10 Utah 298 | Utah | 1894
This is an action to recover the stun of $453.75, due on a promissory note. Judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff for this sum, upon confession of the defendant. It appears from the record that the defendant Wat-ters was a teacher in one of the public schools of Ogden, Utah, and that while the judgment remained unsatisfied there was due him, as salary, from the board of education, the sum of $190. Proceedings supplementary to execution were instituted, and an attempt made to garnish, the defendant’s salary in the hands of the board. 'Upon the hearing these proceedings were dismissed, and the board of education discharged. The plaintiff appealed from this order, as well as from the order overruling a motion for a new trial. The question is raised whether, under our laws, in proceedings supplementary to execution, a board of education
Section 3455, Comp. Laws 1888, provides: “ After the issuing or return of an execution against property of the judgment debtor, or of any one of several debtors in the same judgment, and upon proof by affidavit or otherwise, to the satisfaction of the judge, that any person or corporation has property of such judgment debtor, or is indebted to him in an amount exceeding fifty dollars, the judge may, by an order, require such .person or corporation, or an officer or member thereof, to appear at a specified time and place, before him, or a referee appointed by him, and answer concerning the same/'’ It is contended by counsel for. appellant that this section is applicable to a board of education. It is clear that under our laws a board of education is a public municipal corporation. It forms one of the departments of the municipality. Its functions are exclusively of a public character, and its acts are performed for the public benefit. Its relation to the public is the same as that of any other municipal corporation. If, then, a board of education is subject to the process of garnishment, the phrase “any person or corporation” must embrace both public and private corporations, as is insisted in this case. There appears to be nothing in the context of the statute which would lead to such a conclusion, nor is there anything to indicate that such was the intention of the legislature.
It seems quite clear that the term “corporation” was used in the statute as a word of limitation, and refers solely to private corporations organized for private purposes, and does not refer to public corporations, or such as are created by law for the benefit of the people. Nor can a public or municipal corporation be subject to such proceedings upon any principle of public policy, for it forms a part of the government, and the public interests
But there is another reason why the contention of coun