535 A.2d 291 | Pa. Commw. Ct. | 1987
Lead Opinion
Opinion by
The City of Philadelphia (City) appeals from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County (trial court) which granted a preliminary injunction to Lloyd V. Chambliss and ordered him reinstated
In 1971, Chambliss was hired as an Area Youth Worker with the City’s Department of Welfare. On January 8, 1979, Chambliss was injured in a work-related accident for which he was placed on disability leave. As a result of emotional difficulties associated with his injuries and absence from work, Chambliss began psychiatric treatment with Dr. Clancy D. McKenzie in May of 1980, such treatment continuing until the end of 1982.
On August 4, 1980, Chambliss returned to work. However, approximately one week later, Chambliss failed to appear for work, and the City subsequently separated him from employment under the Philadelphia Civil Service Regulations for job abandonment.
Following his separation, Chambliss filed a grievance against the City under the terms of the relevant Collective Bargaining Agreement alleging harassment and related charges. The controversy went to binding arbitration, and hearings were held on April 12, 1983 and May 2, 1983. At the hearings, Dr. McKenzie testified that Chambliss had suffered severe depression as a result of his physical injuries but that this disorder finally subsided towards the end of 1982.
The arbitrator subsequently ruled in favor of Chambliss and ordered the City to reinstate him to his position as of July 28, 1983. The City did not appeal the arbitrator’s award. In anticipation of his return to work,
On August 27, 1985 Chambliss filed a complaint in civil action with the trial court seeking reinstatement, back pay and damages based upon both his employment contract with the City and the Federal Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §1983.
■In Willman v. Childrens Hospital of Pittsburgh, 505 Pa. 263, 269, 479 A.2d 452, 455 (1984) (quoting Zebra v. Pittsburgh School District, 449 Pa. 432, 437, 296 A.2d 748, 750 (1972)), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated:
In order to sustain a preliminary injunction, the plaintiff’s right to relief must be clear, the need for relief must be immediate, and the injury must be irreparable if the injunction is not granted.
With regard to the irreparable harm element of the test, the Supreme Court of the United States has stated:
The key word in this consideration is irreparable. Mere injuries, however substantial, in terms of money, time and energy necessarily expended in the absence of a stay, are not enough. The possibility that adequate compensatory or other corrective relief will be available at a later date, in the ordinary course of litigation, weighs heavily against a claim of irreparable harm.
Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 90 (1974) (quoting Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Assn. v. Federal Power Commission, 259 F.2d 921, 925 (D.C. Cir. 1958)) (emphasis added).
In his action against the City, Chambliss seeks reinstatement to his former position as an Area Youth Worker pursuant to the prior award of an arbitrator. Should he prevail,
We cannot agree with the trial court’s conclusion. The expert testimony of Dr. McKenzie, Chambliss’ psychiatrist, clearly shows that as of 1983 Chambliss’ past depression had subsided, that he is currently no longer in need of psychiatric treatment, and that he is fully able to return to work. It follows that Chambliss is therefore in the same position as any other individual who seeks reinstatement to his or her former job in an action against the former employer. It is undisputed that such individuals will be fully compensated for lost wages and other damages should they prevail upon the merits of their actions. While we remain sympathetic to the plight Chambliss has experienced in seeking his job back, we are not prepared to hold that the mere denial of reinstatement pending litigation constitutes an irreparable harm to all of such individuals mandating that preliminary injunctions shall issue. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not have reasonable grounds to sustain the preliminary injunction.
Accordingly, the order of the trial court granting a preliminary injunction is reversed.
And Now, December 31, 1987, the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County granting a preliminary injunction in the above-captioned matter is reversed.
In response to Chambliss’ motion for preliminary injunction, the trial court held evidentiary hearings on October 16, 21 and 22, 1986. Thereafter, the trial court issued an order granting Chambliss’ motion on October 23, 1986. The subject of this appeal is that grant of preliminary injunction.
On November 17, 1987, this case was reassigned to the authoring judge.
Philadelphia Civil Service Regulation 9.1411 states:
An employee who is reinstated or has been absent from work for a period of three (3) months or longer due to layoff, illness, leave without pay, or military leave shall be
required to pass satisfactorily a medical examination before being returned to work.
Chambliss also sued AFSCME, District Council 47, and the law firm of Kirschner, Waltin, Willig, Weinberg & Dempsey for damages for breach of duty of fair representation. These claims, however, are not relevant to the present appeal.
The trial court ordered that Chambliss be reinstated upon completion of another medical examination and that the City may compel Dr. McKenzie to provide certain limited information. The order also permitted the City to require Chambliss to undergo a limited psychiatric examination by a neutral psychiatrist.
Our scope of review of a trial courts order sustaining a preliminary injunction is limited to a determination of whether there were any reasonable grounds to support the trial courts action. Bell v. Thornburgh, 491 Pa. 263, 420 A.2d 443 (1980).
The trial court expressed its opinion that there was no doubt that Chambliss would prevail in his action against the City, one of
Chambliss v. City of Philadelphia, 14 Phila. 636, 640 (1986).
Concurrence Opinion
Concurring Opinion by
I concur with the majority opinion insofar as it reverses the decision of the trial court.
However, since this was an action carved within the framework of a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983
The first inquiry in any section 1983 action is whether the plaintiff has been deprived of any right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.
Whether or not there is a deprivation of a right of privacy of a constitutional dimension, permitting a section 1983 action is more elusive than the trial court suggested. While a right of privacy, not particularly articulated in the Constitution, may show constitutional
Far from being absolutely certain that Chambliss would prevail on the merits, an examination of the myriad of cases on this point casts a doubt that there even is
Without any knowledge of the evidence, it seems that the trial judge should not intimate an opinion about the ultimate merits of the case or that there was a denial of due process.
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any State or Territory, subject, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proceeding for redress.
The writer is aware of the recent opinions of Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986), and Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 88 L.Ed.2d 677 (1986), but felt it was not necessary to cite them since they did not overrule the substance of Parratt. “Upon reflection, we agree and overrule Parratt to the extent that it states that mere lack of due care by a state official may ‘deprive’ an individual of life, liberty or property under the Fourteenth Amendment.” Daniels at 330-31, 88 L.Ed.2d at 668.
These cases show that not every constitutional violation constitutes a basis for a section 1983 action for damages for deprivation of a constitutional right. Parratt indicated that mere negligence by a state official may constitute a constitutional deprivation for such action, whereas, Daniels adopted and agreed with the reasoning of Justice Powell, who concurred in the result of the Parratt case, but argued that the negligent acts of state officials are not actionable in a section 1983 action and that such an action would be a gross distortion of the intent of the Constitution.
Daniels fortifies the premise of my opinion that the trial court’s opinion that Chambliss would prevail on the merits is not so clear for the reasons stated therein and that no preliminary injunction is warranted.