The plaintiff, The Charles Parker Company, brought this action against the defendants, The Silver City Crystal Company and Joseph N. DePaola, claiming damages for defamation. The trial court has reserved the cause upon stipulated facts for the advice of this court. The questions propounded which we deem it necessary to answer are contained in a footnote. 1
The stipulated fаcts are as follows: The plaintiff is a Connecticut corporation engaged in the *608 manufacturing business in Meriden. The defendant Silver City Crystal Company, hereinafter referred to as the defendant company, is a Connecticut corporation and owns and operates, under a license issued by the federal communications commission, radio station WMMW in Meriden. Its station has a frequency sufficiently strong to make its signals heard throughout Connecticut and in some of the surrounding states. The defendant Joseph N. DePaola was, on November 29, 1949, the legally qualified candidate on the Democratic ticket for the office of mayor of Meriden in an election to be held on the first Tuesday after the first Monday of December, 1949. On November 29, 1949, DePaola broadcast from the radio station of the defendant company a political speech in which he said, concerning the plaintiff: “This famous firm is now ninety per cent out of production and is up for sale. How many jobs will disappear? The staggering total of one thousand.” On November 30, 1949, the plaintiff gave written notice to the defendant company that the statement made by DePaola was false and demanded а retraction, which the defendant company, in writing, refused to make. The plaintiff’s demand was published in the Meriden papers and came to the attention of DePaola. In a political broadcast on the evening of November 30,1949, from the radio station of the defendant company, DePaola, referring to his statement of the previous day, stated: “I stand by what I said in yesterday’s radio brоadcast.” The statements made by DePaola were read from prepared manuscripts which had been submitted to the defendant company at least twenty-four hours before each broadcast. Since the institution of this action, the plaintiff has unsuccessfully demanded; in writing, a retraction from DePaola. *609 The statements broadcast by DePaola from the radio station of the defendant company, the plaintiff’s demand upon the defendant company for a retraction, and its refusal were published in the Meriden morning and evening papers, which, at that time, had a combined circulation of more than 20,000.
On the days when the alleged defamation was made, the plaintiff employed upward of 326 persons, many of whom were disturbed about the possibility of becoming unemployed. The statements made by DePaola from the radio station of the defendant company came to the attention of bankers, suppliers and customers with whom the plaintiff was doing business, as well as of Dun and Bradstreet, a credit rating firm with a Connecticut office in Hartford. Although the plaintiff was subjected to expense in instituting and prosecuting this litigation, it incurred no special damages excеpt as appears in the pleadings and stipulation. In an amendment to the complaint the plaintiff alleged as special damage that the language used would reasonably convey the impression that the plaintiff, because of lack of managerial skill or business integrity, had suffered a 90 per cent reduction in its volume of business, would be unable to continue in business and was up for sale and that 1000 employees had lost or would, lose their jobs; that the language used tended to lower the plaintiff’s trade reputation, thereby adversely affecting its business gains, alienating its customers, endangering its labor relations and depressing its credit, all to its harm in its business operations. DePaola, in making the alleged defamatory broadcasts, believed and relied upon statements made to him by members of a political advisory committee, consisting of four lawyers and two *610 accountants, and others, among whom was the treasurer of a small loan company, who, in turn, had relied upon a news item published in a trade journal.
In the course of the mayoralty campaign, both Republican and Democratic town committees bought radio time for political speeches over the facilities of the defendant company. No officer or employee of the plaintiff was a candidate for public office or made any speeches or public appearances in behalf of any candidate during the campaign. When the alleged defamatory broadcasts were made, § 315 of the federal Communications Act of 1934 was in full force and effect as follows: “If any licensee shall permit any person who is a legally qualified candidate for any public office to use a broadcasting station, he shall afford equal opportunities to all other such candidates for that office in the use of such broadcasting station, and the [Federal Communications] Commission shall make rules and regulations to carry this provision into еffect: Provided, That such licensee shall have no power of censorship over the material broadcast under the provisions of this section. No obligation is hereby imposed upon any licensee to allow the use of its station by any such candidate.” 48 Stat. 1088, 47 U.S.C. §315 (1946). The defendants were not motivated by any feeling of animosity or ill will toward the plaintiff or any of its people. They made no attеmpt to investigate the verity of the statements made. At the time of the broadcast, the plaintiff was not 90 per cent out of production and was not up for sale, and 1000 employees did not subsequently lose their jobs.
The first question is whether the acts complained of are to be tested by the law of libel or the law of slander. The statements complained of were read by DePaola from a prepared manuscript and were
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broadcast by the facilities of the defendant company. If the statements were defamatory, the acts in question constitute libel.
Sorensen
v.
Wood,
Reading a defamatory letter in the presence of others has been held to be libel. Snyder v. Andrews, *612 6 Barb. (N.Y.) 43, 46; Forrester v. Tyrrell, 9 T. L.R. 257, 57 J.P. 532 (C.A.), cited with approval in Hartmann v. Winchell, supra, 299. The basis of the distinction between libel and slander is the written or printed word or passage. Having been reduced to permanent form and published, the written or рrinted word has greater capabilities of harm. We can see no difference between the reading of defamatory-words from a prepared manuscript to a group of people within the presence of the reader, which constitutes libel, and reading defamatory words from a prepared manuscript to be broadcast by the facilities of a radio station. The latter simply carries the defamatory words farther because the defamer has used a medium for dissemination which reaches listeners far beyond the ordinary limits of the human voice. The law of libel is applicable to the case at bar.
Question 3 asks whether the alleged defamatory statement is actionable without proof of special damage: in short, was it libelous per sе? When a libel is expressed in clear and unambiguous terms, the question whether it is libelous per se is one of law for the court.
Proto
v.
Bridgeport Herald Corporation,
The cases of
Reporters’ Assn.
v.
Sun Printing & Publishing Assn.,
Having concluded that the statement which was made and the circumstances surrounding its making are to be examined in the light of the law concerning libel and that the statement was not libelous per se, we come to the decisive question in the case. Are the defendants shielded from liability on the ground of privilege? The defendant company in its answer alleges that the “utterance constituted fair and reasonable comment in bringing to the attention of the voters of said City of Meriden the economic and financial status of the municipality and as such, said statements referred to were privileged.” The alleged defamatory statement, as previously outlined, was contained in a speech broadcast from a radio station in an election campaign by a candidate for office. It has been stipulated that neither of the defendants was moved by personal animosity or ill will towards the plaintiff. That is equivalent to saying that they both acted without malice. It is fair to presume, unless the contrary be shown, that а candidate for elecdive office and a radio station which broadcasts his political appeal are acting in good faith, the one to show why he should be chosen to better serve the public welfare, the other to make available its facilities to the respective candidates so that the electorate may be informed concerning their purposes and qualifications. Any political campaign is a
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process of debate and appeal publicly conducted in a way to bring knowledge to the voters to assist them in making a choice on election day. It is a time-honored American institution indispensable to our way of life. Courts must be careful not to permit the law of libel and slander to encroach unwarrantably upon the field of free public debate.
Sweeney
v.
Patterson,
There are two facets to the defense of privilege. The occasion must be one of privilege, and the privilege must not be abused. Whether the occasion is one of privilege is a question of law.
Atwater
v.
Morning News Co.,
The plaintiff concedes by its stipulation that there was no animosity or ill will involved, and hence no malice in fact. It argues, however, that
*616
even if made in good faith, misstatements of fact are not the “fair comment” which an occasion of privilege allows. See Harper, Torts, § 251; 53 C. J.S. 211, § 130. There is authority to support this proposition. Harper, Torts, p. 536; Prosser, Torts, p. 839. On the other hand, some courts have held, upon what appeals to us as sound reasons, that privilege extends to misstatements of fact if made in good faith, without malice and under the honest belief that they are true.
Coleman
v.
MacLennan,
The plaintiff contends further that the immunity
*617
of privilege extends only to matters of public interest and that the affairs of a private corporation do not fall within this category. In his political appeal, DePaola was speaking about the loss of employment by the removal from Mеriden of businesses which furnished that employment. Most certainly loss of employment is a matter of public interest. In
Coleman
v.
MacLennan,
supra, the court states (p. 734): “[I]t must be borne in mind that the correct rule, whatever it is, must govern in cases other than those involving candidates for office. It must apply to all officers and agents of government —municipal, state and national; to the management of all public institutions — educational, charitable and penal; to the conduct of all corporate enterprises affected with a public interest — transportation, banking, insurance, and to innumerable other subjects involving the public welfare.” We accept this as the correct viewpoint.
Flanagan
v.
Nicholson Publishing Co.,
There are a number of occasions to which the rule of privilege obtains. In the instant case, the occasion was the presentation of an appeal to the voters in an election campaign and the presentation of facts which legitimately pertained to a proper issue in the campaign. The immunity of privilege is lost if the defendants can be shown to have made the claimed defamatory utterances for a purpose other than that for which the immunity was designed to afford protection.
Moore
v.
Stevenson,
As to the defendant company, it was under a legal requirement to permit the broadcast. Power to censоr the script was denied it. 48 Stat. 1088, 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1946); Donnelly, “Defamation by Radio: A Reconsideration,” 34 Iowa L. Rev. 12,
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30, 38 n.99; note, 61 Yale L. J. 87, 89. There is no reason why it should not be accorded the same qualified privilege as DePaola. Unless it could be shown that the defendant company maliciously permitted its facilities to be used, or that it knew that the facts stated were false and yet allowed the broadcast, or otherwise acted in bad faith, it too is shielded by the privilege.
Josephson
v.
Knickerbocker Broadcasting Co.,
We answer the questions submitted as follows: (1) By the law of libel; (3)(a) No; (4)(a) Yes; (4) (b) Yes. The view we have taken of the case makes it unnecessary to answer the remaining questions.
No costs will be taxed in this court to any party.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
Notes
“(1) Whether the statement (complained of as defamatory in this case, made under the circumstances disclosed in the stipulation) set forth in paragraph No. 4 of the stipulation, is to be tested by the law of slander or the law of libel.
“(3) If the law of libel is applicable: (a) whether said statement is actionable without special damage ....
“(4) Whether the circumstances of this case disclose an occasion of privilege: (a) on the part of the defendant, Joseph N. DePaola; (b) on the part of the defendant, Silver City Crystal Company . . . .”
The constitution of Connecticut provides: “Every citizen may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that liberty.” Conn. Const. Art. I § 5.