Lead Opinion
Aрpellant entered a guilty plea to Counts 3 and 4 of a six-count indictment; prior to sentence he sought leave to withdraw these pleas and go to trial on these two counts. After an extended colloquy with appellant in the course of the hearing, the District Court permitted withdrawal of the guilty plea as to Count 3 but declined it as to Count 4 because no valid reason or basis for withdrawal had been claimed or shown. On the remaining guilty plea to Count 4 he sentenced appellant to nine yeаrs imprisonment under the Youth Corrections Act, 18 U.S.C. § 5010(c) (1958).
The six-count indictment charged three offenses arising out of unrelated robberies and one attempted robbery on a fourth occasion, spanning a period from April 1962 to January 1963.
At arraignment under Fed.R.Crim. P. 10 on February 25, 1963, appellant entered a plea of not guilty as to all six counts and was released on bail. Two months later, with retained counsel, he withdrew the pleas of not guilty to Count 3 (robbery) and Count 4 (assault with intent to commit robbery) and entered plеas of guilty as to both of these counts.
Three weeks later, appellant, with his retained counsel, filed a motion under Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(d)
Appellant is now represented by court-appointed counsel who urges that the District Court committed reversible error in refusing to permit withdrawal of the guilty plea to Count 4 in the circumstances shown here.
We disagree emphatically. We havе held that withdrawal of a guilty plea, made by a defendant unrepresented by counsel, “should be freely allowed” when he seeks withdrawal before sentencing. Poole v. United States,
“[T]he Supreme Court in broad dictum already had said that ‘The court in exercise of its discretion will permit one accused to substitute a plea of not guilty and have a trial if for my reason the granting of the privilege seems fair and fust.’ * * -x-
“This is not to say that the District Court lacks all discretion in dealing with a motion of the present sort. But discretion must be exercised on the basis of sound information, soundly viewed. Where the accused seeks to withdraw his plea of guilty before sentencing, on the ground that he has a defense to the charge, the District Court should not attempt to decide the merits of the proffered defense, thus determining the guilt or innocence of the defendant. In certain situations, where the issue raised by the motion to withdraw is one of tangential, nature, resolvable apart from the-merits of the case, the District Court, may appropriately hold a factual, hеaring to determine whether the-accused has a ‘fair and just’ reason for asking to withdraw his plea of' guilty.”
Far from showing a “ ‘fair- and just’ reason” for a change of plea to Count 4, appellant demonstrated by his repeated statements that he had no reason other than wanting a trial on a charge of which he admitted his guilt.
The record reveals a guilty plea, intelligently and voluntarily made with assistance of retained counsel and candid admission of all essential elements of the crime in open court; this is hardly a predicate for an appellate holding that the District Judge abused his discretion in refusing to permit a withdrawal. We are not disposed to encourage accused persons to “рlay games” with the courts at the expense of already overburdened calendars and the rights of other accused' persons awaiting trial, whose cases may lose both their position on the calendar and the Court’s time and facilities which are thus diverted for no useful purpose.
Affirmed.
Notes
. On the basis of these two guilty pleas, the United States Attorney’s Office moved the dismissal of the remaining four counts. Ruling on this motion has been held in abeyance by the District Judge pending disposition of this appeal.
. Fed.R.Ckim.P. 11 provides in part: “The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, and shall not accept the plea without first determining that the plea is made voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the charge. * * * ”
. Resolved, that it is the consensus of opinion of the Judges of this Court that in all cases in which defendant enters a plea of guilty the defendant should be interrogated by or under direction of the Court to establish the following facts:
1. That defendant has been advised and understands that he has a right to a speеdy trial by jury with the aid of counsel, but will have no such right if his plea of guilty is accepted.
2. That he will have the assistance of counsel at the time of sentence if the plea is accepted.
3. That defendant understands the nature of the charges against him which should bo stated to him in brief by the Court notwithstanding a prior reading of the indictment.
4. That defendant did in fact commit the particular acts which constitute the elements of the crime or crimes charged.
5. That the guilty plea has not been induced by any prоmise or representation by anyone as to what sentence will be imposed by the Court
6. That he has not been threatened or coerced by anyone into making the guilty plea.
7. That no promises of any kind have been made to him to induce the guilty plea.
8. That he has an understanding of the consequences of entering the plea of guilty.
9. That he is entering the plea voluntarily and of his own free will*981 because be is guilty and for no other reason.
10. That be bas discussed tbe entry of bis plea of guilty fully with bis attorney.
It Is Fubtiiek Resolved, that it is the •consensus of opiniоn of tbe Judges of this Court that [a] plea of guilty shall be accepted only when the Court is satisfied that he is guilty and that he is entering the plea voluntarily and of his own free will, and with an understanding of his rights, of the charges against him, and the consequences of entering the plea.
. See note 3, supra, at Pt. 5.
. See id. at Pt. 9. See note 1, supra.
. “A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or of nolo contendere may be made only before sentence is imposed or imposition of sentence is suspended; but to correct manifest injustice the court after sentence may set aside the judgment of conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw his plea.” Fed.R.Cbim.P. 32(d).
. Count 6 charged carrying an unlicensed pistol which had been used in the attempted robbery. It was in this “attempt to rob” that appellant was allegedly shot by the liqnor store employee.
. In his statement to the Court at the time of sentencing appellant said: “Well, I haven’t anything to say about my sentence, but I have something to say about why I did this crime. * * * Well, the only reason why I did this crime, Your Honor, was because of my pregnant wife and unborn child. And she needed medical care, and I just didn’t have any means to try to get her in the hospital.” The Judge noted that he had information that indicated that appellant had been unemployed and his wife pregnant at the time of the offense; further colloquy revealed that appellant’s wife had gone to Jamaica to live with her father.
. We characterized our Poole holding in Gearhart v. United States,
. Indeed, although appellant at the April 25th hearing asserted his innocence of the charge contained in Count 3, he not only never claimed to be innocent of the charge in Count 4, but readily admitted it. Failure to make such an assertion of innocence, although not in itself dispositive, certainly militates against withdrawal. See United States v. Nagelberg,
. See Kadwell v. United States,
. Indeed the record discloses thаt the effort to withdraw the plea and stand trial on all six counts was against the advice of appellant’s retained counsel in the District Court. This was sound advice. Were appellant to stand trial on •all charges, he could receive sentences cumulating more than 40 years imprisonment. We can only assume that court-appointed counsel is acting here solely at appellant’s insistence on this course of action.
. Far more reasonable rationales have been rejected by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit:
“[Appellant] argues that leave to withdraw a guilty plea must be granted when a defendant’s claim of innocence is not frivolous and it will not be inequitable to the government — because of intervening destruction of evidence or otherwise — to afford a defendant a trial * *
United States v. Hughes, supra note 10.
“[Appellant] vigorously contends, however, that where the defendant insists that he is innocent of the charges contained in the indictment and offers ‘any’ explanation for his having pleaded guilty, the trial court should grant his motion to withdraw his plea of guilty * *
United States v. Colonna, supra 10 at 211 of 142 F.2d.
. See United States v. Hughes, supra note 10. And see the balancing process engaged in by the court in Kadwell v. United States, supra note 11,
. Vasquez v. United States,
. High v. United States, supra note 11,
In the recent Nagelberg case, the Supreme Court held that the District Court had discretion to permit the withdrawal of a guilty plea on a motion in which the Government had acquiesced because of defendant’s extensive cooperation. The Court vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals,
. A defendant seeking leave to withdraw a guilty plea prior to sentencing bears the “burden of establishing grounds for the withdrawal.” United States v. Smiley, supra note 16; see United States v. Lester, supra note 10 at 501. Eor discussion of the grounds that may justify withdrawal of a guilty plea before sentencing, see Williams v. United States, supra note 15; Bergen v. United States, supra note 16; United States v. Colonna, supra note 10 at 211-212 of 142 F.2d; Ward v. United States, supra note 16 at 137 of 33 F.2d; Rachel v. United States, supra note 15.
. The dissent seems to assume that when the defendant at the time of sentencing explained his reasons for the crime, see note 8 supra, the District Court wаs required sua sponte to vacate its earlier denial of the motion to withdraw the guilty plea. No authority supports such a view. These reasons do not, as the dissent intimates, go to the existence of mens rea in the appellant: there is no criminal-responsibility issue here; rather, Everett’s reasons only explain his motives for doing a voluntary act. As such, they are irrelevant in our system of criminal justice.
. This court has considered numerous appeals in which challenged trial delay was-caused in part by unavailability of a. judge.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting) :
Admitting the acts charged against, him, the defendant nevertheless moved, unsuccessfully, to withdraw his plea of guilty
At the time of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, the defendant here had' not been sentenced.
But Judge Burger’s scholarly opinion has demonstrated that the cases have established a different standard. And the Supreme Court has recently spoken in .a case where, as here, the defendant admitted the acts charged;
Our jun^ prdperly pass on the culpability of the accused. An element of the crime charged is mens rea, and if “the jury cannot find that thаt state of mind existed in the accused, it must acquit. Thus, in the extreme instance, a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity is tantamount to a finding of “proved” on the Government’s charge concerning certain events, but a finding of “not culpable” on the defendant’s claim concerning his state of mind. A verdict of “not guilty” may have a similar meaning; when the defenses of self-defense, privilege or excuse are raised, for example, a jury may find that the deed was done, but that the man is no criminal. Indeed, it has been recognized as an “elementary principle of justice” that “when a man’s life or liberty is at stake he should be adjudged according to his personal culpability as well as by the objective seriousness of the crime.” Fisher v. United States,
This power of the jury to pass upon culpability is reflected in the institution of the general verdict. Juries decide “guilty” or “not guilty,” criminal or not criminal, rather than bring in a special verdict as to commission of the act charged to the accused. Reflected in the jury’s decisiоn is a judgment of whether, under all the circumstances of the event
In one period in England, the Star Chamber punished juries who acquitted men who had obviously done the acts charged.
The recent ruling
. Rule 32(d), F.R.Cr.P., provides:
“A motion to withdraw a plea of' guilty * * * may be made only before sentence is imposed * * *; but to correct manifest injustice the court after sentence may set aside the judgment of conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw his plea.”
. The Defendant: “Well, the only reason why I did this crime, Tour Honor, was because of my pregnant wife and' unborn child. And she needed medical care, and I just didn’t have any means to-try to get her in the hospital.”
. See Rule 32(d), set out in Note 1, supra.. It is worthy of note that only the right to move to withdraw a plea of guilty pri- or to sentence and the right to appeal are-specifically protected by the Act of Congress, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3771-3772, authoriz
. In Poole v. United States,
“The trial сourt erred when it denied .appellant’s request to withdraw his plea ■of guilty. Leave to withdraw a guilty plea prior to sentencing should be freely allowed. As we said in McJordan v. Huff, 1943,77 U.S.App.D.C. 171 , 172,133 F.2d 408 , 409: ‘* * * it goes without saying that a plea of guilty at that time [arraignment] can be and often is changed, on proper motion, as a matter of course.’ ” (Emphasis added by Poole court.)
. Nagelberg v. United States,
The trial judge, the Hon. Thomas F. Murphy, bad had long experience as a prosecutor of national reputation; Ms refusal to grant the motion, therefore, cannot be ascribed to failure to understand the importance of defendant’s cooperation with the prosecution, which was the basis of the Government’s acquiescence in the motion. It is clear that the trial court, as well as the Court of pеals, was applying to the motion to” change the plea a more stringent test than the Supreme Court thought proper.
. Kercheval v. United States,
. See Frank, Law and the Modern Mind 170-185, 304r-305 (1930); Curtis, Trial Judge and Jury, 5 Vand.L.Rev. 150 (1952).
. Juries were punished as late as the mid-seventeenth century for acquitting against the law and contrary to the evidence, and it was chiefly the court of Star Chamber that exercised this power. See 1 Holds-worth, History or English Law 164-165 (1903). In addition, the common law writ of attaint was available, according to some authorities, to punish a jury which “wrongly” decided a criminal ease against the King. See 2 Hale, Pleas or the Crown *310.
. In 1670, Chief Justice Vaughan held that the juror’s verdict was a judicial act not punishable except by attaint, Bushell’s Case, Vaughan 135 (C.P.Book 2), 6 Howell, State Trials 999, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006, which was by then obsolete, see 3 Blackstone, Commеntaries *404, though not being formally abolished by statute until 1825, 6 George IV c. 50, § 60.
. The Trial of John Peter Zenger, N. T. Province, 1735, 17 Howell, State Trials 675 (1813).
. See cases collected in Howe, Juries as Judges of Criminal Law, 52 Harv.L. Rev. 582 (1939), cases collected in Mr. Justice Gray’s dissenting opinion in Sparf and Hansen v. United States,
. Sparf and Hansen v. United States, supra Note 11.
. Mr. Justice Gray, dissenting,
. In Horning v. District of Columbia,
. In this regard, Professor James has collected a number of leading authorities in his article on tort law and the judicial process:
“Throughout the history of the jury system it has been recognized that the jury does not always stick to its theoretical function and apply the law in the-judge’s charge to the facts as they find' them. Juries sometimes take the law into their own hands and decide a case-according to popular prejudice which often embodies popular notions of what the law ought to be. It has also been recognized that this fact is not always*987 a weakness but sometimes a great strength of the jury system. Lord Coke is reported to have said ‘the jurors are Chancellors.’ [Quoted from Pound, An Introduction to the Philosophy op Law 133 (1922).] Holmes said ‘one reason why I believe in our practice of leaving questions of negligence to them is precisely one of their gravest defects from the point of view of their theoretical function: that they will introduce into their verdict a certain amount — a very large amount, so far as I have observed — of popular prejudice, and thus keep the administration of the law in accord with the wishes and feelings of the community.’ [Holmes, Collected Legal Papеrs 237-238 (1921).] Pound concluded that ‘Jury lawlessness is the great corrective of law in its actual administration.’ [Pound, Lato in Books and Law in Action, 44 Am.L.Rev." 12, 18 (1910).] One of our ablest trial judges ■of today has noted that ‘traditionally juries are the device by which the rigor of the law is modified pending the enactment of new statutes.’ [Wyzanski, A Trial Judge’s Freedom, and Responsibility, 65 Harv.L.Rev. 1281, 1286 (1952).] Justice Traynor of the California Supreme Court believes that ‘we would lose more than we would gain by a reform of fact-finding that would ■only compel righteous adherence [by juries] to wrong rules. * * * ’ Until the rules themselves are changed we are better off ‘with that quiet distortion that presently adapts them to the needs of rough justice.’ [Traynor, Faet ¡Skepticism and the Judicial Process, 106 U.Pa.L.Rev. 635, 639, 640 (1958).]
“It is not, I submit, an improper abdication of responsibility to the jury to call on its dispensing power — its equitable function — when the occasion is appropriate. * * * ”
James, Tort Law in Midstream: Its Challenge to the Judicial Process, 8 Buffalo L.Rev. 315, 342-343 (1959).
And Professors Paulsen and Kadish have noted: “It has often been suggested that juries are agencies of mitigation in that they may serve to bring the law up to date by applying it in a way consistent with present-day community values.” Paulsen & Kadish, Criminal Law and Its Processes 1107 (1962).
It has also been said that:
“ * * * Many an acquittal, many a judgment for the defendant, is * * * an admonition to go and sin no more. Just as the good physician treats the patient as well as the disease, so too the jury sits in judgment on the offender as well as on the offense.
*******
“ * * * Practically, and ignoring pretensions to logic, there are exceptions, and the law looks to the jury to make them, because it does not feel able to make intelligible rules to coyer them ; nor does it want to admit that the law is less than a complete system.”
Curtis, op.cit.snpra Note 7, 155-156, 157. See also Frank, op.cit.supra Note 7.
. See Note 5, supra.
. Ibid.