This сause comes directly to this Court pursuant to Ind.R.App.P. 4(A)(8) since the trial court found a state statute unconstitutional. Plaintiffs-Appellees Judith and Charles Warnick initiated this action against Defendants-Appellants Jin Cha, Indiana Department of Insurance and Indiana Commissioner of Insurance Donald H. Miller, on January 20, 1983, by filing a *110 complaint for declaratory judgment in the Lаke Circuit Court. Their complaint alleged that the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act, Ind.Code §§ 16-9.5-1-1 — 16-9.5-10-5 (Burns 1983), was unconstitutional because “it usurps the judicial function, violates the right to trial by jury, violates the due process clause, violates the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause, violates plaintiffs' right to access to the Court and is a taking of property without due process of law.” Plaintiffs’ action was tried before the Honorable J. Phillip McGraw, Judge of the Jasper Superior Court, on September 30, 1983. On November 2, 1983, Judge McGraw filed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and entered his judgment holding the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act unconstitutional.
Plaintiffs previously had filed a medical malpracticе action against Defendant Cha in the Lake Circuit Court on March 26, 1982. That action, based on the very same facts involved in the present case, eventually resulted in a default judgment against Defendant Cha which was appealed. An
opinion was issued by the Third District Court of Appeals on November 16, 1983, which vacated the default judgment and remanded the casе to the trial court for further proceedings.
Cha v. Wamick,
(1983) Ind.App.,
The trial court heard evidence submitted by Plaintiffs in this second case in the form of statistics suggesting the history of the 2,349 causes filed with the Department of Insurance under the Medical Malpractice Act up until May 13, 1983. This evidence can best be summarized by the following table:
Department of Insurance case classification
Number filed
of total
Average number of months pending (30 day month)
Fund payment completed
54 *
2.32
27.96
Panel opinion rendered
418
18.33
23.83
Closed
146 **
5.96
25.09
Closed — no panel decision
526
20.56
16.83
Progressing to panel
518
22.71
22.24
Pending — no panel selected
599
26.26
14.28
Problems
88
3.86
26.24
2349
100.0
Plaintiffs’ counsel also introduced two expert witnesses who were lawyers having experience with medical malpractice cases. Attorney Richard Tebik testified that he stopped handling medical malpractice cases after the Malpractice Act became effective. He thereafter referred malpractice cases to specialists because of the considerable delays created by the Act in the process by which medical malpractice cases are resolved. Attorney Timothy Schafer testified that he had been practicing law for approximately six and one-half years and was, at that time, involved in apрroximately twelve medical malpractice cases of which five already had been filed. Of those five cases, he had requested a panel review in two. He filed with the Department of Insurance
*111
for the first review m March, 1981, and the panel opinion was rendered in May, 1983. A pretrial conference was scheduled for September 21, 1983. The othеr case was filed in April, 1978, and thereafter became part of the consolidated case decided by this Court in
Johnson v. St. Vincent Hospital, Inc.,
(1980)
Defendant Cha presented the testimony of another expert witness, Attorney David Jensen, who had handled approximately three hundred medical malpractice cases while practicing law since 1971. At the time of the trial, Attorney Jensen had one hundred malpractice defense cases pending in his office. He testified that as cases prоgress through the formation of a medical review panel, almost invariably there is some discovery initiated by the parties in the form of interrogatories and depositions. Jensen further stated his opinion that most discovery involving the parties actually occurs, during the review panel stage while the “expert phase of the trial preparation” tаkes place after the medical review panel has rendered its opinion. With regard to the time it takes to proceed from initial filing to trial, Jensen testified that cases under the Malpractice Act compare very favorably with similar types of litigation not required to follow the Malpractice Act procedure. Defendant Cha аlso presented Jeff Anderson who offered to the trial court his comprehensive statistical analysis of how Indiana medical malpractice cases filed between 1976 and 1983 were treated. This witness’ testimony was that in all of those malpractice cases resulting in a panel opinion, the panel opinion was rendered in an averagе of 23.4 months from the date the case was filed. His statistics also showed that at least one case filed in each of the years of 1976, 1977, 1978, 1979 and 1980 pended for as long as 83.03 months, 74.99 months, 65.75 months, 53.88 months and 41.85 months respectively.
The trial court acknowledged that this Court declared Indiana’s Medical Malpractice Act constitutional in 1980 in
Johnson.
The trial court took the positiоn, however, that this Court in
Johnson
found the Act constitutional on its face without regard to its application to particular individuals and without having had an opportunity to consider the Act’s actual experience. The trial court accordingly distinguished the application of
Johnson
on that basis. Moreover, the trial court found that among the decisions which this Court relied upon in finding Indiana’s Act constitutional were
Carter v. Sparkman,
(1976) Fla.,
“The stated purpose of the Act expressly provides as an objective that one who sustains injury or death as a result of the fault of a health car[e] (sic) provider ‘can obtain a prompt determination оf his claim and the determination of fair and reasonable compensation.’ ”
Mattos v. Thompson,
(1980)
In Johnson, this Court found that the legislative concern in passing the Indiana Malpractice Act was the recognition of an emergency which threatened the availability of the professional services of physicians and other health care providers to the people of Indiana. The Legislature responded with this Act in an effort to preserve medical services and to protect the well being of Indiana citizens. We found that the Act reflected a specific legislative adjudgment that a causal relationship existed bеtween the prosecution of malpractice claims against health care providers and the threatened and actual diminution of health care services. Moreover, we found that the legislative measure was a rational means of obtaining the stated compelling state interest. In so finding, this Court recognized the potential for delays to claimants but found an acceptable trade-off in the benefits to be derived therefor. Justice DeBruler, writing for the unanimous Court, stated:
“The restriction upon the access to courts for patients under the Act is severe, yet based upon the above appraisal for constitutional purposes, it is not so restrictive as to violate the right tо access to courts guaranteed by Art. I, § 12, of our Constitution.”
Johnson,
“[It] ‘need not be in every respect logically consistent with its aims to be constitutional. It is enough that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought that the particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct it.’ ”
Johnson,
Plaintiffs presented no evidence that there is no longer a medical emergency in this State. The Legislature originally found such a medical emergency and determined that the Act was a reasonable means *113 of dealing with that emergency. In order to successfully attack the Act on constitutional grounds, Plaintiffs were required to prove that the Act was not a reasonable means to achieve the continuation of medical services in Indiana. In Johnson, this Court found that the delays caused by the Act might be severe. The evidence introduced at this trial showed only the extent of these delays and did not show that there is no longer a medical emergency in this State. Therefore, the evidence introducеd at trial does not alter the conclusions of this Court reached in Johnson. This Court indicated in Johnson that consideration must be given to the rational basis for the classification contained in the Act. Specifically, we stated:
“The question for our determination is whether there is some ‘ground of difference’ that makes clear the reason for the different and more burdensome treatment accorded medical malpractice tort claimants and explains the corresponding special consideration given the health care providers. We conclude that a ground does exist and was not negatived by appellants in the courts below.”
Johnson,
Defendants claim that the trial court erred by failing to await the eventual decision by the Court of Appeals in Cha v. Warnick which involved these same Plaintiffs and Defendant Cha for the same injuries. We notice that Defendants Miller and the Department of Insurance moved to dismiss the instant case pursuant to Ind.Code § 34-4-10-6 (Burns 1973) but their motions were overruled. Ind.Code § 34-4-10-6 provides:
“The court may refuse to render or enter a declaratory judgment or decree where such judgment or decree, if rendered or entered, would not terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the proceedings.”
In the cause before the Court of Appeals, Plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the Malpractice Act just as they have done in the instant cause for declaratory judgment. Defendants now maintain that it was improper to challenge the Act’s constitutionality in this declaratory action when the same issue was pending on appeal in another court of concurrent jurisdiction. Moreover, Defendants contend that the judgment of the Court of Appeals in the former cause was the “Lаw of the case.”
There is merit to Defendants’ contention that any declaratory judgment which might be entered in this cause cannot resolve all of the controversy between these parties. These are the same plaintiffs who instituted the prior malpractice action against Defendant Cha in the Lake Circuit Court which has now been remanded by the Court of Appeals to that trial court for further proceedings. No matter what disposition is made of this case, Plaintiff’s claim for damages against Dr. Cha will still be before the Lake Circuit Court for determination. That suit and
not
the instant one will determine whether Plaintiffs are entitled to any judgment against Defendant Cha and it is in that suit that any judgment rendered will be obtained or enforсed. Plaintiffs therefore seek to determine the constitutionality of the Medical Malpractice Act in this cause but will litigate their substantive claim in another cause. The Court of Appeals has found that declaratory judgment is not appropriate in a case challenging the qualifications of an office holder since even a decisiоn that the incumbent was not properly holding office could neither determine the proper person to hold the office nor provide for the enforcement of the judgment. After all, another independent action would be required before final relief could be obtained.
Madden v. Houck,
(1980) Ind.App.,
The “law of the case” doctrine designates that an appellate court’s determination of a legal issue is binding on both the trial court and the Court of Appeals in any subsequent appeal given the same case and substantially the same facts.
Fair Share Organization, Inc. v. Mitnick,
(1964)
We find no compelling reason to change or amend our holding in Johnson that the Medical Malpractice Act is constitutional. The trial court’s judgment holding that Indiana’s Medical Malpractice Act is unconstitutional is reversed and this cause is remanded to the trial court with instructions to enter judgment for Defendants-Appellants.