “[ajlthough

state tort law. After ‘the touching anger least another is a bat tery,’ it is not a violation of a constitutional right actionable under 42 U.S.C. 1983.” Glick, (2d

Johnson v. Cir.) J.) (citation (Friendly, omitted), cert. denied, (1973). Constitution, in- threshold,” message This high requires is also the of a showing case cited one that "mis- majority supposedly support position, of its person conduct that a reasonable would find so Cir.1989), May, Wilkinsv. denied, 872 F.2d 190 rt. beyond proper police procedure ce the norm of conscience, to shock the and that is calculated to case, In that the Seventh merely momentary anxiety, induce not fear or inquiry Circuit observed that the "relevant is not suffering.” (emphasis but severe mental Id. add- interrogations freedom from unlawful but free ed). This, plainly, is not all the view of the bodily dom from severe or mental harm inflicted were, majority. appellant’s If it claim could not interrogation.” the course of an Id. at 195 possibly summary judgment. survive added). (emphasis Plaintiffs thus must "a cross

Case Details

Case Name: Charles Richard Riley v. James M. Dorton

Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Date Published: Aug 16, 1996

Citation: 93 F.3d 113

Docket Number: 94-7120

Court Abbreviation: 4th Cir.