101 N.Y.S. 846 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1906
Lead Opinion
The plaintiff, as administrator of James W. Chappell, deceased, • commenced this-action, as his affidavit discloses, to recover stock certificates, bonds and other personal property or the avails thereof, which, it is claimed, belonged to said decedent at the time of his death, but which were fraudulently obtained by the defendant- and are concealed and withheld from the plaintiff.
An order was granted expo/rte upon the application of the plaintiff requiring the defendant toi appear before a referee" to be examined for the purpose of enabling the plaintiff to prepare his com- y
The defendant appeared pursuant to the order, was examined, and testified that the decedent in 1901 owned eighty shares of stock of the Western Union Telegraph Company and fifty shares of the stock of the Morris and Essex Bailroad Company, which comprised-substantially'all his personal property, and at that time these shares of stock were transferred by the decedent. The witness was then asked to whom the transfer was made, but declined to answer for the reason that: “ This action having been brought to recover for certain property alleged by the plaintiff to have belonged to plaintiff’s intestate in his lifetime, and to have been obtained from said intestate in his lifetime by the witness, without right and by false representations and without consideration, the answer of the witness will tend to accuse him of a crime.” A series of questions were then propounded to him for the purpose of eliciting information as to the transfer of these shares of - stock, and the transfer of the balance in the bank to the credit of the intestate, and to each of these questions the witness declined to answer for tlie reason stated.
Upon the presentation of the report of the referee to the Special Term, pursuant to section 880 of the Code -of Civil Procedure, disclosing the refusal of the witness to answer, the order appealed from was granted on the 80th of July, 1906. It requires the defendant to appear before the referee and be examined as to all the property owned by James W. Chappell since January 1, 1900, its transfer to whom and upon what consideration. In addition to the general character of the examination, a large number of specific questions are contained in the order to" - be propounded to the defendant upon the examination, intended to probe fully transactions pertaining to the transfer of these certificates of stock and the bank deposit, the defendant’s disposition and control of the same, to whom transferred, for what purpose, upon what consideration, and in what circumstances.
The defendant is charged with fraudulently acquiring and fraudu
These provisions have unvaryingly received liberal judicial interpretation and have been included among the most important enactments protecting personal rights. (People ex rel. Taylor v. Forbes, 143 N. Y. 219, 227 et seq.; Matter of Peck v. Cargill, 167 id. 391, 395; People ex rel. Lewisohn v. O'Brien, 176 id. 253 ; 1 Burr’s Trials [Robertson’s ed.], 245.)
The -defendant, did not challenge the order requiring him to appear and be examined, but when the examination was directed to the transactions which it is claimed constituted the fraudulent acquisition and disposition of this property he availed himself of his privilege. The right to interpose the bar to these inquiries was accorded to him by the fundamental law, and he alone was given the right to determine whether his liberty might be put in peril if he answered the questions. As was said in People ex rel. Taylor v. Forbes (143 N. Y. 230, 231): “The witness who knows what the court does not know, and what lie cannot disclose without accusing himself, must in such cases judge for himself as to the effect of his answer; and if, to his mind, it may constitute a link in the' chain of testimony sufficient to convict him, when other facts are shown, or to put him in jeopardy, or subject him to the hazard of a criminal charge, indictment or trial, he may remain silent. While the guilty may use the privilege as a shield it may be the main protéction of the innocent, since it is quite conceivable that a person may be placed in such circumstances, connected with the commission of a criminal offense, that if required to disclose other facts within his knowledge, he might, though innocent, be looked upon as the guilty party.” . .
It may be, if it was apparent that - the refusal to answer was a mere pretext, the excuse would not avail the witness (People ex rel. Lewisohn v. O'Brien, 176 N. Y. 253, 266), but in the present instance there is nothing to impugn the reasonableness of the
Section 142 of the Penal Code reads as follows: “ISTo person shall be excused from testifying, in any civil action or legal proceeding, to any facts showing that a thing in action has been bought, sold or received contrary to law, upon the ground that his testimony might tend to convict him of a crime. But no evidence derived from the examination of such person shall be received against him upon a criminal prosecution.” . It is contended that this provision applies to the present case. This section is contained in a chapter devoted to “ Other offenses against public justice,” and with the other associated sections is a substitute for part of the provisions of the Revised Statutes pertaining to the purchase of claims by attorneys, justices and constables with a view to their collection. (See 2 R. S. 288, § 71 et seq.j Id. 267, § 235 et seq.) The provision that the testimony of the witness in this class of cases shall not be used against him in a criminal prosecution was contained in the Revised Statutes from an early period. (Laws of 1818,'chap. 259, § 2 ; R. S. pt. *3, chap. 3, tit. 2, art. 3, § 82; R. S. [Banks & Bros. 6th ed.] pt. 3, chap. 3, tit. 2, art. 3, § 70.) When the Penal Code was adopted these provisions were embodied in chapter 7 of title 8, with the title already stated. (See Laws of 1881, chap. 676.) The Commissioners in their explanatory note (See Report of Comrs. Penal Code, 1865, p. 66) say: “ The commissioners have retained in the Penal Code the. various provisions of the existing law whereby, in respect to particular crimes, the privilege to refuse to testify is removed; e. g., in respect to buying demands for suit, duelling, &c. But they have added no new provisions of this character.” That section does not assume to abrogate section 837 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and should^not be extended beyond its restricted signification.
Passing that, however, the Legislature has no authority to override the constitutional mandate protecting the witness from furnishing evidence which may be made the basis of a criminal prosecution against him.
Ror does the provision inhibiting the reception of the evidence against him upon a criminal prosecution permit the examination.
In People ex rel. Taylor v. Forbes (143 N. Y. 219, supra), the court, in analyzing the Oounselmam-Hitchcock case referred to, and the effect of the statutory provision forbidding the giving in evidence against’him of the testimony, uses this language'(at p. 229) : “ It seems that in such cases nothing short of absolute immunity from prosecution can1 take the place of the privilege by which .the law affords protection to the witness.”
It is suggested that the language of the constitutional provision mentioned only includes evidence given in a criminal case. In the first place, the constitutional provisions have been embodied in the Code of Civil Procedure (§ 837), but no such restriction has been given to these constitutional guaranties. If a compulsory disclosure of incriminating testimony is permissible in a civil case or proceeding then there may be very little protection in the statute for the witness.
In Yamato Trading Co. v. Brown (27 Hun, 248) the complaint alleged that the, defendant had converted a quantity of silk belonging to the plaintiff. Upon affidavits showing that the defendant had acquired the silk by fraudulent representations as to his financial condition, an order for his examination was granted. On appeal from the order the court held that if the affidavits were correct the defendant was guilty of obtaining the goods by false pretenses, and that the defendant could not, therefore, be required to give an answer which would tend to accuse himself of a crime, citing section 837 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
■ Of the same purport is Kinney v. Roberts & Co. (26 Hun, 166) and Andrews v. Prince (31 id. 233).
There is a class of cases (like Ryan v. Reagan, 46 App. Div. 590) holding that the determination of the question should be reserved until after the examination takes place, but these-cases only give emphasis to the .privilege accorded to the defendant. The defend
The pertinent provision in our Code of Civil Procedure is the section cited (837) inhibiting the examination where the answer may accuse the witness of a crime, and that section does not contain the provision that he may be required to testify and then give him immunity by prohibiting the use of the testimony against him. In any event, we assume that section will control in a proceeding of this kind unless there is some plain provision exempting it therefrom.
We do not share in the apprehension of disasters set forth in the dissenting opinion as the probable result of the decision we are about to make. We are not promulgating 'any new or startling principle. The right of a witness to refuse -to answer when the answer may incriminate him is older than our nation and has been one of the constitutional- guaranties for more than a century and has been sustained undeviatingly by the courts, and no calamity seems to have occurred because of it.
The order should be reversed, with ten dollars costs and disbursements, and the motion denied, with ten dollars costs.
All concurred, except McLennan, P. J., who dissented in an opinion.
Dissenting Opinion
I am not convinced that the decision about to be rendered by this court as expressed in the prevailing opinion is not in accord with the decisions of the highest court of this State, yet the results' which necessarily follow from such decision are so extraordinary as to lead me to dissent in the hope that the Court of Appeals may reconsider the entire question and either modify the rule apparently enunciated, or else give it full force and effect and declare that those who obtain property by fraud, false representations or undue influence may know that they may not be questioned as to how they obtained such property, how it was transferred or where it is, provided they assert upon inquiry in regard to such matters that the answers to such interrogatories might tend to incriminate them. Mo case could better illustrate' the injustice of the rule which it is assumed has been adopted than the one at bar. In this case an executor brings
The like suggestion would prevail, if sound, if the executor in this case had been asked to account for moneys or property received by him belonging to the estate of his testator. If he had converted such property to his own use o'r disposed of the. same in violation of law he would be guilty of a crime, and so would be excused from answering any questions in relation to the same. The like suggestion is applicable to an examination in supplementary ■proceedings, which from time immemorial have been regarded as a means of ascertaining what a judgment debtor has done with his property which it is believed should be applied in payment of his just debts. Such proceeding is founded upon the idea that the judgment debtor has fraudulently transferred his prbperty to avoid the payment of his just debts, and yet such action on his part is made a crime. If the' rule suggested in the prevailing opinion is to be adopted then all such judgment debtor need do in order to block investigation as to the disposition of his property is to refuse to answer any questions propounded because his answers might tend to incriminate him. In those cases-—-and as it seems to us clearly in the case at bar by section 142 of the Penal Code—it is provided that the answers given shall not be used in any civil or criminal proceeding against the judgment debtor, but the contention is that that is'not broad enough ; that in order that such information may be obtained it is necessary that there should be a statute broad enough to give absolute immunity to the person required to answer. If
I have said enough to indicate the results which will inevitably follow from such rule, and as above suggested rto case can better illustrate the results which may follow than' the. ohe at bar. An executor seeks to recover possession of the property of' his testator which he alleges is unlawfully in the possession of another, and such other is excused under the rule' enunciated’ from answering any question as to how he came into the possession of such property or where it is, on the ground that the answers to such inquiries might tehd to incriminate him. ,
The case at bar in and of itself is of comparatively little importt atice, but as I understand its import’ it means that no person holding property or funds unlawfully or in a fiduciary capacity can be compelled to disclose the nature of the possession of such property or its whereabouts or what disposition was made of the same to the knowledge of the person of whom inquiry is made, provided such person assumes- to say in answer to any sncli interrogatories, “ The answer might tend to incriminate me ; therefore, I refuse to-answer.” And, therefore, it is incompetent for any court or magistrate to in quire how or in what manner such answer might tend to incriminate. ' There should be no doubt as to the broad extent of the decision about to be rendered. There is hardly an act which a party may do, or atteinpt. to do, fraudulently with respect to property which is; not made a. crime, and yet by the decision about to be rendered no inquiry can be made from the party charged with such' fraud as to the acquisition or disposition of. such property, because the statutes have not yTet granted, to such fraudulent actor absolute and complete immunity. . . ' ■
These considerations lead me to vote for an affirmance of the order appealed from.
Order reversed, with ten dollars costs and'disbursements, and motion denied, with ten dollars costs..
