We are concerned here with a trade name. “Whether the name of a (business) ... is to be regarded as a trade-mark, a trade name, or both, is not entirely clear under the decisions. To some extent the two terms overlap, but there is a differenсe more or less definitely recognized, which is, that, generally speaking, the former is applicable to the vendible commodity tо which it is affixed, the latter to a business and its good will.”
American Foundries v. Robertson,
Notwithstanding this rule, equity will always protect a business from unfair competition and the public from imposition.
Cab Co. v. Creasman,
Although a generic word or a geographic designation cannot become an arbitrary trademark, it may nevertheless be used deceptively by a newcomer to the field so as to amount to unfair competitiоn,
Cleveland Opera Co. v. Cleveland Civic Opera Ass’n.,
When a particular business has used words
publici juris
for so long or so exclusively or when it has promoted its prоduct to such an extent
that the words do not register their literal meaning on the public mind but are instantly associated with one enterprisе, such words have attained a secondary meaning. This is to say, a secondary meaning exists when, in addition to their literal, or dictionary, meaning, words connote to the public a product
-from a unique source.
It has been suggested, however, that when a descriptive word or phrase has сome to mean a particular
entrepreneur,
the term
secondary meaning
is inaccurate because, in the field in which the phrase has acquired its new meaning, its so-cаlled secondary meaning has become its primary, or natural, meaning.
G. & C. Merriam Co. v. Saalfield,
The law will afford protection against the tortious appropriation of tradenames and trademarks alike.
American Foundries v. Robertson, supra
at 380,
In Union Oyster House, supra, the Massachusetts court held that the words oyster house are in common use in the English language and denote a restaurant in which the serving of oysters is featured. The cоurt dismissed plaintiff’s suit to enjoin defendant from using the words oyster house in its business name. The difference between that case and this one is only the differencе between an oyster house and a steak house. Here, plaintiff’s manager testified: “The term steak house means to me a place that features steaks. The term charcoal steak means to me how the steak is prepared or was prepared by the method of using charcoal in preparation.” The manager’s understanding is ours and, we believe, also that of the general public. The name Charcoal Steak House is no more original than it is unusual or fanciful; it is literally descriрtive of the product which both plaintiff and defendant stress in their respective restaurants. How else could defendant describe his rеstaurant to the public, or plaintiff its? Throughout the country the term charcoal steak house is found in the name of so many restaurants giving emphasis to steaks that we may tаke judicial notice of its meaning and common usage, even though, unlike oyster house, it has not yet been defined, qua noun, in dictionaries.
Plaintiff states in its brief: “It is uncontroverted . . . that the words charcoal steak house are in their primary sense descriptive, they are ‘publici juris, and all the world may use them; but is is the contention of the plaintiff appellant that the words as used by it have come to have a secondary meaning in regard to its business within the area of Charlotte, Mecklenburg County, North Carolina.” Undoubtedly this is an accurate statement of the law, so far as it goes, and of what plaintiff contends. Although plaintiff employed the name Charcoal Steak House in Charlotte before defendant came to town, it did not originate the name, nor was it the first to use it in the area. Merely to be the first to use a descriptive nаme, even if it acquires a secondary meaning, does not give the first user an unqualified right to engross it. Even if the words charcoal steak house had acquired a secоndary meaning so as specifically to connote plaintiff’s restaurant in Charlotte, plaintiff still would not be entitled to have defendаnt restrained from making any use whatever of words admittedly publici juris. All plaintiff could reasonably ask of the court is that defendant be required to do what he has already done, namely, so designate his restaurant as to prevent reasonably intelligent and careful persons from being misled. When defendant affixed his nаme, Staley’s, to his identifying sign in letters larger than those of “Charcoal Steak House,” he created a dissimilarity which should preclude any confusion culminating in injury to any of plaintiff’s rights. Surf Club v. Tatem Surf Club, supra.
Nothing in the record suggests the probability that the public will confuse the two restaurants. Unfair compеtition is “the child of confusion.”
Cleveland Opera Co. v. Cleveland Civic Opera Ass’n., supra.
The evidence fails even to hint at any bad faith or any attempt on defendant’s part to deceivе, either in his business sign or in his location. And, all the while, plaintiff remains at its old stand — surely its satisfied customers will be able to find their way back. Should they wend thеir way to defendant’s restaurant, also, for the sake of variety or comparison, any loss to plaintiff will be
damnum absque injuria.
Within our competitive еconomy there is, in the Charlotte area, indeed “room for good service
The judgment of nonsuit is
Affirmed.