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Chance Management, Inc. v. South Dakota
97 F.3d 1107
8th Cir.
1996
Check Treatment

*1 HQ7 rеasons, judg- For these prosecution. court is reversed.

ment of the district MANAGEMENT, INC., a South

CHANCE corporation; A.

Dakota William Sand-

ers, Wyoming resident, Plaintiffs-Ap-

pellants, DAKOTA; Mark

STATE OF SOUTH W.

Barnett, capacity official as Attor- his Dakota;

ney General of South Lottery; Walker, in her

Dakota Susan capacity Executive

official Director Lottery; King,

of the South Dakota H.I. capacity as member of the his official Lottery Commission; Dakota

Beverly McCracken, ca- in her official

pacity Dakota as member of the South

Lottery Commission; Emery, Elaine capacity

her official as member of Lottery Commission; Dakota Don

Bender, capacity in his official as mem- Lottery Dakota

ber of the South Com-

mission; Solum, in her official Burdette

capacity as member of the South

Lottery Commission; Carmody, E. John

Sr., capacity in his official as member of Lottery Commission,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 95-1665. Appeals,

United States Court

Eighth Circuit. 17, 1995.

Submitted Nov. 10, 1996.

Decided Oct. *2 Sanford, Falls, argued,

Steven W. Sioux SD, plaintiffs-appellants. for (Lee Hallem, Pierre, Jeffrey argued, P. SD McCahren, brief), M. defendants- appellees. HANSEN, LAY, MURPHY,

Before Judges. Circuit HANSEN, Judge. Circuit corporation may A obtain a license as lottery operator machine for the South Lottery only if residents of South majority ownership Dakota hold the interest corporation. Laws Ann. S.D. Codified (Supp.1995). Manage- 42-7A-ri3 Chance ment, Inc., and William A. Sanders filed this suit, challenging constitutionality residency requirement under the Commerce Clause, Equal Protection Clause Amendment, Privileges Fourteenth and Immunities Clause. The district court1 granted summary judgment. the defendants court concluded that Commerce Clause apply restrictions do not to the statute be- cause the state of Dakota is in the video busi- ness. The court further held that the statute Equal does not violate the Protection Clause plaintiffs standing and that the Jones, Judge 1. The Honorable John B. United States District for the District of South Dakota.

H09 Commission, promulgated by § 42- id. Privileges and Immunities Clause assert 7A-21. appeal. We affirm. ehallenge. operates South Dakota controls I. large part through Dakota, gam- various forms In South computer system, central which is located in *3 Laws Ann. legal. Codified

bling are See S.D. Lottery the main office of the South Dakota (1991 Supp.1996) §§ to -106 42-7-47 Pierre, Although in South Dakota. the state (horse §§ dog racing); id. 42-7A-1 and on which does own the video machines (South §§ Lottery); id. 42-7B-1 Dakota -55 games played or of chance are the mo- machines). (card games and slot to -62 machines, it dems attached to the owns the operates one of the Dakota owns and South programs operate dominant software Dakota, gaming enterprises South Erasable, machines. The state owns the Lottery, a video lot- Dakota which is South (EP- Only Memory Programmable, Read lottеry of tery consists business. Video ROM) machines, chips in the video without computer-con- played on a games of chance could not function. The which the machines machine, simulating games trolled video chips protects data that EPROM contain the keno, blackjack, bingo. poker, South system by and secures the from invasion lottery business in operates Dakota its video year In outside influences. the first of its III, 25 of the with Article Section accordance operation, spent the state two million dollars Constitution, which, as amend- Dakota South computer system, personnel, on the central 1994,2 reads as follows: ed expenses. and related any Legislature shall not authorize lottery operators (opera- machine Video However, lottery_ it shall game of ... tors) own the individual video machines and Legislature to authorize lawful for the operation responsible are for their and main- law, games lottery or video by a state (J.A. 49.) operator places An tenance. chance, both, regulated or which are lоttery equip- or video machines associated Dakota, separately either state of South play in ment for authorized licensed video jointly or with one or more Dakota, lottery in- establishments states, operated owned and and which are restaurants, bars, lounges, cluding lodging Dakota, sepa- either the state of South licensed to sell alcoholic bev- establishments jointly one or rately by the state or erages premises. S.D. Codified Laws on the any persons, provided such more states or 42-7A-l(6) (defining §§ Ann. “licensed es- directly games of chance shall not video -1(17) tablishment”), (defining lottery “video dispense coins or tokens. operator”). oper- machine The state bills Chapter 42-7A of the South Dakota Codi- revenue, receiving portion of the ators for its lottery establishes the state’s video fied Laws by electronically sweeping oper- payment independent direction of an under the S.D. Admin. R. ators’ bank accounts. Lottery Dakota Commis- agency, the South of the The state’s share 48:02:06:03 (the Commission). S.D. Codified sion per time thе net income was 37 cent chapter (Supp.1995). § 42-7A-2 This Ann. case; this the South district court decided statutory govern- a detailed scheme creates Legislature increased the has since ing Dakota’s video business. portion per cent. § An di- 42-7A-1 to -55. executive See id. manufacturers, All machine lottery pursuant administers the rector distributors, 42-7A, operators § must obtain Chapter 42- provisions of id. 7A-2, from the executive director regulations license and under the rules amending ing joint the South Dakota Lottery began operating resolution 2. The South Dakota Lottery. Supreme the South Dakota Court of Constitution allow 1989. In October pro- approved the voters of South Dakota declared that the state was South Dakota actually running amendment, chance, posed in Novem- lottery, games constitutional but III, Article Section ber under the amended Dakota Constitution. in violation Constitution, (S.D.1994). lot- Poppen 25 of the South Dakota 520 N.W.2d 238 v. Walker. tery operations again responded by pass- commenced. Legislature The South Lottery standing to do Privi- South Dakotа order lacked mount the Lottery. Laws Ann. leges challenge. S.D. Codified and Immunities Clause See issuing any Dakota, 42-7A-41. Before license Management, Inc. v. Chance (D.S.D.1995). parties, of these the state undertakes a back- F.Supp. 211-13 ground investigation to ascertain whether the appeal. Chance and Sanders §§ applicant qualifies Id. 42- license. (investigation), (qualifications), 7A-43 -14 -13 II. (ineligible persons); see also S.D. Admin. R. grant We review the district court’s (additional qualification require- 48:02:02:01 summary judgment Independent de novo. licensure). corporate applicant ments for A Am., Minnesota, Charities Inc. v. person cannot obtain a license until each who (8th Cir.1996). Summary judgment ability corporation’s has the to control the *4 evidence, appropriate is when the viewed majority corpo- activities or to elect a of the light nonmoving the most favorable the passed ration’s board of directors has the party, genuine shows there is no issue of requirements appli- set out for individual moving party material fact and the is entitled cants. Admin. R. S.D. 48:02:02:02. Id.; judgment as a matter of law. Cotto passing background In in- addition to Williams, 790, Waxo Co. v. 46 F.3d 792

vestigation, person must be a of resident Cir.1995). South Dakota to obtain a video ma- operator’s chine license. S.D. Codified Laws Challenge A. Commerce Clause § party seeking Ann. If 42-7A-43. Under the Commerce Clause of the operator’s corporation, majority license is a States, “Congress Constitution of the United ownership corporation of the interest regulate shall have Power ... To Commerce must be held South Dakota residents Nations, foreign among the several qualify order to for a license. Id. ” States, and ‍‌​‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌​​​​​​​‌​​​​​‌​​‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌​‍with the Indian Tribes.... Inc., Management, Plaintiff Chance is a I, 8,§ U.S. Const. art. cl. 3. This clause acts corporation organized under the laws of the only grant regulatory as an affirmative of state of South Dakota and is owned two power Congress, but also “as a restriction Sanders, persons. Plaintiff A. William a res- permissible regulation.” Hughes on state v. (51%) Wyoming, majority ident of owns the Oklahoma, 322, 326, 1727, 441 U.S. 99 S.Ct. Management, of the stock in Chance (1979). 1731, ‘negative’ 60 L.Ed.2d 250 “This (49%) remaining shares a South aspect or ‘dormant’ of the Commerce Clause Management ap- Dakota resident. Chance prohibits protectionism is, economic —that plied operator’s for video license but regulatory designed measures in to benefit was majority turned down because its share- by burdening state economic interests out-of- residency require- holder failed to meet the Charities, competitors.” state 82 F.3d at 798 ment under 42-7A-43. (citing Energy New Co. Indiana v. Lim of Chance and Sanders filed bach, 269, 273, 486 U.S. against Dakota, this suit state (1988)). 100 L.Ed.2d 302 lottery, the executive director of the state Lottery various members of the state power granted Because the to Con challenged gress Commission. Plaintiffs the con- under the Commerce is Clause stitutionality residency requirement of the power “regulate among Commerce ... Clause, States,” under Equal the Commerce Pro- several the correlative restrictions tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend- on the states under the Commerce Clause ment, Privileges only engages and Immunities are invoked when Therefore, Clause. Both regulation. sides filed motions for sum- Suprеme Court mary judgment. granted The district court “regu has drawn a distinction between state motion, holding the defendants’ that the stat- lation of’ a “participation market and state ute not run does afoul of either the in” Corp. Com- a market. v. SSC Town Smith town, 502, (2d Equal Cir.1995), merce Clause or Protection 510 cert. — denied, —-, Clause. The court 911, further held that U.S. 116 S.Ct. 133

HH to be the opted instead ket, legislature Tim South-Central See 842 L.Ed.2d operate a and to 82, to own largest participant, Wunnicke, 93- 467 U.S. Dev., Inc. v. ber That the action. 2243-45, huge piece 71 2237, L.Ed.2d 81 95, 104 S.Ct. mean does not in the market v. Massa actor (1984) opinion); White dominant (plurality 460 Employers, participant. it is not Constr. Council chusetts 104-45, 1042, 75 204, 208, 103 S.Ct. U.S. is not argue that the state plaintiffs Stake, 447 (1983); Inc. L.Ed.2d it is participant because acting aas market 436-37, U.S. seller, employer. buyer, aas (1980); v. Alexandria Hughes L.Ed.2d argument this base 808-10, Scrap Corp., Supreme played in the three roles the states (1976). A 2496-98, 49 L.Ed.2d ex applying market cases Court free a market acting as 205-06, White, ception. See Clause Commerce the strictures Reeves, 447 (employer); at 1043-44 S.Ct. no indication because “there (seller); at 2274-75 S.Ct. to limit intended Clause was [Commerce] Scrap, 426 U.S. Alexandria operate themselves ability [s]tates reasoning these (buyer). The 2492-93 Charities, F.3d at market.” in the free plain support the cases, does not capacity proprietary acting in a 799. States inquiry argument. Court’s tiffs’ as federal constraints free from should *5 not whether cases asks participation market Id. participants. market private are seller, or buyer, acting as is a state the court’s the district agree with We market, in a participates it employer when lottery video that South Dakota’s conclusion actually participat state is the whether but residency requirement, statute, including its propri market as a narrowly defined ing in a exception market the falls within ac simply regulating the than rather etor with, the begin To Clause. to the Commerce participants. private market of other tions the business within a state statute created 94-95, at Wunnicke, U.S. sub Dakota invested South gaming market. White, Reeves, Alex (explaining 2243-45 get money to the sums stantial 97-98, 2245- 104 S.Ct. at Sсrap), andria state ground. The Lottery off the Dakota actually be must that a state (explaining that programs software the dominant owns regu market is specific in the participating owns lottery machines video operate the exception participation market lating for the ma controls system computer that be We do not opinion). (plurality apply) Moreover, present the state payouts. chine questioned that seriously be that it can lieve generated revenue percent of the ly reaps 50 money substantial has invested Dakota Thus, Lottery. by the South narrowly in the participating into effort in the actively running a business is proprietor. a market as gaming defined mon itsof In furtherance gaming market. residency re argue that plaintiffs The has created enterprise, state ey-making of the equivalent functional is the quirement relationship unconstitu court declared the district statute partner akin much operators machine Dak v. South Gaming, Inc. in Gulch tional parties. private joint venture between ship or о (D.S.D.1991). stat The ta, F.Supp. “busi of its choice Because South imposed a Gaming in Gulch at issue ute market in its role is made partners” ness retail operators or on residency requirement only with to deal its decision participant, Deadwood, South gaming in in engaged ers major part corporations owned § 42-7B- Ann. Codified S.D. Dakota. purview beyond the Dakota residents issue in Gulch Although the statute [sjtate, like “[T]he Clause. the Commerce one analogous to be Gaming appears right to company], has a any private [gaming us, role in Gulch the state’s before presently deal.” whom will parties with select role from its entirely different Gaming was made huge profits to Id. lure had the state Gaming, In Gulch here. too attractive proved market gaming activity and gaming ownership interest taxing or just legislature. Instead gambling solely regulator the mar- was participants the other regulating by private conducted businesses they in Dead- permissible act with the purpose Here, however, wood. residency fostering require- industry. local ment reflects a decision the stаte taken as 97-98, 104 Id. at S.Ct. at 2245-46. operator an owner and gaming busi- language This indicates that the market ness. participant exception is limited to the actual which the state participating, also contend that the resi- extent, and to plaintiffs’ that assertion dency requirement falls outside the market statute must be related to the state’s participation exception residency because the participation is correct. Once we determine requirement is unrelated to the par- state’s that the state participating in the relevant ticipation in Plaintiffs market, however, scrutinize, we do not under point to the fact imposes Commerce analysis, Clause whether requirements number of on ma- proprietary state’s decisions best meet chine manufacturers and restricts the manu- goals. We further note that unlike facturers’ sales of the machines to licensed Wunnicke, Alaska South Dakota is actual- operators. distributors argue Plaintiffs ly participating in the market affected Wunnicke, that under this restriction violates legislation at Moreover, issue in this case. the Commerce Clause. residency requirement for video lottery operators machine beyond does not reach Wunnicke involved a Commerce Clause parties those actually who are and freely based challenge constitutional require to a dealing with the its business enter- ment timber harvested from Alaska prise. processed state-owned lands be in Alaska plaintiffs rely GSW, Inc. v. Long prior export. 84-86, 104 County, Cir.1993), 999 F.2d 1508 at 2238-39. In its discus *6 support a interpretation broader of the im- sion, the Court first defined the relevant port GSW, of Wunnicke. In the Eleventh market, concluding that Alaska was a market Circuit county held that the not a was mar- participant in the industry timber as a seller participant ket county where a resolution timber, of but was not a market geographically limited the sources of the sol- in the timber processing industry. Id. id waste that private a local disposal waste 104 S.Ct. at 2246. A plurality of the Court facility could take. The of facts GSW are requiring private concluded that parties who fundamentally different from thosе before us purchased timber from the state of Alaska to today, county because the had no investment process their timber in Alaska was down a in the market in which it it asserted was stream regulation outside of the relevant participating had even made sure it market in which Alaska was participating subject would not be any to liability. By and therefore not within the of bounds contrast, South Dakota put substantial market participation exception. Id. at money sums of in entering at risk the gaming 104 S.Ct. at 2246-47. The Court explained: Furthermore, our analysis is simply The limit of the not market-participant altered doc- the court’s language that, trine Wunnicke, must be that it under allows a to “courts will State scrutinize ‘the impose relationship subject burdens on of commerce within the- matter of the con- legislation] market tract [or which it a participant, and the condition im- but posed.’” GSW, go (citation allows it to 999 F.2d further. at 1516 may The State omitted). Rather, conditions, not precisely that is impose by statute, whether what we have done. regulation, contract, that a sub- stantial rеgulatory effect outside of that analysis Our is consistent with the Su particular market. Unless the “market” is preme Court’s in Wyoming decision v. Okla relatively narrowly defined, 803-04, the doctrine homa, potential has the swallowing up the rule case, In that Okla that impose States not substantial argued homa that it was as a acting market burdens on interstate commerce if even participant because it owned utility. a Not-

1H3 participation and beyond own go to power participation withstanding OHahoma’s private market activities control could to Oklahoma market, held that the Court Sys., Resource Swin participants); pur- to utility companies private require not County, 883 F.2d Lycoming v. Inc. Okla- coal from percentage of certain chase a Cir.1989) allegedly discrimina- (3d (upholding distinguished be- Court homa sources. county’s concerning the landfill tory rules limitations imposition of state’s tween a private apply to land- they did “not because utility business own beyond the apply immedi- not and d[id] fills statute noting companies, private county] transacted] in which [the ate fundamentally different become “would business.”). not us does before issue apply were construed legislation piece of power using regulatory “its state involve the utility company].” only [state-owned [gam- participants other[] to control case If the Id. at Demolition Coast ing] Atlantic market.” residency require- today us involved before Rather, it Inc., at 717. Recycling, with doing corporations ment for integral state’s decision involves which the companies in gaming business, choice, will deal as to whom interest, would this case proprietary had no operators. as However, v. Wyoming Oklahoma.3 be like fundamentally licensing differ- scheme rath- of a considering “a use The state’s we are agreement issue does the statute contractual legislation”; er than a piece ent partic- of the market only [state-owned this outside “applies take case case in this such, doctrine, contend. state’s as ipation company].” Id. As gaming Scrap, at 808- See, e.g., mar- within the Alexandria falls residency requirement (holding that 2496-98 to the Commerce exception participation ket in its as a market was Clause. scrap pro- in-state statutory giving scheme Su correctly *7 deal, through licensure or con- itbe it will Indeed, as analysis. utility our affects tract. expressly out, the Court pointed have we argue that the dissent plaintiffs and The before as that legislation such distinguished virtually ev- involvement in Legislature us, to “the Oklahoma left Lottery, as of the South ery aspect [its] burden wishe[d] whether decide consti- amended in South Dakota’s expressed will private utilities utility when state-owned the legislation, reveals and state tution Id. ... restrictions.” free of be otherwise We actually regulating the is state of Smithtown, 66 Corp. v. Town also SSC See perva- involvement the state’s agree that that, Cir.1995) (2d (holding 502, 512 F.3d this involvement sive, agree that but cannot participant county was market the although the con- To market.” of “the business, county the disposal in the waste administering state is the trary, we believe buy ser parties to compel private could not state, private like The its own business. incinerator), cert. de lоcal vices from its manage entitled companies, is gaming — -, S.Ct. nied, 116 U.S. business. (1996); Demoli Atlantic Coast 842 L.Ed.2d that the mar- argue plaintiffs Finally, Chosen v. Board Recycling, Inc. tion & apply to Cir.1995) not exception does (3d participation Freeholders, ket 717 F.3d 48 because, by constitutional this case a market the state was (holding that Dakota has mandate, of South regulatory using its it was when Gaming. in Gulch by district court Indeed, struck down was such a statute 3.

1114 monopoly in the video plaintiffs’ business in the and the dissent’s ‍‌​‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌​​​​​​​‌​​​​​‌​​‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌​‍reliance Thus, South Dakota. plaintiffs argue, Western misplaced.5 Oil & isGas fur-We acting the state is sovereign capacity. ther note that residency South Dakota’s re- Ninth Circuit of Appeals Court used this quirement for its pre- own business does not reasoning in Western Oil & Gas Ass’n v. clude Chance dealing from Cory, Cir.1984), 726 F.2d 1340 ajfd private the various gaming businesses opinion without by equally divided South Dakota. Court, U.S. Having arguments considered the present- (1985). case, In that the state of issue, ed on this we hold that the state of passed California promulgated statute and acting Dakota is partici- as a market regulаtions, charging refining companies oil pant in gaming operating the by volume for transporting petroleum in Lottery. Further, South Dakota hold we pipelines over and across state-owned tide- that the state’s require business decision to submerged lands and lands. When the com- majority that a panies any interest of corporate filed a challenge Commerce Clause regulations, operator the statute and machine be held argued the state it was a South Dakota residents is petro- subject transport leum Commerce business. The Ninth Clause restrictions. Circuit disagreed, focusing on permanency

plaintiffs’ refining facilities, which did not Equal B. Protection Clause plaintiffs allow the any option but to lease submerged state the and tidewater Sanders Chance Management upon lands pipelines their rested. The also contend residency that the requirement that, facts, court held under those where the equal violates protection their rights under monopoly state had a companies had the Fourteenth Amendment. plaintiffs leases, choice but to renew their concede that rational basis review governs was sovereign capacity equal protection their challenge. Under the regulator rather than partici- as a market standard, rational basis presume legisla we pant. Id. at 1343. tion is valid and will sustain it if the classifi cation drawn entirely rationally We are not statute is persuaded by re the rea- soning legitimate lated to a Gas;4 City Western state interest. Oil and Ctr., Inc., if Cleburne v. agree, Living even we were Cleburne this case is differ- 432, 440, ent. This case does not concern an estab- L.Ed.2d lished relationship statutory between classifica tion private party state and “need not drawn so where the as to fit with party precision raising legitimate challenge purposes constitutional animating the state’s it.” change unilateral Scrap, to the Alexandria terms 426 U.S. at the “contract.” Instead, Nor S.Ct. at does this case involve *8 parties who are forced to the burden proving continue to of deal that the classification the with state because of is so permanency the of attenuated its purpose to asserted that Rather, their facilities. parties involves the distinction it wholly draws is arbitrary who asserting are they right have a Cleburne, to and City do irrational. 478 U.S. at of initially state, business and the Moreover, state party 3257-58. determining that it does want to do challenging busi- legislation negate must “ev with parties. such, ness As we ery believe conceivable might basis which support Regardless of our reasoning doubt about the "activity-by-activity in analysis," post see Gas, agree Western Oil & we with the result confined to whether state’s decision on the because the state actively engaged was residency requirement falls within the market narrowly defined transportation of oil participation exception. Because neither and was for that reason anot market Management Chance nor challenged Sanders has industry. that reap state's to decision of the 50% revenue (nor from its they standing would 5. The dissent finds the state’s recent increase of so), to do we express opinion on share issue. Lottery of the that State revenue to be rele- to respectfully vant this case. We disagree. Our

1H5 Panel, Communications, Inc., Review Procurement v. Beach it.” FCC Cir.1994) rationally (holding was statute in direct- legitimate interest to state’s (internal related (1993) quotations omit- L.Ed.2d by generated purchases ing benefits the state ted). that contend state). of the the citizens purpose for legitimate has not submitted further, that and residency requirement, of 42-7A-43 Accordingly, hold that we is not related residency requirement does not Dakota Codified the South purpose. any legitimate Protection Clause Equal violate Amendment. Fourteenth residency require that the We find inter legitimate rationally related ment is Privileges Clause and Immunities C. is axiomatic by the state. It ests averred interest,- pre first submitted that the state’s claim, argue that appellants In final their and infiltration activities venting illegal requirement vio- residency Da into the elements outside criminal Immunities Clause Privileges lates the Fur purpose. Lottery, legitimate ais kota IV, the United States Article Section court thermore, the district agree with we “citizens of Constitution, that states generally understood “[g]ambling Privileges to all shall be entitled each State tendency attract criminal greater have a in the several Immunities of Citizens types of business most other than infiltration neither responds that The state States.” Management, enterprises.” Chance has stand- Management nor Sanders Chance furtherance note F.Supp. at 212. We if hold argues that we further ing. The state infil against the protecting of its interest on standing, he should lose that Sanders has elements, tration of criminal merits, resi- the South Dakota because lottery machine closely monitors a funda- not burden dency requirement does an exten state undertakes operators. The immunity covered privilege mental appli investigation each background sive Clause, and be- Immunities Privileges and contacts investigations include cant. Those profitability interest cause bodies enforcement foreign law enterprise is integrity of its business con personal contact require sometimes scrutiny. sufficient to survive (J.A. verify information. duct interviews questions not reach We need 50-51.) addition, conducts In Immunities Privileges and of whether premis operators’ periodic inspections residency requirement reaches the Clause 51.) (J.A. use of the state’s While es. its burden has carried and whether the prevent criminal residency requirement statute, neither Chance justifying lottery business infiltration standing on Sanders nor solution, legislature perfect not be the Man corporation, As a Chance this issue. Da that the rationally conclude could Privileges and Im raise the agement cannot the state’s protect Lottery better kota can Ins. Co. & S. claim. Western munities opera Life corporate if the legitimate interests Equalization, State Bd. the vid maintain tors of the machines —who 2076-77, 68 L.Ed.2d temporarily who collect and machines and eo (1981). Sanders, applied indi has not who money them —are large sums hold operator and vidually for a license of South major part residents flowing from his “injury” only whose Dakota. *9 Manage of Chance as a shareholder status court that the agree with district alsoWe & Setzer ment, standing. Smith also lacks insuring in legitimate interest state has a the Sons, 1311. 20 F.3d at in its investment substantial that the state’s distinguish the cases attempts to Sanders ultimately benefits business as a share- status holding that an individual’s legislature taxpayers. The standing by to create inadequate is holder that a resi- rationally concluded could have nonresident prohibits § noting that 42-7A-43 this inter- further dency requirement would in individuals, corporations as Sons, as well Inc. v. S.C. Setzer & est. Smith Cf. 1116 nonresidents,

majority by obtaining op- account of its substantial investment in a residency software, erator licenses. requirement computer, central and related ex- applicants here, individual penses, is not at issue the court declares it immune from however, for no in individual this case has Commerce Clause restrictions.6 applied operator’s for an license. difficulty majority’s stated points Sanders also though out that even approach whether, is that it fails to ask while corporation applicant case, is the in this participant, as a market the state has by regulation required he to meet individu- illegally attempted also regulate the mar ally statutory requirements imposed ket. explained, As the Second Circuit has 42-7A-43, Codified “[cjourts separately must evaluate each chal provides background which for a investiga- lenged activity of the state to determine requires tion operators certain meet participation whether it constitutes or regula qualifications argu- a license. obtain This tion.” Recycling, USA Inc. v. Baby Town unpersuasive ment because it does not lon, (2d 1272, Cir.1995), F.3d — 66 1282 cert. question address the material denied, -, 1419, U.S. —whether 134 and, cognizable has a — injury Sanders under the 544, denied, U.S. -, L.Ed.2d cert. Privileges and Regard- Immunities Clause. 1452, (1996). 134 L.Ed.2d 571 Dis Sanders, less of the extra hurdles a share- Reeves, senting in Justice Powell echoed this holder, must overcome Manage- for Chance truism when he observed that “[s]tate action license, operator’s ment to obtain an burdening interstate trade is no less state potential injury denying that the ‍‌​‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌​​​​​​​‌​​​​​‌​​‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌​‍license to accomplished by public action because it is Management may Chance cause to Sanders agency participаte authorized to pri directly solely flows alleged from the Reeves, Stake, vate market.” Inc. v. 447 U.S. injury to Management, Chance is “not 429, 451, 100 2285, 2271, S.Ct. 65 L.Ed.2d 244 constitutionally cognizable under the Privi- (1980) (Powell, J, Thus, dissenting). the fact leges and Immunities Clause.” Setzer Smith may participate a state in the market Sons, 20 F.3d at 1317. We therefore hold place firm does not mean it neither Chance Sand- nor regulate otherwise the market at will. Yet standing bring Privileges ers majority the distinction reduces between Immunities Clause claim. participation and market to an proposition. either/or III. majority principally relies on Hughes reasons, For foregoing we affirm the v. Scrap 794, 810, Corp., Alexandria judgment of the district court. (1976), Reeves, 100 S.Ct. at LAY, Judge, Circuit dissenting. cases, 2277. In neither of these did With all respect, due the fundamental any regulatory state exercise authority majority’s flaw the reasoning resulting is the man- policy in a of discrimination. See ner which it frames the issue. The ma- Kelley, Inc. v. jority Cir.1979) asks whether the state of South Da- (noting complete absence anof kota, in exclusively favoring its “allegation residents in regulated South Dakota or operation lottery business, of a video privately restricted out-of-state sale manu acting as a participant” “market or a “mar- factured cement or police power exercised its regulator.” ket Upon finding that the state to suppress competition in the manufacture is market cement”), sale of aff'd, 447 U.S. (indeed, operates monopoly) (1980).7 on S.Ct. L.Ed.2d More 6. The Commerce Clause restricts the states competitors.” Energy out-of-state New Co. discriminating against interstate Limbach, commerce. 269, 273-74, Thus, Supreme generally recog- Court has 100 L.Ed.2d 302 " 'negative' aspect nized that the of the Com- prohibits merce Clause protection- economic Indeed, Supreme expressly court in Reeves *10 is, regulatory ism—that designed measures to distinguished observing such cases in that: benefit by burdening in-state economic interests

1H7 beyond merely Oklahoma, reach statutory commands 502 its Wyoming v. importantly, (1992), partners,” dictating to its “business terms 789, 117 437, 112 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. video lot- its analysis. and therefore majority’s directly refuted to the law struck down tery market is similar an Oklahoma struck down Court There the private Wyoming Oklahoma. public and required all statute per supply ten to within the state utilities analysis urged by the In contrast to the from Oklahoma- fuel needs their cent of other cir- majority, the decisions of several acknowledging that Okla coal. While mined analysis activity-by-activity support an cuits market, coal homa, in the aas partici- regulates and the state both where chose, it coal from purchase whomever could In Atlantic pates in the relevant 804, invali the Court at id. at Recycling, Inc. v. Board Demolition & Coast in im conduct regulatory dated Oklahoma’s Freeholders, example, Chosen upon private requirements purchase posing Third Circuit observed: 454-59, at 800-03.8 112 S.Ct. at Id. utilities. entity in a mar- public participates aWhen Oklahoma, the discussing Wyoming v. In chooses, buy ket, may what it it sell and Supreme in the majority takes comfort chooses, its it on terms of from whom or that were the Oklahoma observation Court’s not, choice; participation does its market only to the state- apply law construed right to upon confer it the use (Grand Dam Au utility River public owned the actions of regulatory power to control (GRDA) “would become the statute thority) in that market. others legislation.” fundamentally piece of different (3d Cir.1995); accord SSC 48 F.3d Oklahoma, Wyoming v. (citing at 1113 Ante Smithtown, Corp. v. Town of 804). If the law S.Ct. at — denied, U.S. -, (2d Cir.1995), cert. were Wyoming v. Oklahoma down struck 133 L.Ed.2d GRDA, the market only applied has likewise stated: Circuit Second applied, private exception were Babylon has exercised of] Town [The own make their be free to would utilities denying powers by licenses governmental buy coal they might whom from decisions haulers but the one hired garbage all In regulation. government unimpeded Town, by establishing civil and contrast, way Dakota South because of for haulers who collect penalties lot- criminal regulated the video has structured a License. Because garbage without market, not free companies are tery private activi- engage such actor could private unimpeded by government to do business regu- acting as a market ty, the Town penalties. facing criminal regulation, without participant. a market than lator rather partners,” choosing its own Beyond “business gar- ‘participate’ Town does regulated all actors has Dakota re- in a different market bage collection transac- by prohibiting hauling services buys garbage spect: it Although parties. private tions between gov- and local market, states BSSCI. But participating Dakota is involving guished prior ”interfere[nce] cases sought to limit access has not functioning the interstate materials used limestone or the natural State’s other ability through restricted the Nor has it through prohibition cement. make either .market up plants or sister to set firms States “Mary- concluding regulation,” burdensome Moreover, petitioner has its borders. within hulks, sought prohibit the flow land has possesses suggested that not unique which it regulate under the conditions or to pro- needed to to the access materials Instead, into the market entered occur. cement. duce up price." Id. at their itself to bid omitted). (citation footnote at 444 2496. Likewise, Mary- Hughes upheld Court in automobile of the in-state subsidization land’s impracticable to found it the Court 8. Because ground processing scrap metal governing portion the statute state- sever that that, the chal- "practical effect” of while utilities, Act as a whole it declared of hulks “did not lenged "was that movement scheme 459-61, reduced,” Id. unconstitutional. was commerce in interstate directly.” 426 U.S. at 803 accomplish effect this 802-04. distin- n. The Court S.Ct. at 2495 n. *11 enjoy ernments do not carte permits blanche commerce the State to sub- erect regulate simply they impediments a market because stantial to the free flow of participate reject also in that commerce. market. Particu- We therefore leasing lar state that actions do not constitute State’s contention that its activities subject participation’ subject are not ‘market are Commerce scru- Clause tiny. imposed by limitations the Commerce

Clause. A engaging in mercantile (emphasis Id. at 1343 added and citations activity immunity does not obtаin blanket omitted). regulate partici- the market in it which There was no doubt in Western Oil & Gas pates, free from the strictures of the dor- that the state owned the tidelands over which mant Commerce Clause. transported the refineries their oil. Yet the (citations Recycling, USA 66 F.3d at 1282 monopolistic power, fact that it wielded omitted). participant, as such awas market not did holding deter the regula- court that its Similarly, in Western Oil & Gas Ass’n v. tory subject function was to dormant Com- Cory, Cir.1984), 726 F.2d 1340 aff'd scrutiny. merce Clause opinion ‍‌​‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌​​​​​​​‌​​​​​‌​​‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌​‍court, equally without divided 85 L.Ed.2d 61 majority dismisses Western Oil & Gas (1985), recognized the Ninth Circuit that a ground present “does case ownership interest in a market does parties not involve who are to deal forced exempt not its of market from monopoly in a State situation that scrutiny. Commerce Clause Western Oil forces,” falls outside the reach of free market Gas involved a California scheme to collect a “parties they but rather asserting who are volume-based “rent” from off-coast refineries right have a initially to do business leasing for state-owned tidelands over State, determining and the state that it does they transported which oil. The state con not parties.” want to do business with the tended that its leasehold activities fell outside Ante at slights 1114. This characterization scope of the Commerce Clause on the deciding the fact that not “does that, tidelands, basis as owner of the it acted Chance, want to do business” with proprietary capacity renting them. opportunity also foreclosed the for rejected Id. at 1342. The court argu else, anyone Chance “to do business” with ment: much as the refineries in Western Oil & Gas

The State owns and controls tidelands and dealing were foreclosed from with other land submerged lands in sovereign capacity. its owners. If the rationale behind the market Although some of the are in lands genuinely doctrine is evenhanded possession ness, of local State entities see 447 U.S. at interests, (where this does not mean that Califor- 2278-79 proprietary “state activities” many becomes competitors. nia one of are “burdened with the same im- restrictions permanency plaintiffs’ posed facilities does on private participants,” then permit “[ejvenhandedness” them “shop not around”. There supports invocation of competitor other they participant doctrine), can market then it would go required rental strip seem that South Dakota must take bitter coastline. The Commission has with the sweet: enter the market California complete monopoly over the sites purchaser used as a lottery operation of video companies. the oil companies precluding, services while through the use of no choice but to despite renew their regulatory power, leases potential all competi- rate, oil, the volumetric gas as the entering tors from If anything, market.9 petroleum-derived products cannot presents the instant case compel- facts more transported plaintiffs’ ling facilities without than Oil & Gas for applying Western traversing the state-owned lands. This the market exception, for the control over the channels of interstate monopoly state has а over video argument that, oralAt ply, South Dakota conceded regulating activity interests in Chance’s participant exception if ap- does not scrutiny. do not withstand Commerce Clause

1H9 [lottery] games.” Codified tion of S.D. and not regulations, of its own result direct (Michie Supp.1995). § See 42-7A-2 Like- by “happenstance.”10 Ann. merely 2281; wise, see also C § 42-7A-21 authorizes the Commission Clarkstown, Carbone, Inc. v. Town A regulations” con- promulgate and “[r]ules of 1677, 1682, 388, 391, aspects lottery, in- cerning seventeen (1994) (“With this respect qualifications op- for ... cluding “[a]dditional commerce, ordi control the flow of stream erators, application of fees to ... the amount discriminates, only the for it allows nance 42-7A-21(7), “[l]icensing § paid,” id. and be process waste operator favored 42-7A-21(16). § As procedures,” id. town.”); id. at limits of the within in- in its brief: “The State’s Dakota admits (“[T]hat control the flow at 1683 lottery pervasive. in video Vir- volvement ... proprietor single local favors ordinance lottery opera- tually every aspect of video effect of the protectionist just makes the owned, operated, specified, controlled tions is acute.”). ordinance more Appel- by the Brief for or monitored State.” pres- question in the be little There should at 12. lees simply is not Dakota ent case that South majority asserts that South Although the parties as to the exercising choice it “is free to choose those with whom Indeed, by its own it will trade.11 with whom contract,” deal, through licensure or will legislative enactments the and constitutional granting of and denial ante regulating mar- it is concedes regulation is far more akin to market licenses grant of to the constitutional Pursuant ket.12 Public licen- participation. than to 25, the Dako- authority within Section in nature: a generally contractual sure is delegated to the South legislature has ta property grants the licensee a license neither the “overall Lottery Commission obligation13 If a mutual opera- right nor creates “control over the management” and Dakota, separately by either the state Theoretically involved in West- the refineries of statеs, jointly by with one or more other land- the state or have dealt with ern Oil & Gas could by owners; operated and the state only prohibited them from so and which are owned the cost Dakota, Here, contrast, separately entry either into the market doing. persons, constitutionally jointly states or and with one or more prohibitive, but or cost is not any games shall provided such video of chance statutorily forbidden. dispense directly or tokens. Howev- coins er, expand majority, seemingly Legislature to broaden the statuto- anxious shall not 11. The scope regard- question authority existing ry and to minimize as of June the market in lottery complete monopoly private ownership ing any of state of South chance, games games “created a state or both. The lottery, that South Dakota or video states market,” portion pro- gaming Legislature ante establish the within the shall residency lottery or adds that “South Dakota’s due the state from such ceeds both, chance, pre- purposes for games does not requirement for its own businеss or dealing proceeds be used. SDCL are to clude Chance which those amendments, 42-7A, regulations, Da- private gaming in South businesses and its various laws, relying cannot and contracts at 1114. These statements and all acts kota.” Ante related regulations, authority upon made itself the laws and fact that South Dakota such soften the for plaintiffs may July date of "partner” beginning enter to the effective only with whom amendment, suggest approved. lottery that the business. To are ratified the video this merely go other elsewhere into plaintiffs can (in part): authority defines “license" 13.One private gaming admission that is a tacit market, lottery regulated the video appropriate govern- granted by permit, A consideration, majority's ignore own command generally seems to a body, for a mental person, analyzing inquiry firm, carry is limited to that the court's corporation ... or narrowly subject defined under the some business be- police power. is not a contract A license III, § Constitu- licensee, 25 of the South Dakota 12. Article a mere but is the state and thе tween personal permit. tion, part: example, provides in relevant property or Neither is right. any game property Legislature not authorize shall 1979) (cita- Dictionary ed. any enterprise, Black’s Law lottery, gift under or of chance omitted). quoted phrase The final any purpose whatever.... tions pretense, or for policy public helpful light However, passage Legislature be lawful for the it shall Laws Ann. in S.D. Codified declaration found or video law a state to authorize 42-7A-56(3) (Michie Supp.1995): chance, both, regulated games which are anything, public licensing “pri bargaining pow- constitutes serve limit the licensor’s governmental activity” Here, meval such as tax er. competi- the state has no favoring ation scheme in-state residents tors, legal for it has erected a barrier to then- partici found to fall outside of the market entry into the video market. Private *13 Limbach, 277, pant exception in 486 U.S. at enjoy comparable power. entities no such 108 at 1809-10. (“A Corp., See SSC 66 F.3d at 512 participation’ only actions constitute ‘market licensing normally state concedes if private party engaged could in authorizing private entails “individuals to actions.”). pursue private occupations Characterizing that demand a same the state’s proficiency, activity minimum level of skill and com- “refusal deal” with nonresi- petency,” lottery but contends that its licens- corporations misleading. dent is therefore ing merely regime “provides the individual or Co., Compare Colgate United States 250 ability participate business with the 307, 300, 465, 468, U.S. 39 S.Ct. 63 L.Ed. 992 lottery enterprise.” State’s video (1919) (“In any purpose the absence of Appellees Brief for at 16. This assertion monopoly, create or maintain a [Sher- (which unsupported by any authority) act long recog- man] does not restrict dubious, given eligibility the substantial re- right nized of trader or manufacturer en- quirements in delineated S.D. Laws Codified business, gaged entirely private in an freely (Michie §§ Ann. 42-7A-13 and 42-7A-14 independent to exercise his own discretion as Supp.1995). granting pub- and denial of deal.”) parties with whom he will clearly lic regula- licenses constitutes market Eastman Kоdak Co. v. Southern Photo Ma- Reeves, 440, tion. See 447 U.S. at 100 S.Ct. Co., 359, 375, 400, terials 273 U.S. 47 S.Ct. 2279; Epstein, at Richard A The Permit cf. (1927) 71 L.Ed. (finding 684 refusal to Constitution, Power Meets the 81 Iowa pursuance “in purpose deal of a monopo- (1995) ([“N]o L.Rev. matter how Act). illegal lize” under the Sherman Cf. generous a view one permit takes of the (“In Epstein, supra ordinary markets, at 416 power, distinguish one must still between the you offer, if people don’t like the terms that regulator state as and the state as owner. you go can elsewhere. But there is no effec- Quite bluntly, power permit to issue a right tive exit when the state asserts its does not —or at least should not —make the state, permit power. The which has a stran- part state a property.”). owner of the glehold behavior, on individual must be told The state’s unilateral decision to increase (footnote omitted)). grip.” to relax its lottery its share of video revenues from 35 to sure, To be “participates” South Dakota percent also argument detracts from its lottery some level in the video market each regulating is not the video time “сontracts” with a state-licensed market. See S.D. Codified Laws Ann. 42- (Michie lottery operator, Supp.1995). majority quite 7A-63 competitive In a market, reject correct argument such an increase a licensor’s Chance’s share normally product revenues would be doctrine is limited to cir- negotiations bilateral possibility which the cumstances in formally which a state acts as losing seller, the licensee competitor buyer, to a would a employer.14 or Under South applicant creditors,” No for a parties license or other affirmative and third such as but “there any right commission action has to a clearly general license property right is no in the license granting approval sought. Any to the in South Dakota as between the state and the approval license issued or other commission licensee”) Dictionary with Black's Law at 291-92 granted pursuant provisions to the of this 1979) (in (defining part) ed. “contract” chapter privilege, is a revocable and no holder agreement "[a]n persons between two or more acquires any property right vested interest or obligation which creates an to do or not to do a therein or thereunder. particular thing. competent Its essentials are Accordingly, suggests this section too the state’s matter, parties, consideration, subject legal licensing regulatory, proprietary, scheme is mutuality agreement, mutuality of obli- nature, bargained for a contract creates for gation.”). rights obligations. Compare, e.g., Rushmore Inc., Dev., Kurylas, State Bank v. 14. See 424 N.W.2d South-Central Timber Inc. v. Wun (S.D.1988) nicke, 82, 97, (noting property rights that "there are [liquor] (1984) license as (plurality between the opinion) ("privity licensee “regulatory impeding [are] measures scheme, only that its licensing national market- private trade by resi- free majority in their corporations Reeves, place.” to enter are permitted dents Unfortunately, oppor- Chance has are corporations market; nonresident-owned footing tunity compete equal altogether,” “removed n. state. at 444 a video operate one n. therefore, must, rеspectfully dissent. I license, doing without a lottery machine felony. See S.D. punishable as so is fact (1991). Im §Ann. 42-7A-39 Codified fairly may not penalties

posing criminal *14 participant. act of a market

considered Corp., F.3d at 612. Pursuant 66

See SSC constitution, Dakota is the

its state lottery opera of video “purchaser”

exclusive services; is no residual market there

tion services, Jones; Terry JONES; nor is might its Patricia K. sell L. which Chance buy might Plaintiffs-Appellants; purchaser who any residual there (“The III, § 25 Art. Const. them. See S.D. any game of Inc.; Plaintiff; shall not authorize

Legislature Publishing, Jones activity lottery_”).15 ... public hallmarks of all of the therefore bears Company, Inc.; Jones Oil regulation, and it is inaccurate licensing and Plaintiff-Appellant; lottery arrangement its to characterize Wunnicke, “participation.” See as market Company, partnership; Petroleum Jones 97, (plurality 104 at 2245 467 U.S. at Inc., formerly Holding, known J.O. (market “does participant doctrine opinion) Plaintiffs; Inc.; Company, Jones Oil merely because any requirement not validate v. with imposes upon someone the State privity”). in contractual whom it is America; Stephen L. UNITED STATES Job-Rivera; Tinsley; Sandy Christie set out scheme Under the Vonderschmitt; Stubbert; John Charles should obvious legislature, Doe, Ser- Internal Revenue regu- Unknown using police powers to the stаte is Treasury and vice, Department of the pre- lottery in a manner late Employees; Department Jane pri- of Justice comparison to a cludes an evenhanded Roe, Internal Revenue Ser- question Unknown entrepreneur. There is little vate 791, Minnesota, Am., F.3d 799 boundary 82 always Inc. the outer is not contract Cir.1996) (finding "no well-founded reason activity”); White v. permissible state Massachu Inc., by the proprietary covered activities Employers, 460 U.S. constrict Constr. setts Council of 7, 1042, 7, buying 204, participant exception acts of 75 n. 211 n. (1983) (“[T]he selling”). Clause does Commerce L.Ed.2d 1 boundary stop require city at the activity against which the 15. The baseline Reeves, contract.”); U.S. at privity formal not a market is therefore should be measured 10, (noting that 2278 n. 10 100 S.Ct. at 438 n. complete- competitors, but a open to nonresident may fairly of a claim some measure "States Reeves, ly See foreclosed retaining to decide sovereign interest ‍‌​‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌​​​​​​​‌​​​​​‌​​‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌​‍in freedom ("The 17, ‘bottom S.Ct. at 2281 n. 444 n. whom, how, benefit and for whose closely parallels the result line’ of the scheme (a deal"); n. 1 603 F.2d at 737 “ suppliers Scrap: out-of-state concrete Alexandria produce power possesses 'unrestricted altogether; to from the market are not removed supplies, whom it to determine those with own competitors, successfully compete with in-state deal, and conditions and to fix the terms will upon ” however, they achieve additional efficien- must purchases' make needed it will advantages their Co., exploit such as natural cies or (quoting Steel v. Lukens Perkins advantage the incremental location to offset 84 L.Ed. own market behavior (1940)), the State’s aff'd, channeled suppliers.”). (1980); Independent in-state concrete Charities notes The dissent Charities, treatment); preferential cessors statute the entire down struck preme Court (holding statute 799-800 82 F.3d at Oklahoma, declining the Wyoming participation eligibility for determining the legislation to construe invitation raising fund employees’ charitable a state utility. only to the state-owned applying as participation the market within drive falls believe, that the Court’s do not We doctrine). state, any private gaming like sever- statute as construe decision with whom those company, is free choose only to the state- apply able or intended

Case Details

Case Name: Chance Management, Inc. v. South Dakota
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
Date Published: Oct 10, 1996
Citation: 97 F.3d 1107
Docket Number: 95-1665
Court Abbreviation: 8th Cir.
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