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Chambers v. State
568 S.W.2d 313
Tex. Crim. App.
1978
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*1 n ¶ n Floyd display any photographs confusing, and did meager Floyd was CHAMBERS, Appellant, Ronald Curtis complaining witness did testify (Tex. 505 S.W.2d 878 in Coleman v. his in-court identification Cr.App.1974),that Texas, Appellee. The STATE photographic display and was based on the appellant identified could not have No. 54676. all of photographs, without aid of the man.1 Texas, which were of the same Appeals Court of Criminal En Banc. why There are several reasons error we no reversible is shown. conclude May 1978. Whether there exists at same time “substantial likelihood of misidentification”

depends there was on whether a distinct which, at the time of the event

observation circumstances, light surrounding of the enough credible to serve can considered origin for independent as an the in-court Clay identification. 518 S.W.2d In the case (Tex.Cr.App.1975). instant Floyd adequate opportunity to observe range during close appellant was robbery, appel

course told as he fled from scene. lant’s name origin independent There was an for the Clay in-court su identification. pra. totality surrounding From a circumstances, we do not conclude that was

photographic display, any, impermis- if sibly suggestive.

Further, it should be remembered appellant his witnesses and all testified that he was scene at the on the time of testimony

robbery. The defense was that good took appellant was a Samaritan and away from Newman in an at- knife Floyd’s It was tempt Floyd. aid testimo- ny participated in the rob-

bery ques- him. There was no and stabbed present time

tion that at the error, The question. any, if events procedure, identification pre-trial beyond reasonable doubt. harmless is affirmed. judgment testimony “A I I called to our does don’t remember. But do he’s 1. attention know me, Floyd support assertion that the one brought because that stabbed when he picture— testified his in-court identification was based Floyd testify Well, pictures. “Q you frightened on the did that he could when the man assaulting up you put man him not remember which said walked behind his arm your The record then re- “Give me that watch.” around neck?” following on flects the cross-examination: “Q frightened and don’t re- You were member?

315

SI 7 Perini, Dallas, appellant. Vincent W. Wade, Henry Atty., Dist. W. T. West- moreland, Jr., Burnham, D. Douglas Jim Asst. Dist. At- Stephen Tokoly, Mulder and Vollers, Dallas, Atty., tys., Jim D. State’s Austin, for the State.

OPINION

DOUGLAS, Judge. from a appeals

Ronald Curtis Chambers capital for murder wherein the conviction punishment was assessed at death. 11, 1975, Shortly midnight April after Sutton, col- Mike McMahan and Deia both students, lege nightclub left a Dallas Appellant, entered McMahan’s car. Clar- Williams, Jr., Ray ence and two other men adjacently parked an automobile. occupied appellant Williams and exited that automo- way bile and forced their into McMahan’s ordered gunpoint. Appellant vehicle at get into the back seat with him. Sutton shotgun a .410 on the rear laying After floorboard, pointed pistol he a at her face threatened to kill her. passenger McMahan was moved to the seat. Williams then drove side of the front while Trinity the car to the River bottoms watch, coat, robbed of her appellant Sutton purse and its contents. parked the car on a levee when

Williams arrived at the river bottoms. He and they down the appellant pushed the students and, a they got when .22 hollow-point side of the levee near caliber rifle which bullet bottom, stop. ordered them right recovered from his hip. them, point At this shots were fired at five lodged one of which Sutton’s skull. Both I. The Voir Dire Examination at ground fell to the bottom of the complains Appellant entire levee. process selection was infected appellant, apparently Williams and be- Initially urges constitutional error. he dead, lieving that the victims returned the court excusing upon challenge erred in Sutton, car. to the McMahan shouted prospective for cause jurors seventeen for asking her if were hurt. The she assailants bias against punishment the minimum heard him back to the and came levee. prospective expressed murder. Each Appellant dragged McMahan to the water against punishment bias minimum viciously where he beat him with the shot- and stated that was unable to consider gun. Williams beat woman with his punishment such in a murder case. her. fists and then choked When McMahan upon challenge by court excused each stopped appellant hit screaming, Sutton State. shotgun with the times. several Williams (Tex. In Moore v. S.W.2d 664 “Well, remarked, dead, she’s go.” let’s 35.16(b), held Cr.App.1976), we that Article left, After Williams and had V.A.C.C.P., authorizes the to chal State crawled over McMahan and at- Sutton lenge jurors op cause tempted He was to aid him. dead. Some- pose punishment. the minimum Appellant got how she Le Baron Hotel where adversely concedes that Moore decided police were summoned. him, argues that there is no basis Heyse subsequently Officer C. R. found challenge sustaining a to veniremen who body McMahan’s river bottoms. He oppose punishment the minimum for a less gauge shotgun also found a .410 shell which er included offense. primer been which had its fired but (b)(3) of provides Subsection Article 35.16 indented, breech, shotgun part may challenge that the prospec- if the gun stock. *6 juror prejudice tive bias or against “has a Stephanie Jones observed later any phase upon of the law which the State morning her mother’s house. He is entitled for rely conviction punish- or hair washing shotgun. was blood and off ment.”

Appellant tried to sell Sutton’s coat that For these reasons we find no error in the robbery. had been taken in the excusing prospective jurors chal- H. arrested appel- Officer 0. Wilkerson lenged on the of their against basis bias shotgun, A day. lant the next which was minimum punishment murder. pieces, broken into several several .410 car- also Appellant urges prospec tridges, hollow-point and a .22 caliber rifle juror tive was erroneously excused in Veltman bullet were the Jones’ house. found against his bias the minimum punish belonging cards Credit and identification ment for The record murder. discloses were also the deceased and discover- Sutton excused Veltman was not on this basis ed there. he recalled news excused because autopsy An revealed massive skull offense, concerning the accounts instant injuries caused McMa- fractures and brain recently home had and because his been the deceased’s han’s death. Part of cranial burglarized and was disturbed that the bur brain, into the bone had been driven and glars received No probation that case. one of his ribs fractured and had been driv- error is reflected. en He also lung. into the had suffered Next, gunshot right to the arm and to the contends that eighteen wounds wound was excused in abdomen. The latter made veniremen were violation

SIQ cert, Illinois, 510, (Tex.Cr.App.1976), denied v. 391 88 430 Witherspoon U.S. U.S. 1770, (1968).1 959, 1610, L.Ed.2d 776 (1977). 20 97 S.Ct. 51 L.Ed.2d 811 S.Ct. Williams, v. compare See and also Estelle State, (Tex. v. 532 S.W.2d 293 In Hovila 1691, 501, 425 U.S. 96 48 L.Ed.2d 126 S.Ct. holding held that Cr.App.1975), we Henderson, (1976); 536, 425 Francis v. U.S. light was still alive and well in Witherspoon 1708, (1976). L.Ed.2d 149 96 S.Ct. 48 statutory providing scheme of the new imposition penalty, of the death Nixon, jurors Prospective Meigs and adoption of which followed in the wake of McQueen in the death penal did not believe Georgia, 238, Furman v. 408 92 U.S. S.Ct. not vote for that ty penalty and would 2726, (1972). 33 L.Ed.2d 346 These prospec under circumstances. statutory capital The new scheme for jurors compliance tive were excused Code, murder [V.T.C.A., Penal Section 19.03 Witherspoon. 1257, Y.A.P.C., (formerly Article as amend- Hamilton, jurors Prospective Chase 37.071, 1973) V.A.C.C.P.], ed in and Article opposition McLarty expressed strong and including possible infliction of the death stated penalty the death their penalty, upheld by has been this Court their beliefs would affect deliberations on Jurek v. (Tex.Cr.App. 522 S.W.2d 934 to them. the fact issues submitted 1975), Supreme United States Texas, 262, v. 428 Court in Jurek U.S. 96 V.T.C.A., Code, 12.31(b), Penal Section 2950, (1976). L.Ed.2d 929 S.Ct. See also provides: 153, Gregg Georgia, 428 U.S. 96 S.Ct. “Prospective jurors be shall informed 2909, (1976); 49 L.Ed.2d 859 Proffitt v. imprisonment that a of life sentence or Florida, 2960, 96 S.Ct. U.S. mandatory is death conviction of a (1976). L.Ed.2d 913 capital juror felony. A shall background we With this turn to the disqualified serving from juror question. examination of the veniremen in unless he states under oath that the man- datory penalty imprisonment jurors Everett, Davis, Prospective for life will not affect his deliberations on Wolford, Andrews, Fry, George, Arboqast, any issue of fact.”2 Plamo, Bullock, Patterson and Null objection. excused without to ob Moore supra, Failure In this Court held ject constitutionally exclu improper unnecessary consider sion of waives that right Witherspoon veniremen question where a prospective such cannot be ap exclusion considered on opposition stated that her peal. Boulware S.W.2d 677 would affect her delibera- Witherspoon, Supreme entirely possible person In 1. Court that a “[i]t opinion against’ United States stated: has a or who ‘fixed does *7 might capital punishment ‘believe in’ never- “Specifically, we that a hold sentence of juror perfectly theless as a be able to abide jury if death cannot be carried out imposed conscientiously existing law—to follow it or recommended was chosen judge of a trial and to con- instructions excluding simply veniremen for cause be- fairly imposition sider of the death sen- they objections general cause voiced to the particular tence in And, case.” penalty expressed conscientious or 122, Georgia, in 429 U.S. 97 Davis v. religious scruples against its No infliction. 399, (1976), 50 L.Ed.2d 339 the Court constitutionally S.Ct. put defendant can Witherspoon reaffirmed its adherence death at the hands of a tribunal so selected.” penalty no death can doctrine and held that further Court stated: single if a venireman is excluded in viola- unambiguously stand “Unless a venireman states automatically against that imposition tion that doctrine. he would vote capital punishment no matter provision contained in Article 2. A similar was reveal, might simply what the trial it cannot V.A.P.C., 1925, 1257(d), (Acts as amended position.” be assumed that that is his 1973, 1122, Leg., p. ch. 426—effective 63rd Holman, elaborated in Court Boulden v. 14, 1, January June 1973 until 1974—effective 1138, U.S. S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 433 Code). present date Penal (1969): secretary She was the fact issues submitted in the upon Department tions prospective jurors conclude that case. We Housing Urban Development. It Hamilton, McLarty in the in Chase and developed that the father of Sam Hud- were properly stant case excused under the son, counsel, appellant’s trial was also an State, statutory provision. Moore v. employee there “in another section.” (Tex. Burns v. 556 S.W.2d 270 supra; When asked whether she knew Hudson’s Cr.App.1977). father, Minieks stated that she had spoken really him but did not him person- know Further, objec made no ally. She then testified as follows: disqualification in trial court to the tion juror on the basis potential McLarty now “Q. put you Would in an uncomforta- urged she was excused violation of ble I position, you mean I know don’t any right to Witherspoon. He waived com personally, know Hudson Sam but since ' disqualification appeal. her on plain of you dad, his put you know would it State, supra. also Boulware v. Burns v. See position you an uncomfortable if found State, supra. against client, example, Sam’s go had back there and work with his Prospective juror expressed Godbolt dad? opposition his the death and then as to whether his beliefs would See,

vacillated I “A. No. don’t work with him his deliberations on the fact issues affect directly. I see him in the hall. He —he finally to the jury. submitted He decided works in another section and I’m in beliefs would not influence his these just him, another section and I see you deliberations those issues. While it know, him; speak other than argued might be as to whether Godbolt’s that— would have him un testimony disqualified Oh, “Q. Well, see. you I if think it holding Witherspoon, der the record affect, might you know, your business per the court excused him for reflects that or, matter, for that listening to the objection sonal business reasons over testimony in way, some then that’s appellant. fine. the manager stated that he was Godbolt know, “A. I don’t you I don’t think — shop only and that he had one of a barber think it would. also called for employee jury had been “THE you COURT: Both of work for the duty at time. He related that he government? to close his business if he would have down “MISS MINICKS: Uh-huh. he was already and that served on “THE government? COURT: Federal trouble because was attend- in financial You all have lunch place? in the same managing as well ing school barber No, never “MISS MINICKS: I’ve shop. him, lunch with no. of the voir dire examination The conduct How know you “THE COURT: did largely sound must rest within the discre dad? tion of Moore v. court. Somebody me “MISS MINICKS: (Tex. —let supra; Abron v. 523 S.W.2d 405 I work with attorneys see. One It is Cr.App.1975). clear from record in attorney an told me that his son was present case God- know, somebody pointed and, him preoccupied bolt was by personal and busi out to me. problems ness that would interfere with his *8 ability jury. any to serve on the We find no “THE You’ve never had COURT: excusing abuse discretion in the court dealings with him? business State, supra. him. Moore v. Cf. No, MINICKS: he don’t know me “MISS at all. Appellant again urges that the court posi- challenge “THE COURT: What’s the State’s sustaining a for cause to erred in juror, Minieks. tion? prospective Doris 321 State, Culley versible error shown. 505 Well, feel Judge, we BURNHAM: “MR. (Tex.Cr.App.1974); she dad 567 Weaver v. since does know Sam’s like that S.W.2d on (Tex.Cr.App.1972). be better her to sit might for 476 S.W.2d side way case neither cf. Henriksen another S.W.2d 491 And have someone on the would (Tex.Cr.App.1973). know; we wouldn’t want someone they contends the trial next Appellant jury that we know. chal sustaining the State’s court erred I think more or “THE COURT: that’s juror Patricia prospective to cause lenge for proposition. you? a fair Don’t less Brightman. look like an awful fair-minded You I’m lady. going agree to with young require would that she stated Brightman because, all, after run into you’d capi- support a premeditation evidence when this is with and there him over though Texas even conviction murder tal be, you very know. fair you’d You’re After evidence. require such does not law you Thank so much. I’m sor- minded. to rehabili- counsel by defense much effort wait long had to so to find this ry you would that she then stated tate her she out.” feel- personal her despite law adhere to the objec- over appellant’s was excused Minicks follow- reflects the ings. The record then tion. ing: 35.16(a), supra, part, provides,

Article Now, “Q. Miss I won’t bela- Brightman, that: asked point, just bor the I had but challenge objection for is an

“A cause same you you question particular juror, alleging some to a you made some require said him or unfit incapable which renders fact premeditation. evidence of mistrial. fair and party that such a worked in the same building as defense counsel’s father did not ble or unfit S.W.2d 673 to serve The record in the instant case is devoid of the defense cause In sons: juror’s “8. That U hint Pigg [*] “only when he favor of may impartial ¤ that Miss verdict and (1956), on the to serve on [*] be made relationship he has a any juror. against jury. Minicks could not juror saw him.” We held was not the jury.” We find bias or render her Tex.Cr.R. either The fact that would not affect knew the A the defendant.” following challenge the State prejudice grounds “incapa- injured be a rea- she or “A. “A. Yes. “A. “Q. « “Q. “Q. Yes. “A. [*] premeditation? —yes, All you have Is that going of death swered it. question, Your Honor. She’s “MR. HUDSON: My personal feeling— where he’s Well, my— [*] go by the right, my could [*] by the that’s or a still find going have some evidence law, law. sentence him question way way you guilty Object get I would I feel. But is: Before a sentence life, would of murder feel have an- ? Well, abused the court its discretion in ex- “THE COURT: since she’s cusing her. ways answered both —. I would have My personal feeling, “A.

However, showing because there is no to, law, by the I would have to did not receive a fair and my go everyone else. This is impartial jury, because the exer- have personal feeling. 13 of its 15 I would only peremptory cised chal- evidence, which had to lenges, one of could been used have some but if I have Minicks, re- remove no the law—” go by *9 “MR. TOKOLY: much vacillation —because Although there was accord- ing to question— that she would part, appears Brightman’s premedi- evidence require Nobody some “MR. HUDSON: probably made that follow the law. kind of innuendo. could not and thus tation element of a mur- Well, see, is not an Premeditation I girl. “A. don’t know the I she was ruling that family; The court’s don’t know the I der case. don’t basis was sanc- challenge anything on this know about them subject to at all. er- All I know is that 35.16(b)(3), supra. they No are custom- by Article tioned or, ours, ers of I Further, say my not ours hus- did shown. ror is band’s. challenges. peremptory its two of exercise prospec- Well, “Q. used on this put you could have been let me it to this way One prospective explain as with the and I’ll how there juror tive as well could be a perhaps: You conflict find a de- Minicks. juror guilty fendant not after she says the trial Appellant contends happened, perhaps what this is the overruling challenge in court erred man and so forth. You have go Bolin Rayford Mrs. to venirewoman cause your tell home and husband that grant him an additional refusing to and in guilty,’ ‘We found him not and he’s with challenge in connection peremptory going to have to tell— her examination. Oh, no, “A. this —this would have no— juror last Bolin was the Mrs. think, bearing, no I don’t at all. During juror last chosen. interrogated and “Q. you ‘How could do that to my best examination, she stated that the voir dire customer?’ husband, agent, had an an insurance her Oh, we’re not on that close a per- “A. with Deia relationship ongoing business relationship sonal with our custom- Mr. Bolin han- Although father. Sutton’s ers. Most of our customers are insurance matters and Mr. dled Sutton’s names. Bolin family, Mrs. did the Sutton knew “Q. Okay so— related personally. them She know I say “A. And use the term ‘ours’ —I with the business connection learned of she because, know, strictly I you don’t when she and her husband family Deia’s agency work in the and I don’t —. months case several discussed “Q. You don’t know the extent of the follows: then testified as to trial. She prior business then that Mr. has Sutton you feel that this would “Q. Yes. Do husband? your serving in you any problems cause earthly “A. I have no idea. seeing her in court as a would “Q. feel that you And don’t course, and, husband would your arriving any way influence you know, I family know and the at a decision? assume, trying We’re possibly. I don’t don’t think so because “A. I get a fair— people. know the “A. Yes. “Q. Well— see, “Q. we’re —you and that’s what know, a, they are you But that “A. for, thing— looking this sort of con- we have that —that people that Yes, right. “A. tact with. “Q. —exactly. telling me that you are “Q. Okay. And Well, object to “MR. I TOKOLY: influence this would innuendo— that as if there’s some testimony listening to the way in reaching a decision? “MR. HALSEY: No. No, don’t, really I could think so. —that she “A. I don’t “MR. TOKOLY: that, see. only say but I can not be fair— Right, right. “Q. not— That’s “MR. HALSEY: *10 Appellant really what I think. next contends that saying I’m “A. unreasonably trial court restricted the voir can “THE COURT: That’s all prospective juror dire examination of Mrs. you’ve here lady, do told Court Carl Nelson. not, right? is that it will

“MRS. BOLIN: ‘Yes. discloses that record defense counsel right, get attempted question “THE COURT: All let’s Mrs. Nelson about term something meaning “deliberately” on to else.” 37.071(b)(1), in Article term is used Thereafter, inquired defense counsel special first issue V.A.C.C.P.—the to be sub- prejudiced against Mrs. Bolin was whether at the punishment phase mitted responded that she did not blacks. She of the trial. He first asked her whether she was, “any average more than the think she thought deliberate conduct meant carefully person my age who’slived in Texas all their responded considered conduct. When she life.” She later stated that she was not prosecutor affirmatively, objected on bigoted and that she would be a fair and ground that defense counsel was infer- juror. impartial ring was required prove that the State accepted as the twelfth Mrs. Bolin premeditation. The court sustained the ob- juror. Appellant challenged her on the jection on the basis that the term “deliber- prejudiced was racially that she grounds ately” statutory as used in the provision her husband had a business rela- and that given its commonly accepted meaning, Deia How- tionship with Sutton’s father. (Nelson).” “what it means to her The court we find on the record before us that ever permit refused to defense counsel to challenge overruled the properly the court explore the matter further. Appellant’s ob- ground of racial prejudice. cause on the jection was overruled. 35.16(a)(8),supra. Article See bar, In the case at the voir dire examina- respect to the business rela With tion was with respect limited to certain juror’s husband tionship between questions prospective juror only. as to one Sutton, Mr. we stated in Moore v. juror She was chosen as the second when supra, following: defense counsel stated that “will (Article 35.16, “. . . The statute happy accept juror.” this Voir dire V.A.C.C.P., parts, is divided into three examination could take an unreasonable providing challenges for cause which both length attorneys of time if on both sides make, may and the defense State throughout selected different words con- those which the may State make prospec- each templated charge and asked those which the defense make. Wé may juror those words meant. We tive what nothing find in the statute which renders find no abuse of discretion. these lists an exclusive basis for chal- error, ground of appel In another lenges Challenges for cause. for cause complains lant that the trial court erred in any ground not based on mentioned excusing prospective Delgadillo with ordinarily the statutes are addressed to challenge out either or the judge. the sound discretion of the trial not, A court should defense. on its own ...” 542 S.W.2d at 669. motion, any prospective juror excuse case, In Bolin did not the instant Mrs. cause unless he is absolutely disqualified. she family personally know Sutton (Tex.Cr. Valore v. S.W.2d con- testified that her husband’s business App.1977); Pearce v. 513 S.W.2d 539 not affect family nection with the would (Tex.Cr.App.1974). ability impartial her to sit as a fair and Delgadillo was a juror. We find no abuse of discretion statistician and challenge training had extensive overruling the court in mathematical denying perempto- theory. regard With probability cause and additional to Article V.A.C.C.P., challenge ground. 37.071(b)(2) ry whether there is a com Appellant that the defendant would next probability contends that mit acts of violence that would criminal psychiatric opinion testimony inadmissi continuing society— threat to constitute ble to show that the defendant con *11 not that that issue could Delgadillo stated continuing stitute a threat to society. The He logic. with reason and be determined thrust argument of his is that the discipline that, standpoint, from a statistical related of psychiatry sufficiently is not advanced to the probably will occur in whether an act predictions permit of future violent behav beyond reasona proven be a future cannot Although ior. his counsel had submitted a then determined that ble The court doubt. citing many well-written brief authorities against juror was biased prospective subject psychiatric on the of diagnosis, his law and him. of the excused phase rejected State, contention was in Moore v. concept not the of determin- Whether or supra.3 Livingston State, also v. See 542 ing of future conduct is probability (Tex.Cr.App.1976); S.W.2d 655 Gholsonand viable, it is mathematically clear that State, Ross v. 542 395 (Tex.Cr.App. S.W.2d law. Tex- See Jurek v. concept is viable 1976); State, supra. v. and Smith as, result the was enti- As a supra. rely upon phase tled of the law to Appellant next contends the State We conclude punishment. Grigson did establish that Dr. qual was disqualified was Ar- Delgadillo under expert opinion ified to give testimony. 35.16(b)(3),supra, ticle and that the court Grigson Dr. was certified the Ameri- him. properly excused Neurology and Psychiatry can Board of and was a member of several medical psy- and Phase II. Punishment organizations. chiatric He had examined evi Appellant contends that 7,000 felony over defendants in the course phase of the trial punishment dence at practice. psychiatric of his His evaluation he proba is to show that would insufficient appellant of was within his area exper- criminal acts violence that bly commit tise, and, thus, he was well qualified to continuing threat to so constitute opinion regarding state his the probability 37.071(b)(2), ciety. supra. Article See appellant would be a continuing threat he had Grigson testified that Dr. James State, to society. Hogan Cf. v. 496 S.W.2d to diagnosed and him appellant examined (Tex.Cr.App.1973). 594 sociopath who was not insane be a severe respect for else’s anyone had no We further observe that Grigson expressed Dr. life property. or made no objection at trial to the qualifica opinion appellant was aware of the expert Hence, nothing tions of the witness. right wrong, difference between State, preserved is for review. Jackson v. and quality he the nature of his understood (Tex.Cr.App.1972). 477 S.W.2d 879 acts, showed no for the and that he remorse He further instant offense. testified Grigson’s that Dr. Appellant urges known cure there was no improperly opinion testimony was admitted and that he would con- personality disorder hearsay. on because it was based society. an absolute threat tinue several references made psychiatrist testimony, conjunction This with that that he had read reports documents trial, guilt phase at the of the offered But also testi- offense. concerning jury’s sufficient to sustain the affirmative thoroughly ap- examined fied that he had issue answer to the second submitted at on him the basis pellant diagnosed penalty phase. supra; Cf. Moore he read those re- before that examination (Tex.Cr.App. 540 Smith v. S.W.2d 693 ports. error is shown. 1976). No (Tex.Cr. testimony opinion 548 S.W.2d Robinson Psychiatric See is admissible at 3. App.1977). phase punishment of the on behalf trial on as well as behalf of the State. the defendant Appellant Grig- Appellant asserts that Dr. raised. request did not opinion regarding appellant’s propen son’s copy of the report any purpose and did sity to future acts violence was commit object ground at trial that the improperly admitted because it invaded the report was not submitted. No harm is province jury. This rationale shown. repudiated Hopkins State, S.W.2d error, grounds In five There, we set (Tex.Cr.App.1972). forth asserts that in permit court erred following criteria which be met must ting Dr. Grigson testify regard expert opinion testimony before can be ad concerning matters the psychiatric exami (1) missible: the witness competent must be nation. qualified testify; (2) subject *12 objection No was any made to of the upon must be one which the aid of an testimony challenged. now Nothing is expert’s will opinion be of assistance to the presented for review. v. Braxton

jury; (3) testimony and not state may (Tex.Cr.App.1975); 528 S.W.2d 844 Ryan v. legal conclusion. Those criteria were met State, 523 954 (Tex.Cr.App.1975). S.W.2d in the Appellant’s instant case. contention is overruled. contention, In appellant his next

Next, appellant urges that Dr. argues that permitted the court erroneously Grigson’s testimony improperly was admit Grigson Dr. to describe sociopaths as mani ted because he failed to with the comply pulative. 46.02, (3)(d),

provisions of Article Section The record reflects that Grigson, having V.A.C.C.P., provides: which diagnosed appellant as a sociopath, testified report “A written of the examination persons suffering person- from such shall be submitted to the court within 21 ality disorder develop never a conscience or days examination, of the and the court remorse, feel guilt, shame. He further copies report shall furnish of the sociopaths testified that are convincing liars defense counsel and the prosecuting at- ability and have the to manipulate “people, torney. report shall include a de- lawyers, preachers, jurors doctors” and “as scription procedures of the used in the long as it’s advantage. to their . . .” examination, the examiner’s observations Appellant’s objection was overruled. findings pertaining defend- His analysis sociopathic personality trial, competency ant’s to stand and rec- permissible expert testimony and thus ommended treatment. If the examiner was properly admitted. It is further ob- incompe- concludes that defendant is served that did testify at tri- trial, tent to report stand shall in- No al. error is shown. clude the examiner’s observations and Appellant complains of several answers findings whether is about there a sub- given by Grigson during Dr. cross-examina- probability stantial defendant tion. competence will attain the to stand trial in the foreseeable future.” The record reflects the challenged first remark was made follows: Dr. Grigson appointed court “Q. (Defense counsel) Grigson, Dr. re- wheth- to examine and determine ally, not trying I’m to belabor the competent er he was to stand trial and point, be, well, not trying I’m whether he was sane at the of the time that, or anything offensive like I psychiatrist was thus re- offense. must that I say ques- don’t think the quired a report to submit of that examina- tion pat- was answered because record, however, tion. The no such contains tern I’m speaking of has to be report is no showing and there that one was supported some , other incidents— But ever submitted. also reveals record Yes, “A. sir. insanity no issue time at the incompetency “Q. offense or of stand you— —that ing society. Grigson threat Dr. Yes, sir. “A. that “I don’t need to see him commented aware of. “Q. —are again put my jeopardy. life . I misunderstood. Yes, sir, sorry, I’m “A. objection The court sustained have one Yes, is true. You disregard and instructed the that did being that dead human contends the court Appellant remark. natural causes. And in die of overruling the motion for mistrial. erred in want, we get what order dead, three would have to have two prompt The trial court’s instruction in the dead, dead, With twenty dead. four Appellant error. instant case cured experience, my my training my to a mistrial. Cf. Tristan was not entitled states, ‘Doctor, you are profession (Tex.Cr.App.1974). S.W.2d call, diagnose somebody qualified to Appellant complains next that Dr. diagnose can is like this. You him as a “cancerous sociopathic personality Grigson referred to them as a degree.’ removed from very of a severest who should be type person” disorder I’ve doesn’t state that profession Grig record reveals that Dr. My society. The twenty until he kills got to wait earlier metaphor used the cancer son had him a socio- I can call people before was waived. objection. Any without error State, supra; Hayles path.” Watson *13 supra. objection was overruled. An as previously testified Grigson had Dr. grounds appellant In two of error

follows: improper complains Grigson that Dr. made Now, person the sometimes “. . . Dr. to extraneous offenses. references die, but, now, problem type this doesn’t “previ he Grigson stated that had discussed has, a con- without an individual where and later type appellant, ous trouble” science, being’s life another human taken he things had told him some appellant done, was in which this the manner in was objection done.” No (appellant) had shooting in war somebody this was Error, any, if either statement. made to somebody was not person; another State, v. was waived. Braxton 528 S.W.2d defending their defending their home or State, v. (Tex.Cr.App.1975); Vera 473 844 killed, was wife; stranger that this was a (Tex.Cr.App.1971). 22 S.W.2d itself, without the This in murdered. and conscience, says, ‘Say, that is a socio- it challenges the Appellant kill a dozen He doesn’t have to path.’ limitation of his cross-examination court’s we ‘Now then you say, can before times testified on direct ex Grigson Dr. already you it,’ know. He’s you know appellant sociopath was a — amination that now; you know it.” now is when know continuing threat to he was a and that cross-examination, appellant society. On tes objection no to this was There testified to the him whether he had asked of evi admission improper timony. many on behalf of the State same effect error if reversible not constitute dence does responded that Grigson Dr. capital cases. to by facts were shown same facts occasions so testified on numerous Watson he had was addressed. objection which no objected. The court whereupon the State State, (Tex.Cr.App.1976); 619 532 S.W.2d v. no in objection. There was State, (Tex.Cr. sustained the 213 Hayles v. 507 S.W.2d consider the jury not to struction for App.1974). statement. further cross-examination During the excluded tes Appellant contends another exami why was asked Grigson Dr. bias, preju to show timony was admissible He not needed. appellant was nation part State’s or interest on dice examina psychiatric that another answered therefore, and, heavily bore witness expert unnecessary to deter appellant tion of however, did Appellant, credibility. a continu- on his present he would mine whether

327 court to he “The answer jury ask the retire so to all three questions is develop yes going I’m to proffered testimony. simply could Ab ask to your yes. follow oaths and answer them showing testimony sent a of what such been, would of a have an offer statement containing what the excluded evidence objection No was made to the argument show, nothing presented would re Hence, challenged. nothing now is present- 40.09, 6(d)(1),

view. Article V.A.C. Section State, Rodriguez ed review. v. 530 C.P.; (Tex. S.W.2d 927 Stein (Tex.Cr.App.1975); S.W.2d Jackson Cr.App.1974); Hicks v. 493 S.W.2d State, 516 167 (Tex.Cr.App.1974). S.W.2d (Tex.Cr.App.1973). Appellant next contends court errone- ously overruled his motion after mistrial The Rev. R. testified that Hunter prosecutor following made the comment appellant since four had known he was during argument: years old. After Rev. Hunter stated . . going suggest “. And I’m to appellant’s reputation community something you, to ladies and gentlemen: good, inquired defense counsel whether If Mr. Hudson seriously believed that thought com minister would this man was sick not a criminal of mit a similar offense in future. kind, the worst as the evidence him shows objection court sustained the State’s to be—” question. permitted Rev. Hunter then was the objection The court sustained in- that, testify knowledge, appellant to his disregard structed the the comment had committed no other acts of violence. and overruled the motion for mistrial. Appellant contends court errone- an Generally, instruction dis ously opinion excluded Rev. Hunter’s regard is sufficient cure an error represent con- whether would argument. McClure 544 S.W.2d tinuing society. threat Since he did not (Tex.Cr.App.1976); Gholson and Ross v. show testimony what excluded *14 State, supra. We find that the court’s been, nothing have presented is for review. prompt the instruction in instant case was 40.09, 6(d)(1), supra; Article Section Stein harm, to sufficient remove the if in the any, State, State, supra; supra. v. v. Hicks prosecutor’s unfinished statement. The motion for was properly mistrial denied. grounds In three appellant error State, v. (Tex.Cr. Thomas 519 S.W.2d 430 complains improper jury argument the at Morgan State, App.1975); v. 502 S.W.2d 695 punishment phase of prose the trial. The (Tex.Cr.App.1973). argued cutor as follows: “Now, Hudson, as I to I Appellant listened Mr. prosecu asserts that the back thought improperly and I recall tor to yesterday referred an extraneous telling you during jury argument. was to the offense find Defendant The record guilty because was a reflects: there reasonable Yesterday

doubt in the case. he wanted . . “. And you don’t know as he you today to turn him loose and he wants sits here today he wishes with all disregard belief you your in the death that heart he had struck her harder . penalty, maybe sitting he wouldn’t be where he

is.” objection An was overruled. Now, . gentlemen, “. . ladies and standing I and I know believe I’m prosecutor referring was to the vi here, you talking from folks over a beating cious which inflicted on long days, you period that would (cid:127) Sutton, to give Deia who lived the most jury unless believed the on this in against damaging testimony him. She in penalty proper death case. . shot and choked before struck thought

her. When the two robbers their 328 leave, dead, State, Her they prepared App.1972); supra; v. Smith

victims 475, 667, his com Texas, called to 74 young the man nandez v. 347 after U.S. S.Ct. fur went and inflicted they back panion, (1954). 98 L.Ed. 866 young man. and killed injuries ther judg- No reversible error is shown. The also dead Appellant believed Sutton ment is affirmed. shows her and evidence when he left die. her to We conclude that he wanted ROBERTS, Judge, dissenting. argument was a dis prosecutor’s that from, of, aor reasonable deduction cussion I. State, supra; Cf. evidence. Burns required I remain convinced that oath (Tex.Cr.App. 707 549 Cain v. S.W.2d V.T.C.A., Code, 12.31(b), Penal is Section 1977). equivalent adequate neither the of nor an requirements substitute for the Wither New Trial III. The Motion for Illinois, 510, 1770, spoon v. 88 U.S. S.Ct. that contention is Appellant’s final (1968). my 20 L.Ed.2d 776 Part I of See erroneously excluded evi the trial court in dissenting opinion Shippy systematic exclusion of blacks dence of the 246, (Tex.Cr.App.1977). 257-264 I S.W.2d hearing on at the petit panel from the accordingly judge would that the trial hold Appellant’s trial for new trial. the motion jurors excused improperly quash an oral motion to counsel made McLarty Nixon in violation of Withers systematic exclusion ground panel on poon.1 voir dire examina the conclusion of the McLarty first stated she Although regarding this allegation made no tion but penal- could never vote inflict death racial issue in the motion other she testified she ty, later could truth- is Assuming the contention new trial. fully punishment stage ques- answer the review, conclude us for we properly before according tions evidence. admit- She it without merit. in response prosecutor’s leading ted argu- apparent thrust question factor peremptory used its that the State ment is way her would some “affect delibera- from qualified to strike blacks challenges However, her tions.” she later clarified argument was ad- panel. The same views her last statement testimonial Ridley S.W.2d vanced said, “I it when she still think [the we stated: (Tex.Cr.App.1972), wherein be in back of mind penalty] my systematic exclusion “We hold no way.” result that would To hold otherwise has shown. been *15 Prospective juror the abolishing by Nixon was asked peremp- our in effect be would Nixon, “Mr. how do challenge practice always prosecutor, you your- which has tory help an system penalty; you of our self feel the death do part been a about following well the obtain an as State in it?” The then oc- accused believe impartial jury and a fair trial.” curred: My religious— “A holding Ridley. See

We our adhere hear State, (Tex.Cr. you. I can’t 64 “THE COURT: 487 S.W.2d also Hill McLarty pre- quently objections property is is made other not destruc- 1. error as This objection, clearly appellate of which was over- the trial tive review. After served for by judge. going judge ruled the he was to excuse it clear that made counsel, excep- your McLarty, told “Take he preserved. The error as to Nixon was also preliminary Except mat- for a few short tion.” timely exception Appellant a reserved ters, McLarty had voir of dealt the entire dire excusing Although no of Nixon. counsel made ability favor the death to vote in of with her specific Witherspoon, ground of mention of his only judge penalty. clear, only Thus the trial objection subject the of since be; objection appellant’s during what notice voir Nixon’s dire was his examination ability objection granted anticipated actually willingness pen- the and inflict the and death alty. That subse- it it was made. counsel before

329 alty of is My religious qualitatively “MR. NIXON: death from different —no. however, imprisonment, long. sentence of religion? Against your “THE COURT: finality, Death in its differs more life get back to from right, your go All card and imprisonment than a term 100-year prison the central room.” one only differs from of a year or two.”3 objected on Wither- occupies position This statement rela- of prosecutor and the spoon grounds continued insignificance tive in the midst of over two his examination. Nixon stated be- pages penalty hundred of death opinions religious never cause of beliefs he could 2, Supreme July issued Court on unless, penalty you the death “not vote for Nonetheless, 1976.4 I believe that believe, know, know, only, you I extremely important prop- statement is to a know, prosecu- says.” what Bible er interpretation death as it penalty law asked if the mandatory tor then sentence of under our today exists federal Constitution. life imprisonment death or would affect deliberations in When Nixon’s the case. 2nd, opinions July Supreme In its would, Nixon said “submitted” become, Court re-affirmed what had judge and the him over excused some,5 proposition: a dubious exception. not, penalty itself, death is in and of cruel punishment. and always reasons stated in dissent in unusual This my For the has do not believe were been Shippy, jurors my State, supra, I these view. See Tezeno v. 377; disqualified.2 process require- The due 484 S.W.2d Jurek v. 522 Witherspoon 950, ments were vio- 934, therefore S.W.2d note 11 (Tex.Cr.App.1975) lated, reversal and should result. See Opinion Davis (Dissenting Roberts, J.). This (1976). 429 122 Georgia, U.S. supported conclusion the Constitution itself, particularly in the of the language

II. Fifth Amendments, and Fourteenth both of provide which Carolina, v. North 428 state or federal In Woodson U.S. 280, 305, 2978,2992, government may life, 96 deprive S.Ct. 944 anyone 49 L.Ed.2d (1976), Stewart, Justice for three speaking liberty, property without process.6 due Court, pen- added). course, members wrote that “the (Emphasis Of what prospective jurors I Gregg, 2. do believe Hamilton 4. In addition Woodson and the cases absolutely disqualified Florida, 242, under Chase are Proffitt v. 428 U.S. S.Ct. 96 Witherspoon, though prefers majority 2960, even Texas, (1976); 49 L.Ed.2d 913 Jurek v. justify disqualification their (1976); Louisiana, under lesser 428 U.S. 262 Roberts v. V.T.C.A., 12.31(b). Hamil- 325, standard Section 3001, 428 U.S. 96 S.Ct. 49 L.Ed.2d 974 unequivocal staunch ton remained her (1976). acknowledged inability to vote for case, repeatedly while Chase See, g., Goldberg, 5. e. THE DEATH PENALTY “probably” stated that she vote to could not COURT, AND SUPREME THE 15 Ariz.L.Rev. penalty. inflict the This sufficient. Tao, (1973); 355 BEYOND FURMAN V. 374, See Tezeno v. 484 S.W.2d 383-384 THE GEORGIA : NEED FOR A MORALLY (Tex.Cr.App.1972); White v. 543 S.W.2d BASED DECISION ON CAPITAL PUNISH- 104, (Tex.Cr.App. 1976). 108-109 MENT, (1976); Lawyer Notre Dame Comment, THE DEATH PENALTY: A CRUEL 153, 188, Gregg Georgia, 3. See also 428 U.S. PUNISHMENT, AND UNUSUAL 27 Sw.L.J. (1976). 96 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 859 Two Note, (1973); IS THE DEATH PENALTY *16 apparently agree, other members of the Court DEAD?, Baylor (1974). L.Rev. 26 114 they emphatically, much more since both albeit penalty the death different believe is so I, 19, Similarly, 6. Article Section of Texas imprisonment of from a term as to unconsti- be provides: Constitution “No citizen of this State Carolina, See Woodson su- tutional. v. North life, privi- deprived liberty, property, shall be 305-306, (Opin- pra, U.S. at 428 96 S.Ct. 2978 immunities, leges any or or in manner disfran- Marshall, JJ.); Gregg Brennan and v. ions of chised, except the due course of law of 231, supra, 227, Georgia, 428 96 U.S. at S.Ct. (Emphasis added). the land.” (1976) (Opinions of Brennan and Mar- 2909 shall, JJ.); 238, Georgia, Furman v. U.S. 408 257, 314, 2726, (1972) 92 346 S.Ct. 33 L.Ed.2d Marshall, JJ.). (Opinions of Brennan and 330 implies greater defendant are in a unquestionably necessarily

Due Process Clause life, may deprived liberty, case, is one be only process not because due penalty or if the in accord with property taking it, is our only society’s demands because process. simple enough propo- This is a due it, values affirm the need for but also be- sition, any proper yet it is at the heart of finality cause the penalty of the death itself understanding penalty.7 of the death imperative. makes it matter how No inno- be, an guilty may cent or individual no implies Process also The Due Clause greatly rights may matter how his have just any something important which is as violated, he no relief gain been can from By its penalty: of the death consideration already court if he has been executed. language, the Clause states choice of importance emphasizes relative even every to say This is not error in a protect. the three values seeks to penalty case presumed is to be harm- life, liberty, speaks terms of Clause ful; deny importance nor is it meant to that order. property — in prosecution vigorous capital defend- meaning. however, order which obvious It is an has is necessary, ants. What is that Americans, liberty we above value life indeed, As every court —take spe- this Court — It follows liberty property. above care to assure that a death penalty cial is due when one is on trial process more be scrupulous defendant treated with the depriva- a only than when faces his life process requires. that due We may fairness liberty, just procedural more as tion of violating not do otherwise without the Con- protection required is when an individual’s we have uphold. stitution sworn to when it necessary at stake than is liberty is property which the State is individual’s III. expropriate. seeks to determining In whether defendant’s all death Thus, process requires that due process rights due have been violated guided with juries be selected and examination, conduct voir dire we is in other greater than demanded care look to the entire voir dire and should Illinois, su- Witherspoon v. criminal trials. except portions course isolation — v. Georgia, supra; v. Woodson pra; Gregg portions standing where those alone consti- Carolina, in accord supra. This is North error, Davis v. g., Georgia, tute reversible e. For ex- precedents. with well-established take, we supra. approach This process due demands that ample, example, when we review the court’s in a greater proof burden of put charge when a record to or we review de- liberty is at trial —where life criminal erroneously whether admitted termine evi- required in a civil stake —than other harmless. dence —or error —is In re issues are involved. property where 362-364, 358, 90 S.Ct. Winship, 397 U.S 316, Bailey Thus in 532 S.W.2d v. Mullaney v. 1068, (1970); 368 25 L.Ed.2d (Tex.Cr.App.1975), we 322 held “[i]n 1881, 684, 44 Wilbur, 421 U.S. 95 S.Ct. considering appeal, we charge on will Randall, 357 (1975); Speiser v. 508 L.Ed.2d will portions, not review isolated con 525-526, 1332, 513, 78 2 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. U.S. charge Yet in sider a whole.” Ranso v. Loui- compare And Duncan (1958). 1460 36, (Tex. 550 42-43 nette S.W.2d 145, 1444, 20 194, siana, U.S. 88 S.Ct. 391 (Opinion Appellant’s on Cr.App.1977) Mo (1968), v. Vir- with Alexander L.Ed.2d Rehearing), we held that an in tion 2803, 836, ginia, 413 U.S. 93 S.Ct. evidence is circumstantial re struction (1973). L.Ed.2d evidence is quired if circumstantial relied then, guilt upon to establish the as a summary, I hold that In charge court’s safeguards though a criminal even procedural principal, afforded Illinois, spoon 522-523, Georgia, Gregg supra, supra, 391 U.S. 428 U.S. at 7. See *17 Carolina, 2909; v. North Woodson S.Ct. 1770. 96 S.Ct. 305, 2978; Wither supra, at 428 U.S. 96 S.Ct.

331 principals. includes an instruction on And IV. (Tex.Cr.

in 488 S.W.2d 420 Gavia prosecution App.1972), a murder under the A. Code, 1925 Penal we held that the inclusion James L. When Godbolt was called as a charge in the court’s of an instruction on juror, he testified that he did right arising of self-defense from a Then, not believe in the death penalty. expectation or fear reasonable of death or response prosecutor’s questions, God- bodily injury did serious not eliminate the “personal bolt that this belief” would stated need for an instruction on self-defense preclude voting him from ever for the an against unlawful pro violent attack as by vided for Article 1224 of former penalty. death Godbolt also affirmed that Code. life, the mandatory sentence of death or together feelings against taken with his

We may thus derive exception an death general penalty, would affect his Bailey. rule of We will review delibera- charge except where the absence as a whole case, tions on especial- the fact issues in this is, alone, given charge standing sig- a a ly his deliberations on questions the three deprivation nificant defendant’s punishment asked at the stage of the trial. guaranteed to him rights, the Consti- V.T.C.A., Code, See Penal 12.31(b); Section statutes, or well-settled tution case 37.071, Art. V.A.C.C.P. law. However, upon closer examination by de- We follow a similar rule when we con- fense counsel and the judge, Godbolt sider whether the error in the admission of unequivocally stated that he could set aside unconstitutionally obtained evidence feelings about the death penalty and Generally, harmless. we review the record answer the three punishment questions the case as a whole and determine “honestly based on the evidence . [and] whether the error is harmless beyond a though [appellant] even get reasonable doubt. Cole v. 484 S.W.2d penalty.” In accord with Wither- 779, (Tex.Cr.App.1972), 783-784 and author- spoon, However, 12.31(b), as well as supra, there cited. Section ities there are some rights “so basic declared, constitutional to a fair trial trial judge “All right, quali- he’s infraction can that their never be treated as point.” fied on that Chapman California, error.” harmless prosecutor then asked Godbolt if his 18, 23, 824, 827,17 386 87 S.Ct. U.S. L.Ed.2d business or personal life would suffer if he (1967), quoted with approval 705 and fol- were forced to sequestered for several Arkansas, Holloway 435 lowed U.S. nights following week with the rest of 489, 1173, 475, 55 L.Ed.2d 98 S.Ct. panel. the jury replied Godbolt that he was (1978). barber, every day a away from of the entire An examination voir dire day work was a he received no pay, and especially seems mandated review of that he was behind on his bills. He also capital Witherspoon’s a re case because that he was only stated one of two barbers . quirement “produce that the shop worked, in the where he and the other jury condemn a uncommonly willing to barber had been jury duty summoned for man to die.” 391 U.S. [Footnote omitted.] following Tuesday. Godbolt concluded 88 S.Ct. at 1776.8 I therefore turn if he were to serve on this to the voir dire examination to determine shop barber would have to be shut down whether this imposed by completed until he or the other barber had jury “organized to return a verdict of death.” jury duty. After a brief additional exami- Witherspoon 521-522, specifically 8. The court held also U.S. at [Footnote omitted.] may that “a State not entrust the determina- S.Ct. at 1776. tion of whether a man should live or die to a organized tribunal to return a verdict of death.” 8, supra. 9. See note *18 guilty find if she could someone of murder subject, same Godbolt on the

nation judge, jury by though presented the trial no evi- from the even State exciised motion the benefit of a without re- Initially, Brightman, who acted motive. dence of agree- or the defense or the State so, she could not do then indi- that sponded juror. them to excuse ment between “prefer” to have only she would cated that in a exception counsel noted his Defense evidence, finally unequivo- and stated such timely manner.10 that she would not prosecutor cally to the finding of motive before require confronted evidence judge the trial Thus opposed the capital murder. personally guilty someone of venireman a qualify as a could still penalty turned to the issue prosecutor The then Godbolt was case. Since this juror defining of it as “kind of a premeditation, cause, it was challenge for to a subject explain- pre-planning pre-scheming” excuse him. court to for the error require the ing that does not Texas law in a murder prove premeditation State B. prosecutor’s In response case.11 prospective of examination voir dire Brightman that she would questions, stated represents anoth- Brightman Patricia require the some evidence present State to process of due of the denial er instance premeditation could find of before she a whole. voir dire as by the demonstrated murder, Texas person guilty though of even questions, prosecutor’s responding In require law did not it. The State she believed the stated that Brightman juror. “submitted” the only in imposed should be followed the lead State’s raped young girl where a man cases those nev- premeditation assumed that also otherwise, opposed she was baby; or a proof capital in a part required er exami- Upon further capital punishment. began ques- The defense its murder case.12 her answer Brightman qualified nation that out indicating might tioning Brightman by pointing that she be in favor of of cases: of punishment insusceptible in some murder capital premeditation is often know, depends, you on what of all in the mind only because it exists proof “[I]t case is about.” acknowl- Brightman then the assailant. and not edged she could follow the law that Bright- then determined The State premeditation require prove punish- range full consider the man could despite personal feelings her to the con- mur- offense of included the lesser ment Brightman trary. Next, asked prosecutor der. capital consistently 03 of our Penal Code defines murder. it is held has This Court

10. (a)(3) judge of that section sets out one of to excuse Subsection for the error motion; however, committing capital this erro- jurors murder: his own the methods of unless the person is deemed harmless removal re- neous when “the commits the murder for g., injured. E. he was promise shows that defendant of remuneration or muneration or 477, (Tex.Cr. 545 S.W.2d employs Valore the murder for re- another to commit Nonetheless, App.1977). it should be remem- promise or the of remuneration.” muneration holding on the is conditioned this bered requirement beyond dispute capital mur- It seems to be nor the Constitution that “neither proved der this subsection cannot be under Rogers v. violated.” statutes [be] premeditation, that a without evidence of 260, 261, 289 S.W.2d 163 Tex.Cr.R. prosecutor present evidence who fails to such seen, my not with (1956). concern is will be As Thus, proof. has not met his burden of alone; juror standing it is of this the exclusion prosecutor’s statements on this issue played part exclusion this instead with constituted, part, an overbroad and at least pattern which de- selection an overall general mur- statement of the law of incorrect process right law. to due nied der, portion of that which was the focus voir examination. dire one point be observed it should 11. At proof require capital murder does form 11, supra. spe- although 12.See note word is not premeditation, cifically Section 19.- the statute. mentioned in

33 n *19 its examination (Em- then resumed “MISS BRIGHTMAN: Yes.” The juror. What follows phasis added.) ex- remaining voir dire entirety of emphasized portion of Brightman’s Brightman: of Patricia amination response makes it evident that she was in Now, “Q [By Bright- Miss Prosecutor] process of repeating her assertion that man, I won’t but point, I belabor “go by she could the law” and require just you ques- had asked same provide to proof premeditation. the State you you tion and said that judge juror The trial then cut the off and require pre- would some evidence of her, disqualified again once on his own mo- meditation. tion. Yes. “A “Q way you Is that still feel? Thus, the second time the judge My personal feeling— prospective juror “A with a was confronted strong “Q initially expressed Yes. who had reserva- inflicting penalty tions the death about —yes, way that’s I But “A feel. law, going by it, then I would have all cases that the law but allowed go by to law. qualified was nonetheless to serve as a words, then, “Q you In other if juror. penalty death Again, was error you selected on a knew that qualified for the court to excuse a charged capital the man was with whose answers made it nevertheless clear you murder and know he’s if that she would be less than many inclined guilty found of that he’s you, prospective jurors other to inflict the death sentence of or going get to appellant. life, you know sentence of that. Uh-huh. “A C. question “Q right, my All is: Before him you guilty could find of murder began examination Doris Minicks get to going where he’s a sentence with a discussion whether she was ac- life, or a sentence of quainted with appellant’s some of the rela- you to have some evidence have tives; she concluded that she was not and premeditation? also stated she did not know Nannie Well, my— “A Jones, Marshall, Fay Wayne Linda Robert “MR. HUDSON [Defense Counsel]: Bickems, Trotter, Larry four of the Object question, Your Honor. witnesses in the case. Minicks State’s listed it. She’s answered that, of her knowl- then to the best testified Well, “THE COURT: since an- she’s Next, appellant. edge, had never seen she ways swered both —. knew prosecutor asked if she either of My personal feeling, “A I would have Halsey or attorneys, Steve Sam to, law, I would have Hudson replied, “I know Sam Hudson. She go everyone my with else. This is him out somebody pointed indirectly; personal feeling. I would have pro- dire me.” The voir examination evidence, have some but if I had follows: ceeded as go by the law— HALSEY “MR. [Defense Counsel] No, “THE you’ve got COURT: if answer, sorry, your I missed I’m evidence, have disqualifies some know how? you Sam Hudson you. your Get card. Indirectly; “MISS MINICKS: “MR. excep- Note HUDSON: our somebody pointed him out to me and tion, Your Honor. works father same de- his “THE excep- COURT: Take your I work Other than partment for. kind, tion. You’ve very been Miss that, per- I don’t —I know him Brightman. don’t sorry I’m you had wait me. long. sonally; so he doesn’t know personally, know Hudson don’t Sam see, okay. I “MR. HALSEY: dad, know his would it you but since you know Do “Q [By Prosecutor] position an uncomfortable put you in well? pretty father client, against found Sam’s you if in another He works really. “A Not go back and had to example, I department the same section his dad? work with there and work in. him See, work with “A No. I don’t his fa- talked ever “Q Have in the hall. I see him directly. ther? *20 section He —works in another Yeah. “A just and I see I’m in another section do? you do of work “Q type What him; him, know, to you speak Depart- secretary for Well, I’m a “A than that— other Devel- Housing and Urban ment Oh, Well, it you I see. if think “Q Regional Council. opment, affect, know, might you your busi- father do? what does Sam’s “Q And or, matter, listening for that ness equal specialist, he’s an EO “A I think testimony way, in some specialist. opportunity fine. that’s that like the fact Well, feel “Q you do know, I don’t you “A I don’t think — dad, that that know Sam’s you think it would. know, rath- you’d you might make — you “THE COURT: Both of work don’t you where some case er sit on government? either side? lawyers know the MINICKS: Uh-huh. “MISS might be that think you Don’t govern- “THE COURT: Federal bit better? little lunch in the ment? You all have I—I because you Well, up it’s “A place? same I personally; him know don’t No, I’ve never MINICKS: “MISS know— him, lunch with no. had his dad to see Well, you’re going “Q you How did know “THE COURT: to be course, going and, we’re that was his dad? and afterwards case trying this Somebody “MISS MINICKS: —let and work go back going to you’re attorneys I work me see. One of the And, of dad, know. you with his me his son was an with told that position agot have course, sides both know, and, somebody attorney you know, in all and, you case in this me. him out to pointed that’s sides and to both fairness never had You’ve “THE COURT: question. that I asked reason only with him? dealings any business that know, juries other there’s You No, he don’t MINICKS: “MISS cases other on and serve can you all. me at know party. know either don’t you where What’s the State’s “THE COURT: Okay. “A position? might be better that think “Q you Do BURNHAM “MR. [Prosecutor]: way? like that since Well, Judge, we feel “A Yeah. might dad it know Sam’s she does so, too, since I think COURT: “THE on another case her to sit better family. of the a member you know neither side would way just let me Judge, “MR. HALSEY: they jury someone on have ask her— know; want someone wouldn’t we know. that we

“EXAMINATION on the think that’s more I “THE COURT: MR HALSEY: “BY Don’t proposition. fair or less a an uncomforta- put you “Q Would like an awful fair- You look you? you I know I mean position, ble going excusing by stating Minicks young lady. I’m the State minded because, all, with after agree agreed to excuse him when this is over you’d run into police “who knew a officer or had a relative be, you’d you with and there know. a police that knew officer.” The prosecu- very minded. Thank You’re fair supported tor’s assertion is not by the rec- sorry you much. had to wait so I’m prospective jurors ord. Nineteen long to find this out. so they, acknowledged a relative of we’ll ex- guess “MR. I HALSEY: theirs, police knew one or more officers.14 cept ruling. to that these, two, only Rings, Of Claxton and your “THE COURT: Go about busi- judge excused the trial because of this ness. Go back work he knowledge because admitted —Claxton government. bad feelings police toward officers as a “MR. I’m a TOKOLY [Prosecutor]: juvenile Rings son’s result of his arrest and Halsey surprised light little Mr. because admitted that he didn’t “really agreed fact that we’ve know” an friendship whether his Irv- police people excuse knew a of- *21 ing police judg- lieutenant would affect his relative knew a ficer or had a that police ment of the witnesses in the case. lady officer this has indi- police and Of the seventeen remaining prospective like she a cated she felt knew rela- jurors, ten were by appellant, struck three of the Defendant she knew tive and by the struck and four served met Hudson or least had his Sam jurors. as In contrast with the examination dad. Minicks, juror of the judge trial made no juror.” Next “THE COURT: effort to intervene when these prospective judge excusing in The trial erred Minicks jurors acknowledged they were ac- appellant’s objection, over since was not she officers, quainted police with nor did the subject 35.16, a challenge cause. Art. any spontaneous State make or oth- offer — Ordinarily, Vernon’s Ann.C.C.P. this error any erwise —to excuse of these seventeen Valore be deemed harmless. jurors, though even several of them were supra; Rogers supra. How- closely acquainted much more police with ever, voir the dire examination of Minicks officers than Minicks with counsel’s fairly compar- cannot be considered without father.15 ing it the voir dire of other several jurors to the ex- especially This to say is not these seventeen Rayford of amination Mrs. Bolin.13 prospective jurors have should been excused automatically by judge. However, the trial D. together when taken with the examination Minicks, First, the judge’s I observe that the failure prosecutor to intervene in sought justify judge’s aspect the trial action in this of the voir dire only Blackmore, opinion, supra. Juror 13. See Part III of this who was also struck appellant, stated that he had met or two three Harrell, Department Price, Dallas jurors Mary Police Mar- officers and also 14. These were Funk, Blackmore, deputy, tin, Chamness, Valentine, knew one reserve been a had guest Carter, Shanks, Claxton, Christian, deputy in Rings, Blackmore’s home. The was a good Bums, McFadden, Barker, Hunnicutte, friend of Legg, Blackmore’s son. Price, nineteen, Juror Shanks stated a of his and Shaw. Of the friend Cecil daughter’s Minicks, Department was a Dallas Police of- first were examined before ten Similarly, prospective juror ficer. remaining testi- nine Barker afterwards. fied that he had two that I went to “friends high school with that members Dal- are example, juror that one 15. For Harrell stated Department.” las Police stated Juror Bums nephews police was a officer in California police that he “a knew few” Dallas officers nephew and another was a court bailiff there. that one a All three of “close friend.” Treasury Harrell himself had been a De- once prospective jurors these were struck subject partment investigator. He was the appellant. challenge. peremptory second After several prosecutor’s personal ques- assertion on additional undermines issue, the error in tions, it also accentuates counsel asked Bolin if she any knew Brightman. of Godbolt and the excusal officers; prosecutors police replied she prospec- Unfortunately, the examination did not stated she and also that neither other, similar error. juror Bolin reveals tive she her ever belonged nor husband had any neighborhood organi- law enforcement E. zation or the like. stated that neither She determined that Bolin did The State first any she her family nor member of had ever attorneys. or his not know crime, charged been nor a had felt asked Bolin about how prosecutor them a victim crime. been of a “I penalty. She answered believe acknowledged belonged that she She for it in penalty. I’m certain in Vance, Judge church as John a same later she added instances.” A few moments Dallas, district testi- judge criminal the death she had believed in they well-acquainted. fied were not She long time. as a stated that she had served questions asking Bolin several After case, and that misdemeanor background and as- personal her about a verdict. Defense counsel then reached difficulty have no certaining that she would points her on several covered re-examined sequestered jury, the being part prose- of a testimony. earlier in her her assurance that she would cutor received a list solely her on the evidence. He Defense counsel then showed Bolin base verdict nature of explained to her bifurcated if she of the witnesses the case asked well as the nature and content anyone on the list. replied knew She punishment issues at special Sutton, she knew of Deia deceased’s *22 her stage. stated that answers Bolin killed, when was companion because Sut- on the evidence issues would based these ton’s was my father “a customer of hus- them would not be her deliberations on in the Al- band’s insurance business.” sentence of by mandatory the affected Bolin stated that she did not know though also imprisonment. She stated death or life personally, or her father she testi- Sutton as explained she follow the law that could fied she and her husband had discussed that prosecutor require and not evidence by the in this It Sutton’s involvement case. premeditation. She also testi- of motive or noteworthy testifying in about her range the she could consider full fied that husband’s insurance business with Sutton’s of- punishment for the lesser included of father, family Bolin referred to the Sutton the agreed She follow fense murder. though as customers” even Bolin did “our prove the its case by requiring State to law in the work business. doubt, presuming by reasonable beyond a stated, however, that Bolin she did proved guilty, by appellant innocent until this by think that she would be influenced ev- appellant’s indictment no considering relationship if she chosen as a business guilt, by according the idence of his Then, juror. interrogated after counsel Bo- right his to remain silent. appellant the briefly lin about her husband’s views on his of Bolin Appellant began examination possible and her own racial her questions more about asking several prejudice, the defense concluded its exami- background. Bolin stated personal judge of Bolin and asked the nation the case at the time she had read about grant challenge cause on the basis of its a sum- gave occurred and short the offense in “knowledge complaining of the witness she remembered from her mary what testifying, being this a customer of her case of the case was reading; knowledge her The chal- judge denied this husband.”16 testified not extensive. She accurate but lenge, prosecutor judge told the and the disregard what she had read she could accept juror. that the would the evidence alone. her decision on and base racially prejudiced. urged also that Bolin was 16. The per- Godbolt, jurors five Brightman, had exhausted Because and Min- icks, addi- challenges, seating juror he asked for an and in emptory Bolin. challenge. judge denied tional such Bolin was seated as V. request, the case.

final Finally, I point would out that reversal in required this case is not only by the Federal F. Constitution; Texas our Constitution man- majority that it not an concludes was I, 19, dates also. Article See Section chal- of discretion to overrule this abuse Constitution, quoted the Texas in footnote an lenge deny request cause and 6, supra. This section was construed in peremptory challenge. But so additional 35 Tex.Cr.R. Paris 31 S.W. 855 holding, majority to look at the fails (1896). guilty Paris was found of murder action judge’s trial context of and sentenced to die. The case was re- dire, especially entire voir the examination because trial versed of the court’s failure to By saying of Doris Minicks. and excusal allow the sufficient defendant cross-exami- disqualified was her that Minicks because of witnesses, of one nation of the State’s be- faint awareness of defense counsel’s father of the give cause court’s failure to a limit- Bolin asserting while at the same time ing charge on impeachment testimony, and qualified despite her husband’s business also because of failure to give proper its relationship family with the one of charge the issue duress. The Court victims,17we giving signal are opinion following concluded its with the judges their in the discretion selection language: juries of capital given will not be a mean- which “Whether tried case ingful review this Court. any weight would have attached the opposite process; This is of due it is say, is not for testimony excluded us process in fact no at all. The record reveals court, charge whether the if it had court that the trial allowed the selection of properly testimony, limited the admitted a jury merely which was not neutral case, one presented in the and had predisposed impose penal- other, jury, issues in the clearly ty. This violates the mandate of changed result, prov- have is not our Witherspoon requirements as well as the inquire; that, ince to but we do know *23 our Texas own Constitution. the under law and the decisions of this state, the I would hold that an examination the defendant has been deprived of of entitled, testimony entire dire a to which he jury voir reveals selection was charge process process adequate- in violation of due and the of the court did not ly present due of the law the land.18 More as to course of the issues the other evi- I specifically, would hold that the trial which Every dence was admitted. citi- reversibly zen, upon excusing prospec- placed life, court erred in when trial for his is juror prematurely off), (a pro- Sparks of McFar- 17. And see examination issue cut land, summarily by judge spective juror support pen- excused because whose of the death acquaintance alty moth- qualified of her hesitant who also was but Jackson, Compare issue; er. also the examination of when he stated too could consider not appel- murder, excused because her brother knew the punishment appellant the minimum lant somewhat and mentioned the case to her. again attempts cut off in his at rehabilita- tion), (prospective Lister did who previ- numerous 18. The record contains other penalty, impose in the but believe could ously examples of this undiscussed erroneous it, she was excused because the mother of process. examples, exam- selection For see the 2135, years over children ten old —see Art. V.A. prospective jurors Dunaway (an ination anti- of C.S.), (anti-death penalty Wolford venirewom- penalty venirewoman nonetheless an; appellant prematurely cut off from Wither- impose could it but who stated she could spoon rehabilitation), appellant (again, Palmo five-year punishment impose minimum prematurely rehabilitating off cut from murder; ap- the lesser included offense venirewoman). anti-death pellant’s attempts to rehabilitate her on this according to a to the due entitled land; and the

course of law tes- evidence in admission of rules of application of rules of timony, and the testimony, admitted are much law to part by the land as trial law of may These rules of law be jury itself. technicalities, they some termed trial, impartial with a and an accord fair experi- in the wisdom of and are founded moreover, ence; and, these some of con- safeguards and bulwarks of stitute and, rights, whenever and wher- human ig- they disregarded have been ever nored, marked the decadence that era has added). (Emphasis freedom.” human 858. 31 S.W. at Tex.Cr.R. Paris, judgment should re- As in remanded. versed and cause PHILLIPS, J., joins in this dissent. Houston, appellant. E.

Larry Meyer, J., ONION, P. and DALLY and Before VOLLERS, JJ. HILL, Glynn Appellant,

James OPINION Texas, Appellee. STATE of The DALLY, Judge. No. 58035. The waived a trial Texas, Appeals Criminal Court of plea guilty entered a the court to before No. 2. Panel robbery, violation the offense of of V.T. Code, punish- Penal C.A. Sec. 29.02. 31, 1978. May imprisonment years. for 10 ment asserts that the indictment *24 says He fundamentally defective. alleged which it is he property since the to take in the took or intended course committing was not de- particularly theft scribed, he not on notice of offense charged, which and he cannot plead judgment prosecu- later in bar tion for the offense. same alleges appellant, that the indictment committing in the theft of while course property complainant with the intent prop- and maintain control of the obtain

Case Details

Case Name: Chambers v. State
Court Name: Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas
Date Published: May 24, 1978
Citation: 568 S.W.2d 313
Docket Number: 54676
Court Abbreviation: Tex. Crim. App.
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