76 W. Va. 614 | W. Va. | 1915
Plaintiff, as assignee of Glover, sued defendant for the amount of the alleged death benefits accrued under a policy or certificate of membership issued to Glover by defendant, a fraternal insurance corporation, on July 6, 1908.
The original policy sued on was partially burned so that the words and letters at. the ends of some of the lines could not be read or deciphered, but enough appears on the paper which, read in connection with the constitution and by-laws, introduced in evidence, and other evidence, substantially proves the contract. It provides in substance and effect, that in consideration of the compliance by Glover with the laws governing the endowment bureau of defendant and his good standing as a member of Standing Rock Tribe, No. 29, at Lanark, defendant agreed to pay, within ninety days after receipt of satisfactory proof of death of said Glover, to the widow of the said Glover, or to his heirs, if living, if not living then to his executors or administrators, as follows: In case of his death during the first year, $50.00; in case of his
The provisions of the constitution and by-laws pertinent to the questions presented are as follows: First, the declaration that by authority of the Great Council of the United States the State Council “hereby creates an Endowment Bureau for the benefit of the families or persons designated by deceased chiefs in good standing in this Order”, upon the conditions among others: (a) That all members admitted to a local tribe, and as soon as raised to the rank of chief, shall be entitled to a policy, and upon the payment of fifty cents to the Great Chief of Eecords, shall receive a policy properly made out and signed by the Great Sachem and Great Chief of Eecords, &c., and that the tribe shall be required to pay for the policies issued to its members fifty cents each; (b) that every chief (member) in the order shall pay to the endowment bureau, through his tribe, twenty cents per month, in addition to his regular monthly dues; (c) that upon satisfactory proof of the death of a chief (member) in good standing, to be furnished on blanks provided by the State Council, the Great Chief of Eecords shall draw an order on the Great Keeper of Wampum, signed by the Great Sachem, within ninety daj^s, for the amount to which the beneficiary of such deceased member is entitled by the terms of the policy and the constitution and' by-laws, the by-law specifically providing that such sums shall be “payable to the widow or the legal heir of the deceased”; (d) that it shall be the duty of each tribe, within fifteen suns after the beginning of each Cold Moon, Plant Moon, Buck Moon, and Traveling Moon to forward the amount of wampum due the endowment bureau to the Great Chief of Eecords, who shall record the same, and forthwith pay over the amount thereof to the Groat Keeper of Wampum, taking his receipt therefor, and that he shall furnish to the finance committee every three moons a statement showing the quarter for which such wampum is paid, the names and members’of the tribe paying the same,.
An advisory board' is also provided for, to consist, of not less than seven members, of which a majority shall be located at the home office, to be appointed by the Great Sachem at each Council meeting of the State, and of which the Great Sachem shall be ex-officio chairman and the Great Chief of" Records and the Great Keeper of "Wampum, shall be ex-officio members of said board; and which board, it is provided, shall have jurisdiction in all matters pertaining to the endowment department, with power to change the amount of such endowment, the endowment fee, and to make any levy or assessment necessary to the payment of the face value of the policies held by legal beneficiaries, provided, that the action of said advisory board shall not go into effect until approved by the Great State Council.
Besides the general plea of non-assumpsit, the following breaches of the warranties and conditions of the policy sued on and of the terms and provisions thereof and of the constitution and by-laws, are pleaded and relied on by way of defense to the action, viz: First, that the deceased Glover was not at the time of his death a member in good standing in his tribe, because of his failure to pay through his local tribe, or othei’wise, to the endowment bureau, the sums
To all these special defenses the plaintiff specially replied, denying the facts pleaded in some of them, and as to all alleging that defendant had by its acts and conduct, in the manner specified, waived its right to insist upon the alleged violation of the several provisions of said policy, and of the 'constitution and by-laws, as defenses to said action.
On the trial the plaintiff recovered a verdict and judgment for one hundred and sixty three dollars and fifty cents, the subject of the writ of- error now before us.
Numerous errors are assigned: First, that the alleged assignment of the policy to plaintiff is testamentary in character, and not being proven or provable as a will of deceased, was improperly admitted as evidence of plaintiff’s title and right of action on the policy. There is no merit in this point. The assignment was endorsed on the policy, is in good form, duly witnessed by two witnesses, manifestly on a blank form of assignment printed on the back of the policy, and is wholly unlike the paper involved in Grand Fountain U. O. T. R. v. Wilson, 96 Va. 594, relied upon by plaintiff in error.
The second point is that the court erred in permitting the plaintiff Chambers to give in evidence, as showing consideration for the assignment of the policy to him, and of his in
In our opinion this proposition is not well founded in law or fact. The authorities cited by counsel for the proposition do not support it. It is well settled by many authorities, including those cited by counsel, that a creditor has an insurable interest in the life of his ■ debtor, and that as beneficiary named, or as assignee, he is also entitled to the benefits of the policy to reimburse him for premiums, dues, etc., advanced or paid to the insurer to keep the policy alive. Woody’s Admr. v. Schaaf, 56 S. E. 807; Cammack v. Lewis, 15 Wall. 643; Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Schaefer, 94 U. S. 457; Warnock v. Davis, 104 U. S. 775; Crotty v. Union Mut. Ins. Co., 144 U. S. 621; First National Bank v. Terry, 99 Va. 194, 196; Roller v. Moore, 86 Va. 512; Long v. Meriden Britannia Co., 94 Va. 594; Beaty v. Downing, 96 Va. 451; Neiv York Life Ins. Co. v. Davis, 96 Va. 737; Tate v. Building Association, 97 Va. 74; 1 Cooley’s Briefs on the Law of Insurance, 301.
And this rule respecting insurable interest is applicable to mutual benefit societies, and to policies issued by them, unless there be something in the contract, constitution, or by-laws of the society or of the statute controlling its organization, prohibiting it. 1 Bacon on Benefit Societies and Life Insurance, sections 252 and 311; Pleasants v. Locomotive Engineers Mut. L. & A. Ins. Asso., 70 W. Va. 389; Basye v. Adams, 81 Ky. 368; Niblack on Benefit Societies and Accident Insurance, p. 322, section 165, et seq. True such insurable interest must exist at the time of the contract of insurance or at the time of the assignment thereof to the creditor, or at the time he is designated by the insured as beneficiary in the policy. Outside of the payment of the initiation fee, doctor’s fee, and dues, it does not clearly appear when the relation of debtor and creditor originated, but the policy is dated July 6, 1908,
But a question presents itself in this connection, suggested perhaps by counsel, but not argued, that is, whether there is anything in the contract of insurance itself or in the constitution and by-laws of the society denying to the insured the right to assign the policy or change the beneñeiary named therein. Some of the provisions of the constitution and bylaws do not seem to be harmonious. As the names of the beneficiaries in the policy seem to have been partially obliterated by the burning of the edges, and there is no positive evidence to supply this defect, we must assume that the policy was made payable substantially in accordance with this provision of the by-law.
Assuming that the policy by its terms is payable to the widow, if any, or to the legal heirs or personal representatives of deceased, had Glover, the insured, the power or authority to assign the policy to plaintiff:, or to change the beneficiary therein, as he undertook to do in this ease? As already shown the declared object of establishing this endowment bureau was “for the benefit of the families or persons designated by deceased chiefs in good standing in this Order.” We find nothing in the constitution and by-laws 'of the society, and there is nothing in our statute law, in terms, prohibiting the assured in a policy of insurance or a member of a benevolent society from designating as beneficiary persons other than a member of his family, or from assigning the policy to such other persons with an insurable interest as a creditor or the like. It substantially appears from the record that deceased left no widow. Our case of Pleasants v. Locomotive Engineers Mut. L. & A. Ins. Asso., supra, holds that unless some statute or rule of public policy controls, restrictions or limitations upon the naming of beneficiaries, contained in the constitution and by-laws, are for the benefit of the insurer, but that these may be waived.
• Had Glover then the right and power under the contract to assign the policy to plaintiff, or to substitute him for the
The third point we will consider is the rejection of the record in the office of the Chief of Records, showing Glover’s standing and the standing of his tribe in the endowment department. This record was offered in connection with the testimony of the. witness White, Secretary and Great Chief of Records, who, while proving that the entries made in the book had been made by his wife, his private secretary, proved also that they were made by her in his office and under his personal direction, and that the book offered was the official record, and that it was correct within his personal knowledge. After looking at the book, and without objection, he was permitted to prove orally, the standing of Glover up to March 31st, 1912. But by the terms of the policy Glover agreed that the records of the office of the Chief of Records should be prima facie evidence of his standing in the subordinate tribe.
Fourth, it is complained, (á) that the court below erred in denying to defendant the right to rebut the testimony of Dr. Anderson, with reference to the duties of the finance committee, and (b) in not allowing the witness White to state the provision of the constitution and by-laws with reference to the advisory board, and (c) in refusing to let the same witness state whether or not Standing Rock Tribe had complied with the laws of defendant.
s As to the first of these complaints the constitution and bylaws themselves, introduced in evidence, define the duties of the finance committee, and contain also provisions defining the powers and duties of the advisory board, which answer the second complaint. As to the last objection it was rather a question of law for the court than for the witness, under all the facts in evidence, as to whether Standing Rock Tribe had complied with the laws of defendant. We see no error in these rulings of the court.
Moreover, we do not see from the record that Dr. Anderson undertook to state what were the duties of the finance committee; he simply stated what that committee had reported
The remaining questions, involving the several grounds of defense pleaded, the alleged waivers thereof by defendant, and the testimony thereon adduced on the trial, are severally presented by the instructions given and refused at the instance of the parties, the modifications of some of said instructions, and by the motion of the defendant for a new trial. Of the seven instructions asked by the plaintiff, the court rejected numbers 1, 2, and 3, but gave as requested numbers 4, 5, 6, and 7. The four instructions given were excepted to and the giving of them assigned as error here. These instructions are as follows: “(4) The Court further instructs the jury that if they believe from a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff has substantially proved his .right to recover, as alleged in the declaration, that they should find for the plaintiff. (5) The Court instructs the jury that if they believe from the evidence that Fred Glover assigned either orally or in writing, for value, the policy sued on to the plaintiff^ that such assignment is valid. (6) The Court further instructs the jury that if they believe from the evidence that the said Fred Glover had not complied with the rules of the order and that proper proof of death had not been made, yet they have the right to determine from all the evidence whether this was waived by the defendant. (7) The Court instructs the jury that if they believe from the evidence that the defendant, by its agents, waived compliance with the laws of the order on the part of Fred Glover and'
Instruction number 4, we think, is too general in its terms, and is too uncertain and indefinite in its application, and that it ignores the issues made on the defenses set up by the defendant. As to instruction number 5, there was no evidence of an oral assignment. The assignment relied upon was in writing. The law of the case could only be-made applicable to the written assignment. Moreover, every assignment of an insurance policy, even for value, is not necessarily valid. As we have seen, it depends on whether or not the assignee at the time of the assignment had an insurable interest in the life of the assured. Instruction number 6, is likewise too general in its terms. It singles out the failure to provide proper proof of death, one of the defenses, ignoring the others, and leaves it to the jury in general terms to determine from all the evidence whether defendant had waived breaches of the rules of the order, instead of submitting to them the questions of fact, which would constitute the waiver, and telling them that if they found the facts to be as supposed, such facts constituted a waiver of the terms and conditions of the policy, and of the rules and laws of the order.
Instruction number 7, is equally vulnerable for its generality. It seems to us that the instruction instead of being couched in such general terms should, by reference to the facts proven and relied upon as waiver, have told the jury that if they found the facts to be as claimed, these constituted a waiver, and that they should find in accordance, therewith; but the instruction does not do this, and we think, for this reason, it is erroneous and misleading.
Of the eight instructions requested by the defendant, the court gave numbers 1, 5, 6, and 7, and rejected numbers 2, 3, 4, and 8, those rejected being the subject of a bill of exceptions, and of errors assigned here. Those refused were: “(2') The Court instructs the jury: That if they believe from the evidence that the plaintiff in this action failed to comply with the by-laws and the constitution of the defendant, in giving notice of the death of Fred Glover, then, and in that event, the defendant is not liable, and they should find for the defendant. (3) The Court instructs the jury
Defendant’s instructions numbers 5 and 6, alleged modifications of which are complained of, submitted defendant’s theories of defense, and told the jury that if they found the facts to be as assumed, respecting. the failure of the beneficiary to present proper proofs of death, and decedent’s failure to pay dues, and the alleged suspension of decedent’s tribe, etc., they should find for defendant, unless they further found that defendant had waived compliance with these conditions of the policy as stated. The complaint is that the court erroneously modified these instructions by adding these conditions. We do not find in the record that objection was made by defendant at the trial to these modifications. Indeed
Lastly, defendant complains that the court denied its motion to set aside the verdict and award it a new trial. This point brings up for consideration the entire merits of the case as made by pleadings and proofs, including the alleged errors committed on the trial of the action. But we need not reconsider the points of error already disposed of. The points remaining for consideration are, first, whether as alleged in the several grounds of defense, (a) deceased at the time of his death, because of his failure to pay dues, was not in good ■ standing in his tribe, (b) whether'his local tribe at the time of his death had been lawfully suspended, as alleged, and, (c) whether sufficient notice and proofs of death were furnished. It is conceded that G-lover died on July 5th, 1912, and was then in arrears for his monthly dues, since April 1, 1912, and that his tribe had fallen off in membership below the constitutional limit of seven, and was liable to suspension on that ground. But it is contended that notwithstanding these conceded facts, deceased had not been in arrears for a period of six months, and plaintiff contends that his tribe had not received notice from the Chief of Records, as provided by the sixth section of the endowment law of the society, and that deceased was not unfinaneial in his tribe or order so as to deprive him or his beneficiary of the death benefits of the order.
We do not find in the constitution or by-laws any provisions entitling a member of the endowment department to a grace of six months in which to pay dues. We do find in section 5, of article 16, of the constitution of the tribe, as distinct from the constitution and by-laws of the principal order, that "When a member shall have been in arrears for six Moons, or their equivalent, and has been notified to pay the same, he
But was decedent’s tribe in a state of suspension by the Chief of Records at the time of his decease, depriving him and his beneficiary of the benefits of the endowment law? That officer proved positively, and exhibited a copy of his notice, dated June 18, 1912, mailed to the tribe, that he notified them of their arrears in the endowment fund, and that unless such dues were paid on or before the 28th instant, the tribe woidd stand suspended without further notice. And he proved by his evidence that payment was not made in accordance with this notice and that the records of his office showed the tribe suspended at the time of decedent’s death. Three members of this tribe were introduced as witnesses, who testified that neither of them had received the notice. But that it was mailed to the order is positively proven by the testimony of the Great Chief of Records. The sixth section of the endowment law relating to the subject, we think, contemplates the mailing of the notice as full compliance with the law, and as the tribe is the agent of its members to remit the dues when paid, both members and tribe must be presumed to have notice of their default, and the fact of the receipt of the notice from the Great Chief of Records we do not think is a condition precedent to the finality of the suspension. As we have already noticed the contract of insurance makes the records in the office of the Chief of Records prima facie evidence of the good standing not only of the insured but of his subordinate tribe. But it is contended that the- evidence shows that the
The final question we have then is, did defendant waive the breaches of these conditions and terms of the policy.? The only evidence tending to show such waiver, or any waiver by defendant of any of the terms and conditions of the policy is the evidence of Dr. Anderson, who was at the time chairman of the finance committee, and who swears that his committee in a report to the Great State Council recommended payment of the Glover claim, and that this report was adopted by the Council and the money ordered to be paid to plaintiff. The jurisdiction of this committee is challenged, reference being made to the provision of the endowment law, heretofore referred to, giving the advisory board jurisdiction of all matters
We have already responded to the defense that plaintiff as assignee was not a person having an insurable interest in the life of deceased so as to entitle him to the benefit of the policy sued on. For the errors noted herein, we are of opinion to reverse the judgment and award the defendant a new trial.
Reversed, and new trial awarded.