MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plаintiff moves, pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to certify a class of all consumers in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania who received a letter from the defendant that allegedly contains misstatements and misrepresentations in violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act. For the reasons stated below, the Court grants plaintiffs motion.
I. Background
Defendant Equifax Information Services LLC (“Equifax”) provides a broad range of services to consumers related to credit data information, including serving as a credit reporting agency (“CRA”). {See Declaration of Alicia Fluellen [hereinafter “Fluellen Decl.”] ¶3.) The credit information reporting practices of Equifax and other CRAs are regulated by the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. (“FCRA”). The FCRA was enacted “to insure that consumer reporting agencies exercise their grave responsibilities with fairness, impartiality, and a respect for the consumer’s right to privacy.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681(a). Section 1681i of the FCRA sets forth the procedures that CRAs must follow if a consumer disputes the completeness or accuracy of the information appearing in his or her credit report. Pursuant to section 1681i(a)(l)(A), when a consumer notifies a CRA of a dispute, the CRA must either “conduct a reasonable reinvestigation of that dispute to determine whether the disputed information is inaccurate and record the current status of the disputed information, or delete the item from the file.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(а)(l)(A). If the CRA conducts a reinvestigation, it must provide the consumer with written notice of the results of the reinvestigation containing, including:
[A] notice that, if requested by the consumer, a description of the procedure used to determine the accuracy and completeness of the information shall be provided to the consumer by the agency, including the business name and address of any furnisher of information contacted in connection with such information and the telephone number of such furnisher, if reason*495 ably available. 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(6)(B)(iii).
In January 2007, Plaintiff Richard Chakeji-an (“Mr.Chakejian”) obtained a credit report from Equifax and noticed that a record of an involuntary bankruptcy filing appeared in error on his credit repоrt.
While Equifax’s credit reports include credit data from the public record, such as bankruptcies, liens, and judgments, Equifax is not the primary source of that information. Instead, Equifax employs an independent public records vendor (“PRV”) to gather public records directly from courthouses and court filings and to provide relevant data points to Equifax.
Below are the results of your request for Equifax to reinvestigate certain elements of your Equifax credit file. Equifax contacted each source directly and our investigation is now completed. If you have any additional questions or concerns, please contact the source of that information directly.
(Id.) The Reinvestigation Letter further indicates that Equifax reviewed Mr. Chakeji-an’s “bankruptcy information” and “verified” that the bankruptcy item belonged to him. (Id.) The letter directs that Mr. Chakejian should contact the Eastern District of PA, Robert NC NIX Federal BuiL, 900 Market St. RM 400, Philadelphia, PA 19107-4233, if he has “any additional questions about this item.” (Id.) The letter instructs Mr. Chake-jian to contact Equifax if he had any questions regarding “the specific information contained in this letter.”
The Reinvestigation Letter also includes a “Notice to Consumer” that explains Equifax’s reinvestigation procedures. The “Notice to Consumers” states in full:
*496 Upon receipt of your dispute, we first review and consider the relevant information you have submitted regarding the nature of your dispute. If the review does not resolve your dispute, and further investigation is required, notification of your dispute, including thе relevant information you submitted, is provided to the source that furnished the disputed information, conducts an investigation with respect to the disputed information and reports the results back to us. The credit reporting agency then makes deletions or changes to your credit file as appropriate based on the results of the reinvestigation. The name, address and, if reasonably available, the telephone number of the furnisher(s) of the information contacted while processing your dispute(s) is shown under the “Results of Your Investigation” section on the cover letter that accompanies the copy of your revised credit file.
Mr. Chakejian’s claim is that the Reinvestigation Letter misrepresents the source of Equifax’s public records information and misstates the results of its reinvestigation and its reinvestigation procedures in violation of section 1681i of the FCRA. As a result, Mr. Chakejian experienced “anxiety, frustration, loss of a few hours of his time and the out-of-pocket expense incurred for a certified record from the bankruptcy court.” (Pl.’s Mot. for Class Cert. 6-7).
The FCRA contains two damages provisions. Section 1681n provides liability for willful violations of the statute, and section 1681o provides liability for negligent violations. Mr. Chakejian is pursuing his claims under the willful noncompliance section only. This section applies to “[a]ny person who willfully fails to comply with any requirement of [the FCRA] with respect to any consumer,” and provides for “any actual damages sustained by the consumer as a result of the failure or damages of not less than $100 and not more than $1000,” as well as punitive damages, costs, and attorney’s fees. 15 U.S.C. § 1681n. (emphasis added). Mr. Cha-keijian seeks for himself and for the putative class, statutory damages of not less than $100 and not more than $1,000, punitive damages, and reasonable attorney’s fees. (Am. Compl.6-7.)
II. Discussion
Plaintiff seeks to certify a class comprised of:
All consumers in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to whom, beginning two years prior to the filing of the Amended Complaint and continuing through the resolution of this action, in response to a dispute, Defendant sent a letter substantially similar to the Letter attached to the Amended Complaint as Exhibit A (i.e. the Reinvestigation Letter).
To prevail on a motion for class certification, a plaintiff must satisfy all of the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and the requirements of one of the subsections of Rule 23(b). See Johnston v. HBO Film Mgt., Inc.,
Plaintiff seeks certification under subsection (3) of Rule 23(b), which requires “that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members,” and that a class action be “superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.” Fed. R.Civ.P. 23(b)(3); Amchem Prods. v. Windsor,
Having moved to certify the class, plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating, by a preponderance of the evidence, that class certification is appropriate. In re Hydrogen Peroxide,
1. Rule 23(a) Requirements
a. Numerosity
Rule 23(a)(1) requires that a class be so numerous that joinder of all its members is impracticable. Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a)(1). There is no precise number that will satisfy the numerosity requirement, but the district court may “make a common sense determination” in order to support the finding of nu-merosity. Maldonado v. Houstoun,
Equifax argues that the class definition is faulty because the term “substantially similar” is vague and will require the court to engage in an improper preliminary evaluation of each potential class member’s letter to determine whether it is “substantiаlly similar” to the plaintiffs. See e.g. Forman v. Data Transfer, Inc.,
The court agrees, however, that the term “substantially similar” could be more precise. Where a potential issue with class certification can be resolved by redefining the classes, the district court “should not deny certification on account of such problems without considering the possibility of redefining the classes.” See Finberg v. Sullivan,
All consumers in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to whom, beginning two years prior to the filing of the Amended Complaint and continuing through the resolution of this action, in response to a dispute [over a public record (including, but not limited to a bankruptcy, lien, or judgment)], Defendant sent a letter substantially similar to the Letter attached to the Amended Complaint as Exhibit A.
Equifax has represented that there are at least 11,839 individuals in Pennsylvania who, during the relevant time period, received a reinvestigation letter in substantially the same form as the one sent to plaintiff. Given the number of potential class members involved, the Court is satisfied that joinder
b. Commonality
Rule 23(a)(2) requires the existence of questions of law or fact common to the class. The Third Circuit has held that the commonality requirement is “not stringent, and that a single common issue of law or fact suffices.” Baby Neal v. Casey,
c. Typicality
The typicality requirement of Rule 23(a)(3) is closely related to the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2). See In re Prudential Ins. Co. America Sales Practice Litig.,
d. Adequacy
The purpose of the adequacy requirement is to protect the legal rights of absent class members. Adequate representation depends on two factors: (a) the plaintiffs attorney must be qualified, experienced, and generally able to conduct the proposed litigation; and (b) the plaintiff must not have interests antagonistic to those of the class. Wetzel,
Equifax argues in its brief that Mr. Chake-jian’s interested are not aligned with thоse of the proposed class because (1) he personally lacks an understanding of the case and his role as a class representative, and (2) he has abandoned potentially valuable remedies and causes of action available to members of the class. (Def.’s Opp. 13, 19.) I find that neither of these arguments raises a conflict of interest that would render the plaintiff an inadequate representative of the proposed class.
Equifax claims that plaintiff’s lack of knowledge about the case, and apparent lack of interest, make him unable to fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class as class representative. (Def.Opp.13.) Equifax cites the deposition of Mr. Chakejian in which the plaintiff admitted that he had never read the Amended Complaint, and could not identify the law or the part of the FCRA that he claims Equifax violated. (See Chakejian Dep. 153:15-20; 167:1-7; 168:5-9.) In addition, Chakejian testified that he did not wholly understand his obligations as class representative (Chakejian Dep. 76:1-3.) While Chakejian’s understanding of the instant litigation may be limited, the Supreme Court has held that a class representative’s lack of knowledge about his case does not make him an inadequate representative. Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels, Corp.,
b. Plaintiff’s Failure to Seek All Available Remedies Not a Conflict of Interest
Equifax also argues in its brief that Mr. Chakejian’s election to forego actual damages or a negligence claim under the FCRA make him an inadequate representative of the class because his interests conflict with the interests of potential class members who may have actual damages in an amount exceeding the statutory cap of $1,000.00. (Def.Opp.22.) However, the defendant has not put forth any evidence that there are class members who may have significant actual damages claims under these circumstances. As pointed out by Chief Judge Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, “[ujnless a district court finds that personal injuries are large in relation to statutory damages, a representative plaintiff must be allowed to forego claims for compensatory damages in order to achievе class certification.” Murray v. GMAC Mortgage Corporation,
Furthermore, given the availability of the opt-out mechanism, courts in this Circuit have generally rejected the notion that limiting claims to statutory damages renders class certification inappropriate. See Morgan v. Gay,
2. Rule 23(b)(3) Requirements
Mr. Chakejian seeks to certify this class under Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(3). Class certification under Rule 23(b)(3) must satisfy the “twin requirements” of predominance and superiority. In re Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 at 310; Newton v. Merrill Lynch,
a. Predominance
Predominance requires an evaluation of whether “proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation.” Jordan,
To prove willful noncompliance with the FCRA, the plaintiff must demonstrate that Equifax “knowingly and intentionally committed an act in conscious disregard for the rights of others.” Cushman v. Trans Union Corp.,
b. Superiority
The superiority requirement demands that a class action represent the “best available method for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(3). Superiority must be looked at from multiple points of view: the judicial system, the potential class members, the present plaintiff, the attorneys for the litigants, the public at large, the defendant, and the issues. See e.g. Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp.,
Plaintiff contends that a class action is the superior method of adjudication in consumer protection cases, like this one, where the cost of pursuing individual litigation is too high or would result in inefficiencies and a burden on the courts. (Pl.’s Mot. for Class. Cert. 19.) See also Prudential,
This is a case where there are a large number of potential plaintiffs pursuing statutory claims with a relatively small amount of potential recovery. Rule 23(b)(3) is the best method of adjudication for situations like these in which the potential recovery is “typically so small ... that litigation of a single claim is, as a general matter, hardly worth the cost and effort of litigation.” Seawell v. Universal Fidelity Corp.,
Finally, Equifax argues that a class action is not the best method of adjudication here because it would expose the defendant to liability as to potentially thousands of individuals and million of dollars without any showing that any plaintiff actually sustained any injury or damage. (Def.Opp.30.) Equifax argues that this kind of “super penalty” should not be countenanced by the court. (Id.) The Seventh Circuit in Murray also addressed the question of whether a class action’s superiority is threatened by high potential liability on the part of the defendant. The Murray Court pointed out that damages under the FCRA were instituted by Congress, and therefore, while the statute remained on the books, “it must be enforced rather than subverted.” Murray,
III. Conclusion
Class certification is appropriate here, where the plaintiff has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that the proposed class, as redefined herein, satisfies all four factors under Rule 23(a) and meets the requirements of Rule 23(b)(3). At the same time, potential class members must be adequately informed as to the opt-out procedure and the pros and cons of class litigation. The Court will direct that the Rule 23(c)(2)(B) notice to class members clearly explain their entitlement to bring individual actions seeking actual damages and the difference in the size of potential recovery, should they choose to pursue recovery as part of the class. An appropriate order follows.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 24th day of March, 2009, it is ORDERED that Plaintiffs Motion for
All consumers in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to whom, beginning two years prior to the filing of the Amended Complaint and continuing through the resolution of this action, in response to a dispute over a public record (including, but not limited to a bankruptcy, lien, or judgment), Defendant sent a letter substantially similar to the Letter attached to the Amended Complaint as Exhibit A. Excluded from the Class are all officers and directors of the Defendant,
with respect to the following cause of action:
Willful violation of section 1681i of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq.,
It is further ORDERED that, subject to further order of the court, plaintiff Richard Chakejian is certified as class representative, and the firms of Francis & Mailman, P.C. and Donovan Searles, LLC, shall serve as class counsel.
It is further ORDERED that the plaintiff shall submit a proposed form of notice to the class by April 24, 2009. The notice to class members must inform them as to how they may exclude themselves from the class, explain their entitlement to bring individual actions seeking actual damages, and thе difference in potential recovery.
Notes
. Mr. Chakejian had successfully fought the wrongfully filed Chapter 7 bankruptcy filing in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and had obtained an order from the bankruptcy court that "any adverse credit report to any credit reporting agency should be stricken from the Chakejians' credit records.” (See Pl.'s Mot. for Class Cert. Ex. B, Order of the U.S. District Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania dated May 17, 2006 [hereinafter "May 17th Bankruptcy Court Order”]); Chakejian Dep. 113:25-115:19, July 18, 2008.
. From October 2004 through February 2007, Equifax’s PRV was Choicepoint. (DeGrace Decl. ¶ 6.) Equifax’s current PRV is LexisNexis. (Id. at ¶ 5.)
. Upon receiving the Reinvestigation letter, Mr. Chakejian telephoned Equifax. (Pl.'s Mot. for Class Cert. 6.) The operator he spoke with suggested to Mr. Chakejian that he send in a certified copy of the May 17th Bankruptcy Court Order with a court seal on it. (Id.) Mr. Chakeji-an went to the Nix Federal Building and- found out that the bankruptcy court "was reporting everything correctly.” (Id.) He nonetheless obtained a certified copy of the May 17th Bankruptcy Court Order and sent it, along with another dispute letter, to Equifax on March 4, 2007. (See Pl.’s Mot. for Class Cert. Ex. F, Letter dated March 4, 2007 [hereinafter the "Second Dispute Letter”].) Equifax responded to the Second Dispute Letter in writing, and informed Mr. Chakeji-an that the bankruptcy had been deleted from his credit report. (Pi’s. Mot. for Class Cert. 6.)
. Furthermore, there are inherent difficulties inherent in tracing and proving thе actual harm caused by Equifax's alleged statutory violations. Choosing to pursue only statutory damages under 15 U.S.C. § 1681n in cases like these is a litigation strategy that is not the court's place to second guess.
. With respect to Equifax’s argument that a class action is not appropriate because of the availability of actual damages under the FCRA, the court reiterates its position as previously discussed, supra, in connection with the adequacy requirement, that the use of opt-out provisions is sufficient to redress "any concern about the financial detriment to individual class members through class action litigation” in this case. Jordan,