302 F.3d 107 | 3rd Cir. | 2002
ALITO, Circuit Judge:(cid:13) This appeal was taken from an order granting a petition(cid:13) for a writ of habeas corpus filed by Mr. H. Beatty Chadwick(cid:13) under 28 U.S.C. S 2254. The petitioner has applied eight(cid:13) times to the courts of Pennsylvania and six times to the(cid:13) federal district court for release from incarceration for civil(cid:13) 2(cid:13) contempt for refusing to comply with an order in a(cid:13) matrimonial proceeding directing him to pay over $2.5(cid:13) million into an escrow account. In the present case, the(cid:13) District Court concluded that the petitioner had exhausted(cid:13) state remedies even though he had not applied to the(cid:13) Pennsylvania Supreme Court for review of the adverse(cid:13) decision of the Superior Court. In the view of the District(cid:13) Court, it was sufficient that the petitioner subsequently(cid:13) submitted a habeas petition to the Pennsylvania Supreme(cid:13) Court in its original jurisdiction pursuant to 42 Pa. Cons.(cid:13) Stat. S 721. With respect to the merits of the present(cid:13) proceeding, the District Court accepted the state courts’(cid:13) repeated findings that the petitioner is able to comply with(cid:13) the order directing him to pay the funds into escrow, but(cid:13) the District Court nevertheless held that the length of(cid:13) petitioner’s confinement -- then almost seven years --(cid:13) meant that the contempt order had lost its coercive effect(cid:13) and that confinement for civil contempt was no longer(cid:13) constitutional. We reverse.(cid:13) I.(cid:13) In November 1992, Mrs. Barbara Chadwick filed for(cid:13) divorce in the Delaware County (Pennsylvania) Court of(cid:13) Common Pleas. During an equitable distribution conference(cid:13) in February 1993, Mr. Chadwick informed the state court(cid:13) and Mrs. Chadwick that he had unilaterally transferred(cid:13) $2,502,000.00 of the marital estate to satisfy an alleged(cid:13) debt to Maison Blanche, Ltd., a Gibraltar partnership.(cid:13) It was later discovered that (1) one of the principals of(cid:13) Maison Blanche had returned $869,106.00 from Gibraltar(cid:13) to an American bank account in Mr. Chadwick’s name and(cid:13) that these funds had then been used to purchase three(cid:13) insurance annuity contracts; (2) $995,726.41 had been(cid:13) transferred to a Union Bank account in Switzerland in Mr.(cid:13) Chadwick’s name; and (3) $550,000.00 in stock certificates(cid:13) that the petitioner claimed he had transferred to an(cid:13) unknown barrister in England to forward to Maison(cid:13) Blanche had never been received. The state court then(cid:13) entered a freeze order on the marital assets on April 29,(cid:13) 1994.(cid:13) 3(cid:13) In May 1994, Mr. Chadwick redeemed the annuity(cid:13) contracts and deposited the funds in a Panamanian bank.(cid:13) After a hearing on July 22, 1994, the court determined that(cid:13) Mr. Chadwick’s transfer of the money was an attempt to(cid:13) defraud Mrs. Chadwick and the court. At that time, the(cid:13) court ordered petitioner to return the $2,502,000.00 to an(cid:13) account under the jurisdiction of the court, to pay(cid:13) $75,000.00 for Mrs. Chadwick’s attorney’s fees and costs,(cid:13) to surrender his passport, and to remain within the(cid:13) jurisdiction. Mr. Chadwick refused to comply, and Mrs.(cid:13) Chadwick thereafter filed a petition to have him held in civil(cid:13) contempt. Mr. Chadwick failed to appear at any of the three(cid:13) contempt hearings, but his attorney was present. The court(cid:13) found Mr. Chadwick in contempt of the July 22, 1994 order(cid:13) and issued a bench warrant for his arrest.(cid:13) After learning of the bench warrant, Mr. Chadwick fled(cid:13) the jurisdiction but was arrested and detained on April 5,(cid:13) 1995. The state court determined that Mr. Chadwick had(cid:13) the present ability to comply with the terms of the July 22,(cid:13) 1994 order and set bail at $3,000,000. Mr. Chadwick could(cid:13) have been released from custody either by posting bail or(cid:13) by complying with the July 22, 1994 order. To date, he has(cid:13) done neither.(cid:13) Since his confinement, Mr. Chadwick has applied eight(cid:13) times to the state courts1 and six times to the federal court2(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 1. The state petitions include: (1) an emergency petition for release,(cid:13) which was denied by the Court of Common Pleas and affirmed by the(cid:13) Superior Court; (2) six state habeas petitions, all of which were denied;(cid:13) and (3) a petition for release from imprisonment or, in the alternative,(cid:13) house arrest, which was denied. See Appellant’s Br. at 8-12.(cid:13) 2. The federal petitions include: (1) an emergency motion for injunctive(cid:13) relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. S 1983, which was denied because(cid:13) abstention was appropriate under the doctrine of Younger v. Harris, 401(cid:13) U.S. 37 (1971); (2) an emergency motion pursuant to 42 U.S.C. S 1983,(cid:13) which was denied, or, in the alternative, habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C.(cid:13) S 2241, which was dismissed for failure to exhaust state remedies; (3) a(cid:13) third federal habeas petition, which was denied for failure to exhaust(cid:13) state remedies; (4) a petition for reconsideration of the dismissal of the(cid:13) third federal habeas petition, which was also denied for failure to(cid:13) exhaust state remedies; (5) a fourth federal habeas petition, which was(cid:13) also denied for failure to exhaust state remedies; and (6) a fifth federal(cid:13) habeas petition, which is the basis of this appeal. See Appellant’s br. at(cid:13) 12-13.(cid:13) 4(cid:13) to gain release from incarceration. After the trial court(cid:13) denied his sixth state habeas petition, the Superior Court(cid:13) affirmed the decision on April 23, 1997, stating:(cid:13) Instantly, appellant cites to the fact that he has been(cid:13) incarcerated since April 5, 1995. He claims the length(cid:13) of his incarceration, his age, poor health, inability to(cid:13) pursue his career and repeated hearings where he has(cid:13) refused compliance suggests that there is no possibility(cid:13) that he will comply with the order. Appellant admits(cid:13) that no court in this jurisdiction has adopted this test(cid:13) and we will not do so here. While it seems reasonable(cid:13) that at some point a temporal benchmark should be(cid:13) adopted to determine when contempt incarceration(cid:13) becomes impermissibly punitive we think that it is for(cid:13) our high court to make such a determination.(cid:13) Magistrate Report & Recommendation at 12; App. at 39.(cid:13) Despite the Superior Court’s invitation that the petitioner(cid:13) ask the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to decide the point at(cid:13) which incarceration for contempt becomes punitive, the(cid:13) petitioner did not file an allocatur petition in the state(cid:13) supreme court.(cid:13) Later, on July 18, 1997, petitioner filed another petition(cid:13) for federal habeas relief, which was dismissed for failure to(cid:13) exhaust state court remedies. The District Court wrote:(cid:13) Although Mr. Chadwick has forfeited his right to seek(cid:13) Supreme Court review of the Superior Court’s April 23,(cid:13) 1997 denial of his sixth state habeas petition, see(cid:13) Pa.R.App.P. 1113(a) (petition for allowance of appeal(cid:13) must be filed within 30 days of order), he would not be(cid:13) barred from filing a seventh state habeas petition(cid:13) based on his present confinement of approximately(cid:13) thirty-seven months. Under Pennsylvania law, Mr.(cid:13) Chadwick can file a seventh state habeas petition in(cid:13) the Court of Common Pleas and exhaust his appellate(cid:13) remedies[,] see 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. 931, or petition(cid:13) directly in the Supreme Court, which has original(cid:13) jurisdiction over habeas corpus proceedings. See 42 Pa.(cid:13) Cons. Stat. Ann. S 721(1). But unless the issues(cid:13) presented in the federal habeas petition have all been(cid:13) first presented to the Supreme Court, the district court(cid:13) 5(cid:13) may not exercise jurisdiction. See Lambert, 134 F.3d at(cid:13) 515 (requiring "complete exhaustion"); Swanger, 750(cid:13) F.2d at 295 (raising claim before Supreme Court in(cid:13) petition for allowance of appeal satisfies exhaustion(cid:13) requirement).(cid:13) Magistrate Report & Recommendation at 17; App. at 44(cid:13) (emphasis added). Because Mr. Chadwick had not sought(cid:13) review in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court on the issue(cid:13) presented in his federal petition, that petition was(cid:13) dismissed.(cid:13) In September 1999, Mr. Chadwick filed a pro se (cid:13) Application for Leave to File Original Process (his seventh(cid:13) state habeas action) with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.(cid:13) Mrs. Chadwick sought permission to intervene, and(cid:13) opposed the application and the state habeas petition. In a(cid:13) per curiam order dated February 8, 2000, the Pennsylvania(cid:13) Supreme Court granted the request to file original process(cid:13) and the request to file an answer, and denied the petition(cid:13) for habeas corpus.(cid:13) On March 2, 2000, Mr. Chadwick filed the instant(cid:13) petition for federal habeas relief. The District Court granted(cid:13) that petition on January 3, 2002, but stayed its order for(cid:13) 30 days to "allow appeal and application for further stay of(cid:13) this court’s order to the appellate court." App. at 25. Mrs.(cid:13) Chadwick took this timely appeal. By order dated January(cid:13) 31, 2002, we granted Mrs. Chadwick’s motion for a stay(cid:13) pending appeal. The United States Supreme Court(cid:13) thereafter denied Mr. Chadwick’s Application for(cid:13) Enlargement and to Vacate Stay.(cid:13) II.(cid:13) A.(cid:13) The first issue we must address is whether Mrs.(cid:13) Chadwick has standing to proceed on appeal. Mr. Chadwick(cid:13) argues that because Mrs. Chadwick was an intervenor in(cid:13) the District Court, she lacks Article III standing. He further(cid:13) argues that, because the respondents -- the warden, the(cid:13) Delaware County District Attorney, and the Attorney(cid:13) 6(cid:13) General of the Commonwealth -- did not appeal, we do not(cid:13) have jurisdiction to entertain this appeal.(cid:13) The United States Supreme Court has stated that"an(cid:13) intervenor’s right to continue a suit in the absence of the(cid:13) party on whose side the intervention was permitted is(cid:13) contingent upon a showing by the intervenor that he fulfills(cid:13) the requirements of Art[icle] III." Diamond v. Charles, 476(cid:13) U.S. 54, 68 (1986). Under Article III of the United States(cid:13) Constitution, the judicial power extends only to"Cases" and(cid:13) "Controversies." As noted in Vermont Agency of Natural(cid:13) Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765,(cid:13) 771 (2000):(cid:13) a plaintiff must meet three requirements in order to(cid:13) establish Article III standing. See, e.g., Friends of Earth,(cid:13) Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc. , 528(cid:13) U.S. 167, 180-181, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610(cid:13) (2000). First, he must demonstrate "injury in fact" -- a(cid:13) harm that is both "concrete" and "actual or imminent,(cid:13) not conjectural or hypothetical." Whitmore v. Arkansas,(cid:13) 495 U.S. 149, 155, 110 S.Ct. 1717, 109 L.Ed.2d 135(cid:13) (1990) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).(cid:13) Second, he must establish causation -- a "fairly . . .(cid:13) trace[able]" connection between the alleged injury in(cid:13) fact and the alleged conduct of the defendant. Simon v.(cid:13) Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26,(cid:13) 41, 96 S.Ct. 1917, 48 L.Ed.2d 450 (1976). And third,(cid:13) he must demonstrate redressability -- a "substantial(cid:13) likelihood" that the requested relief will remedy the(cid:13) alleged injury in fact. Id., at 45, 96 S.Ct. 1917.(cid:13) See also, e.g., Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans(cid:13) United For Separation of Church & State, 454 U.S. 464, 472(cid:13) (1982); In re Grand Jury, 111 F.3d 1066, 1071 (3d Cir.(cid:13) 1997).(cid:13) We have little difficulty concluding that Mrs. Chadwick(cid:13) meets all of these requirements here. First, Mrs. Chadwick(cid:13) clearly has suffered and continues to suffer an injury in(cid:13) fact that is both "concrete" and "actual," "not conjectural or(cid:13) hypothetical." Mr. Chadwick has placed a substantial sum(cid:13) of money beyond the reach of the state court before whom(cid:13) the matrimonial case is pending. If the decision of the(cid:13) 7(cid:13) District Court is affirmed, Mr. Chadwick will be released(cid:13) from jail and will be relieved of the pressure to return this(cid:13) money for equitable distribution. Second, Mrs. Chadwick’s(cid:13) injury is unquestionably traceable to Mr. Chadwick’s(cid:13) refusal to comply with the state court order under which he(cid:13) is being held. The District Court’s order would erase the(cid:13) effect of the state court order requiring the return of the(cid:13) funds and would significantly reduce Mrs. Chadwick’s(cid:13) share of the marital estate. Third, Mrs. Chadwick’s injury(cid:13) may be redressed by a favorable decision here. A reversal of(cid:13) the District Court’s order granting Mr. Chadwick’s petition(cid:13) would require him to remain in prison until he returns the(cid:13) $2.5 million to the state court for later distribution.(cid:13) In arguing that Mrs. Chadwick lacks standing, the(cid:13) petitioner relies principally on Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S.(cid:13) 54 (1986), but that case is easily distinguishable. The(cid:13) Diamond case involved a constitutional attack on an Illinois(cid:13) statute restricting abortions. Id. at 56. Diamond, a(cid:13) pediatrician, successfully moved to intervene in the District(cid:13) Court, based on his conscientious objection to abortion and(cid:13) his status as a pediatrician and the father of a minor(cid:13) daughter. Id. at 66. When the District Court permanently(cid:13) enjoined provisions of the statute and the Court of Appeals(cid:13) affirmed, the State of Illinois did not appeal to the Supreme(cid:13) Court, but Diamond did. Id. at 62-63. The Court held that(cid:13) Diamond could not maintain the appeal as the sole(cid:13) appellant because he lacked Article III standing. Id. at 64-(cid:13) 71. Noting that Illinois, by not appealing, had accepted the(cid:13) decision that its statute was unconstitutional, the Court(cid:13) observed that even if it upheld the statute, Diamond, a(cid:13) private citizen, could not compel the state to enforce it. Id.(cid:13) at 64-65. In addition, the Court explained, Diamond could(cid:13) not establish that he had or would suffer injury in fact. Id.(cid:13) at 65-71. Diamond argued that if the statute were upheld,(cid:13) there would be fewer abortions and greater demand for his(cid:13) services as a pediatrician, but the Court dismissed this(cid:13) argument as speculative. Id. at 66. The Court likewise(cid:13) rejected Diamond’s contention that he had standing(cid:13) because of his interest in the standards of medical practice(cid:13) relating to abortion. Id. at 66-67. The Court stated that(cid:13) Diamond’s abstract interest in the issue of abortion could(cid:13) not substitute for the concrete injury demanded by Article(cid:13) 8(cid:13) III. Id. In response to Diamond’s claim of standing as the(cid:13) father of a minor daughter, the Court noted that the(cid:13) validity of the parental notification provision of the statute(cid:13) was not at issue in the appeal and Diamond had not(cid:13) provided factual support to show that the provisions that(cid:13) were at issue threatened him with any concrete injury. Id.(cid:13) at 67. Finally, the Court held that Diamond could not(cid:13) assert any constitutional rights of unborn fetuses and that(cid:13) the award of fees against him in the District Court could(cid:13) not "fairly be traced to the Illinois Abortion Law." Id. at 70.(cid:13) Other than the fact that Diamond and Mrs. Chadwick are(cid:13) both intervenors, the two cases have little in common. Mrs.(cid:13) Chadwick, as noted, has a direct financial interest: she(cid:13) wants Mr. Chadwick to produce a very substantial sum of(cid:13) money in which she claims a share. By contrast, Diamond’s(cid:13) claim that upholding the Illinois law would result in more(cid:13) live births and thus increase his income as a pediatrician(cid:13) was highly speculative and an obvious makeweight.(cid:13) Diamond was a classic case of an attempt to litigate an(cid:13) abstract legal issue; the present case involves a concrete(cid:13) monetary interest.(cid:13) Mr. Chadwick argues, however, that Mrs. Chadwick has(cid:13) no concrete injury at stake because "even if she were(cid:13) somehow to secure a reversal of the district court’s order,(cid:13) the respondents would still be required to release Mr.(cid:13) Chadwick, because they did not appeal." Appellee’s Br. at(cid:13) 21. We reject this highly technical argument and find(cid:13) Martin-Trigona v. Shiff, 702 F.2d 380 (2d Cir. 1983),(cid:13) instructive on the question whether someone other than the(cid:13) legal custodian of a prisoner may appeal an adverse(cid:13) decision in a habeas proceeding. In Martin-Trigona, a(cid:13) bankruptcy judge ordered a debtor imprisoned for civil(cid:13) contempt when he refused to submit to examination by the(cid:13) trustees. Id. at 381. The debtor filed a petition for a writ of(cid:13) habeas corpus, the District Court granted the motion, and(cid:13) the trustees appealed. Id. The Second Circuit held that the(cid:13) trustees were the real parties in interest because"[t]hey(cid:13) ha[d] a legitimate interest in seeing to it that Martin-(cid:13) Trigona testifie[d] to the location of certain assets, books,(cid:13) and records that are necessary to the administration of the(cid:13) estates." Id. at 386. Because the trustees’ interests were(cid:13) 9(cid:13) sufficiently affected by the District Court’s order, the(cid:13) Second Circuit held that the trustees had standing to(cid:13) appeal even though they were not the custodian of the(cid:13) debtor. Cf. United States ex rel. Thom v. Jenkins, 760 F.2d(cid:13) 736 (7th Cir. 1985) (private party who prosecuted contempt(cid:13) proceedings against judgment debtor was respondent and(cid:13) appellee on appeal of debtor’s habeas petition following(cid:13) jailing for contempt). Martin-Trigona is analogous to the(cid:13) case at bar because Mrs. Chadwick -- like the trustees --(cid:13) is the party who has "a legitimate interest in seeing to it,"(cid:13) 702 F.2d at 386, that Mr. Chadwick returns a substantial(cid:13) portion of the marital estate to the court. We find the(cid:13) decision in Martin-Trigona to be persuasive.(cid:13) The only case cited by Mr. Chadwick in support of his(cid:13) position is far afield. In Carter v. Rafferty , 826 F.2d 1299,(cid:13) 1303-04 (3d Cir. 1987), the District Court granted habeas(cid:13) petitions filed by two prisoners who had been tried and(cid:13) convicted together in state court. The habeas respondents(cid:13) appealed, but their notice of appeal "specifically limited(cid:13) itself to the order releasing [one of the prisoners]." Id. at(cid:13) 1303. Noting that what was then Rule 3(c) of the Federal(cid:13) Rules of Appellate Procedure3 required that a notice of(cid:13) appeal "designate the judgment, order, or part thereof(cid:13) appealed from," the Court held that it lacked jurisdiction to(cid:13) consider the portion of the District Court’s judgment(cid:13) relating to the other prisoner because the appellants had(cid:13) failed to specify that they were appealing that part of the(cid:13) judgment. Id. at 1304. Thus, Carter does not stand for the(cid:13) proposition that only the person with the keys to the jail(cid:13) has standing to appeal an order granting a writ of habeas(cid:13) corpus. Rather, Carter holds that only the portions of an(cid:13) order specified in a notice of appeal may be challenged in(cid:13) the appeal. We accordingly hold that Mrs. Chadwick has(cid:13) Article III standing to pursue the present appeal. We have(cid:13) considered all of Mr. Chadwick’s standing arguments, and(cid:13) we find them to be devoid of merit.(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 3. See current Fed. R. App. Proc. 3(c)(1)(B).(cid:13) 10(cid:13) III.(cid:13) Mrs. Chadwick argues that Mr. Chadwick did not(cid:13) exhaust all available state court remedies before presenting(cid:13) his claims to the federal court in his habeas petition. See(cid:13) 28 U.S.C. S 2254(b)(1). Mrs. Chadwick makes two(cid:13) exhaustion arguments. First, she argues that Mr. Chadwick(cid:13) did not fairly present to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court(cid:13) the same claims that he raised in his federal habeas(cid:13) petition. See Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275-76 (1971).(cid:13) Specifically, Mrs. Chadwick urges reversal because the(cid:13) period of confinement listed in Mr. Chadwick’s application(cid:13) for leave to file original process before the Pennsylvania(cid:13) Supreme Court -- "over 50 months" (i.e., four years and(cid:13) two months) -- and the period of confinement for which the(cid:13) District Court granted habeas -- "nearly seven years" -- are(cid:13) not the same. Second, Mrs. Chadwick argues that Mr.(cid:13) Chadwick’s application for leave to file original process did(cid:13) not fairly present the claims to the Pennsylvania Supreme(cid:13) Court where, although it has original jurisdiction in habeas(cid:13) matters,4 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court will ordinarily(cid:13) refer habeas petitions to the appropriate lower court, unless(cid:13) there exists "imperative necessity or apparent reason why(cid:13) expedition is desirable or required." See Commonwealth ex(cid:13) rel. Paylor v. Claudy, 366 Pa. 282, 287 (1951).(cid:13) Although Mrs. Chadwick would have us decide the(cid:13) question of exhaustion, we decline to do so here because,(cid:13) under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of(cid:13) 1996 ("AEDPA"), Pub. L. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (enacted(cid:13) April 24, 1996), we may deny a habeas petition on the(cid:13) merits even though state remedies may not have been(cid:13) exhausted. See 28 U.S.C. S 2254(b)(2); see also(cid:13) Commonwealth ex rel. Craig v. Maroney, 348 F.2d 22, 33(cid:13) (3d Cir. 1965); In re Ernst’s Petition, 294 F.2d 556, 561-62(cid:13) (3d Cir. 1961).(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 4. The Pennsylvania statutes state that "[t]he Supreme Court shall have(cid:13) original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all cases of . . . Habeas corpus."(cid:13) 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. S 721.(cid:13) 11(cid:13) IV.(cid:13) A.(cid:13) Turning to the merits, we must first address the proper(cid:13) scope of review in this case. The parties dispute whether(cid:13) the AEDPA standard of review, see 28 U.S.C.S 2254(d),(cid:13) applies here.5 Relying on Appel v. Horn, 250 F.3d 203, 209-(cid:13) 12 (3d Cir. 2001), Mr. Chadwick argues that 28 U.S.C.(cid:13) S 2254(d) does not apply because the state courts never(cid:13) adjudicated his claims on the merits. As evidence, he points(cid:13) to the fact that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, after(cid:13) accepting the original habeas corpus petition for(cid:13) adjudication on its merits, denied relief without discussion.(cid:13) He also argues that Everett v. Beard, 290 F.3d 500, 508 (3d(cid:13) Cir. 2002), reaffirms that the AEDPA standard does not(cid:13) apply "unless it is clear from the face of the state court(cid:13) decision that the merits of the petitioner’s constitutional(cid:13) claims were examined in light of federal law as established(cid:13) by the Supreme Court of the United States." Consequently,(cid:13) he advocates that we review de novo the federal(cid:13) constitutional question rather than merely evaluate(cid:13) whether the state courts’ rulings were "reasonable."(cid:13) Mrs. Chadwick responds that the Pennsylvania Supreme(cid:13) Court summarily denied his petition on the merits6 and that(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 5. We review de novo the District Court’s legal conclusions, including its(cid:13) application of the standards of review imposed by AEDPA. See Banks v.(cid:13) Horn, 271 F.3d 527, 531 (3d Cir. 2001). If a District Court has a proper(cid:13) occasion to make findings of fact, they are reviewed for clear error. See(cid:13) Love v. Morton, 112 F.3d 131, 133 (3d Cir. 1997).(cid:13) 6. Prior to the habeas petition filed with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court(cid:13) in its original jurisdiction, the Pennsylvania Superior Court repeatedly(cid:13) decided Mr. Chadwick’s claims on the merits. In Mr. Chadwick’s third(cid:13) state habeas petition, Judge Battle held that the confinement was civil(cid:13) because Mr. Chadwick held "the key to the jail house." App. at 143-44.(cid:13) Later, the Superior Court endorsed this same view in its August 1996(cid:13) opinion, stating that "[b]ecause [Mr. Chadwick] clearly holds the keys to(cid:13) the jailhouse door," the "sanctions imposed upon him have not lost their(cid:13) coercive effect." App. at 234. Moreover, when ruling on his fifth state(cid:13) habeas petition, Judge Battle held that even if he were to adopt the(cid:13) proferred "no substantial likelihood" test from Morgan v. Foretich, 564(cid:13) 12(cid:13) therefore 28 U.S.C. S 2254(d) applies. See 28 U.S.C.(cid:13) S 2254(d) (stating that the section applies to"any claim that(cid:13) was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings").(cid:13) She responds that Appel is inapposite because it merely(cid:13) holds that the AEDPA standard of review does not apply(cid:13) where a state court misunderstands the petitioner’s claim(cid:13) and decides a different claim than the one presented. See(cid:13) Appel, 250 F.3d at 211. Finally, Mrs. Chadwick retorts that(cid:13) Everett does not stand for the proposition that summary(cid:13) adjudications are exempt from the AEDPA S 2254(d)(cid:13) standard of review. She argues that such a position would(cid:13) be inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Weeks(cid:13) v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 237 (2000), in which the Court(cid:13) affirmed the Fourth Circuit’s application of S 2254(d)(cid:13) deference where the state court had summarily rejected the(cid:13) petitioner’s claims. See also Weeks v. Angelone , 176 F.3d(cid:13) 249, 259 (4th Cir. 1999) ("Where, as here, the state(cid:13) supreme court has adjudicated a claim on the merits but(cid:13) has given no indication of how it reached its decision, a(cid:13) federal habeas court must still apply the AEDPA standards(cid:13) of review.").(cid:13) Because of the Supreme Court’s decision in Weeks , we(cid:13) cannot agree with Mr. Chadwick that summary(cid:13) adjudications by state courts are not entitled to the AEDPA(cid:13) standard of review. While it is necessary for the state court(cid:13) to have adjudicated the claim on the merits, it is not(cid:13) necessary for the state court to have thoroughly explained(cid:13) its analysis in its opinion. We, therefore, apply 28 U.S.C.(cid:13) S 2254(d) in this case.(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) A.2d 1 (D.C. 1989), he was "satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the(cid:13) contemnor has the current ability to comply and that the coercive(cid:13) sanctions imposed may yet cause the contemnor to ultimately comply"(cid:13) with the state court order. App. at 180-81. Again, the Superior Court(cid:13) concurred, explaining that "[a]fter careful review, we would agree that(cid:13) the record supports the trial court’s conclusion that appellant not only(cid:13) has the ability to comply but also that there is a realistic possibility that(cid:13) he will comply with the order. Therefore, the contempt order is still(cid:13) coercive and not punitive." App. at 243.(cid:13) 13(cid:13) B.(cid:13) AEDPA specifies the standard of review that a federal(cid:13) court must apply in reviewing a state court’s adjudication(cid:13) of a habeas claim. See 28 U.S.C. S 2254. Under that(cid:13) provision, a federal court may grant habeas relief only if the(cid:13) state court’s decision was "contrary to,7 or involved an(cid:13) unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal(cid:13) law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United(cid:13) States," id. S 2254(d)(1), or was"based on an unreasonable(cid:13) determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented(cid:13) in the State court proceeding," id. S 2254(d)(2).8 Moreover, a(cid:13) state court’s factual findings are "presumed to be correct,"(cid:13) and the habeas petitioner carries the "burden of rebutting(cid:13) the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing(cid:13) evidence." 28 U.S.C. S 2254(e)(1).(cid:13) This appeal involves the "unreasonable application" prong(cid:13) of S 2254(d)(1). A state court decision is an"unreasonable(cid:13) application" of Supreme Court precedent if it"identifies the(cid:13) correct governing legal rule from [the Supreme] Court’s(cid:13) cases, but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 7. The District Court correctly concluded that the state court ruling was(cid:13) not "contrary to" controlling federal law as determined by the United(cid:13) States Supreme Court. In Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06(cid:13) (2000), Justice O’Connor, in her controlling opinion, stated that a state(cid:13) court ruling is "contrary to" clearly established Supreme Court precedent(cid:13) for the purposes of S 2254(d)(1) "if the state court applies a rule that(cid:13) contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Supreme Court’s] cases,"(cid:13) or "if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially(cid:13) indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme Court] and(cid:13) nevertheless arrives at a result different from[its] precedent." Nothing in(cid:13) the record suggests that the state court either applied a rule that(cid:13) contradicted the governing law or arrived at a result different from(cid:13) precedent while entertaining facts that were indistinguishable from those(cid:13) in any decision of the Supreme Court, which existed at the time of the(cid:13) state court decision. Our decision will therefore concentrate on the(cid:13) District Court’s application of the "unreasonable application" prong.(cid:13) 8. The District Court agreed with all of the factual findings of the state(cid:13) courts, stating that "[t]he record below clearly demonstrates that the(cid:13) state court findings were not erroneous. This court is convinced that Mr.(cid:13) Chadwick has the present ability to comply with the July 22, 1994(cid:13) order." App. at 18-19. Therefore, no S 2254(d)(2) inquiry is necessary(cid:13) here.(cid:13) 14(cid:13) particular state prisoner’s case." Williams v. Taylor, 529(cid:13) U.S. 362, 407 (2000) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (controlling(cid:13) opinion). When making the "unreasonable application"(cid:13) inquiry, the federal habeas court should ask "whether the(cid:13) state court’s application of clearly established federal law(cid:13) was objectively unreasonable." Id. at 409 (emphasis added);(cid:13) see also Matteo v. Superintendent, SCI Albion, 171 F.3d(cid:13) 877, 891 (3d Cir. 1999) (en banc) (stating the test to be(cid:13) "whether the state court decision, evaluated objectively and(cid:13) on the merits, resulted in an outcome that cannot(cid:13) reasonably be justified [under existing Supreme Court(cid:13) precedent]") (emphasis added).(cid:13) Mr. Chadwick urges this Court to affirm the District(cid:13) Court’s ruling that the state courts unreasonably applied(cid:13) relevant legal precedents. Specifically, Mr. Chadwick argues(cid:13) that the state courts failed to recognize that his(cid:13) confinement has ceased to be coercive and that, as a(cid:13) consequence, he cannot be held in custody any longer(cid:13) unless he is convicted and sentenced for criminal contempt.(cid:13) We disagree and hold that the state courts’ decision--(cid:13) denying habeas relief where the state courts repeatedly(cid:13) determined that Mr. Chadwick has the present ability to(cid:13) comply with the court order -- was not an unreasonable(cid:13) application of "clearly established Federal Law, as(cid:13) determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." 28(cid:13) U.S.C. S 2254(d)(1).(cid:13) 1.(cid:13) To determine whether a contempt order is civil or(cid:13) criminal, Supreme Court jurisprudence requires an(cid:13) examination of the "character and purpose" of the sanction(cid:13) imposed. See United Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 512 U.S.(cid:13) 821, 827 (1994); Gompers v. Buck’s Stove & Range Co., 221(cid:13) U.S. 418, 441 (1911). Civil confinement "is remedial, and(cid:13) for the benefit of the complainant," Gompers , 221 U.S. at(cid:13) 441, whereas criminal confinement "is punitive, to vindicate(cid:13) the authority of the court." Id. The Bagwell Court identified(cid:13) the "paradigmatic coercive, civil contempt sanction" as(cid:13) involv[ing] [the] confin[ement][of] a contemnor(cid:13) indefinitely until he complies with an affirmative(cid:13) 15(cid:13) command such as an order "to pay alimony, or to(cid:13) surrender property ordered to be turned over to a(cid:13) receiver, or to make a conveyance." 221 U.S. at 442.(cid:13) . . . In these circumstances, the contemnor is able to(cid:13) purge the contempt and obtain his release by(cid:13) committing an affirmative act, and thus " ‘carries the(cid:13) keys of his prison in his own pocket.’ " Gompers, 221(cid:13) U.S. at 442.(cid:13) 512 U.S. at 828 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).(cid:13) Conversely, "a fixed sentence of imprisonment is punitive(cid:13) and criminal if it is imposed retrospectively for a‘completed(cid:13) act of disobedience,’ such that the contemnor cannot avoid(cid:13) or abbreviate the confinement through later compliance."(cid:13) Id. at 828-29 (citations omitted). The line drawn by the(cid:13) Supreme Court, then, is between ability to comply and(cid:13) inability to comply.9 The Supreme Court has never held(cid:13) that there is a constitutional limit on the length of(cid:13) incarceration of a civil contemnor who has the ability to(cid:13) comply with a coercive order but obdurately refuses to do(cid:13) so.(cid:13) 2.(cid:13) As an initial matter, the District Court recognized that(cid:13) Mr. Chadwick undoubtedly has the present ability to(cid:13) comply with the July 1994 state court order. The state(cid:13) courts have repeatedly so found. Under AEDPA, the District(cid:13) Court was bound by these state court factual(cid:13) determinations, absent rebuttal of the presumption of(cid:13) correctness by clear and convincing evidence. See 28 U.S.C.(cid:13) S 2254(e)(1). The District Court acknowledged that the(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 9. Bagwell does state that "[t]o the extent that [civil] contempts take on(cid:13) a punitive character . . . and are not justified by other considerations(cid:13) central to the contempt power, criminal procedural protections may be(cid:13) in order." 512 U.S. at 831. But this statement does not suggest that a(cid:13) "paradigmatic" civil contempt order, such as the one issued in this case,(cid:13) can take on a punitive character simply as a result of the passage of(cid:13) time. Rather, it appears that the Court was referring to new types of(cid:13) fines. See 512 U.S. at 830-31. In any event, this statement certainly is(cid:13) not sufficient to show that the holding of the District Court in this case(cid:13) is based on clearly established Supreme Court precedent.(cid:13) 16(cid:13) record demonstrates that the state court findings were not(cid:13) erroneous, and the District Court was "convinced that [Mr.](cid:13) Chadwick has the present ability to comply with the July(cid:13) 22, 1994 order." Dist. Ct. Op. at 17. Under AEDPA, these(cid:13) state court factual findings must stand.(cid:13) Presuming these state court factual findings to be(cid:13) correct, the District Court nevertheless concluded that Mr.(cid:13) Chadwick’s confinement has become punitive and that(cid:13) therefore the state court decision was an unreasonable(cid:13) application of federal law. Although the District Court(cid:13) alluded to the Supreme Court’s decisions in Bagwell and(cid:13) Gompers, the District Court relied chiefly on this Court’s(cid:13) decision in In re Grand Jury Investigation, 600 F.2d 420 (3d(cid:13) Cir. 1979), to conclude that the passage of time could alter(cid:13) the nature of petitioner’s confinement, transforming it from(cid:13) coercive to punitive and thus requiring observance of the(cid:13) procedural rights associated with criminal contempt. With(cid:13) this principle in mind, the District Court concluded that(cid:13) because Mr. Chadwick had defied the court’s order for so(cid:13) long, there was "no substantial likelihood" that he would(cid:13) comply in the future and that therefore the order had lost(cid:13) its coercive effect.(cid:13) In In re Grand Jury Investigation, we upheld a(cid:13) contemnor’s confinement for refusing to testify before a(cid:13) federal grand jury. Id. at 428. The contemnor argued that(cid:13) his confinement was not coercive but punitive, because(cid:13) "there was no substantial likelihood that he would testify(cid:13) before the grand jury." Id. at 422. Recognizing that some(cid:13) courts had applied the "no substantial likelihood of(cid:13) compliance" standard, we noted that the contemnor had(cid:13) been confined under a federal statute that limited(cid:13) confinement to 18 months for refusing to testify before a(cid:13) grand jury. Id. at 423-24. We held that, absent unusual(cid:13) circumstances, 18 months was not an unreasonable length(cid:13) for confinement in this context, and declined to inquire(cid:13) whether, in fact, there was no substantial likelihood that(cid:13) the contemnor would comply with the order to testify. Id. at(cid:13) 427.(cid:13) Under AEDPA, the District Court’s holding -- that Mr.(cid:13) Chadwick can no longer be held in custody for civil(cid:13) contempt because there is "no substantial likelihood" that(cid:13) 17(cid:13) he will comply with the order -- is erroneous. The District(cid:13) Court incorrectly relied on dicta in one of our opinions, but(cid:13) AEDPA is clear that the appropriate law to apply is(cid:13) Supreme Court precedent. See 28 U.S.C. S 2254(d)(1) ("an(cid:13) unreasonable application of [ ] clearly established Federal(cid:13) law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United(cid:13) States"); see also Williams, 529 U.S. at 412 ("S 2254(d)(1)(cid:13) restricts the source of clearly established law to[the(cid:13) Supreme] Court’s jurisprudence").(cid:13) It is true that "federal habeas courts are [not] precluded(cid:13) from considering the decisions of the inferior federal courts(cid:13) when evaluating whether the state court’s application of the(cid:13) law was reasonable." Matteo, 171 F.3d at 890. But this(cid:13) Court has clearly stated that decisions by lower federal(cid:13) courts may be considered only "as helpful amplifications of(cid:13) Supreme Court precedent." Id. It is revealing to us that in(cid:13) In re Grand Jury this Court characterized the"no(cid:13) substantial likelihood" test as an "additional constraint(cid:13) upon the civil contempt power" beyond that recognized in(cid:13) decisions by the United States Supreme Court. In re Grand(cid:13) Jury Investigation, 600 F.2d at 423 (emphasis added). As(cid:13) we noted in Matteo, 171 F.3d at 890, however, "federal(cid:13) courts may not grant habeas corpus relief based on the(cid:13) state court’s failure to adhere to the precedent of a lower(cid:13) federal court on an issue that the Supreme Court has not(cid:13) addressed."(cid:13) The Supreme Court has never endorsed the proposition(cid:13) that confinement for civil contempt must cease when there(cid:13) is "no substantial likelihood of compliance." On the(cid:13) contrary, in words that might as well have been written to(cid:13) describe the case now before us, the Bagwell Court stated(cid:13) that "[t]he paradigmatic coercive, civil contempt sanction(cid:13) . . . involves confining a contemnor indefinitely until he(cid:13) complies with an affirmative command such as an order ‘to(cid:13) pay alimony, or to surrender property ordered to be turned(cid:13) over to a receiver . . . .’ " Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 828(cid:13) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). We have no need here(cid:13) to decide whether In re Grand Jury Investigation remains(cid:13) good law in light of Bagwell. It is enough for present(cid:13) purposes that the "no substantial likelihood of compliance"(cid:13) standard has never been endorsed, much less clearly(cid:13) established, by the Supreme Court.(cid:13) 18(cid:13) V.(cid:13) Because the state courts have repeatedly found that Mr.(cid:13) Chadwick has the present ability to comply with the July(cid:13) 1994 state court order, we hold that it was a reasonable(cid:13) application of Supreme Court precedent for the state courts(cid:13) to conclude that there is no federal constitutional bar to(cid:13) Mr. Chadwick’s indefinite confinement for civil contempt so(cid:13) long as he retains the ability to comply with the order(cid:13) requiring him to pay over the money at issue. Accordingly,(cid:13) the District Court erred in holding that the state courts’(cid:13) decisions were an unreasonable application of Supreme(cid:13) Court precedent. We, therefore, reverse the order of the(cid:13) District Court granting Mr. Chadwick’s petition. Our(cid:13) decision does not preclude Mr. Chadwick from filing a new(cid:13) federal habeas petition if he claims that he is unable for(cid:13) some reason to comply with the state court’s order. And,(cid:13) needless to say, our decision imposes no restrictions on the(cid:13) state courts’ ability to grant relief.10 (cid:13) A True Copy:(cid:13) Teste:(cid:13) Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals(cid:13) for the Third Circuit(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 10. We do not agree with Mr. Chadwick’s argument that despite our(cid:13) reversal of the District Court’s order, the respondents in the District(cid:13) Court must still release Mr. Chadwick because they did not appeal.(cid:13) Because of our judgment, the District Court’s order granting the writ no(cid:13) longer has any operative effect and thus cannot command his release.(cid:13) 19