*1 attorney’s regardless ofthe outcome of fees bad faith and case. omitted.) punctuation
(Citation Ins. v. Cotton States Mut. Fortson imposes it 155, 158 “Since Co., strictly (Cita requirements penalty, are construed.” the statute’s punctuation Jimenez, at 12 tion and initially coverage, although it its Here, refused reversed GFB days position demand, Hendersons’ and after inves- within 60 paid damages, tigating it determine the amount ofthe Hendersons’ to policy limits to cover the full cost of remedia- them in excess of their genuine damage Also, to furniture. tion and other documented dispute above GFB owed amounts over and existed as whether Coverage provision. policy I believe that limits under the Mold reasonably they required were contested the issue ofwhether GFB pay any Damage Coverage under the additional amounts Water damage separate apart provision proof without of water damage. mold
Accordingly, properly granted I would find that the trial court summary judgment JNOV and as to the Hendersons’ bad faith claims. Presiding Judge
I am authorized to state that Andrews and Judge Ray join opinion. in this July 16,
Decided 2014. Long, Long, appellants. Tucker B. John for Currie, Hiers, Dietrichs, Swift, McGhee & Mark T. Melissa K. appellee. Kahren, for
A14A0265. CHAMBERS v. MONROE COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS.
Boggs, Judge. granted discretionary applica- We claimant Pamela Chambers’ appeared tion this workers’ case because precedent bar, additional and this area would benefit the bench and supported for a review of entire record to ensure that the facts findings. considering including record, the Board’s After testimony, given review, claimant’s the deferential standard of the Board’s that Chambers’ was not — “idiopathic” “arising is, because it was not out of” her — supported by evidence and therefore must be affirmed. reviewing compensation cases,
When awards in workers’ appellate both the court and the court must con- light party strue the evidence in the most favorable to the prevailing appellate ofthe before division State Board *2 Compensation. findings It Workers’ is axiomatic that the Compensation, supported the State Board of by any when Workers’ binding. evidence, are conclusive and (Citation, punctuation Mgmt. and footnote Med. Office Hardee, viewed, So January 27, 2012, evidence shows that on employed Pamela Chambers was firefighter/EMT County. returning as an for Monroe After complete station, from a call to the fire she sat down at a desk to paperwork watching and then remained at the desk television. Her supervisor get up her asked to from the desk so that he could use it. “pop” chair, When she rose from her left knee. She continued Chambers felt and heard a in her pain work, but to as surgery increased she went emergency probably room. She had knee and will need replacement. a knee injury compensable
The ALJ found the on the basis that Cham- required bers was following to be in the location where she was and was supervisor’s employer appealed,
her orders. The and the Appellate Division vacated the It ALJ’s award. found “no evidence Employee slipped, tripped, any that the or fell or came in contact with object injury,” simply or hazard that increased her risk of but that she position. Appellate rose from a seated cluded that The Division therefore con- had Chambers failed to show a causal connection between employment injury her and her or that her arose out of her superior noting affirmed, The the deference it was required give findings Appellate finding Division, of the supported that some evidence in the record the award. From this judgment, appeals. Chambers legal governing
The standard whether an “arises out of” Chaparral Heath, is well established. In Boats v. 567) (2004), 12-judge decision,1 whole court held: regardless
Where the would have occurred of where required located, was to be and results from a judges specially, agreeing contending Three concurred with the result but that an earlier case need not he overruled. 269 Ga. at 349-350. exposed equally been
risk to which the would have employment, apart there is no condition of the causal connection between basis for injury, under and no basis for ment and the applies positional general The rule still risk doctrine. that the does not arise out of way danger “peculiar to the work” in a the causative injury. causally connects (Citations omitted.) Chaparral Boats, Id. at 343. In Heath was walking quicker pace” employer’s “at a than normal across popping parking get lot in order to to work on time when she “felt pain in her left knee.” Id. at 339. upon that Heath’s
[T]he ALJ found review evidence slip, trip, fall, or knee was not the result of a contact any object, with and that there was no evidence Heath any particular that, claimed cause. The evidence showed simply walking occurred, when the knee Heath at pace choosing. of her own (1). Accordingly, Id. at 344 we reversed the order court’s *3 concluding denying that the Board erred in the benefits because employment. did not arise out of Heath’s Id. at 348.
Similarly, Joseph’s Hosp. Ward, in St. v. 443) (2009), get a nurse her knee when she turned to a cup patient. Appellate of water for a Id. at 846. The Division found exposed any unique that “the was not risk to her employment by standing turning, turning, that, she did object any employment.” not come into contact or hazard of Id. with again, superior substituting at 847. Once we reversed the court for its judgment for that of the Board. Id. at 848 hearing, get up
At the Chambers testified that she did not from testimony her chair in an unusual manner. She offered no to establish injury: causal connection between her and her for example, configuration that the chair or desk caused her to lose her standing position, balance or strain to reach a that a work-related emergency jump such as a fire alarm caused her to out of the chair in any object manner, a hurried or that she came in contact with or piece equipment. desk, stairs, hazard such as the or a of exclusively upon County Chambers relies almost Harris v.Peach 36) (2009), arguing Commrs., Bd. that of apply we should across the board that case’s affirmance of the Appellate activity finding employee’s Division’s that the arose out of dropped pill Harris, claimant, custodian, a on In injured pick up her knee when she bent over to after the floor. She supervisor pointed her. Id. at 226. The Board concluded her it out to part up obj picking the floor ofthe claimant’s duties ects from concluding superior reversed, custodian, but the that her as a solely obesity, placed unusual strain on arose which judgment, her knee. Id. at 226-227. We reversed the court’s observing: operative question performed the claimant
[T]he is whether job activity duties, in furtherance of her and this is a question of fact that is committed to the factfinder at the Chaparral Boats, administrative level. In the factfinder walking found that under the circumstances tute an ing. did not consti- employment function, and we deferred find- to that case, In this the factfinder found that under the circum- object, bending pick up though an stances over even it was personal medication, the claimant’s did constitute an again, function, and, ment defer to because fact-finding body must each case remain the final compensability arbiter and whether the of of disability claimant’s arose out as well as in the course of it. (Citations, punctuation emphasis supplied.) omitted; and footnotes Id. at 228-229.2 may
While the dissent asserts that we nevertheless review de findings us, novo the not the of Board in the case before the cases cited do support the assertion that the Board’s determination of whether subject “arises out of” to de novo review. In Figueroa, Renu Store Thrift (2007), compensability deciding of an was not at issue. In appropriate penalties benefits and due a claimant after a unilat- suspension by employer, eral statutory provisions of benefits we construed three Compensation governing
of the Workers’
Act
repose, penalty
delayed payment by
employer,
statute of
for
attorney
the award of
fees. And in Thornton v.
Accident &
Hartford
*4
816) (1945),
Supreme
Co.,
Indem.
An arises out injury. employment and the connection between causal establishing causation. carries the burden The claimant properly concerning questions left to are causation Factual superior than to Board to determine rather the State findings appellate must courts, and the Board’s court or support them. evidence to be affirmed if there is Orthopedic Hosp. punctuation Hughston (Citations There, Wilson, supported superior evidence because some reversed the had not suffered a that the Board’s injury. work-related support determi- the Board’s
Here, some evidence to there was to her had no causal connection that Chambers’ nation judgment may therefore affirm the ment, not disturb it. We and we court. Doyle, Ellington, Judgment J., J., Dillard and P. P. affirmed. Miller, J., Barnes, J., Branch, JJ., dissent. P. concur. Judge, dissenting. Presiding BARNES, supervisor directed knee when her Pamela Chambers complete paperwork. up get desk so that he could her to from a *5 408 undisputed context,
In this evidence shows injured employee undertaking at the supervisor, injury express direction of her arose out of and in the employment law, course ofthe as a matter and the should of majority receive workers’ benefits. Because the con- respectfully otherwise, cludes I must dissent. Compensation Georgia
“The Workers’ Act in is intended to have application variety injuries pain broad so as to cover a wide and the injuries.” Hennly suffering Richardson, and incident to v. such 264 (1) (444 317) (1994). “highly 355, 355-356 SE2d It is remedial in Ga. liberally nature” and “must be construed in favor of the claimant in accomplish purposes.” (Citation punctua order to its beneficent and App. (2) Sabel Indus., 236, tion CGU Ins. v.Co. 255 Ga. 243 (564 836) (2002). Gassaway Corp., App. SE2d See v. Precon 280 Ga. 153) (2006) (workers’ compensation system 351, 354 SE2d is “designed especially work”). protect workers in the course of their always principles analyz
We must bear these in mind when ing injury compensable whether an is accidental under the Act. injury compensable
An accidental is under the Workers’ Com- pensation employee’s injury ifAct arose out of and in the course (4); Hughston Orthopedic of her § See OCGA 34-9-1 Hosp. (1) (703 17) (2010). Wilson, 893, 306 895 Ga. SE2d independent injury criteria, “These are two and distinct and an (Citation under the Act unless it satisfies both.” punctuation omitted.) Sallett, Dixie Roadbuilders v. 318 Ga. (2) (733 228, 231 SE2d An “in arises the course of” employment period employment, when occurs within the at place employee reasonably may perfor- where the be in the fulfilling duties, [her] mance of and while is [she] those engaged doing something duties or incidental thereto. statutory requirement place time, This relates to the place. circumstances under which the takes (Citations punctuation omitted.) undisputed It Id. is that Cham- employment, bers’ arose in the course of her and thus that criteria has been satisfied.
“An arises ‘out of’ the when a reasonable person, considering employment, after the circumstances of the perceive would a causal connection between the conditions under resulting injury.” Hennly, which the must work and the 264 (1). Fidelity Co., 492, 495 Ga. at 356 See Fried v. U. & S. Guar. 192 Ga. 704) (1941); (2). Roadbuilders, Dixie at 231 The employee’s ofthe need not be the sole cause conditions of injury; only be a “contribut- rather, conditions need ing proximate v. Hart- sustained. See Thornton cause” 816) Co., & Indem. Accident ford Troupe, App. 108, also Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. See Ga. (1980) (in involving dispute case over no-fault coverage, “con- insurance court notes distinction between automobile cause”). tributing proximate cause” and “sole evaluating compensable, In whether an accidental Appellate findings of the Division of the must defer to the factual (the Board”) Compensation “State if there is State Board Workers’ any support Hernandez, them. The Medical Center v. evidence App. *6 557) (2012). Moreover, “[w]hether Ga. 335 SE2d injury employment generally in is arises out of and the course of question App. Sears, mixed of law and fact.” Lee v. 897 196) (1996). Significantly, however, the material facts dispute, question injury not in in are whether an arises out of and employment question id.; Thornton, the course of is a of law. See 198 applications undisputed facts, And Ga. at 795. “erroneous of law to as subject law, well as decisions based on erroneous theories of are to the (Citation de novo standard of review.” and footnote Renu Figueroa, 455, Store v. 456 Ga. Thrift undisputed, appli- Here, the material facts are and the issue is the cation of the law those to determine to facts whether Chambers’ injury employment. contrary Thus, arose out of her to the conclusion by majority, proper reached standard of review is de novo. applied present case, that When standard of review is is concluding clear that the State Board and court erred in that Chambers’ did not arise out ofher is This because undisputed record before us demonstrates that the conditions of employment contributing proximate Chambers’ were a cause to her Specifically, knee as a matter of law. the facts show that on the day firefighter, working accident, Chambers, an EMT and was responding a 24-hour shift and had returned to the fire station after emergency to an call. Chambers was seated at a desk in the station supervisor approached get up when her and asked her to from the complete job paperwork. desk so that he could One of Chambers’ carry supervisor, duties to out the of her and was instructions she immediately up desk, from the desk. from her stood As she rose popping pain, left knee made a loud noise and she felt instant signaling impaired ability carry a knee that her to out her work ultimately required surgery. duties and injured demonstrates, record her As this Chambers knee as she express supervisor, rose from a desk at the ofher as she direction job respect, required to do in accordance with her duties. In this supervisor get up [her] Board found that Chambers’ “asked State complied it,” from the desk so that he could use and Chambers injured supervisor Thus, her knee. Chambers’ directed Cham very injury. bers to undertake the movement that resulted her knee supervisor expressly employee When a directs an to undertake a specific physical activity, and the is then carrying very activity, out that there is a sufficient causal connection resulting injury between the conditions of and the compensation, warrant no matter how mundane the (i.e., walking, standing, etc.) may e.g., See, itself be. Harris Peach County 36) (2009) Commrs., Bd. (employee’s injury, reaching knee which resulted from her down to pick up personal workplace floor, medication off the was com pensable, among things, supervisor required where, other “her expected pill floor”).3Any her to remove the from the other result principle Compensation turn would that the Workers’ Act is to be “liberally provide coverage construed to to the worker” on its head. Gassaway, at 354. Georgia employee’s
It true that courts have stated that an is not if the “results from a risk to which equally exposed apart would have been employment,” condition of and that “the does not arise out of ‘peculiar danger where the causative to the way causally injury.” work’in a connects the (Citations punctuation omitted.) Chaparral Heath, Boats v. *7 App. 567) (2004). Interpreted expan 339, Ga. sively, 343 too principles compensation
however, these would eliminate from large injuries simply a number of sustained at work because the outside of the might perform claimant the same
workplace.4
present
employer through
Where,
case,
as in the
its
3
Heath,
Chaparral
567) (2004),
Neither
Boats v.
339
nor St.
Ward,
Joseph’s Hosp.
(
For these combined the evidence demonstrates in of her Chambers’ knee arose out of and the course Consequently, is entitled to ment as a matter of law. Chambers benefits, workers’ and the State Board and reaching opposite erred in Because I would conclusion. employer, judgment reverse the Chambers’ I entered favor of respectfully dissent. joins Judge
I am authorized to state that Miller in this dissent. — July Decided appellant. Lemon, Knott, & Paul M.
Knott for Murphy Sibley, Phillip Sibley, appellee. & for A. THE
A14A0297. STATE v.ALLEN et al.
Phipps, Chief Judge. police marijuana stopped After discovered in a car that was for infractions, Allen, lane passenger, respectively, Patrick Scott and Dorian the driver and the possession were indicted for the ofmore than marijuana.* suppress drug one ounce of evidence Scott and Allen moved to illegal the fruit as of an seizure. The court conducted an evidentiary hearing, granted appeals. then their motion. The state follow, For reasons that we affirm. suppression hearing patrol
The sole witness at the was the officer stop. who examination, initiated the traffic On direct he testified to following. September 13, 2012, On while stationed in the median traffic, anof interstate to monitor the officer observed a 2012 Nissan Altima vehicle cross from the center lane oftravel into “the fast lane.” entering place person purpose collecting of business of a third for the a bill owed to his employer disorderly engaging office). early conduct at the These cases from which these *8 principles originated cry are a far from the situation where an sustains an undertaking workplace job at the with her consistent duties. (prohibiting possession substances). See OCGA 16-13-30 of controlled §