Charles H. Thompson, Sr., Individually and as Administrator for the Estate of Charles H. Thompson, Jr., Deceased; Odessa L. Thompson, Individually and as Next Friend of Charles H. Thompson, Jr., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Williamson County, Tennessee; Kenneth G. Gooding, Individually and in his official capacity as Deputy Sheriff of Williamson County, Tennessee, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 99-5458
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
Argued: March 7, 2000 Decided and Filed: July 17, 2000
219 F.3d 555 (6th Cir. 2000)
Before: SILER and GILMAN, Circuit Judges; O‘MALLEY, District Judge.
Jeffery S. Frensley, Charles R. Ray, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellants.
Richard A. Buerger, Lisa Carson, BUERGER, MOSELEY, CARSON & BYRD, Franklin, Tennessee, for Appellees.
*OPINION
SILER, Circuit Judge.
1 Plaintiffs, Charles Thompson, Sr., individually and as the administrator of the estate of his son, Charles Thompson, Jr., and his wife, Odessa Thompson, appeal thе district court‘s grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants, Williamson County, Tennessee, and Williamson County Deputy Sheriff Kenneth G. Gooding, in this suit alleging that the defendants discriminated against their mentally disabled son by denying him access to medical serviсes in violation of the Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990,
I. BACKGROUND
2 This case stems from the death of Charles Thompson, Jr.,1 who was shot and killed by Gooding during a confrontation in which the decedent threatened Gooding with a machete. In 1995, the decedent‘s brother, Robin Thompson, called 911 requesting police assistance because his brother, who was “kinda mentally handicapped,” had “just flipped his wig” and was in the house threatening their father with a machete. Gooding and Sergeant Paul Brady were dispatched to the scene. Upon their arrival, the officers were informed that the decedent was no longer in the house, but had disappeared into the woods behind the Thompsons’ home. Mrs. Thompson told Gooding that the decedent was “mental” and had the “mind of a child.” According to the Thompsons, they did not wish for Gooding to arrest their son, but only wanted him to be transported to a hospital so he could receive medical attention. The officers were unable to locate the decedent and left after telling the Thompsons they would return if needed.
3 Shortly thereafter, Robin Thompson called 911 again and informed thе dispatcher that his brother had returned to their house and was armed with two machetes. Mrs. Thompson also told the dispatcher they needed immediate assistance and that she would be willing to sign an arrest warrant. Gooding returnеd to the Thompsons’ residence and, knowing that the decedent was outdoors and armed, he took his shotgun and proceeded toward the house. Robin Thompson told Gooding that his brother was behind the house, at which point Gooding attempted to peer around the side of the house without being seen. However, the decedent spotted him and began to come toward him with the two machetes. After identifying himself and ordering the decedent to drop his weapons, Gooding claims that the decedent raised one of the machetes as if to throw it at him, whereupon he shot and killed the decedent.
4 The Thompsons sued defendants, alleging that: (1) Gooding unreasonably and unnecessarily used deadly force against decedent pursuant to
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
6 An order granting summary judgment is reviewed de novo; therefore, we must apply the same test as the district court. Wilton Corp. v. Ashland Castings Corp., 188 F.3d 670, 672 (6th Cir. 1999). Summary judgmеnt is proper when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”
III. DISCUSSION
7 Under the ADA, “No qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs or activities of a рublic entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.”
8 An individual is disabled for the purposes of the ADA if the person has “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; [has] a record of such an impairment; or [is] regarded as having such an impairment.”
9 Herе, the Thompsons submit that the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of defendants because the decedent was a “qualified individual with a disability” who was denied emergency medical services “because of his disability.” However, when defendants moved for summary judgment, almost a year after the Thompsons filed their complaint, the Thompsons failed to provide any evidence to the district court that their son was disabled within the meaning of the ADA, that he was an otherwise qualified individual with a disability, or that he was denied access to public medical services because of his disability. Because they neglected to establish the existence of several essential elements to their claim that they would have had the burden of proving at trial, the district court dismissed Thompsons’ ADA and Rehabilitation Act claim. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. On appeal, the Thompsons now offer proof that their son was disabled within the meaning of the ADA, and that he was an otherwise qualified disabled individual who was denied medical services because of his disability. Nevertheless, because the defendants did not dispute the fact that the decedent was disabled, we will assumе, for purposes of this appeal, that he was disabled.
10 The Thompsons’ claim still fails as a matter of law. Although there is no doubt that their son was disabled under the ADA, the Thompsons have failed to produce any evidence that he was denied either access to a public service, or if he was, that such denial was because of his disability5. See Bonds, 20 F.3d at 701 (when reviewing summary judgment, court may only consider pleadings, evidence, and affidavits submitted prior to plaintiff‘s motion to alter or amend judgment); Ogletree v. McNamara, 449 F.2d 93, 99 (6th Cir. 1971) (facts not alleged in amended complaint upon which summary judgment granted are not properly before court). The record indicates that when the Thompsons called 911, they requested and received police assistance. Although they wanted their son taken to a medical facility, it would have still been necessary for Gooding to disarm the decedent before he could be transported аnywhere. Gooding‘s failure to disarm, or take the decedent under control, was not because he was inadequately trained to deal with disabled individuals, but because the decedent threatened him with a deadly weapоn before he could subdue him. Thus, if the decedent was denied access to medical services it was because of his violent, threatening behavior, not because he was mentally disabled. Cf. Sandison v. Michigan High School Athletic Ass‘n, Inc., 64 F.3d 1026 (6th Cir. 1995) (plaintiffs prevented from participating in high school sports due to school‘s age requirement, not because of their learning disability).
11 Although some of the facts have been disputed in this case, it is clear that the Thоmpsons have failed to present either a genuine issue of a material fact as to their ADA and Rehabilitation Act claim, or evidence that their son was denied a public service because of his disability. Therefоre, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of defendants.
12 AFFIRMED.