9 Pa. 72 | Pa. | 1848
The reservations in the deed operate by way of limitation or condition subsequent, for by its terms the right of possession endures only while the father and mother of the grantor or grantee continue to reside on the premises. It was clearly the intention of the parties to the deed, to provide a comfortable home for their aged parents during their joint lives, provided they made the property a permanent home or residence. Analogous cases may be readily cited. Thus an estate to a man and his heirs, tenants of the manor of Dale, is an estate on condition that he and his heirs continue tenants of that manor. So also an estate of freehold durante viduitate, which is an estate on condition that the grantee do not marry. On the breach of these conditions by the failure of these contingencies — by the grantees not continuing tenants of Dale or not continuing sole, the estates which were respectively vested in each grantee are wholly determined and void. And in this case, by leasing the profits to another and removing from the premises, their possession' is for ever gone. They have no right to assign their interest to a stranger, as such a transfer would be contrary to the intention of the parties, who only designed to vest in them a qualified possession to be enjoyed by themselves alone. A person may well grant the right to one which he would be unwilling should be transferred to another, of which the cases cited are- instances: 1 Bl. 419. In whom, then, is the right of possession ? is the next inquiry. Clearly not in the father and mother, or their lessee, for their right by the act of transfer is determined and void. Is it in the grantee ? we think not. After granting the fee simple in apt words, the reservation runs thus: “And Jason W. Chappel, the present grantor, doth by these presents reserve to the use of his father and mother, the possession of the said land during the lives of his said father and mother, as a home and residence for them, and at the death of the father and mother of the said grantor, the possession then to vest in the said Merritt Chappel, the present grantee.” The grant is in fee, but the right of possession is not vested in the grantee, until the death of the father and mother, a contingency which has not yet happened. I at one time doubted whether the forfeiture did not enure to the benefit of the grantee, but to this construction is opposed the words of the deed to Avhich I have referred. The right of possession cannot be in abeyance. It must be in some person. If not in the father,
Judgment affirmed.
