Chambers v. StateChambers v. State
This case involves the appeals of four juveniles from adjudications of delinquency in the juvenile court of Lowndes County. Six separate hearings were held the same day on the various charges pending against the juveniles. (1) Fifteen-year-old Roy C. Hall and fourteen-year-old Alvin James Johnson were found guilty of burglary in the third degree and theft in the second degree in connection with the burglary of Norman's True Value Hardware on February 2, 1986. (2) Hall, Johnson, and seventeen-year-old Chambers were found guilty of burglary in the third degree and theft in the second degree in the burglary of Norman's True Value Hardware on February 3, 1986. (3) Fifteen-year-old Joel Coley and Chambers were found guilty of theft in the second degree for their actions at Old Fort Cleaners on January 21, 1986. (4) Coley was found guilty of theft in the second degree for the events of the Kwik Stop on January 22, 1986. (5) Hall and Johnson were found guilty of criminal mischief in the second degree for their conduct at the Lowndes County Middle School on February 1, 1986. (6) Chambers was found guilty of theft in the second degree for his action on December 18, 1985, involving the Lowndes County Middle School.
At the conclusion of all the hearings, the trial judge adjudged each appellant to be a delinquent child and committed each to the Department of Youth Services.
Rule 11 (A) of the Alabama Rules of Juvenile Procedure provides:
"(A) When the child is taken into custody, he must be informed of the following rights by the person taking him into custody:
"(1) that he has the right to counsel;
"(2) that if he is unable to pay a lawyer and if his parents or guardian have not provided a lawyer, one can be provided at no charge;
"(3) that he is not required to say anything and that anything he says may be used against him; and
"(4) if his counsel, parent, or guardian is not present, that he has a right to communicate with them, and that, if necessary, reasonable means will be provided for him to do so."
"If any one or more of these warnings are omitted, the use in evidence of any statement given by the child is constitutionally proscribed." Ex parte Whisenant,
While the State presented testimony that Coley and Johnson were given "their rights," no evidence was presented of the specific rights given. However, this particular ground of objection was never raised at trial. "Only those grounds of objection presented to the trial court can serve as a basis for reversal of its action. . . . The trial judge will not be placed in error on grounds not assigned in the objection. . . . Even though evidence may have been inadmissible *609
on different grounds, the defendant is bound by the specified grounds of objection." Bolding v. State,
We recognize that "a general objection to [the] admission of evidence should be sustained if the evidence is illegal for any purpose and cannot be made legal by introducing other evidence or by otherwise framing the inquiry." Satterwhite v. State,
This testimony was elicited with regard to Juvenile Hall. In responding to this objection at trial, the court stated:
"Yes, well, the question of the Sheriff, it's not the duty of the Sheriff to determine all the seriousness of anything.
"It's a question that if the Sheriff has testified to the fact that he [the juvenile], that he understood his rights and understood them clearly at the time he gave that statement. He said he was not drinking, did not appear to be under the influence of alcohol or drugs or any other matter.
"As to his reaction to the charges, people react in different ways."
"[I]n most cases, the defendant's mental deficiency will be but one factor to be considered in the `totality of the circumstances' surrounding the confession." Garrett v. State,
"This totality-of-the-circumstances approach is adequate to determine whether there has been a waiver even where interrogation of juveniles is involved. We *610 discern no persuasive reasons why any other approach is required where the question is whether a juvenile has waived his rights, as opposed to whether an adult has done so. The totality approach permits — indeed, it mandates — inquiry into all the circumstances surrounding the interrogation. This includes evaluation of the juvenile's age, experience, education, background, and intelligence, and into whether he has the capacity to understand the warnings given him, the nature of his Fifth Amendment rights, and the consequences of waiving those rights. See North Carolina v. Butler, supra [
, 441 U.S. 369 , 99 S.Ct. 1755 ]. 60 L.Ed.2d 286 "Courts repeatedly must deal with these issues of waiver with regard to a broad variety of constitutional rights. There is no reason to assume that such courts — especially juvenile courts, with their special expertise in this area — will be unable to apply the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis so as to take into account those special concerns that are present when young persons, often with limited experience and education and with immature judgment, are involved." Fare v. Michael C.,
, 442 U.S. 707 725 ,, 99 S.Ct. 2560 2572 ,(1979). 61 L.Ed.2d 197
"[Y]outhfulness is one of the factors to be considered."McElroy at § 200.14 (3).
Contrary to the appellants' assertions, there is evidence which shows that they were aware of the consequences of their actions in waiving their rights. Since the evidence of voluntariness was subject to different interpretations, the findings of the trial judge must be upheld absent an indication of patent and clear abuse of discretion. Williams v. State,
"[N]othing in Code 1975, § 12-15-58 et seq., precludes the transport of an arrested juvenile to a police department first before transfer to a juvenile facility." Ex parte Talley,
Here, we need not decide the question because we find, as we did in Burttram v. State, supra, that, even if the rule requiring corroboration of accomplice testimony applies to a juvenile delinquency adjudication, the testimony of the alleged accomplice was corroborated by the appellants' own confessions.
"A defendant's voluntary confession may likewise be considered corroborative evidence authorizing a conviction."Craig v. State,
On December 18, 1985, the Lowndes County Middle School was burglarized. Four or five dollars in school office supplies were missing as were "some oranges and apples" valued at $8 and a teacher's purse, also valued at $8.
Theft of property in the second degree involves property with a value in excess of $25. Alabama Code 1975, §
Coley's conviction for second degree theft is affirmed because the State proved by Coley's confession that Coley received $65 of the money taken in the burglary.
Coley's conviction for theft ("(3)") was proper because the State proved, contrary to Coley's argument, that $51.20 which had been left in the store was missing after the robbery. Chambers' confession also implicated Coley in the burglary as did Coley's own statement admitting guilt.
The juvenile court's adjudications of delinquency are affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
All Judges concur.