Case Information
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA HUNTINGTON DIVISION
ADAM CHAPMAN, on behalf of himself
and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff,
v. CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:24-0536
TD BANK N.A.,
d/b/a TD RETAIL CARD SERVICES,
Defendant. MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER
Pending before the Court is Defendant TD Bank, N.A.’s Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice.
ECF No. 15. For the following reasons, the motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part .
I. Background This case revolves around Plaintiff Adam Chapman’s alleged outstanding debt and the subsequent efforts at collection. Both parties agree T.D. Bank owns the debt. However, the parties
disagree over the legality of T.D. Bank’s efforts to collect.
Mr. Chapman and TD Bank entered into a cardholder agreement (“Agreement”). [1]
Agreement , ECF No. 15-1. In the Agreement, TD Bank agrees to provide Mr. Chapman a credit
card account. Id. at 1. The Agreement informs Mr. Chapman that “[his] Card is issued and [his]
Account is owned by TD Bank, N.A.” Id. The Agreement also provides Mr. Chapman with a phone
number and address to contact TD Bank. at 1–4.
In correspondence dated May 8, 2023, Mr. Chapman received information about his account (“Account Statement”). [2] Account Statement , ECF No. 1-1. The correspondence is four
pages in length. Id. The top of the first page has the words “Samsung Financing” and “Your
Account Statement” in large font and in bold. Id. at 1. The first page also includes the balance,
minimum payment due, and a due date. Id. The top left of the fourth page, in small font, includes
the statement “Your credit card is issued by TD Bank, N.A.” Id. at 4. The Account Statement also
includes the same phone number [3] and address that were provided in the Agreement. Id. Mr.
Chapman received similar correspondence monthly. Compl. at ¶ 38, ECF No. 1.
In a letter dated June 15, 2023 (“Letter”), TD Retail Card Services sent additional correspondence explicitly seeking to collect on a debt. Letter , ECF No. 1-2. The top of the Letter,
in large font and boldfaced letters, reads “TD Retail Card Services.” Id. The Letter is addressed to
Mr. Chapman and opens with: “We are writing today to remind you that despite several requests
for payment your account still remains past due.” Id. Towards the end, the Letter explicitly states,
“This is an attempt to collect a debt.” Id. This Letter also includes the same contact information
that was provided in the Agreement. Id.
In Mr. Chapman’s Complaint, he alleges TD Bank violated the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act (“WVCCPA”), acted as an unlicensed debt collector in violation of the
West Virginia Collection Agency Act (“WVCAA”), and is a part of an undisclosed joint venture.
Mr. Chapman brings this case as a class action on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated.
TD Bank motioned to dismiss these claims. The Court considers the motion below.
II. Legal Standard
According to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), “[a] pleading that states a claim for relief must contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief.” While detailed factual allegations are unnecessary, the complaint must include “enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007). To demonstrate facial plausibility, the plaintiff must plead sufficient “factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal citation omitted).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows a defendant to motion to dismiss claims for failure to meet the above standard. When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, courts
“must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint.” Erickson v. Pardus ,
551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Further, courts must “draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the
plaintiff.” Edwards v. City of Goldsboro , 178 F.3d 231, 244 (4th Cir. 1999). However, a court
“need not accept the legal conclusions drawn from the facts” or “accept as true unwarranted
inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments.” Giarratano v. Johnson , 521 F.3d 298, 302
(4th Cir. 2008).
In limited circumstances, courts may consider documents outside the complaint without converting a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. Goldfarb v. Mayor & City
Council of Baltimore , 791 F.3d 500, 508 (4th Cir. 2015). For example, courts may consider
documents “submitted by the movant that [were] not attached to or expressly incorporated in a
complaint, so long as the document was integral to the complaint and there is no dispute about the
document's authenticity.” Goines v. Valley Cmty. Servs. Bd. , 822 F.3d 159, 166 (4th Cir. 2016)
(internal citation omitted).
III. Analysis Mr. Chapman brings three counts in his Complaint. Count I alleges violations of the WVCCPA. Count II alleges TD Bank acted as an unlicensed debt collector. Count III alleges TD
Bank formed an illegal or tortious joint venture. In Mr. Chapman’s response, he offers to withdraw
Counts II and III. Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES Counts II and III.
The WVCCPA is core to the remaining issues. According to the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals:
The purpose of the [WV]CCPA is to protect consumers from unfair, illegal, and deceptive acts or practices by providing an avenue of relief for consumers who would otherwise have difficulty proving their case under a more traditional cause of action. State ex rel. McGraw v. Scott Runyan Pontiac-Buick, Inc. , 461 S.E.2d 516, 523 (1995). Hence, we have recognized that the [WV]CCPA is a “remedial” statute. A remedial statute improves or facilitates remedies already existing for the enforcement or rights of redress of wrongs. Martinez v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co. , 803 S.E.2d 582, 588 (2017). Statutes which are remedial in their very nature should be liberally construed to effectuate their purpose. Syl. pt. 6, Vest v. Cobb , 76 S.E.2d 885, 887 (1953). Accord, State ex rel. McGraw v. Scott Runyan Pontiac- Buick, Inc. , 461 S.E.2d at 523 (“Where an act is clearly remedial in nature, we must construe the statute liberally so as to furnish and accomplish all the purposes intended.”).
State ex rel. 3M Co. v. Hoke , 852 S.E.2d 799, 809 (2020) (cleaned up).
Since case law is limited for certain provisions within the WVCCPA, courts have frequently turned to interpretations of the Fair Debt Collection Purchase Act (FDCPA), the federal
corollary of the WVCCPA, to inform decisions. Bourne v. Mapother & Mapother, P.S.C. , 998 F.
Supp. 2d 495, 502 (S.D.W. Va. 2014); Waddell v. Cap. Accts., LLC , No. 2:19-CV-00122, 2019
WL 5792865, at *5 (S.D.W. Va. Nov. 5, 2019). However, where the language of the WVCCPA is
clear, courts must apply the language of the WVCCPA rather than import analogous language
from the FDCPA. Hill v. SCA Credit Servs., Inc. , No. 5:14-CV-29565, 2015 WL 1808930 (S.D.W.
Va. Apr. 21, 2015) at *4 n.2, aff'd , 622 F. App'x 231 (4th Cir. 2015).
Mr. Chapman specifically alleges TD Bank violated WVCCPA § 46A-2-127, which states in relevant part:
No debt collector shall use any fraudulent, deceptive or misleading representation or means to collect or attempt to collect claims or to obtain information concerning consumers. Without limiting the general application of the foregoing, the following conduct is deemed to violate this section:
(a) The use of any business, company or organization name while engaged in the collection of claims, other than the true name of the debt collector's business, company or organization . . .
(e) Any false representation or false implication that any debt collector is vouched for, bonded by, affiliated with or an instrumentality, agent or official of this state or any agency of the federal, state or local government . . . . [4] Mr. Chapman alleges that TD Bank has violated § 46A-2-127(a) by using names other than its true name to collect debt and § 46A-2-127(e) by attempting to collect debts in the name of
unlicensed debt collectors. TD Bank argues that the periodic account summary statements it sends
are not efforts to collect debts, that the names it collects debt under are clearly related and easily
traceable to TD Bank, and that Mr. Chapman’s § 46A-2-127(e) claim is a recasting of his WVCAA
claim, which does not apply to TD Bank. [5] The Court addresses each of these arguments below.
a. Account Statement TD Bank first contends that the Account Statement is not an effort to collect a debt and, therefore, cannot form the basis for a WVCCPA violation. TD Bank’s reasoning falls along three
lines of argumentation: 1) there is no language in the Account Statement that could constitute an
effort to collect a debt; 2) the Account Statement is better characterized as a billing statement that
includes information required by the Truth in Lending Act (TILA); and 3) courts in West Virginia
and elsewhere have held that billing statements that include TILA requirements are not violations
of the WVCCPA as a matter of law. Mr. Chapman disagrees with each of these arguments.
According to TD Bank, the Account Statement cannot be a violation of § 46A-2-127 because the Account Statement correspondence does not seek to collect debt. TD Bank would
prefer the Court to classify the Account Statement as a periodic billing statement. TD Bank argues
the Account Statement is categorically different than the Letter, which explicitly states, “This is
an attempt to collect a debt.” TD Bank contends that the Account Statement, on its face, cannot be
considered an effort to collect debt.
The Court finds plenty of language included in the Account Statement that could constitute action or conduct that seeks to collect a claim from Mr. Chapman. On the first page of the Account
Statement, there is a “Payment Information” section that lists the minimum payment due in bold
and informs Mr. Chapman when that payment is due. Account Statement at 1. In the same section
there is a “Late Payment Warning” that notifies Mr. Chapman that there may be a late payment
fee if he does not make the minimum payment. Id. The first page also includes a detachable coupon
that contains, in bold, the following: “Please detach this portion and return with your payment to
insure proper credit.” Id. The last page lists myriad ways Mr. Chapman could pay the outstanding
debt. at 4. A factfinder could easily find that these statements aimed, at least in part, to induce
Mr. Chapman to pay and that they constituted efforts to collect on claims.
TD Bank next argues that the Account Statement is better understood as a periodic billing statement that includes information required by the Truth in Lending Act (TILA). However, even
if the Court accepts this characterization as accurate, “[n]othing in the Truth in Lending Act says
that a periodic statement cannot serve as a means of debt collection.” Lamirand v. Fay Servicing ,
LLC, 38 F.4th 976, 980 (11th Cir. 2022); see also Caceres v. McCalla Raymer, LLC , 755 F.3d
1299, 1302 (11th Cir. 2014) (“a communication can have more than one purpose”). While TD
Bank may have sent the Account Statement in line with TILA, a factfinder could find that the
statement served the dual purpose of seeking to collect the debt Mr. Chapman allegedly owed.
Finally, TD Bank contends that courts in West Virginia have determined that billing statements that include information required by TILA are not violations of the WVCCPA as a
matter of law. For this argument, TD Bank primarily relies on two Northern District of West
Virginia cases: Rice v. Green Tree Servicing , LLC, No. 3:14–CV–93, 2015 WL 5443708 (N.D.W.
Va. Sept. 15, 2015) and Perrine v. Branch Banking & Tr. Co. , No. 2:17-CV-70, 2018 WL
11372226 (N.D.W. Va. Sept. 25, 2018).
Rice and Perrine were cases decided at the summary judgment stage that implicated WVCCPA § 46A-2-127 and involved monthly billing statements required by federal and state law.
The Rice Court held that the monthly billing statements the defendant sent did not rise to
“unscrupulous collection practices” and may not have been collection practices at all. Rice , 2015
WL 5443708 at *12. Perrine held similarly. Perrine , 2018 WL 11372226 at *5. Though both
opinions suggested that monthly billing statements may not constitute collection practices, neither
went so far as to hold that to be the case as a matter of law. Instead, both rested their holdings on
the finding that the defendants’ practices were not unscrupulous, for purposes of the WVCCPA,
as a matter of law. Rice , 2015 WL 5443708 at *12; Perrine , 2018 WL 11372226 at *5.
Since Rice , several federal courts have had occasion to determine whether monthly billing statements that included information required by state or federal law can be considered debt
collection. The trend in case law suggests these periodic statements may be considered attempts at
debt collection. Lamirand , 38 F.4th at 980–82 (holding a factfinder could conclude periodic
statements required by TILA sought to collect debt); Daniels v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. , 34
F.4th 1260, 1271 (11th Cir. 2022) (holding monthly mortgage statements required by TILA can
constitute efforts to collect debt); see Tederick v. LoanCare, LLC , No. 2:22-CV-394, 2024 WL
1223446, at *12 (E.D. Va. Mar. 21, 2024), reconsideration denied , No. 2:22-CV-394, 2024 WL
3607442 (E.D. Va. July 30, 2024) (declining to follow Rice and Perrine and asserting the court
will not “fashion a new rule that forecloses parties from stating a claim under the WVCCPA based
on allegedly false billing statements”).
To point the Court to case law specific to the WVCCPA, Mr. Chapman cites to Price v. Higher Educ. Loan Auth. of Mohela , No. CC-40-2022-C-179 (W. Va. Cir. Ct. Putnam Cnty. 2024).
The Price Court held that regular monthly statements may constitute debt collection activities that
fall within the scope of the WVCCPA. Id. at 14. The Price Court disagreed with the outcomes in
Rice and Perrine and recognized the general trend of federal court decisions discussed above.
at 15–17. In disagreeing with Rice and Perrine , the Price Court noted that neither case engaged
with changes made to the WVCCPA in 2015.
The Court finds the 2015 revisions to the WVCCPA informative. Section 46A-2-128 of the WVCCPA forbids debt collectors from using “unfair or unconscionable means to collect or
attempt to collect any claim.” One of the explicitly prohibited practices is that a debt collector may
not communicate with a consumer that has attorney representation. § 46A-2-128(e). In 2015, the
West Virginia legislature amended this prohibition to exclude “[r]egular account statements
provided to the consumer and notices required to be provided to the consumer pursuant to
applicable law[.]” Compare W. Va. Code § 46A-2-128(e) (2014) with W. Va. Code § 46A-2-
128(e) (2015) (adding the quoted language). The legislature has amended the WVCCPA multiple
times since. However, the legislature did not amend § 46A-2-127 to include a similar exception.
The West Virginia legislature has demonstrated that it can and will exempt account statements
where appropriate.
The language of the WVCCPA, the case law, and the actions of the West Virginia legislature all suggest that periodic statements that include information required by TILA may
constitute efforts to collect debt. Further, the specific language of the Account Statement, as
detailed above, could easily allow a factfinder to determine that TD Bank sought to use the
Account Statement to collect from Mr. Chapman. Therefore, the Account Statement may
appropriately be considered in determining whether TD Bank violated the WVCCPA. [6]
b. Section 46A-2-127(a)
WVCCPA § 46A-2-127 generally forbids “fraudulent, deceptive or misleading” debt collection practices. Moreover, § 46A-2-127(a) specifically prohibits “[t]he use of any business,
company or organization name while engaged in the collection of claims, other than the true name
of the debt collector's business, company or organization[.]” Therefore, per the language of the
statute, the use of any name other than a true name is a violation of § 46A-2-127.
A plain reading of this statute would suggest a debt collector must use its official, legal name to collect a debt. The use of the word “the” in front of the term “true name” suggests a
company may only have one “true name.” Further, the “true name” of a business would
presumably be the official name it registers and conducts litigation under. Therefore, for purposes
of this motion to dismiss, the Court assumes the true name of TD Bank to be “TD Bank, N.A.”
Mr. Chapman’s complaint supports this assumption, Compl. at ¶3, as does the Agreement, which
states Mr. Chapman’s account is “owned by TD Bank, N.A.,” Agreement at 1.
At this stage, the facts suggest TD Bank used the names “Samsung Financing” and “TD Retail Card Services” to attempt to collect from Mr. Chapman. Neither of these names is TD
Bank’s true name. “TD Retail Card Services” and “TD Bank, N.A.” share the acronym “TD.”
However, the two names are sufficiently distinct that the Court is hesitant to consider “TD Retail
Card Services” to be TD Bank’s true name. Nor does TD Bank claim “TD Retail Card Services”
is its true name. Instead, TD Bank considers both “TD Retail Card Services” and “Samsung
Financing” to be trade names. However, a trade name, by definition, is not a true name. See
Tradename , Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024).
Chapman points to the enumerated §§ 46A-2-127(a) and (e) as the alleged violations here. Since
the Account Statement seeks to collect a debt, the Court may appropriately consider it when
determining whether Mr. Chapman plausibly alleged a violation of the WVCCPA.
As there is no case law on what the term “true name” means for purposes of the WVCCPA, TD Bank asks the Court to look to case law interpreting the FDCPA’s analogous “true name”
provision. The Court agrees that the FDCPA’s “true name” provision is comparably analogous
and informative to this analysis. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(14) (forbidding “[t]he use of any business,
company, or organization name other than the true name of the debt collector’s business, company,
or organization”).
TD Bank first points the Court to two district court cases that dismissed FDCPA claims at the motion to dismiss stage. In Todd v. Capital One Financial Corp. , a district court held that a
law firm with the true name of “Greene & Cooper, LLP” could collect debt under the name
“Greene & Cooper Attorneys LLP” without violating the true name provision of the FDCPA. No.
CIV.A.3:07-CV-189-S, 2007 WL 3306097 at *3 (W.D. Ky. Nov. 6, 2007). TD Bank argues that
the link between “TD Bank N.A.” and “TD Retail Card Services” is equally clear. The Court
disagrees. The defendant in Todd kept the entirety of its true name and added information that
provided additional clarity to the consumer. In contrast, TD Bank removed the “Bank” from its
name and added information that could plausibly confuse a consumer or lead a consumer to believe
that TD Retail Card Services could be a separate entity.
TD Bank also directs the Court to Williams v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A. , where the court allowed the use of “CIBM HSBC BANK USA” instead of the true name “HSBC Bank USA, N.A.”
Williams v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A. , No. 6:14-CV-03103-MDH, 2014 WL 12616751 at *2 (W.D.
Mo. June 30, 2014) The court held the names were “so similar that surely any reasonable
consumer, including an unsophisticated consumer, would make the link between the two.” Id .
Notably, the Williams Court treated the defendant as simply a creditor and not a debt collector and,
therefore, did not actually apply the “true name” requirement that the FDCPA imposes on debt
collectors. Id. at *2 (“Whether the false name used by a debt collector must be materially false to
constitute a violation of the Act is left for another court on another day”). Consequently, this case
is not instructive for the “true name” provision.
TD Bank then cites to a Federal Trade Commission commentary from 1988 that interprets the true name provision of the FDCPA. Statements of General Policy or Interpretation Staff
Commentary on the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 53 Fed. Reg. 50097-02 (Fed. Trade
Comm’n Dec. 13, 1988)). In the commentary, the FTC instructs:
A debt collector may use a name that does not misrepresent his identity or deceive the consumer. Thus, a collector may use its full business name, the name under which it usually transacts business, or a commonly-used acronym. When the collector uses multiple names in its various affairs, it does not violate this subsection if it consistently uses the same name when dealing with a particular consumer. at 51007. The commentary supports TD Bank’s position that it may use multiple names in its
affairs. However, this allowance is contingent on TD Bank using the same name when dealing
with particular consumers. The evidence before the Court at this stage is that, in dealing with Mr.
Chapman, TD Bank used two names—TD Retail Card Services and Samsung Financing—in an
effort to collect a debt properly owned by TD Bank, N.A.
Finally, TD Bank discusses several ways that Mr. Chapman could have discovered that TD Bank was the entity seeking to collect his debt instead of the names listed on the correspondence.
Specifically, TD Bank argues information provided in correspondence with Mr. Chapman, such
as the provided phone number, mailing address, and website link, could have led Mr. Chapman to
discover he was dealing with TD Bank, N.A. However, the requirement set forth in the WVCCPA
is that debt collectors must use their true name. TD Bank has not pointed the Court to any case law
or commentary that suggests that providing the described information somehow obviates the
statutory requirement to collect debt in an entity’s true name.
Because Mr. Chapman has sufficiently plead that TD Bank sought to collect debt under the names “Samsung Financing” and “TD Retail Card Services,” neither of which is TD Bank’s true
name, the Court holds he has alleged plausible violations of the WVCCPA. Accordingly, the Court
DENIES TD Bank’s motion to dismiss the portions of Count I that allege § 46A-2-127(a)
violations.
c. Section 46A-2-127(e) The final issue before the Court is Mr. Chapman’s somewhat amorphous claim that TD Bank violated WVCCPA § 46A-2-127(e). Section 46A-2-127(e) forbids a debt collector from
falsely representing or implying that it is “vouched for, bonded by, affiliated with or
instrumentality” of a federal, state, or local government. Mr. Chapman provides several
explanations for how TD Bank violated this portion of the statute, none of which the Court finds
convincing.
First, Mr. Chapman seems to suggest that TD Bank violated the WVCAA and, therefore, violated WVCCPA § 46A-2-127(e). The WVCAA is the statute on which he based Count II of his
Complaint. Despite withdrawing Count II, Mr. Chapman cites to the WVCAA and alleges TD
Bank is acting as an unregistered debt collector. However, as TD Bank argued in its motion to
dismiss, banks are excluded from the definition of “collection agencies” for purposes of the
WVCAA. § 47-16-2. Mr. Chapman does not dispute this exemption. Therefore, the Court finds no
plausible violation here.
Mr. Chapman next argues that in Cavalry SPV I, LLC v. Morrisey , the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals stated that unlicensed debt collection activities are violations of the
WVCCPA. 752 S.E.2d 356, 366 (2013). The WVSCA did reference potential statutory violations
when a collection agency “collect[s] consumer debts without a license or a surety bond[.]”
However, in making this statement, the WVSCA referenced the WVCAA, not the WVCCPA. See
id. at 366 nn.15–16. As discussed above, the WVCAA exempts banks, and, therefore, TD Bank,
from the definition of collection agencies.
Mr. Chapman also references a footnote in Morrisey that states “[t]hese other improper debt collection actions, which if substantiated, constitute violations of the [WVCCPA], include
collecting debts for unlicensed debt purchasers . . . .” However, the facts, as pleaded, indicate TD
Bank is a creditor seeking to collect a debt owed to it, not an unlicensed debt purchaser, so this
footnote, like the rest of Morrisey , is not helpful to Mr. Chapman’s argument.
Finally, Mr. Chapman appears to argue that, though TD Bank has not explicitly represented itself as bonded by the state, it has done so implicitly in violation of the WVCCPA. The rationale,
presumably, is that in using a name other than its true name to collect debt, TD Bank implied that
it was acting as a collection agency under the WVCAA, which would then require it to be bonded
by the state. The Court disagrees.
The underpinnings of Mr. Chapman’s claims are that TD Bank is collecting a debt that it owns using fictitious names. These allegations, if true, would mean that TD Bank need not be
licensed as a collection agency, per the terms of the WVCAA. TD Bank may have violated the
WVCCPA by not using its true name. However, the Court does not agree that TD Bank using
alternative names to collect debt somehow amounts to TD Bank representing that it is bonded by
the state. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS TD Bank’s motion to dismiss the portion of Count I
that alleges a § 46A-2-127(e) violation.
IV. Conclusion Based on the above analysis, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendant ROBERT C. CHAMBERSUNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE TD Bank, N.A.’s Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice, ECF No. 15. Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES Counts II and III in their entirety and the portion of Count I that alleges violations
under § 46A-2-127(e). The portion of Count I that alleges § 46A-2-127(a) violations may proceed.
The Court DIRECTS the Clerk to send a copy of this Order to counsel of record and any unrepresented parties.
ENTER: May 2, 2025
[1] Though Mr. Chapman did not include the Agreement in his Complaint, the Court may consider the Agreement because it is integral to the Complaint and neither party has challenged its authenticity. Goines v. Valley Cmty. Servs. Bd. , 822 F.3d 159, 166 (4th Cir. 2016).
[2] The Court treats all facts alleged by Plaintiff as true at the motion to dismiss stage.
[3] In addition to including the phone number provided in the Agreement, the Account Statement also directs Mr. Chapman to at least two additional phone numbers. at 1.
[4] Section 46A-2-122 provides the definitions for several of these terms: (a) “Consumer” means any natural person obligated or allegedly obligated to pay any debt. (b) “Claim” means any obligation or alleged obligation of a consumer to pay money arising out of a transaction in which the money, property, insurance or service which is the subject of the transaction is primarily for personal, family or household purposes, whether or not such obligation has been reduced to judgment. (c) “Debt collection” means any action, conduct or practice of soliciting claims for collection or in the collection of claims owed or due or alleged to be owed or due by a consumer. (d) “Debt collector” means any person or organization engaging directly or indirectly in debt collection. The term includes any person or organization who sells or offers to sell forms which are, or are represented to be, a collection system, device or scheme, and are intended or calculated to be used to collect claims. The term excludes attorneys representing creditors provided the attorneys are licensed in West Virginia or otherwise authorized to practice law in the State of West Virginia and handling claims and collections in their own name as an employee, partner, member, shareholder or owner of a law firm and not operating a collection agency under the management of a person who is not a licensed attorney.
[5] In the motion, TD Bank also moved to dismiss due to lack of notice. However, TD Bank withdrew this argument in reply to Mr. Chapman’s response.
[6] In Reply, TD Bank argues that the Account Statement “must contain some fraudulent, deceptive, or misleading representation to turn a monthly statement into a debt collection attempt within the scope of the WVCCPA.” Reply at 4. However, § 46A-2-122(c) defines “debt collection” and has no such requirement. Of course, a plaintiff must allege more than mere debt collection for there to be a violation of the WVCCPA. Section 46A-2-127 instructs that debt collection efforts that are generally “fraudulent, deceptive or misleading representation” can be a violation of § 46A- 2-127. Additionally, the statute details specific practices that are in violation of § 46A-2-127. Mr.