219 S.W. 132 | Mo. Ct. App. | 1920
The controversy in this case is as to whether defendants shall pay all that is due on a certain tax bill owned by plaintiff or only the face value thereof exclusive of interest. The tax bill was issued to a contractor for street improvement and is a lien on defendants' property fronting on the improved street. The only defense made by defendants is *660 that a valid and binding agreement was made by them with plaintiff by which he agreed to accept the face value in full payment, thereby remitting the interest. The defendants offered to pay and tendered in court this amount. The trial resulted in a judgment for the amount tendered. The court granted a new trial and defendants appeal.
The facts testified to show that plaintiff brought suit against defendants on some other tax bills at a previous term of court. A compromise and settlement or accord and satisfaction was made in reference thereto by which defendants paid and plaintiff accepted the face value of the tax bills then in suit in full payment and satisfaction of same and that suit was dismissed. The present tax bill had not been sued on and about a month later plaintiff suggested to defendants that they settle the present tax bill on the same terms. Still later plaintiff wrote defendants a letter in which he said he was willing to settle this tax bill on the same basis as the others were, "with the interest off," and added: "If agreeable, please send check. . . . Please let me hear by return mail." Defendants say that shortly after this they went to plaintiff's bank for the purpose of paying off this tax bill, but plaintiff was busy and told them to come in again; that at another time they went there to pay and plaintiff said that he did not then have the tax bill at the bank, having put it up as collateral at another bank. According to defendants' evidence they made three or four efforts to pay off the tax bill on the basis of the offered compromise but they do not claim to have tendered any money and at none of these times did the plaintiff renew his offer or express his continued willingness to accept the face value in full payment. Plaintiff's evidence is that after making the offer he heard nothing from defendants and after some time he wrote them a letter withdrawing the offer of compromise; that defendants did not make any offer to pay or express any definite acceptance till after he had withdrawn the offer. It is *661 conceded that no tender was made till after the suit was brought.
On these facts we think the plaintiff is entitled to recover all that is due. The defendants' theory is that there was a compromise settlement by which another agreement was substituted in satisfaction of the original demand; that where a creditor makes a compromise of his claim with his debtor by which the debtor agrees to do certain things in discharge of the debt, which he fails to do, the creditor cannot recover on the original debt but must recover, if at all, on the compromise agreement. Carried to its legitimate conclusion this defense might cut deeper than defendants' claim; for plaintiff has not sued on the compromise agreement but on the original demand and to recover on the compromise agreement is to sue on one cause of action and to recover on another. This point, however, is not raised by learned counsel for defendants.
The plaintiff's position is, that at most the defense is in the nature of a plea of accord and satisfaction, but that nothing is shown except an accord without satisfaction and that such is no defense. This we think is correct.
The courts and text writers have made distinctions between compromise and settlement and accord and satisfaction. The distinctions are somewhat shadowy and need not be discussed here. [See, however, 12 C.J. 315.] If this be called a compromise there was no sufficient settlement and if it be called an accord there was no sufficient satisfaction to make the new agreement a merger of the old demand and a bar to an action thereon. There is nothing more shown here than an offer by plaintiff to accept a less sum than was due on this tax bill and a withdrawal of that offer before any payment was made thereon. An accord is said to be an agreement whereby one party undertakes to give or perform and the other to accept in satisfaction of a claim something other than or different from what he is or considers himself entitled to. A satisfaction is the *662
execution or carrying into effect such agreement. [1 C.J. 523; Dry Goods Co. v. Goss,
There are cases where the new agreement is based on a new and independent consideration or imposes such *663
new and independent terms that it necessarily abrogates the prior demand or merges it in the new promise; or, where the new promise is expressly taken as in full satisfaction or as a substitution for the original liability so that the accord may be said to be executed and therefore is a bar to any action on the original demand. [1 R.C.L., sec. 28, p. 201; Gerhart Realty Co. v. Northern Assur. Co.,
The cases which defendants cite do not announce a different doctrine but they are cases where there was both an accord and satisfaction or a compromise and settlement. Thus in Love v. Van Every,
The court should have directed a verdict for plaintiff. The jury disregarded the instructions given. The court granted a new trial and as that is the only matter before us, its action in doing so is affirmed.
Farrington and Bradley, JJ., concur.