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Champa v. Consolidated Finance Corp.
110 N.E.2d 289
Ind.
1953
Check Treatment

*1 The assertion is made in the relator’s brief respondent change judge denied in reliance Court, Shelby

a local rule of the Circuit under change judge which local rule the could not assigned properly be denied. trial court no ruling, have no means of know reason for we ing super Rule 1-12 this assertion is accurate. whether subject, ex rel. on the State Chambers sedes local rules 225, and, 2d 96 N. E. v. Heil 1-12, change judge properly Rule under change denied, properly judge is denied. When assigned regardless reasons affirmed will Young ruling. Niblack State ex rel. v. E. 2d 99 N. 252. The alternative writ mandate heretofore issued is an denied. dissolved and absolute writ Emmert, J., participating. C.

Note.—Reported in E. 2d 110 N. 1. Garage Champa v. Consolidated Watkin’s d/b/a Corporation al. et Finance January 30, 29,011. 1953.] Filed [No. *3 Anthony Champa, Indianapolis, appellant. for Ruckelshaus, Reilly, O’Connor, Rhetts & of Indian- apolis, appellees. brought replevin, is an This action

Draper, J. company, possession appellee finance obtain automobile in the of a certain DeSoto unlawfully appellant complaining appellant, appellee, the conditional from said detained same assignee. vendor’s rules,

Appellant filed answer under the and also filed Barnett, appellee cross-complaint and one alleged vehicle, vendee of the conditional the automobile for mechanic’s held *4 storage author- repairman’s and lien ordered and bill judgment owner, praying a by and the lawful ized the lien be foreclosed and that the amount of his bill satisfy the lien. sold to ordered the automobile and appellee The trial court found for the finance com- awarding pany, damages nominal and vehicle. finding appellant’s

The court made no on cross-com- plaint. Appellate The Court nevertheless reviewed the (98 925) provisions pursuant case N. E. 2d to the Rule 2-8. assigns overruling as error the trial, specifies (1) de-

motion for new by finding and of the court is not sustained suffi- cision finding evidence, (2) the cient decision contrary to law. court January 7, that on Otis

The evidence shows purchased from an Indi- a 1941 DeSoto sedan Barnett dealer, paying part en- cash and anapolis automobile tering contract with seller into conditional sale contract, which sale The conditional for the balance. appellee assigned by to the the seller immediately was motor provides that the title said company, finance assignee until or his in said seller remain vehicle shall performed, the vendee fully and that contract dur- vehicle attempt or encumber said to sell shall The contract is silent ing of the contract. the life or as to making the automobile vehicle, good operating con- of said maintenance dition. application for title January Barnett’s

On contained of title newly certificate both issued and his company. appellee finance lien of the conditional retained to and title mailed The certificate pleasure pur- the car for company. Barnett used only. poses was taken automobile September,

In repairs were ordered garage appellant’s knowledge or au- done without This was Barnett. *5 appellee company. thorization of finance The cost of repairs higher pay the was he than Barnett could and company notified the finance the car was held at garage bill, appellant’s repair the for the that he was defaulting releasing on the contract and all interest appellant the Barnett did the vehicle. not advise he or- existence of lien on said vehicle when repairs. appellant him dered the The did not ask con- cerning appellant attempt that. The made no to ascer- tain whether such lien existed. appel-

At the time Barnett took the automobile to garage company lant’s he still owed the finance more contract. than on the conditional sale The $400 Among things appellant were extensive. other tore engine replaced The down the the crank shaft. 31, 1949, repair December four bill was On $206.33. repaired, public after the car was at months was sold auction for $175. appellee question presented is whether possession company the auto-

finance was entitled to held of the fact that it the conditional mobile virtue appellant, thereon, or whether who sale contract unpaid repair- claiming an virtue of automobile, was enti- lien on man’s and mechanic’s possession thereof. tled to retain appellant upon claim that

There is no relied or any way or enforce a undertook secure lien ac- cording provisions of Acts ch.

being Stat., seq. Burns’ et He relies for §43-801 Barnett, proposition reversal car, vendee, conditional was the “owner” had a mechanic’s lien thereon therefore provisions ch. of Acts §56, because of the provides being Stat., That section Burns’ §47-552. repair au-

part work an that a mechanic who does request given tomobile at the of the owner thereof is lien on the vehicle to the reasonable value of the charges materials, storage repairs, labor, for such charges paid days thirty are not within after if may repairs, ad the vehicle is left for mechanic highest vehicle to the bidder for vertise and sell the advertising *6 charges cash, pay costs and deduct his and provides overplus That act to the owner. §1 “ thereof, in ‘Owner’ shall be construed also firm, corporation rent person, association or clude having leasing use- ing and exclusive a motor vehicle or days.”1 longer (30) thirty period a than thereof for vehicle the “owner” of the To his status as establish 48, ch. relies on Acts under §47-552 being Repl., (d), Burns’ 1952 which §11, §47-1811 fol- vehicle as the “owner” of a motor defines lows: person legal A who holds title of “Owner. subject vehicle, a vehicle is the or in the event a agreement or for the conditional sale lease of an right upon perform- agreement purchase of

thereof with and stated ance of the conditions right possession vested in of an immediate with the conditional lessee, a or in the event or vendee possession, mortgagor a entitled vehicle is of lessee or mort- or vendee such conditional then purpose gagor the owner deemed shall be for supplied.) (Emphasis act.” this laid for the is down definition of “owner” But Act, act, ex- the 1939 which express purpose of regulating title, purpose is for the pressed defining crimes in the use highways, certain traffic subjects. vehicles, related and other operation constitutionality statute concerning of this question No presented considered. or been has nothing concerning It do has the 1925 Act with lien of a mechanic to motor vehicles.

The definition “owner” found in ch. Acts being Stat., (o), Burns’ §2(o), much is §47-2402 (d) like the definition of found owner as in §47-1811 It above referred to. too is definition of “owner” purpose been for the which has furnished sole part, Act it Act bureau of which creates a vehicles, registration provides for the motor operators licensing of vehicles and the thereof. No liens of mechanics is made either title mention of body the 1945 Act. construing statutes, phrases given In words and are ordinary plain, meaning their and usual dif- unless a purpose clearly ferent manifest statute Shirmeyer, R. L. Inc. itself. v. Ind. Revenue Bd. 99 N. E. 2d 847. The word ordinarily “owner” does not include a conditional ven did, unnecessary it dee. would have been for the If legislature to define a conditional vendee as an “owner” *7 Recognition above mentioned. of the enactments vendee is an “owner” the fact that a conditional not Act, of the Sales Uniform Conditional found §2 buyer provides Stat., that the §58-802, Burns’ acquire property in right the have the to “shall . . . the performance the of goods conditions the on the Barnett, ven the conditional that hold contract.” We the dee, the automobile within the “owner” of not Stat., 1925, 213, being Burns’ meaning §56, ch. of Acts Indemnity v. & Co. Accident See Hartford §47-552. 769; 392, General 138 Atl. (1927), 126 Maine Spofford (1932), Corporation Sutherland Acceptance v. Motors 281; Auto v. Cen Co. 720, Cache 241 N. 122 W. Nebr. 862, 30 10, 221 Pac. (1923), Utah Garage 63 tral (1929), Minn. 177 In v. Swanson Sundin A. 1217. L. R. 15, appellant, N. the statute relied W. right furnishing extended a lien at to those services request legal possessor any per- the of the owner or property. provisions found sonal Similar are that, presumed It be statutes of several states. must legislature intended that others than owners had our supra, protection- §47-552, should come within have said so. would company stated, appellee finance had no above

As knowledge making repairs. of the of the actual or notice making to expressly or consent It authorize did right that insists of them. The rights superior to the of his claim is satisfaction vendor, theory on the appellee as conditional making impliedly of the appellee consented repairs. rights rule, making general of an artisan

As at chattel the instance of the conditional to those of a conditional vendee are subordinate Car Co. v. Stratton etc., Partlow, vendor. 470; App. Ind. 124 N. E. General v. Corporation Sutherland, supra; Acceptance Motors jurisdic “Security”, But in some Restatement §76. usually including one, recognized, tions, it has this been rights mortgage cases, of the artisan in chattel mortgagee may superior of the where the to those making mortgagor impliedly consented has Company v. Flecknoe repairs. Finance Personal E. 2d and cases cited. 24 N. logic appeal that the parties assert to this Both equally applies mortgage- to conditional cases chattel implied con far as the element so transactions sale etc., Partlow, concerned, it has so held. been sent *8 Car Co. v. In supra; Accident Stratton, & Hartford supra. Spofford, demnity v. Co. Flecknoe, supra, Company Finance

In Personal v. and the follow- the authorities were reviewed applicable ing as the rule of law evolved was jurisdiction: in this granted pri- majority “The of the courts have mortgagee ority only as the the mechanic repairs (1) where the in those cases would mortgagee by pre- a real benefit the constitute serving mortgage, (2) by the the chattel covered mortgagee had a interest beneficial where the the continued use of the mortgaged chattel use, necessary repairs to such continued were knowledge mortgagee (3) had actual or of the where being repairs there circum- made or were language mortgage, stances, from which or knowledge presumed. could be An artisan such bring claiming within one him to must case priority for his lien upon classes. The burden is these from which the consent facts show may properly implied.” p.

mortgagee be mortgage in that case silent was The chattel being automobile, any repairs subject made on the agreement case. The this as was the conditional sale “badly in that case involved was 1931 automobile longer operated “could no repairs” and need repair an automobile.” The bill was driven about posses- paid. The mechanic retained It $67.76. mortgagee replevy filed suit to car sion it. announcing quoted, rule

After above the court said: “In instant case the evidence fails to show mortgagee justify such a to the as to benefit making presuming court in its consent repairs and to the subordination of the mort- gage showing There lien. is no necessary preserve were the automobile

mortgagee. repairs evidence did that show the necessary were to the continued use of the auto- attempt mobile but there was no to show that the continued use of the automobile would earn funds mortgage pay with which to the debt or would any mortgagee. other manner benefit the might “The mere fact that be inferred that repairs question added some value to the enough automobile is not sufficient. If were this might paint mechanic the automobile and all add undoubtedly new tires. This would increase value of the automobile but the cost of such re- pairs might made in on a 1931 automobile well amount to more than the total value of the repairs automobile after such were made. To im- ply mortgagee making the consent of a to the of might repairs margin which cause him to have no security beyond of value left for his reason. The would be repairs reasonably necessary necessary must be preservation for the to a continued interest. of the automobile or mortgagee in which the use has an “There is no contention in this case that mortgagee knowledge had actual making of the repairs, any provision nor is there in the mort- gage requiring repairs by to be made the mort- gagor. It appellee is contended that since the automobile was left in the of the mortgagor it must be assumed that it would be that, therefore, used him and his consent to the making repairs necessary such as were keep it useful must be assumed. With this contention agree. imply we can not To the consent of the mortgagee might must we have a state facts where we mortgagee assume that if the knew all of give he such facts It would his consent. would be assumption mortgagee violent assume making repairs consent would might endanger were which security when such only purpose continuing for the a use he, mortgagee, interested. Nor require grant do the facts of case us to this ground priority for his lien on mechanic necessity.” convenience commercial extensively quoted the Flecknoe We have from so language there used case because we feel applica- peculiarly applicable to this case and that language is de- of this case tion of that to the facts brought appellant has not apparent cisive. It is that the rule outlined his case within one of the classes appellee case, and that laid in the Flecknoe down impliedly consented can not be held to have making repairs. difference, however, important between

There is one *10 to bar. That case had the Flecknoe case and the case at mortgage fixed a statute which do with a chattel under mortgage had that case priorities, and the chattel repairs. making duly prior to been recorded which contract conditional sale This case involves a Therefore, notice the constructive was not recorded. mortgage in that case recording of the afforded here. absent Act, adopting In the Uniform Conditional Sales legislature part of the Uni- of this state omitted filing provides con- for the

form Law which Stat., Compare contracts. Burns’ ditional sale Act Uniform with §5 §58-801 law, p. and At common in 2 U. L. A. at 6. set out filing it, requiring or record- the absence of statute its ing is not essential contract of a conditional sale generally held persons, validity third recording filing and provide for the which statutes trust, bills sale mortgages, deeds of of chattel recording conditional filing require or do not p. S., Sales, §577, J. contracts. 78 C. sale cited. authorities statutory Indiana provisions in

But there are in automobiles. security especially to interests pertain being Stat., Acts ch. §11, Burns §47- 2501, provides for the issuance of certificate a upon application of title which shall contain a statement of liens or encumbrances thereon. “The (as certificate of shall title be delivered owner (o)) defined in no lien encum- event §47-2402 appears brance thereon. the certificate of Otherwise person title be shall delivered to the named to receive application same in the for certificate.” such Sec. being Act, Stat., 15 of the makes it Burns’ §47-2505, having possession unlawful one aof certificate of having title reason lien or encumbrance there- on, to refuse to deliver such certificate to the owner discharge the satisfaction or of the lien or encum- brance.

It has been this protec said law enacted for the tion of vehicles, the owner of holding motor of those thereon, public.

liens Guaranty and of the Dis- Corp. count App. v. Bowers 231; Bogda E.N. Nichols v. Motors App. 156, 118 N. E. 2d 905. There can no quoted provisions doubt that the above were intended whereby artisans, furnish method as well as own ers, vendors, mortgagees, prospective pur conditional *11 chasers, perhaps protected and others could be involving transactions motor vehicles. “Such certifi convey they cates do not title and are not conclusive designated proof of title him therein- as the who is 447, (1925), App. owner. Meskiman v. Adams 83 are, however, upon They E. 93. evidence of title N. purchasers and which others interested have come supra. put great Bogda Motors, reliance.” Nichols v. knowledge finance It and is common bankers companies generally possession of retain the certificate upon title their interest vehicle They so, course, shown.2 do to avail them is protection them selves of afforded legislation Implicit terms the statute.3 in this automobile the idea that one in of an when therefor, title arti is unable to exhibit a certificate of put upon possessor sans and others are notice that the thereto, may that his have no title vehicle subject rights may prior title and interests to the of others.4

In this case Barnett did not have the certificate of possession. title in his did He not claim to have it. He was not asked whether he had it nor was produce he asked to it. The made no effort to ascertain whether a lien existed. appellee everything did protect it could do to Availing itself and others. law, itself of the it re- tained the certificate of title which its interest had been appellee protected noted. If the had not here, itself practical way we know of no under our Journal, pp. 337, See 25 Ind. Law 339. 3In Associates Investment Co. v. Shelton 122 Ind. App. 105 N. E. 2d the court said that a finance com pany, by failing title, to have its lien shown on the certificate of safeguarded interests, which would have estopped its from asserting legal ownership against purchasers. title innocent App. In Central Finance Co. v. Garber title, bearing assignment 97 N. E. 2d the certificate of purchaser showing appellant’s lien thereon was de- purchaser By erasing livered to the of the vehicle. the lien making purchaser a false affidavit the obtained a new certificate purchaser of title issued in his name which showed no lien. The party appel- sold to an third innocent for value. Held lant, having protected law, himself as best he under the could prevail party. would the innocent third problem See exhaustive discussion of the at hand in Vol. 16 Problems, Contemporary p. Law and 197.

594 appellant failed which it could do so.5

law precaution determining, simple to take at no expense himself, he or could inconvenience whether safely invest time materials automobile. chargeable appellant with must hold that We rights appellee prior of the finance notice of the company. if

Even it could be considered care, party despite lack of we think the an innocent prevail, prevailed it has rule should cases, inno- past one of two where these loss, parties cent it must be borne must suffer possible. act or omission made the loss him whose Motors, supra; Guaranty Bog Discount Nichols v. da Corp. Corp. supra; Bowers, Discount v. LaPorte v. 323; App. Bessinger (1930), 91 Ind. N. E. 171 (1949), Corporation I. v. Walters C. T. Credit Universal Or, stated to 2d as better 230 N. 53 S. E. 520. C. “(W)here one circumstances of this case: fit the loss, it fall persons suffer should innocent must two diligence care, have could who, by him reasonable not.” could himself, than on him who protected rather U. Savings 100 S. Bank v. Nat. Creswell L. Ed. 25 713. rights appellant, under

We conclude that presented, held joined and must be the issues evidence appellee, judgment that the to those of the inferior affirmed. must be bankers, of these contracts to The annual volume of sales $100,000,- approximates companies in Indiana and others finance Department v. Holt Financial Institutions 000. See E. 2d 629. N.

CONCURRING OPINION alleges petition C. J. The to transfer but Emmert, cause, opinion Appellate one to-wit: the ruling precedent contravenes Court the announced in (1940), this court Personal Finance Flecknoe Co. v. 330, 24 E. 2d N. 694. The Fleeknoe case in mortgage, priority volved the of the lien of a chattel garageman’s duly recorded, which had been over a repairing common law lien for the automobile covered mortgage, appeal the the the whereas in at bar assignee controversy the of a conditional arises between garageman, request the of the con seller and a who at necessary buyer, furnished labor and ditional material nine-year-old operation. keep in to DeSoto automobile decided that Fleeknoe case lien of a chattel mortgage, recorded, superior duly to the lien of a car, mechanic for on the and under the facts arising priorities under an it have decided could not petition Therefore the unrecorded conditional sale. appellee transfer was to entitle insufficient transfer.

However, majority since a this court have trans- jurisdiction appeal, ferred the we then have to deter- specified grounds, petition mine it on other than opinion are entitled to our transfer. We base Appellees’ to the record. briefs without resort brief brief, asserts, appellant’s not denied reasonable value of mate- no evidence of the there was required repair The con- the car. rials and labor Barnett, appellant’s buyer, the car to took ditional Otis garage requested repairs, no contract was but im- price. In cases law definite such made for pay of services. plies promise to the reasonable value Ry. Albany Chicago v. Hubbard Louisville, Co. & New 193, 195, Even if there 18 N. E. 611. Ind. agreement specific had been a as to amount of com pensation, assignee, if it the conditional seller’s had being done, only consented to the work could have had its interest made for the liable reasonable amount. (1950), 228 Ind. 2d 138. Mann v. Schnarr N. E. charged price proof Proof of the reason-: performed. value of services Johnson v. Jones able App. 4, 112 N. E. 830. Since there proof total failure of on the issue of reason was a judg furnished, and labor able value of materials be affirmed on this the trial court should ment of n ground. buyer January pur- On conditional nine-year-old chased the DeSoto automobile contro- *14 agreed Indianapolis price versy dealer. from an The $1,140.00. The contract recited for the DeSoto was $310.00, price of a Ford at and cash in the trade-in leaving unpaid $100.00, balance of of an cash sum charge finance and in- $730.00, added a to which was leaving $232.10, a time in the sum surance costs paid in fifteen to be the sum of $962.10 balance February beginning on monthly installments $64.14 encumber buyer promised not to sell or 15, The 1949. to the as contract was silent The motor vehicle. said promise con- making repairs, there was'no and until the buyer the car not use would dition printed on a full. It was paid in price was purchase the back assignment forms form, various with Finance Cor- assignment thereof, Consolidated re- assigned it without the dealer poration to whom of the form is the only possible inference course. Cor- Finance by Consolidated drafted contract by this having prepared contract, been poration. The against strongly most construed appellee, should provision. any meaning to doubt if there

597 v. 121, 164, E. 2d Ind. 65 N. King (1946), 224 Jenkins Buanno v. (1948), 397; 226 Weinraub L. R. 163 A. Co. v. Milling 600; E. 2d Noblesville 81 N. 250; App. N. E. 2d Johnson J. 545. C. mortgagee Under the common law if a a chattel mortgage mortgagor permitted possession to retain chattels, held of the the transaction was fraudulent as mortgagor’s creditors. Jordan Turner v. Qr. p. per- L. 339 In order to 3 Blackf. Cornell mortgagor mit the to retain the of the chat- mortgagor’s tels, protect at the same time to and give creditors, recording acts, complied with, when everyone. lien to 2 of the notice of the Section Chattel Mortgage Replace- Burns’ §51-502, Act of mortgage ment, provides part “shall be a good rights against, superior and lien and to all valid mortgagor, any of the and all unsecured creditors mortgagees, any subsequent purchasers, and all including encumbrancers, judgment credi- lienors and tors, mortgagor, persons.” of the and all third Act, (Italics supplied.) §51-504, Section 4 of mortgage Replacement, gives the recorded Burns’ 1951 mortgage, provides that a chattel priority, further record, duly invalid and ineffec- filed for “shall be mortgagees, purchasers subsequent tual as all mortgagor, no- without actual creditors and/or Act, Burns’ §51-510, 10 of tice thereof.” Section *15 filing “upon in- Replacement, provides such recorder, per- county all in the office of struments charged thereby thereof notice with shall sons trustee, as- mortgagee, or its rights of the of the contemplation In signee representative thereunder.” or notice case had Flecknoe garageman in of law mortgage. of the chattel provision

There is no in the Act Conditional Sales Indiana, 58-829, Replace- to Burns’ 1951 §§58-801 give ment, any Champa which construc- by appellee. title Nor tive notice of the asserted provisions do the certificate of of the Motor title pro- Act, Replacement, Burns’ Vehicle §47-2501, any garageman. any If vide notice to constructive give Assembly had intended to constructive General garageman, it would have so stated as notice to the mortgage. Or third a recorded chattel the case of dealing persons apparent with the owner of the vehicle by provision amply protected have a could been 2603, 2604, registration statute, §§47-2602, certificate of have re- Replacement, could Burns’ quired security noted on title of the seller be card, registration which under the certificate required in the vehicle or to be carried statute is driving person control of such vehicle. or in purpose The evident certificate of title statutes give time to time was not to enacted from additional protection an conditional unrecorded seller or mortgagee. property recorded chattel interests of adequately protected each were fraudulent acts mortgagor. assignments Legis- or the owner Our sought protect buyers lature automobiles providing title with notice of defects them better title title. Before the certificate of re- the seller’s cars, were wholesale thefts quirements, there buying positive he was a stolen could be no one of title acts made it more The certificate automobile. state, dispose automobiles of stolen difficult for the greatly the risk of conviction increased nothing provisions that in the title guilty. There is garageman’s that the lien should intention an indicates

599 a conditional be subordinate interest either mortgagee. or a seller legal justification for economic well as widespread contracts to use of conditional sales buyer permits the

market used automobiles that it is buyer paying car he for it. If the to use the while is money car, it pay to for the would had cash be presumption presume to he do no violent would so charge, the finance case was save this $232.10. buyer by contract of a used car a conditional sales No garage buys put never it until car in his use to pro- pays had no he the contract in full. Consolidated prohibiting car. If the use of the vision in its contract against protect to itself had desired Consolidated automobile, ordinary nine-year-old and use of this wear used, be but not to provided the car was have it could would hardly such a contract assume that could we any When we automobiles. helped sell used have to provisions in doubtful apply rule that the well settled party who construed the contract will contemplation it, within the have been it must drafted going nine-year-old car parties that this assented buyer, that Consolidated used to be that use. to experience in use automobile

It is common going require repairs, and the older the car the to necessary likely repairs become order will more chattel operation. Even in the case of a keep it mortgage, has held by a this court recorded covered mortgagee assented proper infer that 116, (1891), Sweeney Ind. 26 127 repairs. v. Watts 615; Stutz Motor Car 680, 22 Am. St. Grusin N. E. v. 382; Personal Fi N. E. (1933), Ind. Co. E. 24 N. Flecknoe nance Co. v. 694, supra. 2d Assent to the is all that is neces sary, operation the lien is then created of law. Grusin v. Motor Stutz Car Co. Acceptance 382, supra; Mfg. 187 N. E. Yellow

Corp. Linsky App. 691, 699, (1934), v. E. 99 Ind. 190 N. 379, 192 E.N. 715. by Sweeney

As was the court in Watts stated v. 116, 680, (1891), 123, 124, N. 22 Am. 26 E. 615, supra, property to be retained and St. “Where is time, by mortgagor long period of it used the for a presumed have the intention of the will be to been mortgage, property parties to it liable to the where is repairs, kept repair, that it to and such be when is machinery, property character property or of a the is necessary it to it intrust to a mechanic renders mortgagor repairs, such the to make or machinist agent the the of mort- be constituted will repairs made, be and as gagee procure to such to the prop- the the necessary repairs for betterment of are mortgagee, gain of the erty, to its value add mechanic for the favor of the law lien in the common superior paramount and the to repairs of the is value mortgagee presumed in mortgagee. The is of the lien knowledge a of the contracted with case have to such a lien.” giving mechanic to a law given charged mortgagor right the the is or “Where procuring repairs, the duty or con- the where with subject property and the is is the tract silent that machinery such a it or nature vehicle use, object complete and fit for the apparent that parts, upon by the component broken is relied its contemplated mortgagee security, and when mortgagor, and it is property the is to be used necessity repairs may character of such necessary repairs reasonably anticipated, which add be property required preserve to to the value are security mortgagee him, of the and are a benefit to authority mortgagor repairs for have such implied made be from the circumstances. will In mortgagor agent either case will constituted the mortgagee procuring purpose repairs.” 296, Grusin v. Stutz Motor 206 Ind. Car Co. 301, 382, supra. N. E.

In Personal Finance Co. v. Flecknoe E. 2d supra, N. the court classified might the various cases which a mechanic’s lien have priority mortgagee over the interest of a as follows: majority granted “The priority the courts have mortgagee only the mechanic as in those (1) cases where the would constitute a real mortgagee by preserving benefit the chattel mortgage, (2) mortgagee covered where had a beneficial interest continued use of the mort- *18 gaged repairs the necessary chattel and were to such use, (3) mortgagee continued or where the had actual knowledge repairs being of the made there or were circumstances, language mortgage, or from which knowledge presumed. such could be An claim- artisan ing bring priority for his lien must his case within one The to show facts these classes. burden is him mortgagee may properly from which the consent of the held, paragraph implied.” be In the next the court showing necessary repairs that “There no the were mortgagee.” preserve the It is to the automobile for to the court arrived at this difficult understand how stipulation “said in of the that auto- conclusion view ‘badly repairs, in and the same mobile was then need longer operated or driven about as an could no ” that when an It seem obvious automobile.’ would repairs operate, not run or and certain automobile will put operate necessary in are to it condition to with repairs safety, made than and no more are reasonable condition, necessary the it to this value to to restore inures by the artisan which to has been added car mortgagee or conditional seller thus in- benefit creasing authority security title to his benefit. his specific confined to its case should be Flecknoe ruling precedent facts, extended as a not be and should assignee rights seller or his of the conditional when involved. are engine knocked, appeal had rod

In the at bar the a true, it to out, had be towed the crankshaft was reasonably garage. If were neces- operate, security of con- sary car make assignee enhanced, I was can see ditional seller’s garageman equity why a who does in law no reason necessary nothing labor and mate- than furnish more operation, it keep so can be the car rials to parties, contemplated by the contract of used as a a windfall condi- contribute be forced to should notice, assignee, he had no of whom tional seller or nine-year- must have known when seller going operated if to need some old automobile repairs. nothing any of

There the motor statutes vehicle concerning title, registra- certificates of certificates gave tion, or the conditional sales act con- which security notice of the seller’s title. structive If give seller had wanted to notice the world that car, unpaid an debt lien had secured outright car and have taken back it could have sold the mortgage, have chattel when recorded would *19 In of the obvious put the notice. view danger buyer permitted when he of the to creditors an un- possession of the chattel sold under have to 603 contract,1 rights the of the recorded conditional sale per ought further not be extended conditional seller mitting unjust is im when chattel enrichment necessary expense of an proved by repairs, done at notice, good and without artisan acted in faith who either or constructive. actual given agree

Nor I the limited construction can with Replace- Burns’ in 1952 §47-552, word “owner” ment, 213 the 1925 Acts. This which is of Ch. §56 pro- of other section as other sections statutes as well viding merely declaratory for liens common lien, provide but it does law as to the creation of procedure for foreclosure thereof. See Grusin v. N. E. 187 Stutz Motor Car Co. 206 given 382, supra. The definition of the word “owner” purport 213 of the 1925 Acts does not Ch. §1 car, or limit the fee of the term the owner longer thirty days. pro- period than Other lessee for a S., act, R. 1926 visions of the Burns’ §§10084 registration provide car in the name of owner, and the of a to him certificate issuance registration plates motor number for each two must construed vehicle. But Ch. of the 1925 Acts Acts, pari the 1921 materia with Ch. then in force. Acts, Section 1 of the 1921 §10110, Burns’ 1926 S.; prohibited R. the issuance of certificate of registration until an official certificate of had title been application showing applicant’s issued an title have so common under modern “Conditional sales become purchasers deceptive methods of business and are so both to buyer buyer’s creditors, buyer from the and to the since the only property ordinarily has but is entitled to own, recording it use and does use as if it were his acts Williston, passed been have almost all Sales States.” (Rev. §327, Ed.) p. 276. *20 liens, vehicle. or encumbrances Sec- provided: secretary of state

tion 1 of this act “The diligence ascertaining whether use reasonable shall application for a certifi- or not the facts stated said true, and, applicant that the are if satisfied cate of title vehicle, motor or is other- is the lawful owner such registered name, he same in his wise entitled to have the certificate, appropriate thereupon over shall issue an office, signature, of his and sealed with seal purpose.” procured and used for such quite provisions clear of both acts From the registra- title, the certificate of the certificate plates all issued to the were to be the license tion and absolute, conditional person, his title was same whether encumbrances, person and this subject to liens or referred Acts was to as throughout of the 1925 Ch. Hence, clear to me that a condi- it seems the owner. Acts, of the 1925 within buyer an owner tional §56 declaring Replacement, Burns’ §47-552, which is providing an additional law lien the common Moreover, the car had not enforcement. for its method appellant, and or not whether possession left the owner, appellant’s com- buyer absolute long impaired any way as law lien was mon continued. this J.,

Gilkison, concurs.

Note.—Reported in 110 N. E. 2d 289.

Case Details

Case Name: Champa v. Consolidated Finance Corp.
Court Name: Indiana Supreme Court
Date Published: Jan 30, 1953
Citation: 110 N.E.2d 289
Docket Number: 29,011
Court Abbreviation: Ind.
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