Byоng Chol CHAE, Petitioner, v. The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Respondent.
No. 88SC47.
Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc.
Sept. 18, 1989.
Rehearing Denied Oct. 23, 1989.
780 P.2d 481
I would affirm both convictions.
I am authorized to say that Justice ROVIRA joins in this dissent.
Duane Woodard, Atty. Gen., Charles B. Howe, Chief Deputy Atty. Gen., Richard H. Forman, Sol. Gen., and Cynthia D. Jones, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for respondent.
Justice LOHR delivered the Opinion of the Court.
The petitioner, Byong Chol Chae, filed a Crim.P. 35(c) motion to vacate his plea of guilty to a charge of second degree sexual assault. After a hearing on the petitioner‘s motion, the district court concluded that the guilty plea was voluntarily and knowingly entered, and it denied Byong Chol Chae‘s motion to vacate the plea. The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court‘s order in an unpublished opinion. People v. Byong Chol Chae, No. 85CA1506 (Colo. App. Oct. 29, 1987). We granted certiorari to review the court of appeals’ decision, and we now affirm in part and reverse in part.
I.
Byong Chol Chae (“Chae” or “the petitioner“) was charged with second degree kidnapping,
After conducting the providency hearing required by Crim.P. 11, the district court accepted Chae‘s guilty plea and set August 25, 1983, as the sentencing date. Prior to sentencing, Chae moved to withdraw his guilty plea, asserting that due to communication difficulties with the Korean interpreter he did not understand the nature of the charge or the consequences of his plea. The district court granted the motion to withdraw the guilty plea, and it reinstated the second degree kidnapping and first degree sexual assault charges against Chae. The case was then set for a jury trial.
On the second day of trial, after a jury had been selected, Chae decided to accept a plea agreement that was essentially the
At the conclusion of the providency hearing, the district court found, аmong other things, that the petitioner understood his rights, that he knowingly, freely and voluntarily waived those rights, and that a factual basis existed for the guilty plea. The district court then accepted the guilty plea, and sentenced Chae according to the recommendation in the plea agreement.3
Based on the aggravating circumstances present in the sexual assault, the district court sentenced the petitioner to an eight-year term of incarceration, twice the presumptive maximum for the class 4 felony of second degree sexual assault.
Chae failed to appear in the district court on May 25, 1984, in compliance with the sentencing conditions. Instead, he returned tо South Korea on his own without being deported. When Chae failed to appear as required, the trial court issued a bench warrant for his arrest. In May 1985, the petitioner was detained when he attempted to re-enter the United States. He was transferred to the Arapahoe County jail based on the outstanding bench warrant.
Chae then filed a Crim.P. 35(c) motion to vacate his guilty plea,5 alleging that his plea had not been entered knowingly or voluntarily because he had been unaware of the impact of the deportation provisions of the plea agreement and sentence recommendations.6 The district court held a hearing on the motion, at which Chae testified that he would not have agreed to the plea bargain if he had known its effect
At the conclusion of the Crim.P. 35(c) hearing, the district court noted that Chae had already been allowed to withdraw a plea once on the ground that he did not understand the full effect of the plea agreement. The district court then determined that Chae understоod the effect of the deportation provisions when he entered his second guilty plea, and that the plea was voluntarily entered. Based on these determinations, the district court denied Chae‘s motion to vacate his plea. Because Chae had violated the conditions of the original plea agreement by not appearing as ordered to submit to deportation proceedings, the district court revoked the suspended sentence and sentenced Chae to an eight-year term in the department of corrections plus one year of parole. Chae appealed to the court of appeals from the district court‘s denial of his motion to vacate his guilty plea.
The court of appeals concluded that the original suspended prison term imposed by the district court was an illegal sentence because thе alternative sentencing provisions of
II.
The first issue to be determined is whether the original sentence imposed by the district court was an illegal sentence. We agree with the court of appeals’ conclusion that the sentence of a suspended prison term was illegal under
In People v. District Court, the defendant entered into a plea bargain and pled guilty to a second degree murder charge. The defendant received a suspended prison sentence upon the conditions that he participate for two years in a work-release program, continue therapy, and not possess or carry any weapon for two years. 673 P.2d at 993-94. One week later, the trial court revoked the suspension of the defendant‘s sentence for reasons unrelated to the conditions imposed, and placed the defendant in the custody of the department of corrections. The defendant objectеd to the revocation of the suspended sentence, asserting that he had done nothing to warrant the revocation. Id. at 994.
In reviewing the propriety of the sentence in People v. District Court, we noted that a “court may not impose a sentence that is inconsistent with the terms specified by statutes.” 673 P.2d at 995. Under
In People v. Flenniken, 749 P.2d 395 (Colo.1988), the defendant pled guilty to two counts of theft and was sentenced to four years imprisonment plus one year of parole on each count, with the sentences to run concurrently. The trial court then suspended the prison sentences, placed the defendant on eight years probation for each count, and ordered him to make restitution. We held that “[t]he trial court‘s action in imposing a sentence to imprisonment, suspending that sentence, then sentencing defendant to a term of probation violates section 16-11-101.” Flenniken, 749 P.2d at 398. We rejected the argument that People v. District Court should be limited to the unique facts of that case; instead, we stated that People v. District Court stands for the broad proposition that there is “no statutory authority permitting a court to suspend execution of a sentence to imprisonment.” Flenniken, 749 P.2d at 398.7
Under the standards announced in People v. District Court and Flenniken, the original sentence imposed on Chae was clearly an illegal sentence. The district court in the instant case had no statutory authority to suspend the sentence of imprisonment and to impose conditions on that suspension. Flenniken, 749 P.2d at 398. Accordingly, we affirm that part of the court of appeals’ judgmеnt holding that the original sentence imposed on Chae was illegal under
III.
Having determined that Chae‘s original sentence was illegal, we must next decide whether this illegal sentence requires the vacation of Chae‘s guilty plea. The court of appeals held that Chae‘s plea need not be vacated because the trial court corrected the illegal sentence and, despite the illegality, Chae received the sentence for which he originally bargained. We disagree with the court of appeals’ analysis, and we conclude that Chae‘s plea must be vacated because the original illegal sentence was an integral part of the plea agreement in this case.
A.
Whether a guilty plea entered as part of a plea agreement that provides for an illegal sentence is invalid and must be vacated is a question of first impression for this court. Generally, a guilty plea must be voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently made in order to be valid. Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 644-45, 96 S.Ct. 2253, 2257-58, 49 L.Ed.2d 108 (1976); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 1468, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970); Lacy v. People, 775 P.2d 1, 4-6 (Colo.1989) (guilty plea must be voluntary in the constitutional sense, i.e., defendant must understand nature of constitutional protections he is waiving and must receive real notice of true nature of charge against him); People v. Hrapski, 718 P.2d 1050, 1055-56 (Colo.1986) (“guilty plea must be given voluntarily and with an understanding of the consequences of such plea“). To be voluntary, a guilty plea cannot be induced by misrepresentation, including unfulfilled or
Other jurisdictions have held that where a defendant pleads guilty by entering into a plea agreement that includes provisions for an illegal sentence, the defendant must be allowed to withdraw his plea and plead anew. See Forbert v. State, 437 So. 2d 1079, 1081 (Fla.1983) (“when a defendant pleads guilty with the understanding that the sentence he or she reсeives in exchange is legal, when in fact the sentence is not legal, the defendant should be given the opportunity to withdraw the plea“); Rojas v. State, 450 A.2d 490, 493 (Md.App.1982) (“when a material term of a sentence based upon a plea agreement is unenforceable, the appropriate remedy is to vacate the entire sentence and the corresponding plea agreement“); State v. Nemeth, 214 N.J.Super. 324, 519 A.2d 367, 368 (App.Div.1986) (“there can be no plea bargain to an illegal sentence“; case remanded to allow defendant opportunity to withdraw plea or renegotiate a permissible plea agreement).
Similarly, in Colorado we have held that a court‘s rejection of a sentencing recommendation made by the prosecution pursuant to the plea agreement upon which the defendant entered his guilty plea “draws into question the voluntariness of the plеa.” People v. Wright, 194 Colo. 448, 450, 573 P.2d 551, 553 (1978). Thus, under Crim.P. 32(d),9 a defendant is permitted to withdraw his guilty plea when the trial court chooses not to follow the prosecutor‘s sentence recommendation made as promised in a plea agreement. See Wright, 194 Colo. at 450, 573 P.2d at 553.
The concerns about a fundamentally fair plea bargaining procedure that guided our interpretation of Crim.P. 32(d) in Wright apply with equal force to the present case. When, as in Wright, a defendant enters a plea agreement that includes a recommendation for a particular sentence, the fact that the sentence is rejected by the court “removes the basis upon which the defendant entered his plea and draws into question the voluntariness of the plea.” Wright, 194 Colo. at 450, 573 P.2d at 553. The same is true when the recommended sentence is illegal and therefore cannot be validly imposed. Accordingly, we conclude that when a defendant enters into a plea agreement that includes as a material element a recommendation for an illegal sentence and the illegal sentence is in fact imposed on the defendant, the guilty plea is invalid and must be vacated because the basis on which the defendant entered the plea included the impermissible inducement of an illegal sentence. See Brady, 397 U.S. at 748, 90 S.Ct. at 1468; Forbert, 437 So.2d at 1081; Rojas, 450 A.2d at 493-94; Nemeth, 519 A.2d at 368.
B.
In the present case, the recommendation for the illegal suspended prison sentence conditioned on Chae‘s submission to deportation proceedings was part of the plea agreement by which Chae pled guilty to second degree sexual assault. At the Crim.P. 35(c) hearing, the district court found that Chae‘s plea agreement had three consequences as far as the Defendant was concerned. First of all, the Defendant would plead guilty and have a felony conviction. Second, the Defendant would serve eight years in the
The district court‘s finding reflects that the sentence recommendation was a material part of, and not a separate consideration from, the plea agreement entered into by Chae. This conclusion is adequately supported by the record.
The suspended sentence provisions were included on the same stipulation and plea agreement document that Chae executed providing for his guilty plea in exchange for dismissal of the greater charges. When Chae signed this document at the Crim.P. 11 providency hearing, his attorney stated for the record that the stipulation “reflect[ed] the sentence and plea agreement in th[is] case.” (Emphasis added.) Chae and the prosecution stipulated at the Crim.P. 35(c) hearing that at the time Chae entered his guilty plea in 1984, his attorney explained to him that “if he pled guilty to second-degree sexual assault and agreed to be deported all of the [other] charges would be dismissed and he would not have to go to jail in the United States.” (Emphasis added.) Finally, the district court acknowledged the importance of the suspended sentencing recommendation as the basis of the plea agreement at the providency hearing when it stated to Chae‘s brother that if the court did not accept the sentence recommendations, “you [Byong Sok Chae] would have the right to withdraw this guilty plea and go to trial.”10
In sum, the sentence recommendation providing that Chae would not be imprisoned formed an integral part of the plea agreement and was the basis for Chae‘s entry of a guilty plea in the instant case. Because this sentence recommendation provided for an illegal suspended sentence, the basis for the guilty plea amounted to an invalid, unfulfillable promise. See State v. Nemeth, 214 N.J.Super. 324, 519 A.2d 367, 368 (App.Div.1986) (“there can be no plea bargain to an illegal sentence“); cf. Brady, 397 U.S. at 755, 90 S.Ct. at 1472. Accordingly, applying the principles outlined in section IIIA of this opinion, we hold that Chae‘s guilty plea must be vacated because the illegal sentence recommendation in the plea agreement invalidated Chae‘s guilty plea.
The court of appeals held that Chae‘s plea need not be vacated because he received the sentence for which he bargained.11 That is, Chae bargained for a prison term suspended upon certain conditions. Because Chae violated those conditions by failing to submit to deportation, the district court imposed the prison term. However, even if Chae did receive the “benefit” of the sentence he bargained for, the court of appeals’ reasoning is inapplicable in this case where the original sentence imposed was illegal. We have twice held that no sound public policy supports allowing defendants “a right to benefit from illegal sentences.” People v. District Court, 673 P.2d at 997; accord Flenniken, 749 P.2d at 398.12 Similarly, no sound public policy supports allowing the parties to bargain for an illegal sentence, and we cannot uphold a plea bargain that has as its object an illegal sentence.13
We conclude that the sentence bargained for as part of Chae‘s plea agreement was an illegal sentence, and therefore Chae‘s guilty plea must be vacated. Accordingly, we affirm that part of the court of appeals’ judgment holding that Chae‘s original sentence was illegal, and we reverse that part of the сourt of appeals’ judgment holding that Chae may not withdraw his guilty plea. Because the illegal sentencing provision prevents Chae from being bound by his original plea agreement, the district attorney also is not bound by the agreement. Thus, on remand the district attorney may reinstate the charges against Chae that were previously dismissed under the plea agreement.
The opinion of the court of appeals is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and this case is remanded to the court of appeals to be remanded to the district court with instructions to vacate Chae‘s guilty plea and the judgment of conviction entered on that plea.
VOLLACK, J., concurs in part and dissents in part; ROVIRA and MULLARKEY, JJ., join in the concurrence and dissent.
Justice VOLLACK concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur with Part II of the majority‘s opinion that the district court‘s suspended sentence was an improper sentence. The majority concludes that Chae‘s plea must be vacated because the district court‘s illegal sentence was an integral part of the plea agreement. See maj. op. at 485. I dissent because I believe that under the facts of this case Chae entered a knowing and voluntary plea, and the court‘s illegal suspended sentence did not invalidate the voluntariness of the plea. After a Crim.P. 35(c) hearing, the court corrected the illegality in the sentence and the defendant received the sentence he had bargained for at the time of the plea.
I.
On May 22, 1984, during the trial on the original charges, defendant Byong Chol Chae (Chae) entered into a plea bargain in which he pled guilty to second-degree sexual assault. In return the district attorney recommended that the court impose an eight-year prison sentence, and suspend the sentence conditioned on Chae‘s surrender to immigration authorities and submission to deportation proceedings.1 Through this agreement Chae avoided the possibility of being convicted and serving a maximum sentence of forty-eight years. The record shows that Chae thoroughly understood the terms of the plea agreement and the rights he was giving up by pleading guilty.2 Chae understood that, under the agreement, if he did not submit to deportation the district court could sentence him to the Department of Corrections (DOC) for eight years. Chae also understood that if he was convicted after a trial he may be deported.
During the May 22, 1984, hearing, the district court added to the agreement the condition that Chae return to court on May 25, 1984, to surrender to immigration authorities. The court asked Chae if he understood that upon his failure to appear he would receive a penitentiary sentence, and
Chae failed to appear on May 25, 1984, and the court issued a warrant for his arrest. A year later Chae was arrested and brought before the court. On July 27, 1985, Chae moved to vacate his guilty plea pursuant to Crim.P. Rule 35(c) on the ground that his consent to the plea agreement was obtained without minimally adequate reference by his counsel or the court to alternative aspects of federal law governing deportation, and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. The court denied Chae‘s motion on September 16, 1985, and on October 8, 1985, the court sentenced Chae to DOC for a term of еight years. The record does not reveal whether the district court vacated or amended the May 22, 1984, suspended sentence, but it appears from the mittimus that the court vacated the suspended sentence and imposed a new eight-year sentence.
II.
The majority concludes that the illegality in the sentence invalidated Chae‘s consent to the plea bargain. Maj. op. at 487. I disagree. The illegality of the suspension of the sentence was not an integral part of the plea agreement. Chae pled guilty to second-degree sexual assault, and in return the People agreed to dismiss the second-degree kidnapping and first-degree sexual assault charges. Chae and the People also agreed that if Chae would submit to deportation he would not have to serve a prison sentence. Chae agreed to serve a prison term of no morе than eight years if he failed to return to court on May 25, 1984, to submit himself to immigration authorities. The plea bargain allowed Chae to avoid a possible maximum sentence of forty-eight years. The court‘s lack of statutory authority to suspend the sentence on May 22, 1984, was not an integral part of the agreement and did not invalidate the plea. After Chae‘s failure to return on May 25, 1984, the district court subjected him to no more than the eight-year sentence he bargained for. I do not believe Chae should be rewarded with a vacated plea for his failure to return on May 25, 1984, and submit to deportation.
An illegal sentence does not invalidate a knowing and voluntary plea unless the illegality affects one or more of the material conditions of the plea bargain. See People v. Wright, 194 Colo. 448, 450, 573 P.2d 551, 553 (1978) (trial court‘s failure to impose recommended sentence draws into question voluntariness of defendant‘s plea). In People v. Green, 114 Misc.2d 339, 343, 451 N.Y.S.2d 970, 973 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1982), a New York County Supreme Court, relying on cases from a number of jurisdictions, held that “[w]hatever statutory, policy or constitutional considerations courts have enunciated to void a sentence of banishment, it is clear that the underlying conviction, whether by trial or plea of guilty, is unaffected.” The court concluded that the underlying conviction remained valid because “[t]he plea of guilty . . . was voluntarily and knowingly entered with a full understanding of the conditions after consultation with counsel.” Id. The court noted that “[a]t no time before sentence did the defendant request to withdraw his plea. There is therefore no merit to the defendant‘s contention that the underlying plea of guilty is void.” Id. (citations omitted).
In the present case the validity of Chae‘s plea is unaffected by the court‘s decision to illegally suspend the eight-year sentence rather than issue a proper sentence to probation subject to identical terms and conditions. See United States v. Green, 735 F.2d 1203, 1206 (9th Cir.1984) (“When a court exceeds its sentencing authority, the sentence is void only as to the excessive portion of it.“); Weigand v. Commonwealth, 397 S.W.2d 780, 781 (Ky. 1966), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 976, 86 S.Ct. 1870, 16 L.Ed.2d 686 (1966); State v. Wood, 53 Or.App. 198, 200, 631 P.2d 799, 800 (1981) (reference in sentence to unconstitutional statute is a nullity but sentence may be enforced). In In the Matter of the Application of Thomas E. Adams, 360 N.W.2d 513, 516 (S.D.1985), the South Dakota
III.
The district court remedied the illegal sentence when it sentenced Chae on October 8, 1985. The imposition of an illegal sentence may be corrected at any time. Bozza v. United States, 330 U.S. 160, 166, 67 S.Ct. 645, 649, 91 L.Ed. 818 (1947); Peоple v. Emig, 177 Colo. 174, 177, 493 P.2d 368, 369 (1972); People v. Favors, 42 Colo.App. 263, 600 P.2d 78 (1979). In Bozza v. United States, 330 U.S. at 165-66, 67 S.Ct. at 648-49, the trial court failed to impose the mandatory sentence required by statute but later corrected its mistake. The United States Supreme Court stated that “the court only set aside what it had no authority to do and substitute[d] directions required by law to be done upon the conviction of the offender.” Id., 330 U.S. at 167, 67 S.Ct. at 649. In the present case the district court set aside what it had no authority to do and gave Chae a legal sentence consistent with the terms of his plea agreement. We are not required to vacate Chae‘s plea because the district court‘s October 8, 1985, sentence remedied the only defect in the proceedings.
The majority notes that when a defendant enters into a plea agreement that includes as a material element a recommendation for an illegal sentence and the illegal sentence is in fact imposed on the defеndant, the guilty plea is invalid and must be vacated because the basis on which the defendant entered the plea included the impermissible inducement of an illegal sentence. Maj. op. at 486. The majority then concludes that the recommended suspension of Chae‘s sentence was a material part of the plea agreement which induced Chae to accept the agreement. Maj. op. at 487. I disagree with the majority‘s application of the law to the facts of this case. Other jurisdictions have viewed the circumstances surrounding an illegal sentence to determine whether the illegality materially altered the benefits and detriments the parties bargained for in the plea agreement. Weigand v. Commonwealth, 397 S.W.2d 780, 781 (Ky. 1966) (defendant‘s decision to accept void probation and then violate it precludes defendant from challenging validity of probation order). In other jurisdictions, if thе illegal sentence does not affect a material condition of the plea the trial court may correct the illegal sentence at any time. United States v. Green, 735 F.2d at 1206 (where, pursuant to plea bargain, trial court imposed probation condition requiring excessive restitution, proper remedy is reduction of restitution to amount authorized). In this case the recommended suspension of the sentence was not a material part of the plea agreement and the district court was authorized to correct the sentence. United States v. Minor, 846 F.2d 1184, 1188 (9th Cir. 1988) (where an original sentence imposed after conviction was in excess of statutory limit, the district court could not impose wholly new sentences pursuant to Rule 35 motion, but was limited to correcting the original sentence by eliminating the excess that rendered it illegal); Bird v. State, 231 Md. 432, 436, 190 A.2d 804, 807 (1963) (trial court ordered to strike invalid condition of suspended sentence imposed after defendant‘s conviction).
Courts considering the effect of illegal sentences on plea bargains have upheld the state‘s right to accept a corrected sentence which is consistent with the defendant‘s plea bargain. Florida courts have consistently held that when a defendant challenges his plea on the ground that he agreed to an illegal sentence, the court may, with the state‘s agreement, adopt the original plea bargain with the illegality corrected. In Cleveland v. State, 394 So. 2d 230 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1981), the defendant pled guilty to an illegal ten-year sentence for attempted armed burglary. The Florida District Court of Appeal held that “if the state should exercise its option to ac-
Forbert v. State, 437 So. 2d 1079, 1081 (Fla.1983), which the majority cites, is from this line of cases. In Forbert the defendant pled guilty to an illegal “split sentence.” Id. In ruling on Forbert‘s motion to withdraw his plea, the Florida Supreme Court stated that:
Id. Forbert does not support vacating a defendant‘s plea, or allowing a defendant to withdraw his plea, when the state agrees to accept a legal sentence consistent with the original plea bargain. The Forbert court recognized thatForbert had the right to have his sentence corrected so that it conformed to the law. When the judge indicated that he would resentence Forbert to eight years in prison, Forbert sought to withdraw his plea of guilty since such a sentence was not what he bargained for. The court should have then either allowed Forbert to withdraw his plea, reinstating the charges originally filed against him, or should have resentenced him within the parameters of the plea agreement.
Id.since the state may not have witnesses or other evidence available in cases where a defendant moves to withdraw his plea months or years after entering it, the state should have the option of either agreeing that the judgment and sentence should both be vacated or holding the defendant to his plea of guilty and vacating only the excessive portion of that sentence.
IV.
The majority cites People v. District Court, 673 P.2d 991 (Colo.1983), for the proposition that because Chae could not benefit from an illegal sentence he should not be allowed to bargain for one. Maj. op. at 487. In People v. District Court, the trial court imposed a suspended sentence on the defendant. The court later became аware of circumstances which undermined the foundation of its suspended sentence, and revoked the suspension of the sentence. Id. The court refused to alter the sentence itself because it felt to do so would violate the double jeopardy clause. Id. We held that the suspension of the sentence on conditions authorized only for probation made the sentence illegal. Id. at 996. To promote the public-policy interest of ensuring that convicted criminals receive adequate sentences we limited the reach of double jeopardy. We reasoned that to allow the defendant to serve a shorter sentence than he deserved merely because the court could not correct his sentence without twice putting him in jeopardy of life and limb granted to the defendant a right to benefit from his illegal sentence. Id. at 997. “Granting defendants a right to benеfit from illegal sentences,” we stated, “serves no sound public policy.” Id.
The policy concerns that supported our decision in People v. District Court are not present here. Although the sentence imposed by the district court contained an illegality, that illegality was immaterial. Therefore, Chae did not bargain for an illegal sentence. He bargained for a proper agreement which the district court imposed through illegal means. The majority allows Chae to benefit from his illegal sentence despite the fact that his plea was not induced by the illegality, and despite Chae‘s failure to fulfill his part of the agreement.
I respectfully dissent from Part III of the majority opinion.
ROVIRA and MULLARKEY, JJ., join in this concurrence and dissent.
Linda Donnelly, Disciplinary Counsel, and Susan L. Fralick, Asst. Disciplinary Counsel, Denver, for complainant.
William A. McGrath, Denver, pro se.
Chief Justice QUINN delivered the Opinion of the Court.
In this disciplinary proceeding, a complaint was filed with the Grievance Committee charging the respondent, William A. McGrath, with unprofessional conduct in connection with his handling of client funds. Subsequent to the filing of the complaint, the respondent and the Assistant Disciplinary Counsel entered into a written stipulation of fact and a consent to a one-year and one-day suspension, conditioned upon the approval of this court. An inquiry panel of the Grievance Committee approved the stipulation and sanction, and we do also.
The respondent was admitted to the practice of law in the State of Colorado on September 27, 1972, and is subject to the jurisdiction of this court and its Grievance Committee. In April 1986 Francis N. DeMaria retained the respondent to represent him in a collection and eviction action against Matthew Tocco. On June 2, 1986, a default judgment was entered in favor of DeMaria and against Tocco in the amount of $1,676.80. After obtaining $234.00 from Tocco by garnishment, the respondent charged DeMaria $506.30 for fees аnd costs and applied the $234.00 garnished from Tocco to DeMaria‘s bill.
Tocco thereafter left his employment, thus terminating the writ of garnishment, but in March 1987 the respondent served a writ of continuing garnishment on Tocco‘s new employer. Between May and August 1987, the respondent received six checks for garnished funds totalling $1,358.24. Sometime prior to November 4, 1987, the
Notes
I have been very concerned throughout this case and was at the time this guilty plea was entered in making sure the defendant understood what he was doing and what was going on. I set aside one plea because he had some reservations about whether he really understood what he had done the first time [he pled guilty]. I have no reservations about denying the defendant‘s motion today. I find that he fully understood what he was doing, that there was no confusion in his mind, he was aware of not only the direct consequences of his guilty plea, but he was aware of the collateral consequences of deportation and in all probability further exclusion from readmission to this country.
That statute became effective July 1, 1988, and applies to acts committed on or after that date. Ch. 116, secs. 5, 7,When it shall appear to the satisfaction of the court that the ends of justice and the best interest of the public, as well as the defendant, will be best served thereby, the court shall have the power to suspend the imposition or execution of sentence for such period and upоn such terms and conditions as it may deem best.
Wright held that this rule “clearly contemplates that a defendant should be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea where the trial court chooses not to follow the prosecutor‘s sentence recommendation, regardless of whether the prosecution has promised that the court will follow the recommendation.” 194 Colo. at 450, 573 P.2d at 553.A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or of nolo contendere may be made only before sentence is imposed or imposition of sentence is suspended. If the court decides that the final disposition should not include the charge or sentence concessions contemplated by a plea agreement, as provided in Rule 11(f) of these Rules, he shall sо advise the defendant and the district attorney and then call upon the defendant to either affirm or withdraw his plea of guilty or nolo contendere.