Charles R. HENDRIX, Appellee, v. Larry NORRIS, Director, Arkansas Department of Correction, Appellant.
No. 95-3292.
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
Submitted March 11, 1996. Decided April 22, 1996.
81 F.3d 805
Before MAGILL, HEANEY, and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judges.
D. There are two remaining, interrelated issues—the Union‘s contention that the district court should have ordered Fiedler‘s reinstatement, and Champion‘s claim that the court‘s alternative remedy of $495,000 in front pay was excessive. They warrant more extensive comment because of the need for a new trial.
The equitable remedy of reinstatement is left to the district court‘s discretion. Tatum v. Frisco Transp. Co., 626 F.2d 55, 60 (8th Cir.1980). Here, thе court found that the relationship between Fiedler and Champion was acrimonious and that Champion had presented a legitimate and substantial business justification for opposing reinstatement. Substantial hostility, above that normally incident to litigation, is a sound basis for denying reinstatement. See Brooks v. Woodline Motor Freight, Inc., 852 F.2d 1061, 1066 (8th Cir.1988). Moreover, the Union failed to prove that Fiedler was fired because of Union activities, so reinstatement was not needed to avoid a chilling effect on оther union members. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Fiedler‘s claim for reinstatement. However, the passage of time may soften the most acrimonious of relationships, and the discretion to reinstаte must be exercised on a specific trial record. Thus, the reinstatement issue is not foreclosed on remand.
An equitable award of front pay is generally appropriate when reinstatement must be denied. Williams v. Valentec Kisco, Inc., 964 F.2d 723, 730 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1014, 113 S.Ct. 635, 121 L.Ed.2d 566 (1992). In this case, Fiеdler was awarded front pay for twenty-four years, until he reaches retirement age. An award of front pay until retirement ignores the plaintiff‘s duty to mitigate damages and the district court‘s corresponding obligation to estimate the financial impact of future mitigation. See Dominic v. Consolidated Edison Co., 822 F.2d 1249, 1258 (2d Cir.1987). Instead of warranting a lifetime of front pay, Fiedler‘s relatively young age should improve his future opportunities to mitigate through other employment.
Moreover, the Union cites no authоrity for an award of twenty-four years of front pay, whereas a number of cases have rejected far shorter awards as improperly speculative. See Hybert v. Hearst Corp., 900 F.2d 1050, 1056-57 (7th Cir.1990) (five years was too speculative); Goss v. Exxon Office Sys. Co., 747 F.2d 885, 890 (3d Cir.1984) (affirming four months of front pay because a longer periоd would be speculative); Snow v. Pillsbury Co., 650 F.Supp. 299, 300 (D.Minn.1986) (nine-year award reduced to three years). For these reasons, although we need not decide the issue because of the need for a new trial, we express grave doubt that an award of $495,000 in front pay could be upheld.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is reversed and the case is remanded for a new trial.
Thomas L. Williams, argued, Hot Springs, AR, for appellee.
MAGILL, Circuit Judge.
Charles R. Hendrix brought this
I.
On December 2, 1991, Hendrix pled guilty in Arkansas state court to оne count of breaking and entering, two counts of burglary, and one count of robbery. In accordance with a plea agreement, Hendrix was sentenced to concurrent six- and twenty-year sentences. On January 23, 1992, Hendrix
Hendrix began serving his state sentences. In July 1992, Hendrix was told by the Arkansas Department of Corrections that he was to serve his federal sentence consecutively to his state sentences, and that the Federal Bureau of Prisons would not accept him until he had served his Arkansas sentence. Hendrix moved to withdraw his state guilty plea, alleging that the state had breached his plea agreеment because his federal sentence was not concurrent to his state sentences. Hendrix‘s motion was denied in state court, and he did not appeal.
Hendrix brought the instant action in July 1994, again alleging that the state had breaсhed his plea agreement. Following an evidentiary hearing, the district court held that, while Hendrix had failed to pursue all available state postconviction relief, it would exercise its “equitable power to look beyond а state procedural bar and proceed to the merits of a habeas corpus petition.” Mem. Op. at 7 (quoting McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 490, 111 S.Ct. 1454, 1468, 113 L.Ed.2d 517 (1991)). The district court then found that Hendrix had entered his guilty plea in reliance on the plea agreement that his stаte and federal sentences would run concurrently, and that the plea agreement had been effectively breached by the consecutive running of the sentences. This breach invalidated Hendrix‘s guilty plea and entitled him to rеlief. The district court ordered the Director to release Hendrix from state custody to the custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons in order for Hendrix to serve his federal sentence. Upon the completion of his federal sentence, Hendrix was to be returned to state custody, to serve the rest of his state sentences.
II.
When considering a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, we review the district court‘s legal conclusions de novo. Dodd v. Nix, 48 F.3d 1071, 1073 (8th Cir.1995).
We find nо grounds for a successful habeas action against the state in this case. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Hendrix pled guilty to several serious criminal charges, and received a far lighter sentence than he might have reсeived had his case gone to trial. See Appellant‘s App. at 66 (sixty-six-year possible sentence). To date, Hendrix has served only a fraction of his six-and twenty-year concurrent sentences in state custody. Rather than breаching its agreement with Hendrix, the state scrupulously honored the plea bargain: the state requested that Hendrix serve his state sentences concurrently with his federal sentence, and the state court entered such an order. Thаt federal prosecutors did not make a similar request in federal court does not mean that the state breached its plea agreement; “state prosecutors cannot bind federal prosecutors without the lattеr‘s knowledge and consent.” United States v. Fuzer, 18 F.3d 517, 520 (7th Cir.1994). Neither is the state court responsible for the federal court‘s imposition of a consecutive sentence: the discretion of a federal sentencing court cannot be limited by a state сourt‘s judgment. See United States v. Adair, 826 F.2d 1040, 1041 (11th Cir.1987) (per curiam) (federal court could impose sentence consecutive to state sentence, although state court had imposed a concurrent sentence).
We disagree with the district court‘s сonclusion that Hendrix‘s guilty plea in the state court was invalid. We assume, without accepting, that the state court‘s apparent failure to warn Hendrix that the federal
III.
The problem with Hendrix‘s sentences, if a problem indeed exists, lies with his federal sentence. While it is clear that the state court intended Hendrix to serve conсurrent state and federal sentences, the intent of the federal sentencing court is uncertain. The district court made no mention of whether Hendrix‘s federal sentence was to run concurrently with his state sentence. Pursuant to
We are concerned, however, that such an assumption may work an injustice in this case. There is some evidence that federal prosecutors also agreed to seek concurrent state аnd federal sentences, see Mem. Op. at 8, and the federal sentencing court was apparently misinformed by Hendrix‘s public defender that problems with concurrency of sentences could be dealt with by the state court. Id. at 9.
Because Hendrix has not yet begun to serve his federal sentence, the proper means of challenging it is to petition for a writ of error coram nobis against the proper federal defendants. See Zabel v. United States Attorney, 829 F.2d 15, 17, (8th Cir.1987) (per curiam). We therefore vacate the district court‘s grant of a writ of habeas corpus, and remand this case to the district court for consideration as a petition for a writ of error coram nobis.
HEANEY, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
I respectfully dissent for the reаsons stated by the district court. Although it is my hope that a writ of error coram nobis will serve the same ultimate purpose as the writ of habeas corpus granted by the district court, I believe that the remand—except with directions to remove the federal detainer—is an unnecessary step. In light of the prosecutor‘s agreement and all the parties’ expressed intent, I believe the interests of justice would best be served by the approach taken by the district court.