Chambers v. ThompsonChambers v. Thompson
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Birch, Carnes, Marcus
CARNES, Circuit Judge:
James Harris Chambers, a Georgia prisoner, appeals the denial of his
However, the district court‘s procеdural bar holding as to the claims not raised in state court warrants further discussion, because that holding conflicts with our prior decision in Cherry v. Director, State Board of Corrections, 613 F.2d 1262 (5th Cir.1980), adopted in relevant part, 635 F.2d 414, 417 (5th Cir. Jan.27, 1981) (en banc), which dеalt with the intersection of the Georgia successive petition default rule and federal procedural bar law. In this case, the district court held that the claims not raised in state court were barred from federal habeas review because of Chambers’ failure to raise them in the first statе habeas petition he had filed.
If that part of Cherry is still good law, the district court should have held the claims Chambers failed to raise in his state habeas pеtition were unexhausted instead of holding them procedurally barred. The result would have been a mixed petition due to be dismissed without prejudice fоr failure to exhaust some of the claims, see, e.g., Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 519-20, 102 S.Ct. 1198, 1204, 71 L.Ed.2d 379 (1982), instead of a petition due to be denied with prejudice because there are no stаte remedies left to exhaust and all of the claims are either meritless or procedurally defaulted, see, e.g., Allen v. Alabama, 728 F.2d 1384, 1387 (11th Cir.1984) (discussing the futility exception to the exhaustion requirement). However, in light of the Supreme Court‘s decisions in Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 125 n. 28, 102 S.Ct. 1558, 1570-71 n. 28, 71 L.Ed.2d 783 (1982), Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 109 S.Ct. 1056, 103 L.Ed.2d 380 (1989), Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989), and Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991), we conclude that Cherry is no longer good law.
As quoted in Cherry, 613 F.2d at 1265, the Georgia procedural default provision applicable tо claims not raised in a prisoner‘s initial state habeas petition, provided as follows:
All grounds for relief claimed by a petitioner for a writ of hаbeas corpus shall be raised by a petitioner in his original or amended petition. Any grounds not so raised are waived unless the Constitution of the United Stаtes or of the State of Georgia otherwise requires, or any judge to whom the petition is assigned, on considering a subsequent petition, finds grounds for reliеf asserted therein which could not reasonably have been raised in the original or amended petition.
Ga. Code Ann. § 50-127(10)(1979) .
(emphasis added). The provision has sinсe been recodified as
We are bound to follow a prior panel or en banc holding, except where that holding has been overruled or undermined to the point of abrogation by a subsequent en banc or Supreme Court decision. See, e.g., Cargill v. Turpin, 120 F.3d 1366, 1386 (11th Cir.1997); United States v. Hogan, 986 F.2d 1364, 1369 (11th Cir.1993). “To the extent of any inconsistency between our [prior opinions‘] pronouncements and the Supreme Court‘s supervening ones, of course, we are required to heed those of the Supreme Court.” Davis v. Singletary, 119 F.3d 1471, 1482 (11th Cir.1997). The holding in Cherry that a Georgia prisoner‘s claim not raised in an initial state habeas petition cannot be deemed by a federal court to be procedurally defaulted until a state court says it is, is inconsistent with subsequent pronouncements of the Supreme Court.
Two years after our holding in Cherry and one year after the en banc opinion adopted it, the Suрreme Court held some claims to be procedurally barred from federal habeas review based upon its prediction that state courts wоuld hold a state collateral remedy was unavailable to the petitioners in the circumstances. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 125 n. 28, 102 S.Ct. 1558, 1570-71 n. 28 (1982). Seven years later, the Supreme Court said in Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. at 351, 109 S.Ct. at 1060, that a federal habeas court could hold claims were procedurally defaulted, and therefore exhausted, “if it is clear that [the] claims are now procedurally barred under [state] law.” The same day, the Court also held the rule requiring state
After all of those Supreme Court decisions came our decision in Burger v. Zant, 984 F.2d 1129, 1135 (11th Cir.1993), involving the same Georgia successive petition statute at issue in Cherry and in this case. Our Burger decision demonstrates that the Georgia statute should be аpplied and enforced in a federal habeas proceeding even though there is no state court decision applying it to the claim in question. We held a claim to be procedurally barred in Burger based upon our prediction that the Georgia statute “would lead a state habеas court to find this claim procedurally defaulted because Burger did not raise it in his first or second state habeas corpus petitions.” Id. Although our Burger opinion did not explicitly deal with Cherry‘s contrary holding, it implicitly recognizes that subsequent Supreme Court decisions have eviscerated that holding.
Accordingly, we make explicit what is implicit in Burger, which is that Cherry‘s exhaustion and procedural bar holding is no longer good law. The Georgia statute restricting state habeas review of claims not presented in earlier state habeas petitions can аnd should be enforced in federal habeas proceedings against claims never presented in state court, unless there is some indication that a state court judge would find the claims in question “could not reasonably have been raised in the original or amended [state habeas] petitiоn.” See
In this case there is no such indication, therefore, we conclude that a state habeas court would hold Chambers’ claims to be prоcedurally defaulted and not decide them on the merits, because they were not presented in his initial state habeas petition. It follows that those claims are procedurally barred from review in this federal habeas proceeding and exhausted. The district court‘s denial of Chambers’ petition is AFFIRMED.