Chappuis v. ReggieChappuis v. Reggie
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Fournet
The plaintiff, Philip J. Chappuis, II, having received a commission as Judge of the Crowley City Court on June 30, 1952, and been administered the oath of office, following Senate confirmation of his nomination by Governor Robert F. Kennon, and avail-: ing himself of the provisions of
The trial judge, in a well-considered opinion, maintained defendant’s alternative plea and dismissed plaintiff’s suit. The plaintiff prosecutes this appeal, and the defendant, in answer to the appeal, is now urging the correctness of the lower court’s-ruling; but in the event we should hold the trial judge was in error, he reurges his main defense.
At the outset the plaintiff-appellant submits that he has established a prima facie right to’ the office in dispute ‘by presenting his commission, issued after appointment ánd confirmation by the Senate, such right being specifically accorded by
The fact that defendant was unsuccessful below in establishing the legality of his own title cannot serve to impart validity to the plaintiff’s muniment of title if, after examination, such requisite is found to be lacking. It is well settled that in proceedings such as this, the issue to be determined is title to the office, Blessing v. Levy, 214 La. 856, 865, 39 So.2d 84, and that after the plaintiff has exhibited his muniment of title and thus offered prima facie proof of his right to hold and exercise the office, the next inquiry is into the right of tenure of the defendant, State ex rel. Langlois v. Lancaster, 218 La. 1052, 51 So.2d 622; Blessing v. Levy, supra; State ex rel. Williams v. Cage, 196 La. 341, 199 So. 209; State ex rel. Ford v. Miltenberger, 33 La.Ann. 263.
The defendant, for his part, has abandoned his attempt to differentiate his recess appointment from the appointment and confirmation received by the plaintiff, maintaining now that the lower court was correct in its ruling that the office of Judge of the Crowley City Court is one created by the Legislature and not a constitutional office, and therefore the governor was without power, under authority granted to him
The trial judge, in our opinion, ably and correctly resolved this question, and- we quote approvingly the ruling of the court in that respect:
“An examination of the various Louisiana Constitutions since the year 1898 reveals that all have contained provisions granting to the Legislature power to abolish justice of the peace courts in wards containing cities of a given population, and to create in their stead courts now known
as City Courts. Constitutions of 1898, Art. 96; 1913, Art. 96; 1921, Art. 7, Sec. 51. Pursuant to this authority various city ■courts have from time to time been established, and in the year 1928, by Act No. 137, later incorporated as
The plaintiff (while denying that the Revised Statutes are in any way pertinent, in the alternative and only if the office is held to be statutory and not a constitutional office) attacks the above section,
The statutory provisions dealing with vacancies in public office are found in the title of the LSA-Revised Statutes of 1950 devoted to public officers and employees. The Chapter, No. 7, contains four sections, two of which are pertinent here. Section 371, covering
“Vacancies filled by gover
nor”, provides: “Except as is otherwise required by the constitution and laws of the United States and the constitution of the State of Louisiana, and except in other cases where the law already provides for vacancies in office’ to be filled by appointment by the governor, whenever a vacancy occurs in any state, district, parish, ward or
municipal office, by reason of death, resignation or otherwise, the said vacancy shall be filled by appointment of the governor, by and with the advice and consent of the
The uniform jurisprudence is to the effect that all statutory provisions are to be given effect whenever possible. LSA-Civil Code of Louisiana, Art. 17; State v. Texas Co., 205 La. 417, 17 So.2d 569; Town of Abbeville v. Police Jury, 207 La. 779, 22 So.2d 62; Melancon v. Mizell, 216 La. 711, 44 So.2d 826. If acts can be reconciled by a fair and reasonable interpretation, it must be done, since the repeal of a statute by implication is not favored and will not be indulged if there is any other reasonable construction. Town of Abbe-ville v. Police Jury‘, supra; State v. Standard Oil Co. of La., 188 La. 978, 1054, 178 So. 601; Mouledoux v. Maestri, 197 La. 525, 2 So.2d 11; State v. Jones, 220 La. 381, 56 So.2d 724. Moreover, where two-acts relating to the same subject are passed at the same legislative session, there is a. strong presumption against implied repeal,, and they áre to be construed together, if possible, so as to reconcile them, giving effect to each. State v. Shushan, 206 La. 415,. 19 So.2d 185; City of New Orleans v. Board of Supervisors of Elections, 216 La. 116, 43 So.2d 237. In the latter case this-Court quoted with approval the following language:- “Where it is possible to do so,, it is the duty of the courts, in the construction of statutes, to harmonize and reconcile laws * * *. These rules are particularly applicable to statutes passed at or about the same time, or at the same session of the legislature, since it is not to be presumed that the same body of men would pass conflicting and incongruous acts.” 216 La. at pages 144 — 145, 43 So.2d at page 246.
Applying these rules of statutory construction, we have no difficulty in reconciling the two sections.
Having reached this conclusion, in view of the appellee’s concession of the correctness‘of the trial judge’s opinion, in which we fully concur, it is unnecessary to further discuss the main demand of the defendant-encumbent, that is, that by the 1950 constitutional amendment to Article 7, Section 51, his term was extended to December 31, 1954.
For the reasons assigned, the judgment appealed from is affirmed.