Chambers v. StateChambers v. State
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Per Curiam
The appellant Edward Chambers was found guilty by a jury on May 6, 1987, of aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon and sexual abuse in the first degree. He was sentenced as a habitual offender to consecutive terms of life and thirty years imprisonment. We affirmed. Chambers v. State, CR 87-144, (December 14, 1987). Appellant subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief in this court pursuant to Criminal Procedure Rule 37. The petition was denied. Chambers v. State, CR 87-144, (February 8, 1988). Appellant also filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the trial court which was denied. The denial of relief was affirmed by this court. Chambers v. State, CR 90-54, (June 4, 1990).
On June 26,1990, appellant filed in the trial court a petition for reduction of sentence pursuant to
The motion is denied and the appeal dismissed because it is clear that there was no merit to the petition filed in the trial court. This court- has consistently held that counsel will not be appointed to pursue a meritless appeal. Johnson v. State, 303 Ark. 560, 798 S.W.2d 108 (1990); Williams v. State, 293 Ark. 73, 732 S.W.2d 456 (1987) and Glick v. Lockhart, 288 Ark. 417, 706 S.W.2d 178 (1986).
As the appellant raised issues which were cognizable under Criminal Procedure Rule 37, the trial court was entitled to treat the allegations under Rule 37. Williams v. State, 291 Ark. 255, 724 S.W.2d 158 (1987). We agree with the trial court that, considered under Criminal Procedure Rule 37, the petition was untimely. Where a petitioner raises no issue which, if found meritorious, would render his conviction absolutely void, a Rule 37 petition is untimely if not filed within three years of the date of judgment. Rule 37.2(c); Maxwell v. State, 298 Ark. 329, 767 S.W.2d 303 (1989). The allegations in the petition filed in trial court were not sufficient to establish that the judgment was void. Moreover, Rule 37.2(b) provides that all grounds for relief available to a petitioner under the rule must be raised in his original petition unless the original petition was denied without prejudice to filing a second petition. Appellant did not receive permission to file a subsequent Rule 37 petition. Thus, the petition was not only untimely but also subject to dismissal as an unauthorized second petition.
Furthermore, even if the petition filed in the trial court were considered under
Motion denied and appeal dismissed.