159 Ga. App. 669 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1981
Following her husband’s death from a gunshot wound, the appellant was indicted for murder and found guilty of voluntary manslaughter. On appeal, she lists five enumerations of error, only one of which is supported by citation of authority. Held:
Although the appellant also contends on appeal that the prejudicial effect of the photographs outweighed their relevance to the issues in the case, no such argument was advanced at trial, and accordingly we will not consider it at this time.
2. The trial court did not err in refusing to allow defense counsel to question a state witness as to whether the appellant had been present during the grand jury proceedings to present her side of the case. Even assuming arguendo that such a fact could have been established by the witness, it was wholly irrelevant to the issue of the appellant’s guilt or innocence. The jury was properly instructed that the indictment did not constitute evidence and that no inference of guilt was to be drawn from it.
3. The appellant was not entitled to the opening and concluding argument, having introduced into evidence a garden hoe with which her husband had allegedly threatened her prior to the shooting. See generally Code §§ 27-2201, 38-415; Suggs v. State, 239 Ga. 332 (236 SE2d 676) (1977); Hart v. State, 88 Ga. App. 334 (1) (76 SE2d 561) (1953).
4. The appellant contends that the court’s charge on mutual combat was in error, both because the evidence did not support it and because the court gave undue emphasis to it by repeating it several times.
The appellant admitted, in a tape recorded statement made to police and played to the jury, that she and her husband had argued and “started scuffling” prior to the shooting. This, along with her testimony that both of them subsequently left the room and returned with weapons, was sufficient to authorize the charge. While it is true that the charge was repeated several times in one form or another, the court also instructed the jury repeatedly that even if the appellant and her husband had engaged in mutual combat, the jury was nevertheless authorized to acquit her if they found that the deceased was the assailant at the time of the shooting and that the appellant
Judgment affirmed.