92 U.S. 299 | SCOTUS | 1876
CHAMBERLAIN
v.
ST. PAUL AND SIOUX CITY RAILROAD COMPANY ET AL.
Supreme Court of United States.
*304 Mr. Gordon E. Cole and Mr. W.M. Evarts for the appellant.
Mr. E.C. Palmer and Mr. James Gilfillan, contra.
*305 MR. JUSTICE FIELD, after making the foregoing statement of the case, delivered the opinion of the court, as follows:
Pending the proceedings stated, the bonds of the State in the hands of the complainant remained unpaid, and they are still unpaid. The faith of the State, solemnly pledged for the payment of both principal and interest, has never been kept. So far from keeping it, the State, as early as November, 1860, adopted an amendment to its constitution, prohibiting any law, which levied a tax or made other provision for such payment, from taking effect until the same had been submitted to a vote of the people and been adopted by them. This prohibition, if not a violation of the State's pledge, conflicts with its spirit. The bonds issued are legal obligations. The State is bound by every consideration of honor and good faith to pay them. Were she amenable to the tribunals of the country as private individuals are, no court of justice would withhold its judgment against her in an action for their enforcement.
The complainant, under these circumstances, finding no relief from the pledged faith of the State, and unable to pursue any remedies at law against her on the bonds, seeks to charge with their payment the two hundred and forty sections mortgaged by the original Southern Minnesota Railroad Company under the constitutional amendment of 1858 and purchased by the State under the foreclosure of the mortgage, and now held by the defendant railroad companies.
The position of the complainant is, that, notwithstanding the form of the contract, the original company was, in fact, the principal debtor, and the State its surety; and that, as the creditor to be paid, he is entitled to have the securities taken by the State applied to the payment of the bonds held by him; that the one hundred and twenty sections for each road, which the company was authorized to construct, became its property by the act of May 22, 1857; that the subsequent interest of the State under the trust-deed and mortgage was only the right to hold them as security against loss upon its bonds; that this interest was not changed by the foreclosure of the mortgage and purchase of the State at the sale; and that the lands passed to the defendant railroad companies with notice that they were thus held by the State.
*306 The general doctrine, that a creditor has a right to claim the benefit of a security given by his debtor to a surety for the latter's indemnity, and which may be used if necessary for the payment of the debt, is not questioned. The security in such case is in the nature of trust-property, and the right of the creditor arises from the natural justice of allowing him to have applied to the discharge of his demand the property deposited with the surety for that purpose if required by the default of the principal. In this case, the deed and mortgage to the State were not intended to create a trust in favor of the holders of her own bonds. The State was primarily liable to the bondholders; and it was only as between her and the company that the relation of principal and surety existed. It may be doubted whether the bondholders could call upon the company in any event. The indorsement made by the president simply transferred the bonds: it was not the act of the company. Be that as it may, whatever right the plaintiff had to compel the application of the lands received by the State to the payment of the bonds held by him, it was one resting in equity only. It was not a legal right arising out of any positive law or any agreement of the parties. It did not create any lien which attached to and followed the property. It was a right to be enforced, if at all, only by a court of chancery against the surety. But, the State being the surety here, it could not be enforced at all, and, not being a specific lien upon the property, cannot be enforced against the State's grantees.
Where property passes to the State, subject to a specific lien or trust created by law or contract, such lien or trust may be enforced by the courts whenever the property comes under their jurisdiction and control. Thus, if property held by the government, covered by a mortgage of the original owner, should be transferred to an individual, the jurisdiction of the court to enforce the mortgage would attach, as it existed previous to the acquisition of the government. The Siren, 7 Wall. 158, 159. But, where the property is not affected by any specific lien or trust in the hands of the State, her transfer will pass an unincumbered estate.
But aside from this consideration, which of itself is a sufficient *307 answer to the present suit, the long delay of the complainant in asserting any claim to the lands in controversy, whilst the defendants were constructing, at a vast expenditure of labor and money, their railroads, deprives his suit of favorable consideration. It does not appear that for twelve years after the abandonment of work by the original Minnesota Company on the roads, the grading of which it commenced, he set up any claim such as is advanced in this suit: on the contrary, it is abundantly established that in various ways he urged upon members of the legislature the adoption of measures for the construction of the roads, which involved an appropriation by the State for that purpose of the lands in controversy; and that after the new companies were organized, and the lands were granted to them, he urged them to proceed with the enterprises, knowing that upon those lands they relied to carry on the works. Under these circumstances, it would be manifestly inequitable and unjust to grant his prayer.
The conclusion we have reached renders it unnecessary to consider the effect of the alleged forfeiture, declared by the State, upon the interest of the company in the lands.
Decree affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE STRONG dissented.
