(after stating the facts).
“The notice of defendant, which I have called your attention to, alleges that the plans and specifications drawn by the plaintiff were unskillfully drawn, whereby the alleged damages resulted. A person who holds himself out to the public in a professional capacity holds himself to be possessed of average ability in such profession, and ihe law implies that he contracts with his employer (1) that he possesses that requisite degree of learning, skill, and experience which is ordinarily possessed by the profession in the same art or science, and which is ordinarily regarded by the community, and by those conversant with that employment, as necessary and sufficient to qualify him to engage in such business; (2) that he will use reasonable and ordinary care and diligence in the exercise of his skill — in the application of his knowledge — to accomplish the purpose for which he is employed; (3) in stipulating to exert his skill and. apply his diligence and care, an architect, like other professional men, contracts to use his best judgment. If you shall find that the plaintiff was qualified to that degree which the law required him to be in his profession, then the question as to whether or not he did the work unskillfully is a question which you are to determine under the rule I have just given you. If he made any mistakes by which the defendant was damaged, and it was through negligence or from incapacity, he is liable for such alleged specific damages as you may find from the evidence grew out of such negligence or incapacity. If, from a mistake growing out of the exercise of his best judgment, he possessing the reasonable degree of learning, skill, and experience in his profession required by law or implied by law, then, in such case, he would *640 not be liable for any damage resulting therefrom. A mistake in judgment does not excuse negligence or ignorance.”
The request does not correctly state the law. It makes the architect a warrantor of his plans and specifications, although they might be justified by the knowledge and experience of those ordinarily skilled in the business. The law does not imply such a warranty, or the guaranty of the perfection of his plans. The result may show a mistake or defect in them, although he may have exercised the reasonable skill required. Plans, now considered safe, experience and advanced knowledge of the science may hereafter show to be unsafe. The law requires only the exercise of ordinary skill and care, in the light of present knowledge.
Coombs
v.
Beede,
“Grand Rapids, Mich., Dec. 8, 1894.
“ I hereby acknowledge full payment and satisfaction *641 for all services heretofore rendered, or hereafter to be rendered, in and about the preparation of plans for the business block to be built by M. J. Clark on South Ionia street, and in looking after the building of said block, to its completion. W. A. Chapel.”
Error is assigned upon the following instruction:
“If the circumstances under which the receipt, so called, was given by the plaintiff, were as testified to by the plaintiff, it was given at the request of the defendant, under a promise by him that, as between them, it was to have no effect, and the defendant would, in fact, pay to plaintiff all that his services should be worth, — ‘would pay him well for his services,’ in his own language.”
The objection is that there was no testimony on which to base the instruction. The case evidently was tried by both parties upon the theory that this receipt was open to explanation. Plaintiff testified that defendant, just before leaving home for California, asked for this receipt, saying that it would make no difference with their agreement, and that he was going to pay him well for his work. There was a clear dispute as to the circumstances and reasons for giving this receipt, which made it a proper subject for the determination of the jury.
Judgment affirmed.