CHARLES J. VACANTI, M.D., INC., et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
STATE COMPENSATION INSURANCE FUND et al., Defendants and Respondents.
Supreme Court of California.
*569 Howrey & Simon, Howrey Simon Arnold & White, John E. McDermott, Philip G. Grant and Keri R. Curtis, Los Angeles, for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Catherine I. Hanson, San Francisco, and Aynah V. Askansas, for California Medical Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants.
David Bryan Leonard, Los Angeles, for California Society of Industrial Medicine and Surgery, Inc., as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Paul R. Gant, Sacramento, for California Applicants' Attorneys Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Kroll & Tract, Kroll, Rubin & Fiorella, Woolls & Peer, Paul Woolls and Gregory B. Scher, Los Angeles, for Defendants and Respondents Fremont Compensation Insurance Company, Fremont Pacific Insurance Company, Fremont Indemnity Company, Pacific Compensation Insurance Company, Beaver Insurance Company and Unicare Insurance Company.
Hancock, Rothert & Bunshoft, Ray L. Wong, San Francisco, and Vipal J. Patel, Los Angeles, for Defendant and Respondent Republic Indemnity Company of America,
Richard A. Krimen, Charles W. Savage, San Francisco; Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton, Pierce T. Selwood and Frank Falzetta, Los Angeles, for Defendant and Respondent State Compensation Insurance Fund.
Heggeness & Sweet and Clifford D. Sweet III, San Diego, for Defendant and Respondent Superior National Insurance Company.
Barger & Wolen and Martin E. Rosen, Los Angeles, for Defendant and Respondent Pacific Rim Assurance Company.
Kern and Wooley, Susan T. Olson and Randy L. Rezen, Los Angeles, for Defendants and Respondents Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company, Liberty Mutual Insurance Company and Liberty Insurance Corporation.
Manatt, Phelps & Phillips and Marc P. Goodman, for Defendant and Respondent Unicare Insurance Company.
Ku, Fong, Larsen & Chen, Milam & Larsen, Paul A. Larsen and Jeffrey Milam, for Defendants and Respondents California Indemnity Insurance Company, California Casualty Management Company, California Casualty Indemnity Exchange, California Casualty Insurance Company, California Casualty General Insurance Company and California Casualty & Fire Insurance Company.
Rossbacher & Associates, Henry H. Rossbacher and James S. Cahill, Los Angeles, for Defendant and Respondent Continental Casualty Company.
Wildman, Harrold, Allen & Dixon, Michael L. McCluggage, Michael R. Blankshain, Douglas R. Carlson, Chicago, IL, and Kelly L. Murray, for Defendants and Respondents American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Company, American Motorists Insurance Company, American Protection Insurance Company, Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Company, Continental Casualty Company, CNA Casualty of California, Valley Forge Insurance Company, Transcontinental Insurance Company and Transportation Insurance Company.
Burns, Ammirato, Palumbo, Milam & Baronian, Jeffrey Milam, Pasadena; Lewis, D'Amato, Brisbois & Bisgaard and Joseph K. Hegedus, Los Angeles, for Defendant and Respondent California Indemnity Insurance Company.
Charton, Vermes & Rovenger, Lloyd A. Charton, Santa Ana; Benjamin, Lugosi & Benjamin and Antoinette S. Waller, for Defendant and Respondent California Compensation Insurance Company.
*570 John M. Rea, Anthony Mischel, San Francisco, and Stella L. Owens-Murrell, Los Angeles, for the Department of Industrial Relations of the State of California as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents.
Finnegan, Marks & Hampton, Michael A. Marks and Ellen Sims Langille, San Francisco, for California Workers' Compensation Institute, American Insurance Association and Association of California Insurance Companies as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents.
Kegel, Tobin & Truce, Encino, Theodore C. Hanf and Robert R. Wills, for Californians for Compensation Reform, California Chamber of Commerce, California Manufacturers Association, California Self-Insureds Association, California Small Business Association, California State Association of Counties, California Grocers Association, California Sheet Metal and Air Conditioning National Association, Western Growers Association, National Council of Self-Insurers, Employers Group, American Stores, Inc., American Freightways, Longs Drug Stores, Inc., and Coast Foundry and Manufacturing Company as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents.
BROWN, J.
This case contains a new twist on the seemingly endless litigation over the scope of workers' compensation exclusivity. Unlike the typical case where an employee wishes to sue his or her employer or workers' compensation insurance carrier, this case involves a group of medical providers that wish to sue a group of workers' compensation insurers. In their novel complaint, the medical providers allege the insurers conspired to put them out of business by intentionally mishandling their lien claims before the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB) and seek only to recover the damage to their businesses. We now consider whether the exclusive remedy provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act (WCA) preempt the statutory and tort claims asserted by these medical providers and conclude that these provisions bar some claims but not others.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
Because "[t]his case comes to us after the sustaining of a general demurrer . . ., we accept as true all the material allegations of the complaint." (Shoemaker v. Myers (1990)
Plaintiffs are (1) licensed medical groups that provided medical-legal services to employees with workers' compensation claims, and (2) medical management companies under contract to the medical groups.[2] To provide these services, plaintiffs employed or contracted with physicians to treat and evaluate employees injured in the workplace. After promptly paying these physicians, plaintiffs would seek compensation from the workers' compensation insurance carrier of the employee's employer.
Defendants are workers' compensation insurance carriers.[3] At a meeting in 1991, *571 defendants decided to put plaintiffs out of business by delaying payment or refusing to pay for services rendered by plaintiffs to injured workers. As part of their scheme, defendants agreed to keep the meeting secret and to deny the existence of their plan to eliminate plaintiffs.
In subsequent meetings, defendants discussed strategies and distributed "hit lists" of targeted medical providers, including plaintiffs. Reminiscent of the methods used by Great Benefit Insurance Company, the villain in the John Grisham thriller, The Rainmaker (Doubleday, 1995), defendants developed procedures for delaying or avoiding payment to plaintiffs using "false, fraudulent and frivolous objections." Defendants incorporated these procedures into their claims manuals and training protocols. Defendants also misled plaintiffs into believing they would promptly pay all valid lien claims. Meanwhile, they publicly accused plaintiffs of being "fraud mills" and advised other insurance carriers not to pay plaintiffs' claims.
Due to the "no pay" or "slow pay" tactics of defendants, plaintiffs suffered heavy business losses. Because plaintiffs promptly paid the treating physician even if they failed to receive timely compensation, plaintiffs were especially susceptible to a disruption in cash flow. Not surprisingly, defendants' tactics were quite effective, as "the average time from billing to payment rose dramatically" and "the percentage collected [by plaintiffs] of the amount billed steadily declined." These tactics eventually forced plaintiffs out of business, and plaintiffs "now exist only to collect outstanding accounts receivable."
Plaintiffs filed suit against defendants, alleging: (1) abuse of process; (2) fraud; (3) violations of the Cartwright Act (Bus. & Prof.Code, § 16700 et seq.); (4) violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) (18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)); (5) conspiracy to violate RICO (id., § 1962(d)); (6) intentional and negligent interference with ongoing businesses; (7) intentional and negligent interference with contractual and prospective economic relations; and (8) violations of the unfair competition law (UCL) (Bus. & Prof.Code, § 17200 et seq.). Plaintiffs based their claims on defendants' alleged scheme to wrongfully delay or avoid payment on plaintiffs' lien claims and sought to recover the damage to their businesses. In doing so, plaintiffs declined to seek recovery of any amount owed on their individual lien claims against defendants.
Defendants filed a demurrer to plaintiffs' first amended complaint, alleging, among other things, that the exclusive remedy provisions of the WCA bar plaintiffs' claims. The first trial court judge overruled the demurrer on exclusivity grounds, but dismissed with leave to amend on other grounds. After plaintiffs *572 filed a second amended complaint, defendants filed another demurrer, again alleging that workers' compensation exclusivity bars plaintiffs' claims. The same judge overruled the demurrer again and held that "[t]his is not an action to adjudicate medical liens in Worker's Compensation cases" and plaintiffs'"use of the liens does not impinge on the exclusive jurisdiction of the Worker's Compensation Appeals Board."
After the first judge retired, a new judge took over. Two defendants subsequently added to the complaint filed a demurrer, contending once again that plaintiffs could only recover the remedies provided by the workers' compensation system. After plaintiffs amended their complaint a third time, the second judge sustained the demurrer solely on exclusivity grounds. Concluding that "the gravamen of the complaints is . . . delay or refusal to pay medical liens," the judge held that "exclusive jurisdiction is with the WCAB."
Plaintiffs appealed. The Court of Appeal affirmed for the reasons cited in its unpublished opinion in FWHC Medical Group v. CNA Casualty of California (June 18, 1998, B113493), a companion case with identical allegations and issues.[4] Specifically, the court concluded that (1) section 5300 of the Labor Code[5] establishes that the WCAB has exclusive jurisdiction over plaintiffs' claims; (2) defendants did not act outside their proper roles as insurers as understood in Unruh v. Truck Insurance Exchange (1972)
We granted review to determine whether the claims asserted by these medical providers, alleging that various workers' compensation insurers conspired to intentionally mishandle plaintiffs' lien claims in order to drive them out of business, are barred by workers' compensation exclusivity.
II. Discussion
Article XIV, section 4 of the California Constitution gives the Legislature "plenary power . . . to create, and enforce a complete system of workers' compensation." Pursuant to this authority, the Legislature enacted the WCAa comprehensive statutory scheme governing compensation given to California employees for injuries incurred in the course and scope of their employment. (§ 3201 et seq.)
Under this statutory scheme, an employee injured in the workplace may request workers' compensation benefits by delivering a claim form to the employer within 30 days of the injury. (See §§ 5400, 5401.) Benefits include compensation for medical treatment and other services "reasonably required to cure or relieve [the employee] from the effects of the injury." (§ 4600; see also § 3207.) The employee may also obtain compensation for medical-legal evaluations necessary to establish his or her entitlement to benefits. (§ 4621.) If the employer's workers' compensation insurer accepts coverage, then the insurer substitutes for the employer and assumes liability for benefits owed to the employee under the WCA. (§§ 3755, 3757.)
Ordinarily, the insurer must pay all medical or medical-legal bills of an injured employee within 60 days of receiving the bill. (§§ 4603.2, subd. (b) 4622, subd. (a).) If the insurer, however, contests the *573 bill, then the insurer has to pay the contested portion of the bill only after the WCAB orders payment. (See §§ 4603.2, subd. (b), 4622, subd. (a).)
Medical providers that treat employee injuries covered by the WCA may file a lien claim for the costs of their services directly with the WCAB. (§§ 4903, 5300.) Any such provider is a "party in interest" to the WCAB proceeding (Independence Indent. Co. v. Indus. Acc. Com. (1935)
The underlying premise behind this statutorily created system of workers' compensation is the "`compensation bargain.' " (Shoemaker, supra,
To effectuate this theoretical bargain, the Legislature enacted several provisions limiting the remedies available for injuries covered by the WCA (the exclusive remedy provisions). (See Shoemaker, supra,
Nonetheless, we glean several guiding principles from the case law. In determining whether exclusivity bars a cause of action against an employer or insurer, courts initially determine whether the alleged injury falls within the scope of the exclusive remedy provisions. Where the alleged injury is "collateral to or derivative of an injury compensable by the exclusive remedies of the WCA, a cause of action predicated on that injury may be subject to the exclusivity bar. (Snyder v. Michael's Stores, Inc. (1997)
If the alleged injury falls within the scope of the exclusive remedy provisions, then courts consider whether the alleged acts or motives that establish the elements of the cause of action fall outside the risks encompassed within the compensation bargain. "[I]n some exceptional circumstances the employer is not free from liability at law for his intentional acts even if the resulting injuries to his employees are compensable under workers' compensation." (Johns-Manville Products Corp. v. Superior Court (1980)
With these principles in mind, we conclude that, while the alleged injury falls within the scope of the exclusive remedy provisions, some of the alleged acts and motives do not. Thus, we bar plaintiffs' *574 abuse of process and fraud claims on exclusivity grounds, but not their Cartwright Act and RICO claims. We also bar in part and allow in part plaintiffs' tortious interference and UCL claims.
A. The Alleged Injury
The starting point of our analysis is the alleged injury underlying plaintiffs' claims. This injury is collateral to or derivative of a personal "injury sustained and arising out of the course of employment" (a compensable injury). (Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection Dist. (1987)
Because workers' compensation exclusivity is statutory in nature, we begin with the pertinent statutory provisions. (See American Psychometric Consultants, Inc. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1995)
The Legislature has extended the protection of these exclusive remedy provisions to workers' compensation insurance carriers by defining the term "employer" to include "insurer." (§ 3850, subd. (b).) Thus, these insurers "retain immunity from lawsuit as the `alter ego' of the employer." (Unruh, supra,
Together, these provisions establish that the liability of employers and insurers for "industrial injury which results in occupational disability or death" is limited to workers' compensation remedies. (Livitsanos v. Superior Court (1992)
*575 Thus, the trigger for workers' compensation exclusivity is a compensable injury. An injury is compensable for exclusivity purposes if two conditions exist. First, the statutory conditions of compensation must concur. (See § 3600, subd. (a).) For example, if the injury arises "out of and in the course of the employment, the exclusive remedy provisions apply notwithstanding that the injury resulted from . . . intentional conduct . . . even though the . . . conduct might be characterized as egregious." (Shoemaker, supra,
Second, the injury must cause a "disability or the need for medical treatment." (Gomez v. Acquistapace (1996)
Where the alleged injury is neither collateral to nor derivative of an injury that satisfies both of these conditions, then it is not subject to exclusivity. (See Snyder, supra,
Causes of action seeking to recover "[e]conomic or contract damages incurred independent of any" workplace injury are also exempt from workers' compensation exclusivity. (Pichon v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (1989)
On the other hand, courts have regularly barred claims where the alleged injury is collateral to or derivative of a compensable workplace injury. For example, courts have barred employees from suing for psychic injuries caused by their termination (see Semore v. Eric Pool (1990)
Courts have also consistently held that injuries arising out of and in the course of the workers' compensation claims process fall within the scope of the exclusive remedy provisions because this process is tethered to a compensable injury. Indeed, every employee who suffers a workplace injury must go through the claims process in order to recover compensation. Thus, we have barred all claims based on "disputes over the delay or discontinuance of [workers' compensation] benefits" (Marsh, supra,
In this case, plaintiffs seek to recover the economic damage to their businesses resulting from the failure to receive full and timely payment on their lien claims before the WCAB. These damages arise out of the alleged mishandling of plaintiffs' lien claims. Plaintiffs concede that their underlying lien claims sought to recover compensation for medical services provided to workers injured in the course of their employment. Thus, the alleged injury underlying all of plaintiffs' causes of action is collateral to or derivative of a compensable workplace injury and falls within the scope of the exclusivity provisions. (See Marsh, supra, 49 Cal.3d at pp. 7-8,
In reaching this conclusion, we reject plaintiffs' narrow interpretation of the exclusive remedy provisions. The mere fact that plaintiffs are medical providers, and not employees, does not preclude the application of these provisions. The rights of lien claimants "derive from" the rights of injured employees. (Fox v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd. (1992)
Plaintiffs' decision to forgo recovery on their individual lien claims and to seek only economic damages also does not insulate their claims from the exclusivity provisions. Unlike the economic damages *577 alleged in Coca-Cola, supra, 233 Cal. App.3d at pages 1288-1289,
A contrary result would create a huge loophole in the workers' compensation system and eviscerate the compensation bargain. Employees often suffer economic damages when they suffer workplace injuries or fail to receive prompt payment of their medical bills. Under plaintiffs' logic, these employees could circumvent the workers' compensation system by asserting claims for economic damages even though their claims derive from their workplace injuries. This circumvention of the system, if allowed, would destroy the careful balancing of employee-employer rights created by the WCA and effectively breach the compensation bargain.
Finally, our recent decision in City of Moorpark v. Superior Court (1998)
In concluding that FEHA and Tameny claims fall outside the scope of the exclusive remedy provisions, we observed that "the existence of a workers' compensation remedy does not by itself establish that the remedy is exclusive." (City of Moorpark, supra,
Here, unlike section 132a, the provisions that create the remedies for the mishandling of workers' compensation claimssections 4603.2, 4622 and 5814 are located in division 4. These remedies are therefore exclusive. (See City of Moorpark, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 1154-1155,
The existence of a penalty provision covering defendants' alleged misconduct does not alter our analysis. Section 129.5, found in division 1, does not create a remedy against workers' compensation insurers. Instead, it gives the Administrative Director of the Division of Workers' Compensation (DWC) the power to impose *579 an "administrative" or "civil penalty" on insurers who unreasonably delay or refuse payment of compensation. (Ibid.) Potential penalties include "a civil penalty, not to exceed one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000)" (id, subd. (d)), and revocation of an insurer's "certificate of authority." (Id, subd. (d)(4).)[7] The director may impose these penalties in addition to any other remedy available under the WCA, including the penalties provided by sections 4603.2, 4622, and 5814. Thus, section 129.5 does not affect the exclusivity of remedies in division 4. Indeed, the Legislature's enactment of a penalty provision as opposed to a remedy provisionequally suggests an intent to have the DWC, rather than private litigants, address the type of insurer misconduct alleged here. Accordingly, the alleged injury underlying plaintiffs' claims falls within the scope of the exclusive remedy provisions.
B. The Alleged Acts and Motives
Even if the exclusivity provisions cover the alleged injury, plaintiffs may still pursue their causes of action if they fit within the "narrow exception to the WCAB's jurisdiction" established in Unruh, supra, 7 Cal.3d at pages 629-631,
Since Unruh, courts have struggled to define the contours of this exception to workers' compensation exclusivity. Throughout the years, we have identified various circumstances where the exception precludes application of the exclusive remedy *580 provisions. For example, we have held that conduct "having a `questionable' relationship to the employment" is not protected by the exclusivity rule. (Cole, supra,
Despite these vague pronouncements, several guiding principles are clear. When determining whether the exception applies to a cause of action, courts first determine whether the alleged acts that give rise to that cause of action are "of the kind that [are] within the compensation bargain." (Fermino, supra,
For this initial determination, courts consider only the acts themselves and not the motive behind the acts. (See Fermino, supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 722-723,
Thus, typical employer actions "such as demotions, promotions, criticism of work practices, and frictions in negotiations as to grievances" do not, by themselves, exempt a cause of action from exclusivity. (Cole, supra,
Insurer activity intrinsic to the workers' compensation claims process is also a risk contemplated by the compensation bargain. Thus, insurer actions "closely connected to the payment of benefits" fall within the scope of the exclusive remedy provisions. (Mitchell, supra,
Of course, an employer or insurer may not use the exclusive remedy provisions as a "get out of jail free" card by characterizing its acts as a normal employer or insurer activity. "What matters . . . is not the label that might be affixed to the . . . conduct. . . ." (Fermino, supra,
Thus, courts have permitted fraud claims against an employer when the employer conceals the existence of an employee's workplace injury because such concealments cannot be linked to a normal employer action. (See Johns-Manville, supra,
With respect to insurers, courts have permitted fraud claims when the insurer denies the existence of a workers' compensation insurance policy, because such denials are not a normal part of *582 the claims process. (See Jablonski v. Royal Globe Ins. Co. (1988)
In addition to the acts themselves, the motive element of a cause of action may insulate that cause of action from the purview of the exclusive remedy provisions. This exception to exclusivity, however, is quite limited. "[A]ny inquiry into an employer's motivation is undertaken not to determine whether the employer intentionally or knowingly injured the employee, but rather to ascertain whether the employer's conduct violated public policy and therefore fell outside the compensation bargain." (Fermino, supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 714-715,
We now apply these principles to plaintiffs' specific claims and allegations.
1. Abuse of process and fraud claims
After reviewing the acts and motives that give rise to plaintiffs' abuse of process and fraud claims, we conclude these claims do not fit within the Unruh exception to workers' compensation exclusivity. Thus, they are barred.
Plaintiffs' abuse of process and fraud claims, in essence, allege that each defendant engaged in a pattern or practice of delaying or denying payments in bad faith. For example, the abuse of process claims allege that defendants misused the claims process by making frivolous objections, filing sham petitions and documents with the WCAB, issuing unnecessary subpoenas, and improperly threatening to depose plaintiffs' physicians. Similarly, the fraud claim states that each individual defendant made false statements about and during its processing of plaintiffs' lien claims. All of these alleged acts are closely connected to a normal insurer activity the processing and payment of medical lien claims. Therefore, plaintiffs' abuse of process and fraud claims are encompassed within the compensation bargain. (See Marsh, supra, 49 Cal.3d at pp. 9-11,
In reaching this conclusion, we reject plaintiffs' attempt to shield these claims from preemption by including superfluous allegations unrelated to the elements of the cause of action. For example, plaintiffs claim defendants committed abuse of process by advising other insurers not to pay plaintiffs' claims, distributing hit lists of medical providers and conducting training sessions on how to delay or avoid payments on plaintiffs' claims. These acts do not, however, support an abuse of process claim because they do not involve the use of a procedure "incident to litigation." (Barquis v. Merchants Collection Assn. (1972)
*583 Plaintiffs' characterization of defendants' acts of fraud as a "scheme" suffers from the same defect. Fraud does not require a scheme, and a scheme does not establish an element of a fraud claim. (See Civ. Code, § 1709.) Thus, the existence of a scheme cannot insulate plaintiffs' fraud claim from preemption. In any event, the mere allegation of a conspiracy is not enough where, as here, the alleged acts in furtherance of the conspiracyi.e., the fraudulent statementsare closely connected to claims processing, a normal insurer activity. (See Hazelwerdt v. Industrial Indent. Exchange (1958)
The fact that the misdeeds alleged in the abuse of process and fraud claims may constitute crimes under Insurance Code sections 1871 and 1871.4 does not alter our conclusion. Unlike "those classes of intentional . . . crimes against the employee's person by means of violence and coercion, such as those crimes numerated in part 1, title 8 of the Penal Code," regulatory crimes like the ones cited by plaintiffs do not "violate the employee's reasonable expectations and transgress the limits of the compensation bargain." (Fermino, supra,
Finally, neither abuse of process nor fraud contains a motive element that violates a fundamental public policy. Abuse of process claims merely require malice, which "may be inferred from the wilful abuse of the process." (Tranchina v. Arcinas (1947)
2. Cartwright Act claim
Although we find plaintiffs' abuse of process and fraud claims barred on exclusivity grounds, we reach a contrary conclusion as to their Cartwright Act claim. Because the wrongful acts and motives that give rise to plaintiffs' Cartwright Act claim fall outside the compensation bargain, it is not subject to workers' compensation exclusivity.
We begin with the alleged acts that give rise to plaintiffs' Cartwright Act claim. The Cartwright Act "makes unlawful any `trust.'" (Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co. (1969)
The motive element of a Cartwright Act claim also makes the exclusivity bar inapplicable. A "cause of action for restraint of trade under the Cartwright Act . . . must allege . . . a purpose to restrain trade." (Jones, supra,
Hazelwerdt does not compel a contrary result. In Hazelwerdt, the plaintiff alleged that an insurer and a physician employed by that insurer to treat the plaintiff conspired to mishandle the plaintiffs medical treatment. The Court of Appeal barred plaintiffs civil conspiracy claim because the acts in furtherance of the conspiracy were closely connected to a normal insurer activitythe provision of medical treatment for a workplace injury. (See Hazelwerdt, supra,
3. RICO claims
We reach a similar conclusion with respect to plaintiffs' RICO claims. The pattern of racketeering activity necessary to establish a RICO enterprise always falls outside the scope of the compensation bargain. Thus, plaintiffs' RICO claims are exempt from the exclusivity bar.
In their complaint, plaintiffs allege that defendants violated and conspired to violate 18 United States Code section 1962(c). A violation of 18 United States Code section 1962(c) requires "(1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity." (Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc. (1985)
Here, plaintiffs' RICO claims allege that defendants conducted or conspired to conduct various enterprises through numerous acts of mail and wire fraud. Because these predicate acts of *585 mail and wire fraud allegedly form a pattern of racketeering activity, they, by definition, cannot be closely connected to a normal insurer activity. The compensation bargain anticipates that an insurer may commit various misdeeds during the claims process, including some criminal acts. (See Fermino, supra,
4. Tortious interference and UCL claims
We now turn to plaintiffs' remaining claimstortious interference with business relations and violations of the UCL. These claims encompass a wide range of misconduct due, in part, to the breadth of these causes of action and some haziness in the pleadings. After reviewing the alleged misconduct, we conclude these claims are barred to the extent they focus on the individual misdeeds of each defendant. They, however, are not precluded to the extent they are predicated on the conspiratorial misconduct of defendants.
As an initial matter, we note that neither tortious interference nor the UCL requires a motive that violates a fundamental public policy. Tortious interference claims encompass "wrongful" interferences and do not require an improper motive. (Della Penna v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. (1995)
An examination of the alleged acts underlying plaintiffs' tortious interference and UCL claims yields mixed results. These acts fit into two categories: (1) individual acts of a defendant that establish a pattern or practice of mishandling plaintiffs' lien claims; or (2) acts in furtherance of a conspiracy among defendants to mishandle plaintiffs' lien claims. As explained below, we find plaintiffs' tortious interference and UCL claims barred to the extent they are predicated on the first category of misconduct but permissible to the extent they are based on the second.
The first category of misconduct covers the wrongful acts of each individual defendant during the claims process and is virtually identical to the misconduct alleged in plaintiffs' abuse of process and fraud claims. The mere fact that an individual insurer has a pattern or practice of bad faith delays or denials of payment is *586 not enough to insulate a cause of action from preemption where, as here, each wrongful act is closely connected to a normal insurer activitythe processing of medical lien claims. Indeed, such misconduct is indistinguishable from the insurer misconduct alleged in the claims barred by Marsh, supra, 49 Cal.3d at pages 9-11,
In contrast, the second category involves far more than the pattern or practice of an individual insurer. This misconduct consists of a conspiracy among multiple insurers to coordinate the economic destruction of plaintiffs through the mishandling of their lien claims. By joining this conspiracy, each individual defendant necessarily became involved in claims it did not insure. Thus, the second category of misconduct is almost identical to the misconduct underlying plaintiffs' Cartwright Act claim and cannot be connected to a normal insurer activity. Accordingly, plaintiffs' tortious interference and UCL claims are not barred to the extent they are predicated on defendants' conspiratorial acts.
In closing, we stress that our decision today merely holds that some of plaintiffs' claims are not barred by the exclusive remedy provisions of the WCA. We make no judgment as to the viability of these claims, and defendants are free to challenge them on any other grounds.
Disposition
We affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the Court of Appeal and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
GEORGE, C.J., MOSK, J, KENNARD, J., BAXTER, J., and CHIN, J., concur.
Concurring Opinion by WERDEGAR, J.
I agree with the disposition and much of the reasoning of the majority opinion. I write separately only to distance myself from the suggestion that Gantt v. Sentry Insurance (1992)
NOTES
Notes
[1] Plaintiffs request judicial notice of a verified complaint filed by one of the defendants in an unrelated case. Certain amici curiae request judicial notice of the form 10-Q filed by Tri-Care, Inc., a plaintiff in the companion case that settled, and its 1990 annual report. Because none of these documents are relevant, we deny these requests. (See Mangini v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. (1994)
[2] Plaintiffs are: (1) Charles J. Vacanti, M.D., Inc., doing business as NPI Medical Group; (2) Marina Pain Physicians Medical Group, Inc.; (3) Marina del Rey Ambulatory Surgery Center; (4) Huntington Pain Physicians Medical Group, Inc.; (5) Pain Centers of America Medical Group, Inc.; (6) National Pain Institute, Inc., doing business as Huntington Beach Surgery Center; and (7) Allegiant Physician Services, Inc.
[3] Defendants are: (1) Slate Compensation Insurance Fund; (2) Golden Eagle Insurance Company; (3) California Compensation Insurance Company; (4) Superior Pacific Casualty Company (previously known as Pacific Rim Assurance Company); (5) American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Company; (6) American Motorists Insurance Company; (7) American Protection Insurance Company; (8) Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Company; (9) Fremont Compensation Insurance Company; (10) Pacific Compensation Insurance Company; (11) Beaver Insurance Company; (12) Liberty Mutual Insurance Company; (13) Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company; (14) Liberty Insurance Corporation; (15) California Indemnity Exchange Insurance Company; (16) Republic Indemnity Company of America; (17) Continental Casualty Company; (18) CNA Casualty of California; (19) Transportation Insurance Company; (20) Transcontinental Insurance Company; (21) Valley Forge Insurance Company; (22) Superior National Insurance Company; (23) California Casualty Management Company; (24) California Casualty Insurance Company; (25) California Casualty General Insurance Company; (26) California Casualty & Fire Insurance Company; (27) California Casualty Indemnity Exchange; and (28) Unicare Insurance Company. Golden Eagle Insurance Company, California Compensation Insurance Company, Superior Pacific Casualty Company, and Superior National Insurance Company are no longer parties to the appeal because the action against them was stayed pursuant to Insurance Code section 1020.
[4] Because FHWC Medical Group v. CNA Casualty of California settled, we dismissed that appeal.
[5] All further statutory references are to the Labor Code unless otherwise stated.
[6] Section 4603.2 states in relevant part:
"(b) Payment for medical treatment provided or authorized by the treating physician selected by the employee or designated by the employer shall be made by the employer within 60 days after receipt of each separate, itemized billing, together with any required reports. If the billing or a portion thereof is contested, denied, or considered incomplete, the physician shall be notified, in writing, that the billing is contested, denied, or considered incomplete, within 30 working days after receipt of the billing by the employer. A Notice that a billing is incomplete shall state all additional information required to make a decision. Any properly documented amount not paid within the 60-day period shall be increased by 10 percent, together with interest at the same rate as judgments in civil actions retroactive to the date of receipt of the bill, unless the employer does both of the following:
"(1) Pays the uncontested amount within the 60-day period.
"(2) Advises, in the manner prescribed by the administrative director, the physician, or another provider of the items being contested, the reasons for contesting these items, and the remedies available to the physician or the other provider if he or she disagrees. . . .
"If an employer contests all or part of a billing, any amount determined payable by the appeals board shall carry interest from the date the amount was due until it is paid.
"An employer's liability to a physician or another provider under this section for delayed payments shall not affect its liability to an employee under Section 5814 or any other provision of this division."
Section 4622 states in relevant part:
"All medical-legal expenses for which the employer is liable shall, upon receipt by the employer of all reports and documents required by the administrative director incident to the services, be paid to whom the funds and expenses are due, as follows:
"(a) Except as provided in subdivision (b), within 60 days after receipt by the employer of each separate, written billing and report, and where payment is not made within this period, that portion of the billed sum then unreasonably unpaid shall be increased by 10 percent, together with interest thereon at the rate of 7 percent per annum retroactive to the date of receipt of the bill and report by the employer. Where the employer, within the 60-day period, contests the reasonableness and necessity for incurring the fees, services, and expenses, payment shall be made within 20 days of the filing of an order of the appeals board directing payment.
"The penalty provided for in this subdivision shall not apply if (1) the employer pays the provider that portion of his or her charges which do not exceed the amount deemed reasonable pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 4624 within 60 days of receipt of the report and itemized billing, and (2) the appeals board sustains the employer's position in contesting the reasonableness or necessity for incurring the expenses. . . .
"(b) Where requested by the employee, or the dependents of a deceased employee, within 20 days from the filing of an order of the appeals board directing payment, and where payment is not made within that period, that portion of the billed sum then unpaid shall be increased by 10 percent, together with interest thereon at the rate of 7 percent per annum retroactive to the date of the filing of the order of the board directing payment. [¶] . . . [¶]
"The provisions of Sections 5800 and 5814 shall not apply to this section."
[7] Section 129.5 provides in relevant part that:
"(a) The administrative director shall assess an administrative penalty against an insurer, self-insured employer, or third-party administrator for any of the following:
"(1) Failure to comply with the notice of assessment issued pursuant to subdivision (c) within 15 days of receipt.
"(2) Failure to pay when due the undisputed portion of an indemnity payment, the reasonable cost of medical treatment of an injured worker, or a charge or cost of implementing an approved vocational rehabilitation plan.
"(3) Failure to comply with any rule or regulation of the administrative director. [¶] . . . [¶]
"(d) In addition to the penalty assessment permitted by subdivision (a), the administrative director may assess a civil penalty, not to exceed one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000), upon finding, after hearing, that an employer, insurer, or third-party administrator for an employer has knowingly committed and has performed with a frequency as to indicate a general business practice any of the following:
"(1) Induced employees to accept less than compensation due, or made it necessary for employees to resort to proceedings against the employer to secure compensation due.
"(2) Refused to comply with known and legally indisputable compensation obligations.
"(3) Discharged or administered compensation obligations in a dishonest manner.
"(4) Discharged or administered compensation obligations in a manner as to cause injury to the public . . . .
"Upon a second or subsequent finding, the administrative director shall refer the matter to the Insurance Commissioner or Director of Industrial Relations and request that a hearing be conducted to determine whether the certificate of authority, certificate of consent to self-insure, or certificate of consent to administer claims of self-insured employer, as the case may be, should be revoked."
[8] See, e.g., Marsh, supra, 49 Cal.3d at pages 7, 9-10,
[9] Plaintiffs may, however, pursue their tortious interference and UCL claims to the extent they are predicated on their RICO claims because conducting an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity establishes a wrongful interference (see Della Penna, supra, II Cal.4th at pp. 392-393,
