MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Agudas Chasidei Chabad of the United States (“Chabad”) has moved for civil contempt sanctions against defendants the Russian Federation (“Russia”), the Russian Ministry of Culture and Mass Communication (the “Ministry”), the Russian State Library (“RSL”), and the Russian State Military Archive (“RSMA”) based on their failure to comply with this Court’s July 30, 2010 Order, ECF No. 80. See Pl.’s Mot., Apr. 4, 2011, ECF No. 92. After considering plaintiffs motion, the United States’ ' Statement of Interest (“U.S. Statement”), ECF No. Ill, plaintiffs response, ECF No. .112, applicable
I. BACKGROUND
Chabad brought this action in 2004 seeking return of religious books, artifacts and other materials concerning the cultural heritage of its forebearers, which fell into defendants’ hands in the early 20th century. See Agudas Chasidel Chabad of U.S. v. Russian Fed’n (Chabad III,)
Defendants failed to comply. Nearly a year after the order was issued Chabad moved for civil contempt sanctions, seeking “the entry of a monetary penalty for every day that the defendants continue to disobey this Court’s Order.” Pl.’s Mot. 3, Apr. 4, 2011, ECF No 92. The Court noted that it possessed the authority to issue the requested sanctions in the FSIA context. See Chabad III,
Chabad subsequently twice requested temporary stays of its motion in order “to facilitate [its] attempts to commence negotiations with the Russian Government, and to encourage the Russian Government to rethink its position of refusing to comply with the Court's judgment.” Pl.’s Request, Oct. 19, 2011, ECF No. 104; see also Pl.’s Second Request, Dec. 16, 2011, ECF No. 105. But despite “multiple meetings at the Russian Embassy in Washington, D.C.,” the parties were un
Noting “the serious impact such an order could have on the foreign policy interests of the United States,” the Court solicited the views of the United States, See Order Soliciting the Views of the United States, May 23, 2012, ECF No. 107, who submitted a statement urging the Court not to enter sanctions. U.S. Statement, ECF No. 111. Chabad responded, Pl.’s Response, Sept. 28, 2012, ECF No. 112, and a hearing was conducted before the undersigned judge on January 9, 2013.
II. ANALYSIS
The United States objects to the requested sanctions on both legal and pragmatic grounds. First, the United States argues that civil contempt sanctions are unavailable to enforce judgments issued against foreign states under the FSIA. U.S. Statement 4-10. Second, the United States argues sanctions would damage the United States’ foreign policy interests, including its diplomatic efforts to reach a settlement with defendants on Chabad’s behalf. U.S. Statement 10-13. As discussed below, the Court rejects both arguments and will issue civil contempt sanctions against defendants.
A. The Court Has Authority to Issue Sanctions
As this Court noted in Chabad III, “[Qederal courts enjoy inherent contempt power....”
The Court already concluded that defendants’ non-compliance with this Court’s July 30, 2010 Order has been “demonstrated ... ‘to a reasonable certainty,’ as required to warrant the entry of civil contempt sanctions.” Id. (quoting Bilzerian,
While the United States concedes that “Russia has not complied with the Court’s order,” it now insists that the FSIA “does not authorize the Court to-award relief’ in the form of contempt sanctions for this non-compliance — -notwithstanding this Court’s earlier statement to the contrary. U.S. Statement 3-4; cf. Chabad III,
As this Court noted in Chabad III, the authority of district courts to issue civil contempt sanctions against foreign states under the FSIA was recently confirmed by the D.C. Circuit. Id. In FG Hemisphere, the circuit affirmed a district court’s order
The United States now attempts to distinguish FG Hemisphere, which involved a foreign state’s non-compliance with a discovery order, from the present case, which involves a foreign state’s non-compliance with a final order compelling defendants to return the collection of expropriated materials to Chabad’s representatives. U.S. Statement 9-10. The distinction based on the subject of the underlying order matters, the United States insists, because of the FSIA’s distinct treatment of “jurisdictional immunity, on the one hand, and execution immunity, on the other.” Id. at 4-5 (quoting Walters v. Indus. & Comm’l Bank of China,
This argument fails because it mistakenly conflates the entering of a sanction with its enforcement. “The government’s position is quite confusing, conflating a contempt order imposing monetary sanctions with an order enforcing such an award through execution.” FG Hemisphere,
Accordingly, the Court reaffirms its pri- or holding that it possesses authority to issue contempt sanctions in this context. See Chabad III,
B. Sanctions Are Appropriate
The Court next returns to the general principles, outlined above, governing the issuance of civil contempt sanctions in order to determine whether such sanctions are appropriate in the present case.
As to the requirement that “the putative contemnor [must have] violated an order that is clear and unambiguous,” see Broderick,
As to whether sanctions would be likely to “coerce compliance” with this Court’s 2010 order, see Bilzerian,
The United States protests that any such award would not only fail to “achiev[e] its intended purpose,” but would also “damage” its efforts towards “promoting resolution of the dispute between Chabad and Russia over the Collection.” U.S. Statement 10. Noting that “the United States has engaged in high-level diplomatic efforts with Russia to secure the transfer of the Collection,” and insisting that it is “committed to continuing these efforts which ... require perseverance and consistency,” the United States complains that sanctions would be “counter-productive.” U.S. Statement 13.
The Court is not convinced. “Although [courts] often give consideration to the government’s assertion that a legal action involves sensitive diplomatic considerations, [courts] only defer to these views if reasonably and specifically explained.” FG Hemisphere,
The United States’ claim that sanctions would “risk damage to significant foreign policy interests” is similarly unconvincing. It states that an order “that purports to dispose of tangible property held by anoth
The United States also alludes to its interest in reversing Russia’s moratorium on “all loans of Russian cultural treasures to exhibitors in the United States” which, it states, was begun “in response to what Russia perceived to be threats from Chabad to seek attachment of the loaned items.” U.S. Statement 13 n. 9. But, as the Court explained previously, the fears purportedly ’motivating Russia’s moratorium were legally unfounded, as such items would be immune under federal law from attachment. Chabad III,
Accordingly, the Court concludes that contempt sanctions are appropriate.
C. Amount
It remains to be decided what size award would be best calibrated to “coerce compliance” with the 2010 Order. See Bilzerian,
Guided by these precedents, the Court will issue civil contempt sanctions in the
III. CONCLUSION
Chabad’s motion for civil contempt sanctions will be GRANTED, and the Court will issue an Order with this Opinion, entering contempt sanctions against all defendants in the amount of $50,000 per day until defendant complies with the July 30, 2010 Order.
Notes
. As the history of this case is set out elsewhere in detail, this opinion provides only a brief summary of the relevant background. See Agudas Chasidei Chabad of U.S. v. Russian Fed’n (Chabad I,)
. As the Court rejects defendants’ attempt to distinguish FG Hemisphere because it is based on an erroneous conflation of issuing a sanction and enforcing it, it need not consider Chabad’s further arguments on this point. See, e.g., Pl.’s Response 7 (”[I]t would be curious indeed if the [FSIA] were held to authorize courts to threaten monetary civil contempt sanctions for refusal to comply with their discovery orders but disabled courts from enforcing their final judgments with similar sanctions.”).
. The CIA World Factbook lists Russia as having the seventh largest gross domestic product in the world, calculated at purchasing power parity, after only the European Union, the United States, China, Japan, India and Germany. See Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, Country Comparison: GDP (Purchasing Power Parity,) https://www. cia.gov/library/pubhcations/theworldfactbook/rankorder/200 lrank.html? countryName=Russia&countryCode=rs& regionCode=cas&rank=7#rs (last visited Jan. 10, 2013).
. Ranked number 116, according to the Fact-book. Id.
