2 Tex. 306 | Tex. | 1847
delivered the opinion of the court.
David Chandler was indicted for murder, charged to have been committed upon the person of “ one Claiborne, a negro man, who theretofore had been a slave of one David Conner.”
The accused was put upon his trial and the jury returned a verdict of “guilty of manslaughter.”
His counsel moved the court for a new trial, which being refused, they moved in arrest of judgment. This motion was also overruled, and the prisoner appealed.
It is now insisted that the judgment ought to be reversed on two grounds.
1st. That the court erred in the instruction given to the jury, as to the effect, as evidence, of admissions or confessions.
2d. That the court erred in ruling, both in the instructions to the jury and on the motion in arrest of judgment, that a freeman may be convicted of manslaughter for the homicide of a slave.
1. The record contains no statement of facts and none of the evidence accompanies the bill of exceptions. It is manifest that the propriety of the instruction, which is the subject of the first objection, must depend upon the evidence upon which that instruction was based. That evidence not being before us, we have no means of revising the charge, in reference to its correctness as applied to the case in evidence; nor of ascertaining whether, indeed, it had any application whatever to the evidence, or could by any possibility have influenced the verdict. As it appears in the record, the instruction complained of must be regarded as a mere abstract proposition, and cannot authorize a reversal of the judgment. A judgment will not be reversed for an erroneous instruction,
2. It remains to inquire whether the court erred in ruling that a freeman may be convicted of manslaughter for the homicide of a slave. This was the question considered in the case of Fields v. The State of Tennessee, 1 Yerg. 156. The supreme court of that state seem to have examined and considered the question with great care, and with reference to all the authorities and principles which have been invoked in the case before us. After a very elaborate and thorough investigation of the subject, conducted, doubtless, with means of information to which we have not access, that learned court decided that, by the common law, the felonious killing of a slave without malice is manslaughter.
We deem it unnecessary to enter upon a particular examination of the grounds upon which this conclusion is based. It seems so-consonant to reason and principle as scarcely to require the support of argument or authority. The only matter of surprise is that it should ever have been doubted.
In the absence of legislation, the common law is, and since the adoption of the constitution of the late republic ever has been, in criminal cases the rule of decision.
Our legislation applicable to the question leaves no doubt that the ruling of the court in the case before us was in ac
At the same time that the legislation of this country makes certain distinctions between slaves and freemen respecting particular crimes and offenses, it is not perceived that where not otherwise provided, or where the relations arising out of the institution of slavery do not necessarily imply the reverse, the general laws providing for the punishment of crimes do not ■equally apply to both. It seems especially to have been the intention of our legislation upon that subject to throw around the life of the slave the same protection which is guaranteed to a freeman. The 4th section of the act of 1840, “concerning slaves,” 4 Stat. 172, declares “ that if any person shall murder any slave, or so cruelly treat the same as to cause death, the same shall be felony and punished as in other cases of murder.” The constitution of the state, art. 8, see. 3, provides that “ Any person who shall maliciously dismember or deprive a slave of life shall suffer such punishment as would be inflicted in case the like offense had been committed upon a free white person.” These provisions seem to have been intended to make the felonious homicide of a slave punishable in the same manner as that of a freeman.
It is not pretended that the murder of a slave is not a crime indictable and punishable in like manner as that of a free white person. Manslaughter is treated in the law, not so much ■as an independent and distinct substantive crime, as the extenuation or mitigation of the crime of murder. Under an indictment for murder the offender may be convicted of man
But the doctrine contended for would lead to the singular consequence of denying to the accused the right to extenuate a homicide, proved to have been committed by him, by any proof whatever, or else of converting that extenuation into a. justification of the homicide — an absurdity, as we think, which has no foundation in our system of criminal jurisprudence.
We are of opinion that there is no error in the judgment of the district court, and* that it is. affirmed.