49 So. 241 | Ala. | 1909
The bill in this case was filed by the appellant, as trustee in bankruptcy of Jacob Traub,
This court has recently passed upon the validity of section 32 of the act of February 18, 1897 (Acts 1896-97, p. 1393), holding it not to be violative of the Constitution (Rayford v. Faulk, 45 South. 714), and has also held that under said act (which was copied into the Code of 1896 as se.ction 2607) policies of insurance therein described are exempt from the claims of creditors of either the insured or the beneficiary. — Mitchell et al. v. Allis, Adm’r, et al., 157 Ala. 304, 47 South. 715; Heflin, as Adm’r, v. Allen et al., supra, 48 South. 695. Whether reference is made to the amount due at the death of the insured, or to the amount of the surrender value of the policy, it is still “the sum or amount of insurance becoming due and payable by the terms of the application and policy.” If the creditors can come in and demand that the valué of the policy be paid to them, either by the insured or by the company, it' would destroy its value as exempt property and render the statute nugatory.
The appellant claims that there is a distinction between the words “insured” and “assured,” and that the “assured” is the beneficiary, while the “insured” is the party whose life is insured. ' It is true that the word
It will be seen, from this and other cases, that stress is laid upon the question as to who procured the policy to be issued, and that, when a third party procures a policy on another’s life, said third party is spoken of as the assured, because the contract is with him; also that the construction depends upon the “collocation of the terms.” 1 Words and Phrases, pp. 592. But, however that may be (although we think that, in our statute, the word applies to the person whose life is insured), in this case, according to the statement in the bill, the person who procured the policy, and whose life was insured, was also the beneficiary, as it is stated ' that it was payable to him or his estate. The gravaman of this complaint is that he had no right to assign the policy to his wife, and, as above shown, he was both the “insured” and the ‘assured,” if there was any difference in the terms, and the policy was exempt under the statute. Consequently it was no wrong to the creditors for him to assign it to his wife.
It is evident that section 70 refers only to insurance policies which are not exempt by the state laws. As stated by the Circuit Court of Appeals : “This rule of exemption, therefore, pervades the whole act, and is to be read into every other section and provision of the act.” — Steele et al. v. Buel et al, 104 Fed. 968, 970, 44 C. C. A. 287. The point is also clearly decided in the case of Holden v. Stratton, 198 U. S. 202, 212, 213, 25 Sup. Ct. 656, 49 L. Ed. 1018.
The trustee in bankruptcy is not entitled to receive any part of the proceeds of said policy of insurance, and the decree of the court is affirmed.
Affirmed.