163 Iowa 571 | Iowa | 1914
H. D. Copeland died in May, 1910. He had for some years been president of the plaintiff bank, was also engaged in other business activities, and was reputed a man of large wealth. The defendants Charles M. Whieher and
(1) In this claim it is alleged that the estate is justly indebted to the bank in the sum of $2,478.50, with interest on a promissory note made by L. P. Pulliam, which is a just, valid, and legal claim against said estate, and of which claim the bank is now the owner. To this is attached a copy of a promissory note which .is signed by L. D. Pulliam, as maker, payable to the order of J. C. Copeland (who, it subsequently appears, was the cashier of the bank). No indorsement by J. C. Copeland is shown.
(2) This claim for $2,948.15 is based upon two notes signed by J. H. Roberts; the first being made payable to the order of J. C. Copeland, cashier, and the other to the order of H. D. Copeland. The statement of the claim is in substantially the same form as in the one upon the Pulliam note above mentioned. No indorsement by the payee of either note is alleged.
(3) This claim for $2,000 is upon three promissory notes made by one C. H. Boothroyd; two of them being made payable to the order of H. D. Copeland, and one to the order of J. C. Copeland, cashier, the allegations of the bank’s rights in the premises being made as in the other claims above mentioned. The two notes made payable to H. D. Copeland bear his indorsement “without recourse.” The third note is not indorsed.
(4) The fourth claim for $4,467.40 is upon six promissory notes bearing the signature of T. O. Hughes. Of these notes four are made payable to the order of J. C. Copeland, cashier, one to the order of H. D. Copeland, and one to the order of Chariton National Bank, none of which shows indorsement by the payee. Other allegations are like those in the claim first described.
(5) The fifth claim for $900 is upon one promissory note
(6.) The sixth claim for $590 is stated in similar terms upon two promissory notes made by D. B. Custer, each payable to the order of J. C. Copeland, cashier, and unindorsed.
(7) The seventh claim for $300 is stated in similar terms upon a promissory note made by Joel E. Clark, payable to the order of H. D. Copeland, and indorsed by him, without recourse.
(8) The eighth claim for $3,495.52 is stated in similar terms upon three promissory notes made by W. H. Essex. Two of these notes are made payable to the order of H. D. Copeland, and one to J. O. Copeland, cashier. The first note payable to IT. D. Copeland for $2,350 is indorsed by him, with waiver of demand and protest. The others are unindorsed.
It will be observed that these claims each and all (except, perhaps, such as are based upon notes payable to the order of the deceased, and indorsed by him in his lifetime) are founded upon promissory notes none of which, upon their face or by written indorsement, indicate any liability or indebtedness on the part of H. D. Copeland or of his estate to the plaintiff bank, and, aside from the very general allegation as a legal conclusion that the administrators of said estate “are justly indebted to plaintiff” upon the notes mentioned, and that the amount thereof “is a just, valid,, and legal claim against the estate of said H. D. Copeland, deceased, of which your petitioner is now the owner,” there is nothing revealed showing how or in what manner the notes which apparently evidence the indebtedness of other persons become or are evidence of the indebtedness of the estate of the deceased. Later, and after the time for filing of claims of the third class had expired, the bank, by its counsel, filed various amendments to its said claims to supply the omissions above noted. These amendments, stated as briefly as practicable, are to the effect that the said H. D. Copeland was in his lifetime a silent partner with
By the time these amendments were filed, the administration of the estate had so far developed its condition as to make it apparent that the assets would be wholly insufficient to pay all the claims against it, thus exciting a natural rivalry among creditors to secure for their several claims a place among those of the third class, and to exclude therefrom as many as possible of their competitors. Among 'these creditors were several banks in Iowa and Illinois who appeared in the proceedings and contested the right of the plaintiff bank to amend its claim, and disputed the sufficiency of the amendments so pleaded.
Of the various objections raised, the one on which the contesting creditors principally rely is that the amendments are in substance and effect the statements of new claims or
In this court, after a considerable fencing over the perfection of the record the parties have entered into a stipulation which in effect eliminates all question of the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the court’s findings concerning the real nature of the transactions in which the several promissory notes had their origin and the nature of the deceased’s relation thereto, except it is still insisted that in any event the allowance made upon the Hughes notes is excessive by a matter of something more than $700. Except as to this item, the stipulation removes from the realm of dispute all question of the propriety of the allowance of said claims against the estate,
Appellants’ position is: (1) That the claims as originally filed state no cause of action, and that an allowance thereof in such form would be reversible error. (2) That the amendments set up entirely new and independent matter constituting other and different causes of action, and that, if allowed at all, they should be treated as claims filed at the date of the amendments, and therefore as claims falling within the fourth class.
The ruling in the cited case was made with reference to facts upon which there could be no recovery either at common law or under the statutes, and the demurrer thereto presented the legal question on which it must Anally stand or fall. But it has never been held that claims in probate are subject generally to the rules of pleading which prevail in ordinary litigation. Indeed, it has been distinctly held otherwise. In University v. Emmert, 108 Iowa, 502, it is held that a defect wjiich would render a petition demurrable is not necessarily fatal in the statement of a claim in probate. We there cited the statute concerning the proper manner of stating such claims, and said: “These statutes are evidently intended to cover all necessarily to be included in the statement of a claim. No petition is to be required, and, if the sections referred to are complied with substantially, when not assailed the pleading will be sufficient. ’ ’
In the Thornburg case, supra, under a statute substantially like our own, the court says:
The strict rules of pleading and practice do not apply in claims against decedents’ estates. Neither nicety of averment nor nicety of proof is required. The statute requires that only a succinct statement of the nature and amount of the claim shall be filed. The purpose of the statute is to facilitate the settlement of estates with as little expense as possible to both the estate and the claimant. It is not contemplated that the claimant shall incur the expense of employing professional counsel, and prepare his pleadings with legal accuracy. The rule that a pleading must proeéed upon a single, definite theory, the trial had and judgment pronounced upon the theory indicated, has little or no application to claims against estates. This rule concerning theory should not be carried to that degree of refinement that leads to absurdity and injustice. To compel a claimant to conform to this rule would require
In Corr’s Appeal, supra, the claim as presented was a simple book entry of indebtedness, “To cash, $1,700,” with no statement of the facts or circumstances relied upon, and the court held that, no attack having been made thereon by motion or otherwise, an allowance of the claim could properly be ordered. It has also been held that a claim on a judgment rendered against the deceased in his lifetime in favor of a third person, which claim as filed discloses no assignment of the judgment, is sufficiently established by proof that claimant is in fact an assignee. Sublett v. Nelson, 38 Mo. 487. See, also, Hyatt v. Bonham, 19 Ind. App. 256 (49 N. E. 361).
The claims now before us even in their original form are expressly based upon an alleged right of the plaintiff to recover on the notes against the estate of the deceased. The allowance from which the appeal has been taken expressly upholds and sustains that alleged right of recovery. It is true that conclusion is reached upon proof of facts not expressly alleged in the original claim, and not shown upon the face of the original instruments; but, in view of the record which discloses no demurrer and no motion requiring any further statement, we think these facts may be regarded as relevant and competent evidence directly supporting the allegations of the claim, the pleading of which evidence was not essential to the right of recovery.
Whether either of these tests is decisive in all cases we need not decide; but it is quite clear that an application of either or all to the facts of this case serves to sustain the propriety of the amendments, and that they do not amount to the pleading of a new cause of action. Surely a recovery had or allowance made in plaintiff’s favor upon these notes as demanded in the original claim would bar another recovery or allowance thereon under the allegations of the amendments; the same evidence which would sustain a recovery upon either form of the statement would be equally pertinent and decisive on a trial upon the other, and in either case the measure of recovery is the same — the amount appearing due upon the notes according to their terms.
This result is in our judgment inevitable, even if we apply to the case the strict rule of pleading which obtains in more formal proceedings, a practice which we have seen is distinctly modified and liberalized in dealing with claims in probate. Somewhat in point with this case is McCall v. Lee, 24 Ill. App. 585. There the claim was filed by plaintiff in his representative capacity as an administrator. Subsequently-he amended his statement to show the debt was due him in his own personal right, and this was held not to be regarded as the filing of a new claim.
The claims before us, we repeat, have from the first been claims to recover upon the specified promissory notes, and it would seem clear that the additional allegations subsequently pleaded have material application thereto within the meaning of. the statute.
Without pursuing the discussion further, we have to say, as already indicated, that we find no error in the rulings of the trial court. While the statements in their original form may be said to have lacked in completeness, they cannot be treated as wholly nugatory and ineffectual, and, in the absence of direct attack thereon, the court might lawfully have proceeded to hear the evidence, and enter order of allowance. The amended statements do not in any manner change the nature
Concerning the objection made to the allowance of the Hughes notes as excessive, the point is that in an early stage of the transactions between Hughes and the deceased the former included in a note given by him to the bank an item of overdraft on his personal account. The notes then given by him were renewed on one or more occasions, and the appellants argue that the amount of that overdraft is still in the notes, and should be deducted from the allowance. The facts concerning this item are not entirely clear; but it appears that the current personal dealings of the parties were more or less involved in the renewal notes, and that Hughes seems to have paid or accounted for a sum substantially equal to the amount of the overdraft. The trial court seems to have reached the conclusion that Hughes’ personal indebtedness has been eliminated from the notes, and, as we are of the opinion such holding has support in the record, we do not feel justified in finding otherwise.
In explanation of the record in this case, it should have been said at the outset that the several claims we have considered, though separately filed, have by stipulation of parties been tried as one, and have been submitted in this court as upon a single appeal.
For the reasons stated in the foregoing opinion, the rulings and judgment of the trial court are in all respects Affirmed.