The dispute which gave rise to this case involves the following factual allegations. Chambeo was the roоfing subcontractor on a construction project at 701 and 801 Pennsylvania Avenue, in the District of Columbia. Chambеo had installed roof flashing on the new buildings, some of which was located in areas where Urban, the masonry subcontractor, would later install masonry. When Urban performed the masonry work, it allegedly damaged some of the flashing that had been installed by Chambeo. Chambeo replaced the damaged flashing at a cost оf over $100,000.00.
The construction project gave rise to litigation in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. Lаter, Chambeo filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, naming Urban as the sole defendant. The complaint alleged the facts set forth above and contended that Urban was liable to Chambeo in dаmages under a negligence theory.
Neither party gave notice of an intent to rely on foreign law рursuant to Maryland Code (1974,1995 RepLVoL), § 10-504 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. Instead, the parties and the circuit court proceeded upon the assumption that the case was governed by Maryland tort lаw. At trial, Urbán raised two legal defenses. It contended that Chambeo had no cause of action in negligence against Urban because, under Maryland law, recovery in negligence for purely eco
Chambeo appealed to the Court of Special Appeals. The Court of Spеcial Appeals, also applying Maryland law, affirmed, holding that “[ajbsent privity of contract, there is no cause of action [for negligence] available by Chambco against Urban.” Chambco v. Urban Masonry,
Chambeo filed in this Court a petition for a writ of certiorari, raising the question of whether Maryland law authorized a tort remedy under the circumstances. We granted the petition, but we shall not reach the issue of tort law debаted by the parties.
Maryland adheres to the principle of lex loci delictus for determining what jurisdiction’s tort law applies in tort actions. See, e.g., Ward v. Nationwide Ins.,
As mentioned earlier, Code (1974, 1995 Repl.Vol.), § 10-504 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, provides that a party to an action may rely on applicable foreign law and provides that notice shall be given to adverse pаrties. In the present case, however, no party gave notice as provided by the statute.
Since the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the judgment of the circuit court on the basis of Maryland tort law, the judgment of the Court оf Special Appeals shall be vacated. On remand, the Court of Special Appeals should decide the res judicata/collateral estoppel issue which formed the alternate ground for thе trial court’s judgment in Urban’s favor. If the trial court’s judgment may properly be upheld on the res judicáta/collateral estoppel ground, the Court of Special Appeals should affirm the judgment. If the Court of Special-Appeals concludes that the circuit court’s judgment cannot be affirmed on this alternate ground, then the appellate court should vacate the judgment of the circuit court and remand the case to that court. Upon remand, the parties may submit
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS VACATED. CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT FOR PROCEEDINGS NOT INCONSISTENT WITH . THIS OPINION. COSTS IN THIS COURT TO BE PAID ONE-HALF BY THE PETITIONER AND ONE-HALF BY THE RESPONDENT. COSTS IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE DETERMINED BY THAT COURT.
Notes
. Thus in the Frericks case this Court stated (
"The respondents are, in effect, asking us to take judiciаl notice of North Carolina law in spite of their failure to comply with § 10— 504.... [W]e may in our discretion take judicial notice of foreign law where the statutory notification was not given and proof of the foreign law was not presented, Harry L. Sheinman & Sons v. Scranton Life Ins. Co.,125 F.2d 442 , 444 (3d Cir.1942); M.N. Axinn Co. v. Gibraltar Development,45 N.J.Super. 523 ,133 A.2d 341 , 347 (1957); Litsinger Sign Co. v. American Sign Co.,11 Ohio St.2d 1 ,227 N.E.2d 609 , 613-614 (1967)....”