Chambers v. CottrellChambers v. Cottrell
Reginald S. Jackson, Jr., Timothy P. Nackowicz, and Edwin A. Coy for appellee.
* * * * *
DECISION AND JUDGMENT
SINGER, J.
{¶ 1} Appellant, Dawn Chambers, appeals from a judgmеnt of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas granting summary judgment to appellee, Stephen E. Cottrell. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
{¶ 3} In 2004, appellee reached a settlement in appellant‘s case and charged her $33,000. In June 2005, Sue Ann Chambers fired appellee and retained the services of Murray and Murray Co. L.P.A. The case against Jerry Chambers’ employer was settled.
{¶ 4} On February 26, 2008, Sue Ann Chambers and appellant filed a сomplaint against appellee. Count one of the complaint alleged that appellee was guilty of legаl malpractice in his representation of Sue Ann Chambers. Count two alleged that, in representing appellant, he breached his contractual obligation to her. Appellant claimed appellee charged an excessive fee and refused to represent her after her parents terminated their professional relationship with him.
{¶ 5} On December 23, 2008, аppellee filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that Sue Ann Chambers’ claim and appellant‘s claim were barred by the statutе of limitations. On May 8, 2009, the trial court denied summary judgment as to Sue Ann Chambers but granted appellee‘s motion for summary judgment as to appellant. She now appeals setting forth the following assignment of error:
{¶ 6} “It was error for the trial court to rule that Dawn Chambers’ contract claim against Cottrell was not viable because the statute of limitations expired on her legal
{¶ 7} On review, appellate courts employ the same standard for summary judgment as trial courts. Lorain Natl. Bank v. Saratoga Apts. (1989), 61 Ohio App.3d 127, 129. The motion may be granted only when it is demonstrated:
{¶ 8} “* * * (1) that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact; (2) that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) that reasonablе minds can come to but one conclusion, and that conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, who is entitled to have the evidence construed most strongly in his favor.” Harless v. Willis Day Warehousing Co. (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 64, 67,
{¶ 9} The issue is this case is whether the claims asserted in appellant‘s suit amounted to a legal malpractice action. Appellant contends that her cause of аction was of a contractual nature. The distinction is important because legal malpractice claims are subject to the one-year statute of limitations set forth in
{¶ 10} The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that, “[t]he crucial consideration in determining the applicable statute of limitations in a given action is the actual nature or subject matter of the cause, rather than the form in whiсh the complaint is styled or pleaded.” Hunter v. Shenango Furnace Co. (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 235, 237. “A party
{¶ 11} Consequently, courts have found that, even where a plaintiff‘s pleadings frame his arguments against an attorney not as malpractice, but as claims on theories such as breach of contract, misrepresentation, or promissory estoppel, if the grаvamen of the complaint is legal malpractice, the one-year statute of limitations will apply. Leski v. Ricotta, 8th Dist. No. 83600, 2004-Ohio-2860, ¶ 10. See, also, Muir v. Hadler Real Estate Management Co. (1982), 4 Ohio App.3d 89, 90.
{¶ 12} Appelleе represented appellant after she was injured in a drunken driving accident through no fault of her own. In addition to charging an excessive fee, appellant contends that appellee breached their contract by failing to investigatе other avenues of recovery in addition to the drunk driver directly responsible for her injuries. Specifically, appellant contends that appellee was contractually obligated to investigate possible dram shop claims and that hе failed to do so. In support, appellant cites the contract she entered into with appellee which statеs in pertinent part: “[I] hereby retain and employ the law firm of [appellee] as my attorney to represent me in our claim for damages against * * * or any person or company who may be liable on account of the automobile аccident on or about the 17th day of July 2004.”
{¶ 14} The judgment of thе Lucas County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. Appellant is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal pursuant to
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
A сertified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to
Peter M. Handwork, J.
_______________________________
JUDGE
Arlene Singer, J.
_______________________________
Thomas J. Osowik, P.J. JUDGE
CONCUR.
_______________________________
JUDGE
This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of Ohio‘s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court‘s web site at: http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/newpdf/?source=6.