Chambliss v. StateChambliss v. State
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Staton
Ralph Chambliss (Chambliss) was convict ed of robbery.1 He appeals and contends that the trial judge erred in admitting testimony implicating Chambliss in another robbery.
Affirmed.
Chambliss was сonvicted of robbing a clerk at a Photomat store. Although the victim was unable to make an in-court identificаtion, she had positively identified Chambliss at the scene shortly after the robbеry. Over defense counsel‘s objeсtions, the victim was allowed to testify thаt the same man who robbed her and whom she identified the day of the chargеd robbery had robbed her the previous week at the same locatiоn.
Evidence of uncharged criminal activity is inadmissible at trial for the purposes of proving a defendant‘s guilt. Maldonado v. State (1976), 265 Ind. 492, 355 N.E.2d 843, 846. However, such evidеnce may be admissible where its relevance is on another issue such as the defendant‘s motive, intent, purpose, knowledge, or identification as the perpetrator. Cobbs v. State (1975), 264 Ind. 60, 338 N.E.2d 632, 633.
In this case the victim‘s testimony that she had recognized the man she identified аt the scene of the charged rоbbery as the perpetrator аlso of the previous robbery was relevant to help identify Chambliss as the perpetrator of the chargеd crime. That is, the reliability of her on-the-scene identification of Chambliss wаs bolstered by the fact that she had bеen his victim twice in the same place and under the same circumstanсes. The testimony was properly admitted. See, Chocktaw v. State (1979), 270 Ind. 545, 387 N.E.2d 1305; see also, Lockridge v. State (1977), 172 Ind.App. 141, 359 N.E.2d 589.
Chambliss argues that the prejudicial effeсt of the testimony outweighed its probative value. He suggests that the on-the-‘sеene identification could have been bolstered by limiting the victim‘s testimony tо a statement simply that she had seеn the defendant at the store on another occasion.
The reсeption of evidence is within the sоund discretion of the trial judge whose decision is reversible only upon a showing of abuse of discretion. Talley v. State (1980), Ind.App., 400 N.E.2d 1167, 1170. Abuse of discretion must be shown by demonstrating that the ruling was contrary to logic. Id. Chambliss ean make no such showing.
Affirmed.
HOFFMAN, PJ., and GARRARD, J., concur.Notes
. IC 1979, 35-42-5-1 (Burns Code Ed., Supp.