312 F.3d 597 | 3rd Cir. | 2002
ALITO, Circuit Judge:(cid:13) This appeal was taken from an order granting a petition(cid:13) for a writ of habeas corpus filed by Mr. H. Beatty Chadwick(cid:13) under 28 U.S.C. S 2254. The petitioner has applied eight(cid:13) times to the courts of Pennsylvania and six times to the(cid:13) federal district court for release from incarceration for civil(cid:13) 2(cid:13) contempt for refusing to comply with an order in a(cid:13) matrimonial proceeding directing him to pay over $2.5(cid:13) million into an escrow account. In the present case, the(cid:13) District Court concluded that the petitioner had exhausted(cid:13) state remedies even though he had not applied to the(cid:13) Pennsylvania Supreme Court for review of the adverse(cid:13) decision of the Superior Court. In the view of the District(cid:13) Court, it was sufficient that the petitioner subsequently(cid:13) submitted a habeas petition to the Pennsylvania Supreme(cid:13) Court in its original jurisdiction pursuant to 42 Pa. Cons.(cid:13) Stat. S 721. With respect to the merits of the present(cid:13) proceeding, the District Court accepted the state courts’(cid:13) repeated findings that the petitioner is able to comply with(cid:13) the order directing him to pay the funds into escrow, but(cid:13) the District Court nevertheless held that the length of(cid:13) petitioner’s confinement -- then almost seven years --(cid:13) meant that the contempt order had lost its coercive effect(cid:13) and that confinement for civil contempt was no longer(cid:13) constitutional. On appeal, the petitioner defends that(cid:13) decision of the District Court but does not contest the state(cid:13) courts’ findings that he is able to comply with the(cid:13) underlying order but simply refuses to do so. We reverse.(cid:13) I.(cid:13) In November 1992, Mrs. Barbara Chadwick filed for(cid:13) divorce in the Delaware County (Pennsylvania) Court of(cid:13) Common Pleas. During an equitable distribution conference(cid:13) in February 1993, Mr. Chadwick informed the state court(cid:13) and Mrs. Chadwick that he had unilaterally transferred(cid:13) $2,502,000.00 of the marital estate to satisfy an alleged(cid:13) debt to Maison Blanche, Ltd., a Gibraltar partnership.(cid:13) It was later discovered that (1) one of the principals of(cid:13) Maison Blanche had returned $869,106.00 from Gibraltar(cid:13) to an American bank account in Mr. Chadwick’s name and(cid:13) that these funds had then been used to purchase three(cid:13) insurance annuity contracts; (2) $995,726.41 had been(cid:13) transferred to a Union Bank account in Switzerland in Mr.(cid:13) Chadwick’s name; and (3) $550,000.00 in stock certificates(cid:13) that the petitioner claimed he had transferred to an(cid:13) unknown barrister in England to forward to Maison(cid:13) Blanche had never been received. The state court then(cid:13) 3(cid:13) entered a freeze order on the marital assets on April 29,(cid:13) 1994.(cid:13) In May 1994, Mr. Chadwick redeemed the annuity(cid:13) contracts and deposited the funds in a Panamanian bank.(cid:13) After a hearing on July 22, 1994, the court determined that(cid:13) Mr. Chadwick’s transfer of the money was an attempt to(cid:13) defraud Mrs. Chadwick and the court. At that time, the(cid:13) court ordered petitioner to return the $2,502,000.00 to an(cid:13) account under the jurisdiction of the court, to pay(cid:13) $75,000.00 for Mrs. Chadwick’s attorney’s fees and costs,(cid:13) to surrender his passport, and to remain within the(cid:13) jurisdiction. Mr. Chadwick refused to comply, and Mrs.(cid:13) Chadwick thereafter filed a petition to have him held in civil(cid:13) contempt. Mr. Chadwick failed to appear at any of the three(cid:13) contempt hearings, but his attorney was present. The court(cid:13) found Mr. Chadwick in contempt of the July 22, 1994,(cid:13) order and issued a bench warrant for his arrest.(cid:13) After learning of the bench warrant, Mr. Chadwick fled(cid:13) the jurisdiction but was arrested and detained on April 5,(cid:13) 1995. The state court determined that Mr. Chadwick had(cid:13) the present ability to comply with the terms of the July 22,(cid:13) 1994, order and set bail at $3,000,000. Mr. Chadwick(cid:13) could have been released from custody either by posting(cid:13) bail or by complying with the July 22, 1994, order. To date,(cid:13) he has done neither.(cid:13) Since his confinement, Mr. Chadwick has applied eight(cid:13) times to the state courts1 and six times to the federal court2(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 1. The state petitions include: (1) an emergency petition for release,(cid:13) which was denied by the Court of Common Pleas and affirmed by the(cid:13) Superior Court; (2) six state habeas petitions, all of which were denied;(cid:13) and (3) a petition for release from imprisonment or, in the alternative,(cid:13) house arrest, which was denied. See Appellant’s Br. at 8-12.(cid:13) 2. The federal petitions include: (1) an emergency motion for injunctive(cid:13) relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. S 1983, which was denied because(cid:13) abstention was appropriate under the doctrine of Younger v. Harris, 401(cid:13) U.S. 37 (1971); (2) an emergency motion pursuant to 42 U.S.C. S 1983,(cid:13) which was denied, or, in the alternative, habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C.(cid:13) S 2241, which was dismissed for failure to exhaust state remedies; (3) a(cid:13) third federal habeas petition, which was denied for failure to exhaust(cid:13) state remedies; (4) a petition for reconsideration of the dismissal of the(cid:13) 4(cid:13) to gain release from incarceration. After the trial court(cid:13) denied his sixth state habeas petition, the Superior Court(cid:13) affirmed the decision on April 23, 1997, stating:(cid:13) Instantly, appellant cites to the fact that he has been(cid:13) incarcerated since April 5, 1995. He claims the length(cid:13) of his incarceration, his age, poor health, inability to(cid:13) pursue his career and repeated hearings where he has(cid:13) refused compliance suggests that there is no possibility(cid:13) that he will comply with the order. Appellant admits(cid:13) that no court in this jurisdiction has adopted this test(cid:13) and we will not do so here. While it seems reasonable(cid:13) that at some point a temporal benchmark should be(cid:13) adopted to determine when contempt incarceration(cid:13) becomes impermissibly punitive we think that it is for(cid:13) our high court to make such a determination.(cid:13) Chadwick v. Janecka, No. 00-CV-1130, 2000 U.S. Dist.(cid:13) LEXIS 21732, at *14-15 (E.D.Pa. Dec. 11, 2000) (internal(cid:13) citation omitted). Despite the Superior Court’s invitation(cid:13) that the petitioner ask the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to(cid:13) decide the point at which incarceration for contempt(cid:13) becomes punitive, the petitioner did not file an allocatur(cid:13) petition in the state supreme court.(cid:13) Later, on July 18, 1997, petitioner filed another petition(cid:13) for federal habeas relief, which was dismissed for failure to(cid:13) exhaust state court remedies. The District Court wrote:(cid:13) Although Mr. Chadwick has forfeited his right to seek(cid:13) Supreme Court review of the Superior Court’s April 23,(cid:13) 1997 denial of his sixth state habeas petition, see(cid:13) Pa.R.App.P. 1113(a) (petition for allowance of appeal(cid:13) must be filed within 30 days of order), he would not be(cid:13) barred from filing a seventh state habeas petition(cid:13) based on his present confinement of approximately(cid:13) thirty-seven months. Under Pennsylvania law, Mr.(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) third federal habeas petition, which was also denied for failure to(cid:13) exhaust state remedies; (5) a fourth federal habeas petition, which was(cid:13) also denied for failure to exhaust state remedies; and (6) a fifth federal(cid:13) habeas petition, which is the basis of this appeal. See Appellant’s Br. at(cid:13) 12-13.(cid:13) 5(cid:13) Chadwick can file a seventh state habeas petition in(cid:13) the Court of Common Pleas and exhaust his appellate(cid:13) remedies, see 42 Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. S 931, or petition(cid:13) directly in the Supreme Court, which has original(cid:13) jurisdiction over habeas corpus proceedings. See 42(cid:13) Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. S 721(1). But unless the issues(cid:13) presented in the federal habeas petition have all been(cid:13) first presented to the Supreme Court, the district court(cid:13) may not exercise jurisdiction. See Lambert, 134 F.3d at(cid:13) 515 (requiring "complete exhaustion"); Swanger, 750(cid:13) F.2d at 295 (raising claim before Supreme Court in(cid:13) petition for allowance of appeal satisfies exhaustion(cid:13) requirement).(cid:13) Chadwick v. Andrews, No. 97-4680, 1998 WL 218026, at *5(cid:13) (E.D.Pa. April 30, 1998) (emphasis added). Because Mr.(cid:13) Chadwick had not sought review in the Pennsylvania(cid:13) Supreme Court on the issue presented in his federal(cid:13) petition, that petition was dismissed.(cid:13) In September 1999, Mr. Chadwick filed a pro se (cid:13) Application for Leave to File Original Process (his seventh(cid:13) state habeas action) with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.(cid:13) Mrs. Chadwick sought permission to intervene, and(cid:13) opposed the application and the state habeas petition. In a(cid:13) per curiam order dated February 8, 2000, the Pennsylvania(cid:13) Supreme Court granted the request to file original process(cid:13) and the request to file an answer, but the court denied the(cid:13) petition for habeas corpus.(cid:13) On March 2, 2000, Mr. Chadwick filed the instant(cid:13) petition for federal habeas relief. The District Court granted(cid:13) that petition on January 3, 2002, but stayed its order for(cid:13) 30 days to "allow appeal and application for further stay of(cid:13) this court’s order to the appellate court." Chadwick v.(cid:13) Janecka, No. 00-1130, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10, at *27(cid:13) (E.D.Pa. Jan.3, 2002). Mrs. Chadwick took this timely(cid:13) appeal. By order dated January 31, 2002, we granted Mrs.(cid:13) Chadwick’s motion for a stay pending appeal. The United(cid:13) States Supreme Court thereafter denied Mr. Chadwick’s(cid:13) Application for Enlargement and to Vacate Stay.(cid:13) II.(cid:13) The first issue we must address is whether Mrs.(cid:13) Chadwick has standing to proceed on appeal. Mr. Chadwick(cid:13) 6(cid:13) argues that because Mrs. Chadwick was an intervenor in(cid:13) the District Court, she lacks Article III standing. He further(cid:13) argues that, because the respondents -- the warden, the(cid:13) Delaware County District Attorney, and the Attorney(cid:13) General of the Commonwealth -- did not appeal, we do not(cid:13) have jurisdiction to entertain this appeal.(cid:13) The United States Supreme Court has stated that"an(cid:13) intervenor’s right to continue a suit in the absence of the(cid:13) party on whose side the intervention was permitted is(cid:13) contingent upon a showing by the intervenor that he fulfills(cid:13) the requirements of Art[icle] III." Diamond v. Charles, 476(cid:13) U.S. 54, 68 (1986). Under Article III of the United States(cid:13) Constitution, the judicial power extends only to"Cases" and(cid:13) "Controversies." As noted in Vermont Agency of Natural(cid:13) Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765,(cid:13) 771 (2000):(cid:13) a plaintiff must meet three requirements in order to(cid:13) establish Article III standing. See, e.g., Friends of Earth,(cid:13) Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc. , 528(cid:13) U.S. 167, 180-181, 120 S. Ct. 693, 145 L. Ed. 2d 610(cid:13) (2000). First, he must demonstrate "injury in fact" -- a(cid:13) harm that is both "concrete" and "actual or imminent,(cid:13) not conjectural or hypothetical." Whitmore v. Arkansas,(cid:13) 495 U.S. 149, 155, 109 L. Ed. 2d 135, 110 S. Ct. 1717(cid:13) (1990) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).(cid:13) Second, he must establish causation -- a "fairly . . .(cid:13) traceable" connection between the alleged injury in fact(cid:13) and the alleged conduct of the defendant. Simon v.(cid:13) Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26,(cid:13) 41, 48 L. Ed. 2d 450, 96 S. Ct. 1917 (1976). And third,(cid:13) he must demonstrate redressability -- a "substantial(cid:13) likelihood" that the requested relief will remedy the(cid:13) alleged injury in fact. Id.(cid:13) See also, e.g., Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans(cid:13) United For Separation of Church & State, 454 U.S. 464, 472(cid:13) (1982); In re Grand Jury, 111 F.3d 1066, 1071 (3d Cir.(cid:13) 1997).(cid:13) We have little difficulty concluding that Mrs. Chadwick(cid:13) meets all of these requirements here. First, Mrs. Chadwick(cid:13) clearly has suffered and continues to suffer an injury in(cid:13) 7(cid:13) fact that is both "concrete" and "actual," "not conjectural or(cid:13) hypothetical." Mr. Chadwick has placed a substantial sum(cid:13) of money beyond the reach of the state court before whom(cid:13) the matrimonial case is pending. If the decision of the(cid:13) District Court is affirmed, Mr. Chadwick will be released(cid:13) from jail and will be relieved of the pressure to return this(cid:13) money for equitable distribution. Second, Mrs. Chadwick’s(cid:13) injury is unquestionably traceable to Mr. Chadwick’s(cid:13) refusal to comply with the state court order under which he(cid:13) is being held. The District Court’s order would erase the(cid:13) effect of the state court order requiring the return of the(cid:13) funds and would significantly reduce Mrs. Chadwick’s(cid:13) share of the marital estate. Third, Mrs. Chadwick’s injury(cid:13) may be redressed by a favorable decision here. A reversal of(cid:13) the District Court’s order granting Mr. Chadwick’s petition(cid:13) would require him to remain in prison until he returns the(cid:13) $2.5 million to the state court for later distribution.(cid:13) In arguing that Mrs. Chadwick lacks standing, the(cid:13) petitioner relies principally on Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S.(cid:13) 54 (1986), but that case is easily distinguishable. The(cid:13) Diamond case involved a constitutional attack on an Illinois(cid:13) statute restricting abortions. Id. at 56. Diamond, a(cid:13) pediatrician, successfully moved to intervene in the District(cid:13) Court, based on his conscientious objection to abortion and(cid:13) his status as a pediatrician and the father of a minor(cid:13) daughter. Id. at 66. When the District Court permanently(cid:13) enjoined provisions of the statute and the Court of Appeals(cid:13) affirmed, the State of Illinois did not appeal to the Supreme(cid:13) Court, but Diamond did. Id. at 62-63. The Court held that(cid:13) Diamond could not maintain the appeal as the sole(cid:13) appellant because he lacked Article III standing. Id. at 64-(cid:13) 71. Noting that Illinois, by not appealing, had accepted the(cid:13) decision that its statute was unconstitutional, the Court(cid:13) observed that even if it upheld the statute, Diamond, a(cid:13) private citizen, could not compel the state to enforce it. Id.(cid:13) at 64-65. In addition, the Court explained, Diamond could(cid:13) not establish that he had or would suffer injury in fact. Id.(cid:13) at 65-71. Diamond argued that if the statute were upheld,(cid:13) there would be fewer abortions and greater demand for his(cid:13) services as a pediatrician, but the Court dismissed this(cid:13) argument as speculative. Id. at 66. The Court likewise(cid:13) rejected Diamond’s contention that he had standing(cid:13) 8(cid:13) because of his interest in the standards of medical practice(cid:13) relating to abortion. Id. at 66-67. The Court stated that(cid:13) Diamond’s abstract interest in the issue of abortion could(cid:13) not substitute for the concrete injury demanded by Article(cid:13) III. Id. In response to Diamond’s claim of standing as the(cid:13) father of a minor daughter, the Court noted that the(cid:13) validity of the parental notification provision of the statute(cid:13) was not at issue in the appeal and Diamond had not(cid:13) provided factual support to show that the provisions that(cid:13) were at issue threatened him with any concrete injury. Id.(cid:13) at 67. Finally, the Court held that Diamond could not(cid:13) assert any constitutional rights of unborn fetuses and that(cid:13) the award of fees against him in the District Court could(cid:13) not "fairly be traced to the Illinois Abortion Law." Id. at 70.(cid:13) Other than the fact that Diamond and Mrs. Chadwick are(cid:13) both intervenors, the two cases have little in common. Mrs.(cid:13) Chadwick, as noted, has a direct financial interest: she(cid:13) wants Mr. Chadwick to produce a very substantial sum of(cid:13) money in which she claims a share. By contrast, Diamond’s(cid:13) claim that upholding the Illinois law would result in more(cid:13) live births and thus increase his income as a pediatrician(cid:13) was highly speculative and an obvious makeweight.(cid:13) Diamond was a classic case of an attempt to litigate an(cid:13) abstract legal issue; the present case involves a concrete(cid:13) monetary interest.(cid:13) Mr. Chadwick argues, however, that Mrs. Chadwick has(cid:13) no concrete injury at stake because "even if she were(cid:13) somehow to secure a reversal of the district court’s order,(cid:13) the respondents would still be required to release Mr.(cid:13) Chadwick, because they did not appeal." Appellee’s Br. at(cid:13) 21. We reject this highly technical argument and find(cid:13) Martin-Trigona v. Shiff, 702 F.2d 380 (2d Cir. 1983),(cid:13) instructive on the question whether someone other than the(cid:13) legal custodian of a prisoner may appeal an adverse(cid:13) decision in a habeas proceeding. In Martin-Trigona, a(cid:13) bankruptcy judge ordered a debtor imprisoned for civil(cid:13) contempt when he refused to submit to examination by the(cid:13) trustees. Id. at 381. The debtor filed a petition for a writ of(cid:13) habeas corpus, the District Court granted the motion, and(cid:13) the trustees appealed. Id. The Second Circuit held that the(cid:13) trustees were the real parties in interest because"[t]hey(cid:13) 9(cid:13) ha[d] a legitimate interest in seeing to it that Martin-(cid:13) Trigona testifie[d] to the location of certain assets, books,(cid:13) and records that are necessary to the administration of the(cid:13) estates." Id. at 386. Because the trustees’ interests were(cid:13) sufficiently affected by the District Court’s order, the(cid:13) Second Circuit held that the trustees had standing to(cid:13) appeal even though they were not the custodian of the(cid:13) debtor. Id.; Cf. United States ex rel. Thom v. Jenkins, 760(cid:13) F.2d 736 (7th Cir. 1985) (private party who prosecuted(cid:13) contempt proceedings against judgment debtor was(cid:13) respondent and appellee on appeal of debtor’s habeas(cid:13) petition following jailing for contempt). Martin-Trigona is(cid:13) analogous to the case at bar because Mrs. Chadwick-- like(cid:13) the trustees -- is the party who has "a legitimate interest in(cid:13) seeing to it," 702 F.2d at 386, that Mr. Chadwick returns(cid:13) a substantial portion of the marital estate to the court. We(cid:13) find the decision in Martin-Trigona to be persuasive.(cid:13) The only case cited by Mr. Chadwick in support of his(cid:13) position is far afield. In Carter v. Rafferty , 826 F.2d 1299,(cid:13) 1303-04 (3d Cir. 1987), the District Court granted habeas(cid:13) petitions filed by two prisoners who had been tried and(cid:13) convicted together in state court. The habeas respondents(cid:13) appealed, but their notice of appeal "specifically limited(cid:13) itself to the order releasing [one of the prisoners]." Id. at(cid:13) 1303. Noting that what was then Rule 3(c) of the Federal(cid:13) Rules of Appellate Procedure3 required that a notice of(cid:13) appeal "designate the judgment, order, or part thereof(cid:13) appealed from," the Court held that it lacked jurisdiction to(cid:13) consider the portion of the District Court’s judgment(cid:13) relating to the other prisoner because the appellants had(cid:13) failed to specify that they were appealing that part of the(cid:13) judgment. Id. at 1304. Thus, Carter does not stand for the(cid:13) proposition that only the person with the keys to the jail(cid:13) has standing to appeal an order granting a writ of habeas(cid:13) corpus. Rather, Carter holds that only the portions of an(cid:13) order specified in a notice of appeal may be challenged in(cid:13) the appeal. We accordingly hold that Mrs. Chadwick has(cid:13) Article III standing to pursue the present appeal. We have(cid:13) considered all of Mr. Chadwick’s standing arguments, and(cid:13) we find them to be devoid of merit.(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 3. See current Fed. R. App. Proc. 3(c)(1)(B).(cid:13) 10(cid:13) III.(cid:13) Mrs. Chadwick argues that Mr. Chadwick did not(cid:13) exhaust all available state court remedies before presenting(cid:13) his claims to the federal court in his habeas petition. See(cid:13) 28 U.S.C. S 2254(b)(1). Mrs. Chadwick makes two(cid:13) exhaustion arguments. First, she argues that Mr. Chadwick(cid:13) did not fairly present to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court(cid:13) the same claims that he raised in his federal habeas(cid:13) petition. See Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275-76 (1971).(cid:13) Specifically, Mrs. Chadwick urges reversal because the(cid:13) period of confinement listed in Mr. Chadwick’s application(cid:13) for leave to file original process before the Pennsylvania(cid:13) Supreme Court -- "over 50 months" (i.e., four years and(cid:13) two months) -- and the period of confinement for which the(cid:13) District Court granted habeas -- "nearly seven years" -- are(cid:13) not the same. Second, Mrs. Chadwick argues that Mr.(cid:13) Chadwick’s application for leave to file original process did(cid:13) not fairly present the claims to the Pennsylvania Supreme(cid:13) Court where, although it has original jurisdiction in habeas(cid:13) matters,4 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court will ordinarily(cid:13) refer habeas petitions to the appropriate lower court, unless(cid:13) there exists "imperative necessity or apparent reason why(cid:13) expedition is desirable or required." See Commonwealth ex(cid:13) rel. Paylor v. Claudy, 366 Pa. 282, 287 (1951).(cid:13) Although Mrs. Chadwick would have us decide the(cid:13) question of exhaustion, we decline to do so here because,(cid:13) under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of(cid:13) 1996 ("AEDPA"), Pub. L. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (enacted(cid:13) April 24, 1996), we may deny a habeas petition on the(cid:13) merits even though state remedies may not have been(cid:13) exhausted. See 28 U.S.C. S2254(b)(2); see also(cid:13) Pennsylvania ex rel. Craig v. Maroney, 348 F.2d 22, 33 (3d(cid:13) Cir. 1965); In re Ernst, 294 F.2d 556, 561-62 (3d Cir.(cid:13) 1961).(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 4. Pennsylvania statutes state that "[t]he Supreme Court shall have(cid:13) original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all cases of . . . Habeas corpus."(cid:13) 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. S 721.(cid:13) 11(cid:13) IV.(cid:13) A.(cid:13) Turning to the merits,5 we must first address the proper(cid:13) scope of review in this case. The parties dispute whether(cid:13) the standard of review set out in 28 U.S.C. S 2254(d)(cid:13) applies here.6(cid:13) Relying on Everett v. Beard, 290 F.3d 500, 507-08 (3d(cid:13) Cir. 2002); Appel v. Horn, 250 F.3d 203, 209-12 (3d Cir.(cid:13) 2001); and Hameen v. Delaware, 212 F.3d 226, 248 (3d(cid:13) Cir. 2000), Mr. Chadwick argues that 28 U.S.C. S 2254(d) is(cid:13) inapplicable in this case because the "state supreme court,(cid:13) after accepting Mr. Chadwick’s original habeas corpus(cid:13) petition for adjudication on its merits, denied relief without(cid:13) any statement of reasons at all." Appellee’s Br. at 33.(cid:13) According to Mr. Chadwick, under these circumstances, 28(cid:13) U.S.C. S 2254(d) "simply does not apply." Appellee’s Br. at(cid:13) 33. We reject this argument, which is contrary to Supreme(cid:13) Court precedent and misinterprets our court’s prior(cid:13) decisions.(cid:13) Under 28 U.S.C. S 2254(d)(1)(emphasis added), if a state(cid:13) prisoner’s habeas claim "was adjudicated on the merits in(cid:13) State court proceedings," our standard of review is narrow:(cid:13) we may not reverse "unless the adjudication of the claim(cid:13) . . . resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 5. After our decision reversing the decision of the District Court was(cid:13) filed, Mr. Chadwick filed a petition for rehearing that substantially(cid:13) elaborated on certain points raised in his original brief, and the panel(cid:13) received an answer to the petition pursuant to our Internal Operating(cid:13) Procedure 9.5.2. Both panel rehearing and rehearing en banc have been(cid:13) denied, but the panel believes that it is appropriate to respond to certain(cid:13) points addressed in the petition for rehearing. Rather than issuing a(cid:13) separate opinion sur denial of panel rehearing, this opinion has been(cid:13) amended in order to integrate that discussion into the related discussion(cid:13) in the original opinion.(cid:13) 6. We review de novo the District Court’s legal conclusions, including its(cid:13) application of the standards of review imposed by AEDPA. See Banks v.(cid:13) Horn, 271 F.3d 527, 531 (3d Cir. 2001). If a District Court has a proper(cid:13) occasion to make findings of fact, they are reviewed for clear error. See(cid:13) Love v. Morton, 112 F.3d 131, 133 (3d Cir. 1997).(cid:13) 12(cid:13) an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal(cid:13) Law . . . ." In Hameen, we held that the petitioner had(cid:13) properly exhausted the claim that his Eighth Amendment(cid:13) rights had been violated because two of the aggravating(cid:13) circumstances found to support the death penalty were(cid:13) duplicative. 212 F.3d at 246-47. We concluded, however,(cid:13) that the Delaware Supreme Court "did not pass on[the(cid:13) petitioner’s] Eighth Amendment constitutional duplicative(cid:13) aggravating circumstances argument, even though it had(cid:13) the opportunity to do so." Id. at 248. Accordingly, the(cid:13) Hameen panel held that this claim had not been(cid:13) "adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings" and(cid:13) that the restrictive standard of review in 28 U.S.C.(cid:13) S 2254(d)(1) did not apply. 212 F.3d at 248.(cid:13) Appel followed Hameen, stating that"when, although(cid:13) properly preserved by the defendant, the state court has(cid:13) not reached the merits of a claim thereafter presented to a(cid:13) federal habeas court, the deferential standards provided by(cid:13) AEDPA . . . do not apply." 250 F.3d at 210. The Appel panel(cid:13) held that the petitioner had properly presented in the state(cid:13) courts a claim of the constructive denial of counsel but that(cid:13) the state courts had misconstrued the claim as one of the(cid:13) ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 210-12. Observing(cid:13) that "[t]he two claims, of course, are different," id. at 210,(cid:13) the panel held that the constructive denial claim had not(cid:13) been decided by the state courts and that the restrictive(cid:13) standards of S 2254(d) did not apply. Id . at 211.(cid:13) Finally, the Everett court, relying on Hameen, 290 F.3d at(cid:13) 508, held that the S 2254(d) standards did not apply(cid:13) because the state courts had not adjudicated the(cid:13) petitioner’s properly exhausted claim that his Sixth(cid:13) Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel had(cid:13) been violated but instead had decided only that his rights(cid:13) under state law had not been abridged. See id . at 516.(cid:13) Hameen, Appel, and Everett stand for the proposition(cid:13) that, if an examination of the opinions of the state courts(cid:13) shows that they misunderstood the nature of a properly(cid:13) exhausted claim and thus failed to adjudicate that claim on(cid:13) the merits, the deferential standards of review in AEDPA do(cid:13) not apply. Hameen, Appel, and Everett did not deal with(cid:13) 13(cid:13) summary dispositions -- but Weeks v. Angelone , 528 U.S.(cid:13) 225 (2000), did.(cid:13) In Weeks, the petitioner "presented 47 assignments of(cid:13) error in his direct appeal to the Virginia Supreme Court."(cid:13) 528 U.S. at 231. The state supreme court rejected number(cid:13) 44 without explanation. Reviewing this claim, the Fourth(cid:13) Circuit recognized that the AEDPA standards do not apply(cid:13) when a state court has not adjudicated a claim on the(cid:13) merits, Weeks v. Angelone, 176 F.3d 249, 258 (4th Cir.(cid:13) 1999), but the Fourth Circuit held that "[w]here, as here,(cid:13) the state supreme court has adjudicated a claim on the(cid:13) merits but has given no indication of how it reached its(cid:13) decision, a federal habeas court must still apply the AEDPA(cid:13) standards of review." Id. at 259. Applying those standards,(cid:13) the Fourth Circuit denied the application for a certificate(cid:13) and dismissed the habeas petition.(cid:13) The United States Supreme Court reviewed the claim set(cid:13) out in assignment of error 44 and affirmed. See 528 U.S. at(cid:13) 231. After explaining why there had been no constitutional(cid:13) violation, the Court wrote:(cid:13) Because petitioner seeks a federal writ of habeas(cid:13) corpus from a state sentence, we must determine(cid:13) whether 28 U.S.C. S 2254(d) precludes such relief. The(cid:13) Court of Appeals below held that it did. 176 F.3d, at(cid:13) 261. We agree. Section 2254(d) prohibits federal(cid:13) habeas relief on any claim "adjudicated on the merits(cid:13) in State court proceedings," unless that adjudication(cid:13) resulted in a decision that was "contrary to, or involved(cid:13) an unreasonable application of, clearly established(cid:13) Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of(cid:13) the United States." 28 U.S.C. SS 2254(d) and (1) (1994(cid:13) ed., Supp. III). For the reasons stated above, it follows(cid:13) a fortiori that the adjudication of the Supreme Court of(cid:13) Virginia affirming petitioner’s conviction and sentence(cid:13) neither was "contrary to," nor did it involve an(cid:13) "unreasonable application of," any of our decisions.(cid:13) 528 U.S. at 237. Thus, the Supreme Court clearly held that(cid:13) the S 2254(d) standards apply when a state supreme court(cid:13) rejects a claim without giving any "indication of how it(cid:13) reached its decision." 176 F.3d at 259.(cid:13) 14(cid:13) Needless to say, if Hameen, Appel, and Everett conflict(cid:13) with Weeks, the former must give way, but we see no such(cid:13) conflict. Hameen, Appel, and Everett govern when the(cid:13) opinion of a state court reveals that it did not adjudicate a(cid:13) claim; Weeks applies when a claim is rejected without(cid:13) explanation. In the present case, the Pennsylvania Supreme(cid:13) Court rejected Chadwick’s claim on the merits without(cid:13) explanation. Weeks is therefore the governing precedent,(cid:13) and S 2254(d) must be applied.(cid:13) B.(cid:13) Under 28 U.S.C. S 2254(d), a federal court may grant(cid:13) habeas relief only if the state court’s decision was"contrary(cid:13) to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly(cid:13) established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme(cid:13) Court of the United States," id. S 2254(d)(1), or was "based(cid:13) on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of(cid:13) the evidence presented in the State court proceeding," id.(cid:13) S 2254(d)(2).7 Moreover, a state court’s factual findings are(cid:13) "presumed to be correct," and the habeas petitioner carries(cid:13) the "burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by(cid:13) clear and convincing evidence." 28 U.S.C. S 2254(e)(1).(cid:13) In Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000),(cid:13) Justice O’Connor wrote in her controlling opinion that a(cid:13) state court ruling is "contrary to" clearly established(cid:13) Supreme Court precedent for the purposes of S 2254(d)(1)(cid:13) "if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the(cid:13) governing law set forth in [the Supreme Court’s] cases," or(cid:13) "if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially(cid:13) indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme Court](cid:13) and nevertheless arrives at a result different from[its](cid:13) precedent." A state court decision is an "unreasonable(cid:13) application"8 of Supreme Court precedent if it "identifies the(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 7. The District Court agreed with all of the factual findings of the state(cid:13) courts, stating that "[t]he record below clearly demonstrates that the(cid:13) state court findings were not erroneous. This court is convinced that Mr.(cid:13) Chadwick has the present ability to comply with the July 22, 1994(cid:13) order." Chadwick v. Janecka, No. 00-1130, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10, at(cid:13) *19 (E.D.Pa. Jan. 3, 2002). Therefore, no S 2254(d)(2) inquiry is(cid:13) necessary here.(cid:13) 8. It has been argued that a state court may unreasonably apply clearly(cid:13) established Supreme Court precedent by unreasonably refusing to(cid:13) 15(cid:13) correct governing legal rule from [the Supreme] Court’s(cid:13) cases, but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the(cid:13) particular state prisoner’s case." Williams v. Taylor, 529(cid:13) U.S. 362, 407 (2000) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (controlling(cid:13) opinion). When making the "unreasonable application"(cid:13) inquiry, the federal habeas court should ask "whether the(cid:13) state court’s application of clearly established federal law(cid:13) was objectively unreasonable." Id. at 409 (emphasis added);(cid:13) see also Matteo v. Superintendent, SCI Albion, 171 F.3d(cid:13) 877, 891 (3d Cir. 1999) (en banc) (stating the test to be(cid:13) "whether the state court decision, evaluated objectively and(cid:13) on the merits, resulted in an outcome that cannot(cid:13) reasonably be justified [under existing Supreme Court(cid:13) precedent]") (emphasis added).(cid:13) In urging this Court to affirm the District Court’s(cid:13) decision, Mr. Chadwick argues that the state courts failed(cid:13) to recognize that his confinement has ceased to be coercive(cid:13) and that, as a consequence, he cannot be held in custody(cid:13) any longer unless he is convicted and sentenced for(cid:13) criminal contempt. We disagree and hold that the state(cid:13) courts’ decision -- denying habeas relief because Mr.(cid:13) Chadwick has the present ability to comply with the court(cid:13) order -- was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable(cid:13) application of "clearly established Federal Law, as(cid:13) determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." 28(cid:13) U.S.C. S 2254(d)(1).(cid:13) 1.(cid:13) To determine whether a contempt order is civil or(cid:13) criminal, Supreme Court jurisprudence requires an(cid:13) examination of the "character and purpose" of the sanction(cid:13) imposed. See International Union v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821,(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) extend a legal principle to a new context. Ramdass v. Angelone, 530 U.S.(cid:13) 156, 165 (2000); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 408 (2000); Marshall(cid:13) v. Hendricks, 307 F.3d 36, 51 n.2 (3d Cir. 2002). For present purposes,(cid:13) we assume the validity of this subset of the concept of unreasonable(cid:13) application. In discussing the concept of unreasonable applications in(cid:13) this opinion, we intend our remarks to refer to all types of unreasonable(cid:13) application, including the unreasonable failure to extend.(cid:13) 16(cid:13) 827 (1994); Gompers v. Buck’s Stove & Range Co. , 221 U.S.(cid:13) 418, 441 (1911). Civil confinement "is remedial, and for the(cid:13) benefit of the complainant," Gompers, 221 U.S. at 441,(cid:13) whereas criminal confinement "is punitive, to vindicate the(cid:13) authority of the court." Id. The Bagwell Court identified the(cid:13) "paradigmatic coercive, civil contempt sanction" as(cid:13) involv[ing] [the] confin[ement][of] a contemnor(cid:13) indefinitely until he complies with an affirmative(cid:13) command such as an order "to pay alimony, or to(cid:13) surrender property ordered to be turned over to a(cid:13) receiver, or to make a conveyance." 221 U.S. at 442(cid:13) . . . . In these circumstances, the contemnor is able to(cid:13) purge the contempt and obtain his release by(cid:13) committing an affirmative act, and thus " ‘carries the(cid:13) keys of his prison in his own pocket.’ " Gompers, 221(cid:13) U.S. at 442.(cid:13) 512 U.S. at 828 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).(cid:13) Conversely, the Bagwell Court observed,"a fixed sentence(cid:13) of imprisonment is punitive and criminal if it is imposed(cid:13) retrospectively for a ‘completed act of disobedience,’ such(cid:13) that the contemnor cannot avoid or abbreviate the(cid:13) confinement through later compliance." Id. at 828-29(cid:13) (citations omitted). Thus, Bagwell seems to permit a(cid:13) contemnor who has the ability to comply with the(cid:13) underlying court order to be confined until he or she(cid:13) complies, and if this reading is correct, Bagwell directly(cid:13) contradicts the decision of the District Court in the present(cid:13) case.(cid:13) Mr. Chadwick, however, urges us not to take Bagwell at(cid:13) face value. He contends that the phrase "indefinitely until(cid:13) he complies" in Bagwell does not mean"permanently and(cid:13) without other recourse." Pet. for Rehearing at 4. Instead, he(cid:13) maintains that "[t]he word ‘indefinitely’ is apparently used(cid:13) in its most precise sense, to mean ‘with no pre-determined(cid:13) ending date’ . . . ." Pet. for Rehearing at 4 n.4. We have no(cid:13) quarrel with this definition, but this understanding of the(cid:13) term "indefinitely" does not explain away the critical(cid:13) statement in Bagwell that a civil contemnor may be(cid:13) confined "indefinitely until he complies." 512 U.S. at 828(cid:13) (emphasis added).(cid:13) 17(cid:13) The meaning of the statement in Bagwell that a(cid:13) contemnor may be held "indefinitely until he complies" is(cid:13) perfectly clear. The phrase "until he complies" sets the(cid:13) point in time when confinement must cease. The term(cid:13) "indefinitely" describes the length of confinement up to that(cid:13) point, namely, a period "having no exact limits," WEBSTER’S(cid:13) THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1147 (1971), because the(cid:13) end point (the time of compliance) cannot be foretold. Mr.(cid:13) Chadwick’s contrary interpretation -- that "indefinitely(cid:13) until he complies" means "indefinitely until he complies or(cid:13) it becomes apparent that he is never going to comply" -- is(cid:13) insupportable. And even if that were a reasonable(cid:13) interpretation, the petition would still lack merit because in(cid:13) order to win it is not enough for Mr. Chadwick to show that(cid:13) his reading is reasonable; he must show that his reading is(cid:13) "clearly established" in Supreme Court precedent. 28 U.S.C.(cid:13) S 2254(d)(1).(cid:13) In an effort to show that his position is "clearly(cid:13) established" in Supreme Court case law, Mr. Chadwick(cid:13) turns to Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56 (1948), which he(cid:13) interprets to mean that a civil contemnor who is able to(cid:13) comply with the underlying court order but simply will not(cid:13) do so must eventually be released. In making this(cid:13) argument, Mr. Chadwick relies almost entirely on two(cid:13) sentences in the Maggio opinion, but when that opinion is(cid:13) read in its entirety and with the context of the case in(cid:13) mind, it is apparent that the opinion does not support Mr.(cid:13) Chadwick’s position. As we will explain, Maggio focuses on(cid:13) the question of ability to comply, not willingness to comply(cid:13) -- and Mr. Chadwick’s ability to comply has not been(cid:13) challenged in the present proceeding and is not at issue.(cid:13) Maggio is a procedurally complicated case, 9 but for(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 9. Maggio was the principal of a bankrupt camera shop. 333 U.S. at 58.(cid:13) The bankruptcy trustee asked the referee to order Maggio to turn over(cid:13) cameras and camera equipment that he had allegedly taken from the(cid:13) business. Id.; In re Luna Camera Services, 157 F.2d 951, 953 (2d Cir.(cid:13) 1946). To obtain such an order, the trustee was supposed to prove by(cid:13) clear and convincing evidence that Maggio had wrongfully taken the(cid:13) property and still possessed it. In re Luna Camera Services, 157 F.2d at(cid:13) 953. However, under Second Circuit precedent, once a wrongful taking(cid:13) 18(cid:13) present purposes, it is enough to note that Maggio was the(cid:13) principal of a bankrupt company; that he was jailed for civil(cid:13) contempt for failing to comply with a "turnover order"(cid:13) directing him to return property that he had wrongfully(cid:13) taken from the debtor; and that the Second Circuit affirmed(cid:13) the order of contempt -- even though there was no evidence(cid:13) in the record that Maggio still possessed the property and(cid:13) was thus able to return it and even though the Second(cid:13) Circuit panel expressed the view that Maggio clearly did not(cid:13) have the property and could not comply. Central to the(cid:13) Second Circuit’s holding was its interpretation of certain(cid:13) statements in Oriel v. Russell, 278 U.S. 358 (1929), to mean(cid:13) that Maggio’s continued possession of the property had to(cid:13) be viewed as established as a matter of law irrespective of(cid:13) whether he actually still had the property. See 333 U.S. at(cid:13) 71.(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) was shown, continued possession at the time when the turnover order(cid:13) was sought was presumed unless the subject of the requested order(cid:13) proved the contrary. Id. In Maggio’s case, the trustee offered no evidence(cid:13) of Maggio’s continued possession, but the referee found that Maggio still(cid:13) possessed the property based solely on the presumption. The trustee(cid:13) thus ordered Maggio to turn over the property, and both the District(cid:13) Court and the Second Circuit affirmed. See 333 U.S. at 59. When Maggio(cid:13) failed to comply with this order, the referee found him in contempt, and(cid:13) the District Court affirmed and ordered him jailed until he complied. Id.(cid:13) On appeal, the Second Circuit panel disagreed with Second Circuit(cid:13) precedent under which continued possession was presumed unless(cid:13) disproved. See 157 F.2d at 953. The panel expressed the view that the(cid:13) presumption was contrary to common sense in some instances and that(cid:13) Maggio no longer possessed the cameras and equipment. Id. at 953.(cid:13) The panel, however, felt bound by circuit precedent to accept the(cid:13) presumption. The panel noted that the finding in the litigation regarding(cid:13) the turnover order that Maggio still possessed the property at the time(cid:13) of that order (in 1943) was res judicata. 157 F.2d at 954. Furthermore,(cid:13) the panel interpreted the Supreme Court’s decision in Oriel v. Russell,(cid:13) 278 U.S. 358 (1929), to mean that it was also necessary to accept the(cid:13) fact that Maggio still possessed the property at the time of the order of(cid:13) contempt (in 1945). See 157 F.2d at 954. The panel thus affirmed the(cid:13) order of contempt, but it explicitly invited the Supreme Court to grant(cid:13) certiorari and wipe out the objectionable circuit precedent regarding the(cid:13) presumption of continued possession. See id. at 955. The Supreme(cid:13) Court obliged.(cid:13) 19(cid:13) The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit and(cid:13) remanded the case to the District Court for the purpose of(cid:13) receiving evidence and making a finding on the question(cid:13) whether Maggio was able to comply with the turnover order.(cid:13) The entire focus of the opinion was on the issue of ability(cid:13) to comply. In part I of its opinion, the Court held that a(cid:13) turnover order should not be issued unless the person in(cid:13) question has the present ability to comply. 333 U.S. at 61-(cid:13) 64.10 In part II, the Court discussed the ways in which a(cid:13) bankruptcy trustee may prove continued possession and(cid:13) present ability to comply. Id. at 64-67. The Court agreed(cid:13) that present possession may sometimes be inferred from(cid:13) past possession, but the Court counseled that close(cid:13) attention should be paid to the particular circumstances of(cid:13) the case. Id.(cid:13) After discussing other aspects of civil contempt law in(cid:13) part III of its opinion,11 the Court explained in part IV that(cid:13) a bankrupt may not be jailed for refusal to perform"an(cid:13) impossibility." 333 U.S. at 69. The Court disagreed with the(cid:13) Second Circuit that Oriel compelled the courts to proceed(cid:13) on the assumption that Maggio continued to possess the(cid:13) property at the time of the order of contempt. The Maggio(cid:13) Court noted that Oriel had quoted the following statement(cid:13) from a lower court opinion:(cid:13) " ‘Where [confinement for civil contempt] has failed [to(cid:13) produce compliance], and where a reasonable interval(cid:13) of time has supplied the previous defect in the(cid:13) evidence, and has made sufficiently certain what was(cid:13) doubtful before, namely, the bankrupt’s inability to(cid:13) obey the order, he has always been released, and I(cid:13) need hardly say that he would always have the right to(cid:13) be released, as soon as the fact becomes clear that he(cid:13) can not obey.’ "(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 10. Court stated: "The nature and derivation of the remedy make clear(cid:13) that it is appropriate only when the evidence satisfactorily establishes(cid:13) the existence of the property or its proceeds, and possession thereof by(cid:13) the defendant at the time of the proceeding." 333 U.S. at 63-64.(cid:13) 11. The Court reaffirmed that a person held in civil contempt cannot(cid:13) attack the validity of the underlying order with which the person has not(cid:13) complied. 333 U.S. at 67-69.(cid:13) 20(cid:13) 333 U.S. at 72 (emphasis added) (quoting Oriel , 278 U.S. at(cid:13) 366 (quoting In re Epstein, 206 F. 568, 570 (E.D. Pa.(cid:13) 1913)). The Court continued that "the authorities relied(cid:13) upon" in Oriel made it clear that the"decision did not(cid:13) contemplate that a coercive contempt order should issue(cid:13) when it appears that there is at that time no willful(cid:13) disobedience but only an incapacity to comply ." Id. at 72-73.12(cid:13) Addressing Maggio’s situation, the Court concluded that(cid:13) Maggio’s possession of the property at the time of the(cid:13) turnover order created a prima facie case of his ability to(cid:13) comply at the time of the civil contempt, and the Court(cid:13) stated that he could "successfully meet" this prima facie(cid:13) case "only with a showing of present inability to comply."(cid:13) Id. at 75. The Court continued:(cid:13) Of course, if he offers no evidence as to his inability to(cid:13) comply with the turnover order, or stands mute, he(cid:13) does not meet the issue. Nor does he do so by evidence(cid:13) or by his own denials which the court finds incredible(cid:13) in context.(cid:13) Id. at 76-77. Then, in the passage on which Mr. Chadwick(cid:13) relies, the Court added:(cid:13) [T]he bankrupt may be permitted to deny his present(cid:13) possession and to give any evidence of present(cid:13) conditions or intervening events which corroborate(cid:13) him. The credibility of his denial is to be weighed in the(cid:13) light of his present circumstances. It is everywhere(cid:13) admitted that even if he is committed, he will not be(cid:13) held in jail forever if he does not comply. His denial of(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 12. In two lengthy footnotes, the Maggio Court surveyed the relevant(cid:13) lower court authorities. Id. at 73-74 nn. 6 & 7. In footnote six, the Court(cid:13) examined cases involving turnover orders in bankruptcy and stated that(cid:13) "[t]he cumulative effect of these authorities seems clearly to be that,(cid:13) while a bankrupt’s denial of present possession, standing alone, may not(cid:13) be sufficient to establish his inability to produce the property or its(cid:13) proceeds, if the court is satisfied, from all the evidence properly before(cid:13) it, that the bankrupt has not the present ability to comply, the(cid:13) commitment order should not issue." 333 U.S. at 73 n. 6 (emphasis(cid:13) added). In footnote seven, the Court considered"cases involving(cid:13) contempt orders for failure to pay alimony" and found that these also(cid:13) turned on the same ability-to-comply principle. Id. at 74 n. 7.(cid:13) 21(cid:13) possession is given credit after demonstration that a(cid:13) period in prison does not produce the goods. The fact(cid:13) that he has been under the shadow of prison gates(cid:13) may be enough, coupled with his denial and the type(cid:13) of evidence mentioned above, to convince the court(cid:13) that his is not a wilful disobedience which will yield to(cid:13) coercion.(cid:13) The trial court is obliged to weigh not merely the two(cid:13) facts, that a turnover order has issued and that it has(cid:13) not been obeyed, but all the evidence properly before it(cid:13) in the contempt proceeding in determining whether or(cid:13) not there is actually a present ability to comply and(cid:13) whether failure so to do constitutes deliberate defiance(cid:13) which a jail term will break.(cid:13) 333 U.S. at 76 (emphasis added).(cid:13) Mr. Chadwick’s reading of Maggio is based principally on(cid:13) the two highlighted sentences in the block quote above. See(cid:13) Pet. for Rehearing at 5. Mr. Chadwick interprets these(cid:13) sentences to mean that "[t]he law eventually ceases trying(cid:13) in the civil context to distinguish inability to comply with(cid:13) adamant refusal." Pet. for Rehearing at 5. This reading,(cid:13) however, takes these two sentences out of context. When(cid:13) the statements are read in context, it is apparent that they(cid:13) refer to the inference of an inability to pay that arises after(cid:13) long confinement.(cid:13) This interpretation is strongly supported by the Maggio(cid:13) Court’s discussion of Oriel, to which we have previously(cid:13) referred. The first of the two sentences in Maggio on which(cid:13) Mr. Chadwick relies begins with the words "It is every(cid:13) where admitted . . . ." The sentence is thus restating settled(cid:13) law, not forging new ground, and the settled law is that(cid:13) recounted in Oriel, i.e., that a contempt order should not be(cid:13) issued unless there is a present inability to comply. See(cid:13) 333 U.S. at 72-74 and nn. 6, 7.(cid:13) That the sentences in Maggio on which Mr. Chadwick(cid:13) relies refer to the inability to comply is also strongly(cid:13) supported by other parts of the opinion to which we have(cid:13) already referred. One example is the Court’s statement that(cid:13) a person in Maggio’s position could meet the prima facie(cid:13) case of continued possession "only" by showing a present(cid:13) 22(cid:13) inability to comply. 333 U.S. at 75. Another example is(cid:13) supplied by the very next sentence after those on which the(cid:13) petition relies. That sentence states that long confinement(cid:13) ("the shadow of prison gates"), together with a denial of(cid:13) possession and corroborating evidence "may be enough" to(cid:13) convince a court that the contemnor is not being"willfully(cid:13) disobedient" but simply cannot comply. Id. at 76 (emphasis(cid:13) added).(cid:13) When the two sentences from Maggio on which Mr.(cid:13) Chadwick relies are read in context, it is apparent that they(cid:13) refer to the inference that may be drawn under most(cid:13) circumstances when a contemnor, despite long(cid:13) confinement, fails to comply with an order such as a(cid:13) bankruptcy turnover order.13 After all, the vast majority of(cid:13) people would not remain in jail "forever" rather than obey(cid:13) a court order requiring that the property of a bankrupt(cid:13) estate be turned over. Thus, in most cases, after a certain(cid:13) period, the inference that the contemnor is unable to(cid:13) comply becomes overwhelming. The present case, however,(cid:13) is not the ordinary case. On the contrary, it concerns an(cid:13) individual whom we must assume is fully capable of(cid:13) complying with the state court order but simply will not do(cid:13) so. Neither Maggio nor any other Supreme Court case(cid:13) clearly establishes that such a person must be released.(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 13. We note that the Third Circuit opinion on which Mr. Chadwick relies(cid:13) most heavily -- In re Grand Jury Investigation (Appeal of Braun), 600(cid:13) F.2d 420 (3d Cir. 1979)("Braun") -- interpreted Maggio in this way. In(cid:13) Braun, a panel of our court accepted the very proposition of law(cid:13) advanced by Mr. Chadwick and accepted by the District Court -- that a(cid:13) civil contemnor who is simply unwilling to comply with the court order(cid:13) must be released after the passage of a certain period of time -- but the(cid:13) panel did not suggest that Maggio required or even supported this(cid:13) holding. Instead, the Braun court wrote:(cid:13) Since it is impossible to succeed in coercing that which is beyond a(cid:13) person’s power to perform, continued incarceration for civil(cid:13) contempt "depends upon the ability of the contemnor to comply with(cid:13) the court’s order. Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56, 76, 68 S.Ct. 401,(cid:13) 411, 92 L.Ed. 476 (1948)."(cid:13) 600 F.2d at 423 (quoting Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 371(cid:13) (1966)). This understanding of Maggio, which contrasts sharply with Mr.(cid:13) Chadwick’s, is correct.(cid:13) 23(cid:13) 2.(cid:13) In this case, the District Court properly proceeded on the(cid:13) assumption that Mr. Chadwick has the present ability to(cid:13) comply with the July 1994 state court order. The state(cid:13) courts have repeatedly so found. Under 28 U.S.C.(cid:13) S 2254(e)(1), the District Court was bound by these state(cid:13) court factual determinations, absent rebuttal of the(cid:13) presumption of correctness by clear and convincing(cid:13) evidence. The District Court acknowledged that the record(cid:13) demonstrates that the state court findings were not(cid:13) erroneous, and the District Court stated that it was(cid:13) "convinced that [Mr.] Chadwick has the present ability to(cid:13) comply with the July 22, 1994 order." Chadwick v.(cid:13) Janecka, No. 00-1130, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10, at *19(cid:13) (E.D.Pa. Jan. 3, 2002).(cid:13) Presuming these state court factual findings to be(cid:13) correct, the District Court nevertheless concluded that Mr.(cid:13) Chadwick’s confinement had become punitive and that(cid:13) therefore the state court decision was an unreasonable(cid:13) application of federal law. Although the District Court(cid:13) alluded to the Supreme Court’s decisions in Bagwell and(cid:13) Gompers, the District Court relied chiefly on this Court’s(cid:13) decision in In re Grand Jury Investigation (Appeal of Braun),(cid:13) 600 F.2d 420 (3d Cir. 1979)("Braun"), in concluding that(cid:13) the passage of time may alter the nature of a contemnor’s(cid:13) confinement, transforming it from coercive to punitive and(cid:13) requiring observance of the procedural rights associated(cid:13) with criminal contempt. With this principle in mind, the(cid:13) District Court concluded that because Mr. Chadwick had(cid:13) defied the court’s order for so long, there was"no(cid:13) substantial likelihood" that he would comply in the future(cid:13) and that therefore the order had lost its coercive effect.(cid:13) In Braun, we upheld a contemnor’s confinement for(cid:13) refusing to testify before a federal grand jury. Id. at 428.(cid:13) The contemnor argued that his confinement was not(cid:13) coercive but punitive, because "there was no substantial(cid:13) likelihood that he would testify before the grand jury." Id. at(cid:13) 422. Recognizing that some courts had applied the"no(cid:13) substantial likelihood of compliance" standard, we noted(cid:13) that the contemnor had been confined under a federal(cid:13) statute that limited confinement to 18 months for refusing(cid:13) 24(cid:13) to testify before a grand jury. Id. at 423-24. We held that,(cid:13) absent unusual circumstances, 18 months was not an(cid:13) unreasonable length for confinement in this context, and(cid:13) declined to inquire whether, in fact, there was no(cid:13) substantial likelihood that the contemnor would comply(cid:13) with the order to testify. Id. at 427.(cid:13) Under 28 U.S.C. S 2254(d), the District Court’s holding --(cid:13) that Mr. Chadwick can no longer be held in custody for civil(cid:13) contempt because there is "no substantial likelihood" that(cid:13) he will comply with the order -- is erroneous. The District(cid:13) Court incorrectly relied on dicta in one of our opinions, but(cid:13) AEDPA is clear that the appropriate law to apply is(cid:13) Supreme Court precedent. See 28 U.S.C. S 2254(d)(1)(cid:13) (referring to "clearly established Federal law, as determined(cid:13) by the Supreme Court of the United States"); see also(cid:13) Williams, 529 U.S. at 412 ("S 2254(d)(1) restricts the source(cid:13) of clearly established law to [the Supreme] Court’s(cid:13) jurisprudence").(cid:13) It is true that "federal habeas courts are [not] precluded(cid:13) from considering the decisions of the inferior federal courts(cid:13) when evaluating whether the state court’s application of the(cid:13) law was reasonable." Matteo, 171 F.3d at 890. But this(cid:13) Court has clearly stated that decisions by lower federal(cid:13) courts may be considered only "as helpful amplifications of(cid:13) Supreme Court precedent." Id. It is revealing to us that in(cid:13) Braun this Court characterized the "no substantial(cid:13) likelihood" test as an "additional constraint upon the civil(cid:13) contempt power" beyond that recognized in decisions by the(cid:13) United States Supreme Court. Braun, 600 F.2d at 423(cid:13) (emphasis added). As we noted in Matteo, 171 F.3d at 890,(cid:13) however, "federal courts may not grant habeas corpus relief(cid:13) based on the state court’s failure to adhere to the precedent(cid:13) of a lower federal court on an issue that the Supreme Court(cid:13) has not addressed."(cid:13) The Supreme Court has never endorsed the proposition(cid:13) that confinement for civil contempt must cease when there(cid:13) is "no substantial likelihood of compliance." On the(cid:13) contrary, in words that might as well have been written to(cid:13) describe the case now before us, the Bagwell Court stated(cid:13) that "[t]he paradigmatic coercive, civil contempt sanction(cid:13) . . . involves confining a contemnor indefinitely until he(cid:13) 25(cid:13) complies with an affirmative command such as an order ‘to(cid:13) pay alimony, or to surrender property ordered to be turned(cid:13) over to a receiver . . . .’ " Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 828(cid:13) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). We have no need here(cid:13) to decide whether In re Grand Jury Investigation remains(cid:13) good law in light of Bagwell. It is enough for present(cid:13) purposes that the state court decisions cannot be disturbed(cid:13) under the restricted standard of review applicable in this(cid:13) habeas case.(cid:13) V.(cid:13) Because the state courts have repeatedly found that Mr.(cid:13) Chadwick has the present ability to comply with the July(cid:13) 1994 state court order, we cannot disturb the state courts’(cid:13) decision that there is no federal constitutional bar to Mr.(cid:13) Chadwick’s indefinite confinement for civil contempt so long(cid:13) as he retains the ability to comply with the order requiring(cid:13) him to pay over the money at issue. Accordingly, the(cid:13) District Court erred in holding that the state courts’(cid:13) decisions were an unreasonable application of Supreme(cid:13) Court precedent. We, therefore, reverse the order of the(cid:13) District Court granting Mr. Chadwick’s petition.(cid:13) Our decision does not preclude Mr. Chadwick from filing(cid:13) a new federal habeas petition if he claims that he is unable(cid:13) for some reason to comply with the state court’s order. And,(cid:13) needless to say, our decision imposes no restrictions on the(cid:13) state courts’ ability to grant relief.14 (cid:13) A True Copy:(cid:13) Teste:(cid:13) Clerk of the UnitedStates Court of Appeals(cid:13) for the Third Circuit(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 14. We do not agree with Mr. Chadwick’s argument that despite our(cid:13) reversal of the District Court’s order, the respondents in the District(cid:13) Court must still release Mr. Chadwick because they did not appeal.(cid:13) Because of our judgment, the District Court’s order granting the writ no(cid:13) longer has any operative effect and thus cannot command his release.(cid:13) 26
