*1 VT 105 Gorczyk Charbonneau v. John John A.2d [838 117] 01-312 No. J., JJ., Allen, (Ret.), Amestoy, Dooley, Skoglund, Present: C Johnson C.J. Specially Assigned1
Opinion Filed November Valerio, Matthew General, SethLipschutz, Prisoners’ Rights Defender Office, and Michal Mokryn, Legal Intern, Montpelier, Plaintiff- Appellant. Sorrell,
William H. General, Montpelier, and Nicole An- Attorney dreson, General, Attorney Assistant Waterbury, for Defendant-Appellee. originally This ease was heard in March 2002 before Justice L. James Morse retired from parties agreed argument Court. The to waive oral after retired Chief Justice Frederic agreed W. Allen following substitute for Justice Morse Justice Morse’s retirement.
¶ Amestoy, .J. Plaintiff John appeals a decision C Charbonneau County dismissing against the Orleans Court his claim John Superior Gorczyk, Commissioner of the Vermont of Corrections Department (DOC) under Title II ofthe Americans for discrimination with Disabilities (ADA). trial, (1) Act Following a bench trial court concluded that disabled, “disabled” under the if requested disability modifications to accommodate the are unreason- *2 able. We affirm the court’s decision that is not disabled within the plaintiff unnecessary of the and therefore we find it to determine the plaintiff’s requested reasonableness of accommodations.
¶ 2. The
presented
essentially undisputed.
facts
at trial were
At issue
here whether the
support
legal
is
facts
the trial court’s
conclusions. Our
Pollander,
of law is de novo. State v.
standard of
on questions
review
¶ prisoner 3. Plaintiff is a at the Northern Facility State Correctional (NSCF). He suffers from angina, Prinz-Metil a heart condition that intermittent, causes involuntary spasms coronary artery, restrict- ing spasms blood flow to heart. The are unpredictable and are not necessarily by caused or overexertion. People stress this condition occur, can suffer at spasms even rest. When these spasms plaintiff acute experiences pain, and he must take three nitroglycerin tablets over a fifteen period. medication, minute If the pain persists despite the more intensive medical intervention necessary diagnose is the potential for a heart Timely attack. following care a is spasm essential to successfully manage monitor and plaintiff’s condition. incarcerated, 4. While experienced has sixteen of these
episodes. One of episodes those sixteen required hospital a visit. At the trial, time NSCF, was housed at a facility duty with a nurse on per day. hours ¶ 5. Athough most individuals who suffer from Prinz-Metil angina must live in an area they care, where have access medical can many few, live and work in the community residence, travel, if any, or work restrictions. has been able to work while in prison, performing janitorial and laundry services. For his plaintiff has (ERT). received earned reductions his term ERT, 6. Seeking additional plaintiff asked for a transfer to a prison work in St. camp Johnsbury. The work is a camp special prison facility that houses a small number of It provides program inmates. whose mission is through rehabilitation service. community camp Inmates at the ERT, receive additional reducing their at a sentences faster rate than facilities, inmates at other like NSCF. DOC officials denied for the request medically qualified program transfer because he was not necessary to monitor and coverage due to the lack of full-time medical Plaintiff the denial to the DOC. He mange angina. grieved his Prinz-Metil or, alternative, to receive the requested camp to attend work camp remaining additional ERT he would receive while at NSCF. Prison officials denied his grievance.
¶ 7. denial of his filed suit in Following prison’s grievance, plaintiff 7,2000. trial, Orleans Court on November At Superior argued the ADA he given camp under should either be access to the additional ERT he earned at the camp. Following receive would have trial, claims, the Orleans Court Superior bench dismissed that he is not under the ADA finding disabled because his range jobs. affect his to work in broad The court also found that even if plaintiff were disabled within the ADA, meaning of the request camp attend could not be made without undue hardship appeal DOC. This followed. case governed by prohibits This Title II of the which agencies state like the DOC from excluding an individual from a DOC because of the individual’s program disability. See U.S.C. 12132 states). (forbidding disability discrimination A person *3 (1) person disabled if the has a or mental “physical impairment,” “that substantially limits one or more of the life 42 major activities.” U.S.C. 12102(2)(A)(1995). regulations Under the Title II of the implementing deference, Bartlett v.N.Y.State Bd. great to which we must accord Examiners, (2d Law 69, 79, 2000), 226 F.3d 82 Cir. a substantial limitation is established “when the individual’s life important activities conditions, manner, are restricted to the as or duration under which they can be in performed comparison people.” to most 28 C.F.R. Pt. AApp. (2003); see also Gonzales v. § 35.104 Bd. of Medical Examiners, Nat’l 620, 626-27(6th 2000) (DO F.3d Cir. J regulations require comparison of “disabled,” plaintiffs general population). limits to those of To a causal nexus must exist between the and the substantial limitation 84-85, Bartlett, life major activity at issue. 226 F.3d at “In other words, the of‘disability’... definition encompasses requirement that factors, the impairment, and not some other factor or that causes the substantial limitation.” Id. case, 9. In this there is dispute angina physi- no that Prinz-Metil is a impairment.
cal At issue is whether plaintiffs impairment substantially a life major activity. major activity limits The life the parties contest is to plaintiffs ability work. a determination of whether plaintiff is disabled within the of the ADA on whether his working turns ability substantially than some angina limited Prinz-Metil rather factor. The trial court that heart is not other found condition limits, normally way, which in meaningful person’s capacity one few, Many persons angina work. with Prinz-Metil live and work with if any, any day-to restrictions. Plaintiffs condition has not affected of his day activities, perform laundry nor interfered with his ability fact, janitorial jobs prison. In position held laundry at the time he in this fact testified case. The that could work while incarcerated demonstrates his medical condition not substantially ability limit his to work. Cf. Gelabert-Ladenheim Airlines, Inc., 54, 59-63(1st 2001) American Cir. in (relying part F.3d pre- post-impairment history, court concludes that work); was not “substantially ability limited” her Dutcher v. (5th 1995) (welder Ingalls Shipbuilding, 53 F.3d Cir. was not substantially limited her to work where she could shop); 718, 722-24 welder in fab Hosp., Heilweil v. Mount Sinai (2d 1994) (construing Rehabilitation Act’s similar definition of disability and concluding that asthmatic substantially was not limited in working she because could work other of hospital areas without asthma); her aggravating Police, Smaw v. Va. State Dep’t 862 F. Supp. 1469, 1475 (E.D. Va. position (plaintiffs “present dispatcher as a negate would seem any argument is disqualified she from her profession by weight”). her Significantly, plaintiff himself describes his condition as an inconvenience.
¶ 10. argues Plaintiff notwithstanding ability to at a jobs number of at the prison, his need to be in reasonable proximity of presents care a geographical temporal limitation on his points to work. regulations He out that issued under Title I of the ADA direct jobs courts to consider the available and foreclosed individual in the geographical area to which the individual has access. See 1630.2(j)(3)(ii)(A.) analogizes Plaintiff his situation to guidelines one described interpreting regulations: those an individual [SJuppose has allergy to a substance found in high most rise office buildings [making] ... ex- breathing tremely difficult. Since this individual would be *4 limited in the ability perform range the broad vari- jobs in ous classes that are conducted in rise office high buildings within the geographical area to which he she or has reasonable access, he she would be limited in substantially working. (2003). that because Plaintiff claims 1630.2(j), App. Pt. at the work working any job him from
condition precludes limiting. substantially is impairment case, not, a in the instant It is analogy inapposite. is Plaintiffs variety jobs -wide from a being precluded of an individual
matter
common to the
by a factor
aggravated
condition is
the medical
because
by substances
(i.e.,
allergy aggravated
are
jobs
where
workplaces
Rather,
is
from
precluded
the individual
buildings).
office
high-rise
convicted of
having
been
because he is
variety
jobs
wide
whose
to a worker
analogous
is more
situation
plaintiffs
crime.
particular
in a
office
doing office work
her from
allergies preclude
buildings
in other
(the
similar work
camp)
can
building
but
Heilweil,
such,
(NSCF).
As
¶ case, place plaintiff 14. In this the DOC decided not to at the work camp to the same he was because it has job doing coverage misper no medical condition. The DOC holds no heart, condition, however, the ceptions about nature of his nor does it work; the regard plaintiff limited in his As trial found, court the plaintiff DOC full time at the permitted to work jobs. laundry regard addition other Because the DOC does not substantially limiting heart condition as 12102(2)(C). the meaning is not disabled within of In of light 15. our not disabled for holding purposes the plaintiff’s we render no on the opinion trial court’s decision that request accommodation was unreasonable.
Affirmed. Johnson, J., 16. dissenting. logic underlying The the Court’s conclu- Department sion that the of Corrections did not against discriminate plaintiff on the physical basis of a disability, although indisputably denied him community-based access to a camp solely condition, because of his heart recalls the old children’s “I saw a adage: man upon the stairs. I again, looked not there. I he’d go was wish away.” There is a strangely similar the reasoning, disconnects Court’s and while the fault lie some extent in inherent difficulty a civil enforcing rights statute inside a prison setting, responsi- we have a bility protect nevertheless to even our prison population from invidious on discrimination basis of or mental disability. Because I do not believe that the Court adequately has addressed responsibility, this I must respectfully dissent.
¶ 17. The facts here were generally The undisputed. State conceded an plaintiff, inmate at the Northern Facility State Correctional Newport, “physical has impairment” under the Americans with condition, Disabilities Act. U.S.C. His known as Prinz-Metil angina, results coronary occasional of the spasms artery requires that plaintiff initially then, take nitroglycerin several tablets and if pain persists, have an EKG to determine if further treatment neces- sary. Failure to diagnose and treat within hours two could spasm result found, a heart attack. Accordingly, as the trial court here to, “proximity availability capability 24-hour EKG is critical to successful monitoring, management [plaintiff’s condition].” facilities in Vermont the few correctional is one of
Northern State coverage. hour twenty-four has to the Caledonia to transfer sought 18. Plaintiff in St. Facility Regional Correctional to the Northeast adjacent located there to earn offered advantage opportunity Johnsbury, to take during camp generally Inmates at the time” credit. “good double communities, in the although jobs camp in local day projects is staffed camp available. The on site are also laundry and elsewhere medical care is Additional p.m. from a.m. to 2:30 on-duty nurse 6:00 Regional Northeast nearby at per-day sixteen hours available The deter- Department hour care. neither has Facility, but participate “medically qualified” mined that was *6 to coverage hour medical of the lack of because camp work affirmed the condition. The trial court manage and his heart monitor decision, plaintiff other that is concluding, among things, Department’s working only from the ADA he is barred not “disabled” under because limited in location, substantially and therefore is not the work one 12102(2)(A) “disability” as a (defining § ability his to work. See id. more “substantially that limits” one or impairment or mental physical activities, “working”). includes major life which below, here, reaches the same para- like the trial court 19. The Court not within the that disabled plaintiff doxical conclusion — — medical care his condition adequate with access to ADA because work, undisputed to it is that ability although not limit his generally does solely because the De- prison camp denied access to the plaintiff was him from precludes that his medical condition determined partment fair, not anomaly for this rest working responsibility there. To be Court, defining traced to the federal rule entirely may but with to “either a class inability perform limitation” on work as an “substantial classes,” precluding and from jobs range jobs or a various broad job.” 29 C.F.R. perform single, particular to “a inability the definition Airlines, Inc., 471, 491 Sutton v. United 527 U.S. 1630.2(j)(3)(i); see to that (“substantially” ability requires limited in the jobs”). in a Yet they are unable to “broad class plaintiffs allege may that a-substantial limitation regulations recognize the federal also “condition, on the manner or duration from a restriction significant arise work, can his or her under which an individual” added), area “geographical as well as from the 1630.2(j)(l)(ii) (emphasis § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii)(A) reasonable access.” Id. to the individual has which added). (emphasis plainly 20. here supports evidence conclusion that employment has a medical that impairment restricts to work that, testified,
sites as his physician relatively “quick easy” afford and inconceivable, sophisticated to care. It is for example, access any job condition would allow him to work at located more than facility EKG-monitoring one hour’s drive from a medical with equipped conclude, or in equipment, joba where he was alone. It is reasonable to therefore, that plaintiffs significant heart ailment imposes “condition” work, on the circumstances in which he can significantly limits the “geographic area” of to which employment reasonably has access.2 (2d Derwinski, e.g., Guice-Mills v. (plaintiff generally ability illness that restricted to arrive at work during early morning substantially had hours ability limited to work under analogous provisions Rehabilitation Act of 1973); 504, 510, 687 Potvin v. Cable Champlain Corp., 165Vt. A.2d (1996) (plaintiff with gastrointestinal ailment that made it impossible work evening ability hours was limited work under Act); (individual ADA and Rehabilitation 29 C.F.R. Pt. App. 1630.2 allergy substance found in most high buildings rise is substan limited in tially performrange jobs). It follows that s work, heart condition limits significantly therefore constitutes a the ADA. disability under concludes, nevertheless, The Court is not substan-
tially limited in his ability to therefore is disabled under the Act, because the only prison work site from plaintiff precluded which as a result of his community medical condition is the As the camp.- Court explains, “plaintiffs limited, choice of work sites but the *7 condition, limitation is not a factor of medical ais factor of his Ante, added). incarceration.” at 11 (emphasis ¶ With all due I believe respect, the majority’s analysis is deficient. The United States Court Supreme has determined that Title II of the (ADA), Americans with Act § Disabilities 42 12131 U.S.C. et seq., “unmistakably prisons includes State and within its prisoners coverage.” 206, 209 Pa. Dep’t Yeskey, U.S. As many commen of Corr. observed, however, tators have holding Yeskey Court’s raised more 2 The fact like most individuals here, insists that disabilities, significant reasonable accommodations his condition does not on restriction impose any finding “regarded to work does not that he is as” preclude disabled, disabled, 12102(2)(C) (1995). legal sense under the ADA. 42 U.S.C. no one with Otherwise, Id. 12131(2); job. could ever that he or she was disability prove “qualified” 35.140(a) (2003). C.F.R.§ the anti- actually applying of purposes for than it answered questions context of state unique ADA in the provisions discrimination Yeskey, much less come to mention fails even Yet the Court prison. The Carnahan, e.g., S. for the case at bar. grips implications with its Institutions, Act in State Correctional Disabilities Americans with Yeskey (1999) (Court decision in 291, 314-15 Appeals of U. L. Rev. Cap. address, question not difficult resolve, Court did Supreme and did of deference to extent, whether, principles traditional and to what apply administrators context in constitutional of prison decisions Language Is Statutory Broad ADA); Comment, under statutory claims Prisons, Act in State Disability Applies Americans The Ambiguous: Not (1998) (Yeskey raises funda Pol'y Health L. & Contemp. 15 J. setting”); applied prison ADA as to “how the will mental issue Battle, Scrutiny Judicial Losing the War?: Winning Note, Act, theAmericans with Disabilities Prisoners’Statutory Claims Under (1999) “far- (Yeskey promises to have L. 483-84 98 Mich. Rev. fundamental issue having left unresolved reaching consequences,” ... claims judicial scrutiny prisoners’ “the level of concerning Safley, also Turner v. 482 U.S. 89-91 réceive”); should see (courts balancing prisoner’s four factors generally must consider prison regulation, against claims reasonableness constitutional interest, regulation governmental and claimed including nexus between impact of accommoda exercising right, means of existence of alternative resources, availability population tion of right ready regulation). alternatives real to the ADA’s only way give that the 23.1 submit the elimination of discrimination “national mandate for overarching — 12101(b)(1) disabilities,” in an 42 U.S.C. against individuals with — to the setting require equal is to access
institutionalized realistically the inmates have access. and services to which programs Appeals Posner of the United States Court Judge Chief Richard in a case that position articulated this eloquently the Seventh Circuit Yeskey. he wrote: prisoners, Disabled anticipated holding the Court’s services, and programs, interest in access to the have the same inmates of their as dis- to the other activities available the counterpart programs, on the outside have to people abled services, They have no people. activities available to free inmates, they than the able-bodied but right to more services
149 right, have a if the Act is given its natural not to meaning, treated even worse than those more fortunate inmates. ****8
Crawford, v. Ind. Dep’t of Corr., 115 F.3d (7th 1997).3 Cir. means, view, What this in my just is that prison as the context must be considered in evaluating burden on the Department of a accommodation, particular proposed so too must the unique circum- stances of life recognized evaluating legitimacy of an disability. inmate’s claimed The reality of life ways. cuts both recognize Courts must the Department’s needs, special security but must equally acknowledge work, inmate’s truncated opportunities for service, education, Note, and other benefits and programs. See supra, 98 (courts Mich. L. Rev. at 505 must “incorporate the unique circumstances life [ADA]”). into their determinations under the The Court’s facile rejection of plaintiffs claim simply because his medical condition — restricts him from only one work site the only community work-camp — available ignores this reality. The Court’s further suggestion that plaintiffs argument would lead to the absurd result of measuring prison guard’s “geographic” access to employment by opportunities avail- able in prisons is equally misguided, guard as the obviously ahas broad range of employment choices outside the prison context. The inmate has no choice.
¶ 25. Measuring plaintiffs access to programs against that of the average inmate —rather than the average person in the general popula- — tion leads to the obvious conclusion that plaintiffs heart ailment limits as it bars him from participation the only community-based work program of its kind for inmates in plaintiffs position. The common-sense conclusionthat plaintiff is disabled within the is, of the therefore, inescapable.
¶ 26. A similar focus on institutional context should also inform the
Court’s
35.130(b)(7)
reasonable-accommodation analysis.
See 28 C.F.R.
(public entity must provide disabled individualwith reasonable accommo-
dation to assist the individual in becoming qualified for participation in
program, but need not do so if it would cause undue hardship). To protect
3
Governors,
In Erickson v. Bd.
(7th
2000),
Cir.
a divided
panel
Seventh
holding
Circuitreversed
Congress
abrogated
had
Eleventh
validly
Crawford’s
Amendment
state
under Title II of the
but left undisturbed
immunity
Crawford’s
applying
construction of the
allowing
ADA as
to state
thus
actions
prisons,
by prisoners
state courts or
the United States.
prisoners administration, key the needs of simultaneously acknowledge implicates prison the inmate’s claim must be whether consideration *9 Thornburgh, e.g., order. Pitts security or institutional (D.C. “general 1450, 1453-54 implicate claims (prisoner concerns do not security choices” rather than policy budgetary deference). is no claim or There same level of administrative require camp poses for access to plaintiffs request evidence here that any security risk. is, course, accommodating the cost of 27. Another consideration noted, accommoda- any in the work As program.
plaintiffs participation
“reasonable,”
prison
and not
an undue burden on
impose
tion must be
35.130(b)(7).
12131(2);
Although
42 U.S.C.
28 C.F.R.
administration.
potentially crippling
evidence of the
cost
Department
adduced
there
hour medical care at the work
implementing
Crawford,
alternatives. See
explored any
costly
no evidence that it
less
(state
that there was no reasonable
Opinion Filed November