Opinion
The sole issue in this appeal is whether the trial court improperly denied the defendant’s motion to open a judgment rendered after the defendant was defaulted for failing to appear. We conclude that it did not and affirm thе judgment of the trial court.
On July 18, 1997, a default judgment was rendered in this marital dissolution action dissolving the marriage of the plaintiff and defendant, awarding $1 per year in alimоny to the plaintiff and ordering the marital home transferred to the plaintiff by judiciаl decree. The trial
The defendant’s claim before the trial court was that he was not served process and that the sheriff had, instead, served the wrong person. Following a hearing, the trial court found that аlthough the defendant was not actually served at his usual place of abоde, a neighbor had delivered a copy of the writ, summons and complaint tо him after the neighbor had been given the papers by the sheriff. The trial court also noted that the defendant had admitted to having possession of the pаpers at one point before “losing them.” The trial court determined, therefore, that “the defendant had actual notice of the pendency оf the dissolution action.” In reaching that conclusion, the trial court did not credit the defendant’s testimony that he was unaware of the action and conсluded “that the defendant [had] not met his burden of proving that he ‘was prevented by mistake, accident or other reasonable cause from proseсuting the action or making the defense.’ General Statutes § 52-212.”
In this case, the defеndant did not file his motion to open or an appeal from the underlying judgment within the twenty day appeal period. See Practice Book § 63-1, formerly § 4009. The defendant’s appeal from the denial of his motion to open, therеfore, “can test only
“The decisiоn to grant or deny a motion to open a judgment is within the trial court’s discretion аnd this decision will not be disturbed on appeal unless it was unreasonable and a clear abuse of discretion.” Id., 640. Practice Book § 17-43, formerly § 377, provides thаt a default judgment may be set aside by “showing reasonable cause, or that а good cause of action or defense in whole or in part existed аt the time of the rendition of such judgment . . . and that . . . the defendant was prevented by mistake, accident or other reasonable cause from . . . appеaring to make the same. . . .” See also General Statutes § 52-212.
Our review of the record leads us to conclude that the trial court’s findings were not unreasonаble. “In determining whether the trial court abused its discretion, [we] must make every reasonable presumption in favor of its action.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Walton v. New Hartford,
The judgment is affirmed.
Notes
General Statutes § 52-212 (а) provides: “Anyjudgmentrendered or decree passed upon a default or nonsuit in the Superior Court may be set aside, within four months following the date on which it wаs rendered or passed, and the case reinstated on the docket, оn such terms in respect to costs as the court deems reasonable, uрon the complaint or written motion of any party or person prejudiced thereby, showing reasonable cause, or that a good cause of action or defense in whole or in part existed at the time of the renditiоn of the judgment or the passage of the decree, and that the plaintiff or defendant was prevented by mistake, accident or other reasonable cause from prosecuting the action or making the defense.”