Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's v. Warrantech Corp.Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's v. Warrantech Corp.
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- Before:
- Reavley
Lead Opinion
This case brings questions of our jurisdiction to review an order remanding the case to state court after its removal as a case that “relates to” an earlier arbitration proceeding. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London and Other Insurers Subscribing to Reinsurance Agreements F96/2922/00 and No. F97/2992/00 seek dismissal for lack of jurisdiction of the appeal filed by Warrantech Corporation and Joel San Antonio (collectively, “Appellants”). Appellants appeal (1) the district court’s order remanding all “unresolved” issues back to state court; (2) the district court’s order granting Underwriters partial summary judgment on Appellants’ res judicata and collateral estoppel affirmative defenses; and (3) the district court’s order dismissing with prejudice Warrantech’s counterclaims.1
This case arises out of the administration of consumer warranties and extended service plans on computers, printers, and related items sold by CompUSA, a national electronics retailer. CompUSA contracted with Warrantech to administer the warranties on CompUSA’s consumer goods. The contract required Warrantech to obtain insurance to cover the cost of paying warranty claims, which Warrantech did with Houston General Insurance Company, a nonparty to this litigation. Houston General, in turn, reinsured a portion of the risk with Underwriters.
After approximately one year, Underwriters contended that Warrantech was paying unauthorized claims and refused to reinsure Houston General for any unauthorized amounts. Houston General instituted arbitration proceedings to determine Underwriters’ obligations, which took place under the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbi-tral Awards (hereinafter, “the New York Convention”).2 After five weeks of hearings, the arbitration panel ordered Underwriters to pay Houston General $39 million, and the order was confirmed by the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York.3
On September 19, 2002, one month after the arbitral panel’s decision, Underwriters filed the instant lawsuit against Warran-tech in Texas state court, seeking to recoup as damages the reinsurance payments that Underwriters was ordered to pay Houston General.4 Warrantech filed counterclaims, asserting causes of action for fraud, unfair and deceptive insurance practices in violation of Article 21.21 of the Texas Insurance Code,5 and violation of the duty of good faith and fair dealing.6 After Underwriters added San Antonio to the litigation, the case was removed under
Underwriters moved to remand the matter to state court. In consideration of its jurisdiction, the district court, relying upon Beiser v. Weyler,8 stated that its only task was to determine whether Appellants’ arbitration-related affirmative defenses were “facially frivolous.”9 Concluding that they were not, the district court denied Underwriters’ motion to remand. In its order, the court supplied a caveat: “If the court later makes a summary ruling that the arbitration award does not provide a defense to any of [Underwriters’] claims, the court will then consider whether the action should be remanded to the state court.”10
Subsequently, Underwriters moved for partial summary judgment on Appellants’ res judicata and collateral estoppel affirmative defenses and on Warrantech’s state-law counterclaims. On August 24, 2004, the district court granted summary judgment for Underwriters, concluding that the affirmative defenses were without merit and dismissing Warrantech’s counterclaims with prejudice. After determining that “there [was] no just reason for delay,” the district court entered final judgment dismissing Warrantech’s counterclaims.11 That decision forms the basis of part of this appeal.
After its August 24 order, the district court requested additional briefing on whether Underwriters’ remaining state-law claims should be remanded to state court given that the issues related to the arbitration award were -no longer part of the lawsuit. After briefing, the district court granted Underwriters’ motion to remand, concluding that Appellants were not asserting any “non-frivolous” defense based on the arbitration award.12 Finding no “policy” reasons in support of exercising jurisdiction over this case and concluding that there were “no other grounds for federal jurisdiction,” the district court remanded all “unresolved claims and causes of action” to state court.13
II
We must first decide what we can decide. Prior to remanding all “unresolved” matters to the Texas state court, the district court granted Underwriters’ motion for partial summary judgment on Appellants’ res judicata and collateral estoppel affirmative defenses and Warrantech’s state-law counterclaims. Appellants seek merits review of each of the district court’s orders. Underwriters seeks dismissal for lack of appellate jurisdiction.
A
1
Our analysis of the district court’s remand order begins with
It is plain that with any remand based on the enumerated grounds of
Our analysis is complicated by the Supreme Court’s recognition, in a narrow category of cases,18 that a district court can remand a case to state court on the basis of a non-
So framed, we must determine whether the district court’s order remanding all “unresolved” matters to state court was based on jurisdictional grounds, i.e.,
Moreover, our clear-statement requirement focuses our inquiry away from the merits of the district court’s decision.
Nothing in the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust requires us to back away from our clear statement requirement. There, the Court held that
We recognize that there is some disagreement among the circuits regarding the methodology for reviewing remand orders. We apply a clear-statement requirement; others do not, opting instead to analyze a remand order for what the district court did rather than what the district court said it did. The Supreme Court recognized but did not resolve this dispute in Kircher. Justice Scalia would stop with the district court’s words, forgoing any examination of the merits; the majority passed on the issue, noting that the result was the same under either approach. As the Solicitor General recently recognized, this type of “methodological dispute may have more impact on how district court judges draft remand orders than on the rights of the parties.”29 The validity of our methods for reviewing remand orders is not before us, so we need say no more.
2
With these principles in mind, our analysis requires examination of the text of the district court’s remand order.30 Af
No policy evidenced by the federal arbitration statutes would be advanced in the slightest by the exercise by this court of subject matter jurisdiction over the issues that remain to be resolved in this case .... There is no reason from a policy standpoint for this court to further entertain jurisdiction over this case, bearing in mind that there is no claim of arbitrability, and that the only issues which implicate the arbitration award itself have been summarily removed from the case.31
Appellants contend that the order’s reference to “policy” indicates that the remand was based, not on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, but on the efficiency and economy considerations guiding courts under Camegie-Mellon. Underwriters point to subsequent language in the remand order, which, they contend, indicates the remand was based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Specifically,
[N]ow that the arbitration award issues have been removed from this case by a summary ruling, and there being “no other grounds for federal jurisdiction” in this case, the case should be remanded to the state court.
Therefore, [t]he court ORDERS that all unresolved claims and causes of action in the above-captioned action be, and are hereby, remanded to the state court from which this action was removed.32
With only this language before us, we conclude that the district court did not “clearly and affirmatively” state a non-
The district court’s first reference to “policy” is to that “evidenced by the federal arbitration acts,” and not the concerns animating discretionary remands.33 The second reference to “policy” considerations is essentially a single sentence, with no citation to Camegie-Mellon, Thermtron Products, or any of the efficiency and economy factors guiding courts in making discretionary remands. Any conclusion that this was a discretionary remand, on the basis of references to policy, is militated by the subsequent discussion by the district court suggesting that it perceived itself to lack subject matter jurisdiction. As the district court concluded its remand order, it stated that there are “no other grounds for jurisdiction,” language we read to mean the court perceived it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Moreover, the court also states that the case “should” — a derivative of the imperative “shall”; although “must” might have been a more
3
Unclear remand orders are not a new thing in this Court, even given our strict adherence to a clear-statement requirement. We have confronted situations before in which a district court’s remand order offered language supporting both a statutory and a nonstatutory remand. In Bogle v. Phillips Petroleum, Co., various plaintiffs injured in a chemical-plant explosion brought state-law claims against Phillips for their injuries as well as a claim for wrongfully denied medical benefits, which Phillips used to remove the case alleging that the Employee Retirement Income Security Act preempted the litigation.35 The district court ruled on the asserted ERISA-preemption defense, finding no preemption, and granted plaintiffs’ motion to remand, stating that “[t]his case does not contain a federal claim” and applying the discretionary factors from Camegie-Mellon,36 On appeal, we dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, concluding that “[t]he district court’s discussion [of the Camegie-Mellon factors], although improper sur-plusage, [did] not taint its ultimate conclusion that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction.”37
The district court’s reliance on Beiser v. Weyler does not alter our conclusion. Reading “relates to” very broadly,38 Beiser suggests that in cases removed under
Moreover, nothing in Beiser alters our analysis of the district court’s order. The mere citation of dicta in Beiser suggesting a discretionary remand cannot serve to satisfy our clear-statement requirement,41 and nothing in Beiser suggests that we should not apply our clear-statement requirement within the context of
B
Although we lack jurisdiction to review the district court’s remand order, we still must consider whether we can review the district court’s grant of partial summary judgment to Underwriters on Appellants’ res judicata and collateral estoppel defenses. District court determinations accompanying remand orders are reviewable despite
Our decision in Linton v. Airbus Industrie is illustrative.49 There, prior to remanding the matter to state court, the district court determined that the defendants did not qualify for foreign sovereign immunity, the basis for removal.50 We held that “[i]n light of the district court’s ultimate conclusion that the entire case had to be remanded for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the district court’s [foreign sovereign immunity] determination [could] be deemed a jurisdictional finding under the facts of this case and, as such, [could] be reviewed by the state court upon remand.”51 Thus, determinations made in the process of remanding a case for lack of jurisdiction are “jurisdictional findings” that can be revisited by the state court upon remand.52
Here, the district court’s orders— that res judicata and collateral estoppel did not provide Appellants a defense to Underwriters’ state-law claims — were made in the process of remanding the case for lack of jurisdiction. We see no difference between the rejection, in Linton, of the defendants’ foreign sovereign immunity defense — the basis for removal — and the rejection, here, of Appellants’ affirmative defenses — again, the basis for removal. We conclude that the district court’s order rejecting Appellants’ affirmative defenses is not “conclusive” under City of Waco; thus, we are unable to review the merits of the district court’s decision.
C
Finally, we turn to the most troubling aspect of this case — namely, what to do with the district court’s order dismissing with prejudice Warrantech’s state-law counterclaims. Unlike resolution of Appellants’ arbitration-based affirmative defenses, we cannot say that the decision to dismiss the counterclaims was a “jurisdictional” finding, not “conclusive” under City of Waco, and therefore not binding on the state court upon remand. We also decline to hold that the decision is “conclusive” under City of Waco, as Warrantech asserts and as Underwriters appears to concede.53 Rather, the prudent resolution of Warran-tech’s state-law counterclaims requires a step-back, a reexamination of what the
Warrantech’s state-law counterclaims rode into federal court on the coattails of Appellants’ assertion that Appellants’ res judicata and collateral estoppel affirmative defenses “relate[d] to” the state-law claims asserted by Underwriters.55 As we have noted, this is proper, and it would be within the district court’s prerogative to adjudicate them on the merits, but only if the district court properly exercised its discretion under
Our inquiry starts with the mandatory nature of
This is such a case. Here, all claims with even a tenable connection to federal jurisdiction were dismissed very early in the litigation. As the Supreme Court noted in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, “[I]f the federal claims are dismissed before trial, even though not insubstantial in a
Under§ 205 . . . the federal issue in cases will often be resolved early enough to permit remand to the state court for a decision on the merits .... If the district court decides that the arbitration clause does not provide a defense, and no other grounds for federal jurisdiction exist, the court must ordinarily remand the case back to state court.61
Thus, the absence of any claims with any connection to federal law at such an early point in the litigation suggests that the district court abused its discretion in exercising supplemental jurisdiction over War-rantech’s state-law counterclaims.62
Moreover, Warrantech’s state-law counterclaims have little, if any, relation to the arbitration award. Our task is to compare the federal basis for jurisdiction (here, the asserted affirmative defenses stemming from the arbitration award) against the dismissed state-law claims (here, Warrantech’s counterclaims arising from Underwriters’ alleged discovery conduct and failure to voluntarily make payment of warranty claims).63 There is little factual overlap between these two claims. Appellants asserted their arbitration-related affirmative defenses in response to Underwriters’ underlying claims. Res judi-cata and collateral estoppel are judicial economy devices, seeking to prevent reliti-gation of issues previously adjudicated.64 Warrantech’s counterclaims arise out of separate and independent actions of Underwriters — discovery misconduct and failure to pay insurance claims. In short, we do not see a sufficient connection between the two claims to warrant the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction. We conclude that the district court abused its discretion in exercising supplemental jurisdiction over Warrantech’s state-law counterclaims.
Ill
In sum, our inquiry into what we can decide leaves us without jurisdiction to consider the merits of any of the district court’s orders. First, we lack jurisdiction to review the district court’s remand order as the district court did not “clearly and affirmatively” state a non-
Appellee’s motion to dismiss appeal for lack of jurisdiction is GRANTED.
Notes
. Both Warrantech and San Antonio assert affirmative defenses based on the arbitration award. Only Warrantech asserts various state-law counterclaims against Underwriters. As such, when discussing the affirmative de fenses, we refer to “Appellants” and when discussing the counterclaims, we refer only to “Warrantech.”
. See
. Houston General Ins. Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd‘s London, No. 02 Civ. 7559 JSR, 2003 WL 22480058 (S.D.N.Y. Oct.31, 2003).
. Underwriters asserts causes of action against Warrantech for fraud and negligent misrepresentation, alleging that they are sub-rogated to all rights Houston General may have to seek damages from defendants concerning claims wrongfully submitted and paid under the insurance policies. Underwriters also seeks to recover for spoliation, alleging that Warrantech destroyed certain evidence during the course of the arbitration proceeding.
. Article 21.21 of the Texas Insurance Code was repealed by Acts 2003, 78th Leg., ch. 1274, § 26(a) (effective Apr. 1, 2005). It was replaced by Tex. Ins.Code Ann. tit. 5, § 541.001 et seq. The recodification does not affect the issues in this appeal.
. Warrantech‘s counterclaims arise from Underwriters’ alleged discovery conduct during the arbitration proceedings and the failure of Underwriters to voluntarily make payment of warranty claims.
.
Where the subject matter of an action or proceeding pending in a State court relates to an arbitration agreement or award falling under the Convention, the defendant or the defendants may, at any time before the trial thereof, remove such action or proceeding to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where the action or proceeding is pending. The procedure for removal of causes otherwise provided by law shall apply, except that the ground for removal provided in this section need not appear on the face of the complaint but may be shown in the petition for removal.
. 284 F.3d 665 (5th Cir.2002).
. Order Denying Remand (May 13, 2004), at 4.
. Order Denying Remand (May 13, 2004), at 4.
. Summary Judgment Order (Aug. 24, 2004), at 13.
. Remand Order (Sept. 23, 2004), at 3.
. Remand Order (Sept. 23, 2004), at 3-6.
.
. Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 711, 116 S.Ct. 1712, 135 L.Ed.2d 1 (1996); Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 516 U.S. 124, 116 S.Ct. 494, 133 L.Ed.2d 461 (1995); Thermtron Prods., Inc. v. Hermansdor fer, 423 U.S. 336, 345-46, 96 S.Ct. 584, 46 L.Ed.2d 542 (1976).
.
. Gravitt v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 430 U.S. 723, 723, 97 S.Ct. 1439, 52 L.Ed.2d 1 (1977) (per curiam) (noting that
. See Angelides v. Baylor Coll. of Medicine, 117 F.3d 833, 836 (5th Cir.1997) (noting that the Thermtron Court carved out only a “narrow exception to the strict bar to appellate review of remand orders”).
. Thermtron Prods., 423 U.S. at 343, 96 S.Ct. 584 (finding jurisdiction review remand order expressly based on the district court’s crowded docket).
. 484 U.S. 343, 357, 108 S.Ct. 614, 98 L.Ed.2d 720 (1988).
. Id. at 353, 108 S.Ct. 614.
. See Bogle v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 24 F.3d 758, 761 (5th Cir.1994); Burles v. Amerada Hess Corp., 8 F.3d 301, 304 (5th Cir.1993).
. Giles v. NYLCare Health Plans, Inc., 172 F.3d 332, 339 (5th Cir.1999).
. Heaton v. Monogram Credit Card Bank of Georgia, 231 F.3d 994, 997 (5th Cir.2000); Copling v. Container Store, Inc., 174 F.3d 590, 596 (5th Cir.1999); Giles, 172 F.3d at 336; Soley v. First Nat’l Bank of Commerce, 923 F.2d 406, 408 (5th Cir.1991); Royal v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 685 F.2d 124, 126 (5th Cir.1982); In re Weaver, 610 F.2d 335, 337 (5th Cir.1980); see also In re Merrimack Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 587 F.2d 642, 648 (5th Cir.1978).
. See United States v. Rice, 327 U.S. 742, 751, 66 S.Ct. 835, 90 L.Ed. 982 (1946) (noting that Congress opposes “interruption of the litigation of the merits of removed cause by prolonged litigation of questions of jurisdic tion of the district court to which the cause is removed”); Soley, 923 F.2d at 408 (citing Thermtron Prods., 423 U.S. at 351, 96 S.Ct. 584) (noting that the purpose of
. Arnold v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 277 F.3d 772, 775 (5th Cir.2001); State of Rio de Janeiro of Federated Republic of Brazil v. Philip Morris, 239 F.3d 714, 716 (5th Cir.2001).
. Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, - U.S. -, 126 S.Ct. 2145, 2153-55, 165 L.Ed.2d 92 (2006).
. Id. at 2158 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting the district court).
. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae; No. 05-107, Davis v. Int’l Union, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of Am. (UAW), at 9-11 (2006) (filed in response to invitation from Supreme Court).
. See McDermott Int’l, Inc. v. Lloyds Underwriters of London, 944 F.2d 1199, 1201 n. 1 (5th Cir.1991) (directing district courts to “take care to explain their reasons for remanding cases” because “the availability of appellate review turns exclusively on the district court‘s reason for remand”); Tillman v. CSX Transp., Inc., 929 F.2d 1023, 1026 (5th Cir.1991) (“Reviewability of a remand order depends entirely upon the trial court‘s stated grounds for its decision to remand.”).
. Remand Order (Sep. 23, 2004), at 5 (emphasis added).
. Remand Order (Sep. 23, 2004), at 6 (emphasis added).
. See Carnegie-Mellon, 484 U.S. at 353, 108 S.Ct. 614 (“[A] remand may best promote the values of economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.”).
. We do not decide today whether, had the district court omitted the language indicating a perceived lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, the passing reference to “policy” considerations would be sufficient to satisfy our clear-statement requirement.
. 24 F.3d 758, 760-61 (5th Cir.1994).
. Id. at 762.
. Id.
. Beiser relies, in part, on the expansive definition of “relates to” in Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96-97, 103 S.Ct. 2890, 77 L.Ed.2d 490 (1983), an ERISA preemption case. Beiser v. Weyler, 284 F.3d 665, 669 (5th Cir.2002); see also Acosta v. Master Maintenance and Const. Inc., 452 F.3d 373, 375 (construing “relates to” under
. Beiser v. Weyler, 284 F.3d 665, 669 (5th Cir.2002) (holding that a dispute “relates to” an arbitration clause “whenever the clause could conceivably have an affect on the outcome of the case”). We continued,
As a result, absent the rare frivolous petition for removal, as long as the defendant claims in its petition that an arbitration clause provides a defense, the district court will have jurisdiction to decide the merits of the claim. This approach honors the statute’s command that we treat defenses based on arbitration clauses under the Convention in the same way that we treat removal generally. It allows the district court to determine its jurisdiction from the petition for removal, without taking evidence and without a merits-like inquiry.
Id. at 671-72 (internal footnote omitted).
. As the question is not presented, we do not decide whether the district court’s decision was correct. We do recognize, however, that Warrantech’s affirmative defenses in the pres ent litigation are rather tangentially related to the arbitration award between Houston General and Underwriters.
. Cf. Giles, 172 F.3d at 335 (finding a discretionary remand where the district court stated that “[tjhis is an appealable order because the basis of my ruling is an exercise of discretion to remand pendent state law claims”).
.
. Dahiya v. Talmidge Int‘l, Ltd., 371 F.3d 207, 209 (5th Cir.2004) (citing Transit Cas. Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London, 119 F.3d 619, 624-25 (8th Cir.1997); LaFarge Coppee v. Venezolana De Cementos, S.A.C.A., 31 F.3d 70, 71-72 (2d Cir.1994); In re Amoco Petroleum Additives Co., 964 F.2d 706, 712-13 (7th Cir.1992)).
. Appellants also attempt to revive the oft-rejected argument that a “post-removal event” offers an escape from the strictures of
Appellants also ask us to adopt a “not-all-post-removal-events-are-equal” approach, which they contend is illustrated by the Seventh Circuit in Adkins v. Illinois Central Railroad Co., 326 F.3d 828, 833 (7th Cir.2003). Given the clear line of precedent in our Court regarding the treatment of post-removal events, we decline to do so.
. 293 U.S. 140, 55 S.Ct. 6, 79 L.Ed. 244 (1934).
. Dahiya, 371 F.3d at 210; Heaton v. Monogram Credit Card Bank, 297 F.3d 416, 421 (5th Cir.2002).
. City of Waco, 293 U.S. at 143, 55 S.Ct. 6.
. Arnold, 277 F.3d at 776.
. 30 F.3d 592 (5th Cir.1994).
. Linton, 30 F.3d at 594-95. The foreign defendants relied upon
. Linton, 30 F.3d at 597.
. See Dahiya, 371 F.3d at 210-11 (reviewing cases).
. We take no position on whether the order dismissing Warrantech’s counterclaims is “conclusive” under City of Waco. Warrantech relies upon John G. and Marie Stella Kenedy Memorial Foundation v. Mauro, in which we concluded that we had jurisdiction to review the dismissal of plaintiffs’ federal law claims even though the district court remanded the remaining state-law claims for lack of jurisdiction. 21 F.3d 667, 670 (5th Cir.1994). In John G., unlike here, there was a sound basis for federal jurisdiction — plaintiffs asserted claims fell under
. See Hernandez ex rel. Hernandez v. Tex. Dep‘t of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 380 F.3d 872, 878 (5th Cir.2004) (“Prior to reaching the merits, we must verify, sua sponte, that our jurisdiction . . . is proper.”); In re McCloy, 296 F.3d 370, 373 (5th Cir.2002) (“[A] lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time, and we can examine the lack of subject matter jurisdiction for the first time on appeal.”).
. See
. Robertson v. The Neuromedical Center, 161 F.3d 292, 296 (5th Cir.1998); Parker & Parsley Petroleum Co. v. Dresser Industries, 972 F.2d 580, 585 (5th Cir.1992).
.
.
. Parker & Parsley Petroleum Co., 972 F.2d at 585; Wong v. Stripling, 881 F.2d 200, 204 (5th Cir.1989).
. 383 U.S. 715, 726, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966).
. Beiser, 284 F.3d at 674-75.
. See Carnegie-Mellon, 484 U.S. at 351, 108 S.Ct. 614 (nothing that when the single federal law claim is eliminated at an “early stage” of the litigation, the district court has “a powerful reason to choose not to continue to exercise jurisdiction”); Parker & Parsley Petroleum Co., 972 F.2d at 585.
. We are not seeking a connection between the arbitration-based defenses and Underwriters’ state-law claims properly presented in Texas state court. That is the proper inquiry under Beiser, but the issue has not been presented on appeal.
. See Key v. Wise, 629 F.2d 1049, 1061 (5th Cir.1981) (discussing res judicata); Parklane Hosiery, Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 329, 99 S.Ct. 645, 58 L.Ed.2d 552 (1979) (discussing collateral estoppel).
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
I dissent from the majority’s initial holding that the district court’s remand order is not reviewable under
The law in this area is clear. “After a district court remands a case to state court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,
Asserting a newly tailored “clear-statement requirement,”1 the majority concludes that “the district court did not ‘clearly and affirmatively’ state a non-
In its analysis, the majority pauses only momentarily to discuss and cast aside our
Because the only basis for remand provided by the district court is taken from Beiser, our analysis of whether the remand stated a non-
The district court understood and scrupulously adhered to our guidance in Beiser when it exercised jurisdiction and subsequently remanded this case. Quoting pertinent parts of that opinion, it initially determined that jurisdiction was proper based upon purported ties between War-rantech’s res judicata and collateral estop-pel defenses and the arbitration proceeding. Finding no non-frivolous ties to the arbitration award after its ruling on sum-maryjudgment, however, the district court remanded, “[cjonsistent with the expectations of the Fifth Circuit,” because
The majority acknowledges that the district court applied Beiser and that Beiser calls for a discretionary remand in these circumstances. Nonetheless, it asserts that “the mere citation of dicta in Beiser . . . cannot satisfy our clear-statement requirement ....” The majority’s reasoning here is puzzling. Dicta is, of course, not binding. But in stating the basis for its remand, there is no principle in law or reason that prevents a district court from interpreting and using our case law to explain itself. In this case, the district court used Beiser’s dicta to clearly and affirmatively state the basis for its remand. No clearer statement was required.
If there remained any doubt, the district court’s remand order contains additional convincing indicia of a discretionary, “non-
The critical distinction for determining appealability is the presence of federal subject matter jurisdiction prior to the order of remand. In aSection 1447(c) remand [for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction], federal jurisdiction never existed, and in a non-Section 1447(c) remand, federal jurisdiction did exist at some point in the litigation, but the federal claims were either settled or dismissed.
Bogle, 24 F.3d at 762. Here, the district court initially rejected a motion to remand because, under Beiser, “the district court will have jurisdiction under
There is no need to “decipher the tealeaves” of the district court’s remand order because the district court clearly and affirmatively remanded for discretionary rea
. We have never invoked a “clear-statement requirement.” Rather, we look to the remand order to determine whether a “district court ‘clearly and affirmatively’ relie[d] on a non-
. Tellingly, the majority does not, indeed cannot, affirmatively state that the district court remanded based upon a
.Our cases do not uniformly adhere to this requirement. Furthermore, this requirement may be in tension with the other courts of appeals and, possibly, Supreme Court cases addressing the issue of appellate jurisdiction. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, No. 05-107, Davis v. Int’l Union, United Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of Am. (UAW), at 9-11 (2006) (cited in the majority opinion, supra note 29).
. Upon motion to remand, the district court determined that it had subject-matter jurisdiction over the action. It supported this determination with a quotation from Beiser:
[T]he district court will have jurisdiction under§ 205 over just about any suit in which a defendant contends that an arbitration clause falling under the Convention provides a defense. As long as the defendant‘s assertion is not completely absurd or impossible, it is at least conceivable that the arbitration clause will impact the disposition of the case.
Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London v. Warrantech Corp., No. 4:04-CV-208-A, slip op. at 4 (N.D.Tex. May 13, 2004) (quoting Beiser, 284 F.3d at 669) (“Order Denying Remand”). The district court concluded that the arbitration-related defenses were neither facially frivolous nor absurd or impossible and that, under Beiser, it had “no choice but to deny the motion.” Id. (citing Beiser, 284 F.3d at 669, 671).
. Later, in its order remanding the case to state court, the district court again supported its decision with a lengthy quotation from Beiser:
Moreover,§ 205 does not interfere with state courts as much as ordinary removal under the general removal statute,28 U.S.C. § 1441 . When a case is removed under§ 1441 , it will often remain in federal court until its conclusion. Under§ 205 , however, the federal issue in cases will often be resolved early enough to permit remand to the state court for a decision on the merits. The arbitrability of a dispute will ordinarily be the first issue the district court decides after removal under§ 205 . If the district court decides that the arbitration clause does not provide a defense, and no other grounds for federal jurisdiction exist, the court must ordinarily remand the case back to state court. [See28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (granting district court discretion to remand all claims in which state law predominates); Parker & Parsley Petroleum Co. v. Dresser Indus., 972 F.2d 580, 585 (5th Cir.1992) (noting that when all federal claims are resolved early in a lawsuit and only state law claims remain, the district court almost always should remand to the state court); Wong v. Stripling, 881 F.2d 200, 204 (5th Cir.1989) (same).] Except for state law claims that turn out to be subject to arbitration,§ 205 will rarely permanently deprive a state court of the power to decide claims properly brought before it. The district court will ordinarily remand those cases that turn out not to be subject to arbitration, such that the state court will be able to resolve the merits of the dispute.Section 205 therefore raises fewer federalism problems than the general removal statute,§ 1441 : except in arbitrable cases, it will ordinary [sic] permit state courts to resolve the ultimate issues in a case.
Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London v. Warrantech Corp., No. 4:04-CV-208-A, 2004 WL 2203244, at *3 (N.D.Tex. Sept.23, 2004) (quoting Beiser, 284 F.3d at 674-75) (“Remand Order”). The district court supplied no other basis for its remand.
. The majority contends that the district court made only “passing reference to policy considerations.” But the paragraph-long statement by the district court is more than a “passing” reference and, moreover, is more substantial than the statement upon which the majority relies to support its determination that the remand order is most likely based upon a lack of jurisdiction — namely the district court’s statement that there are “no other grounds for federal jurisdiction.”
. By contrast, such an expression of prudential reasons is consistent with a remand of supplemental state-law claims following the dismissal of those claims that provided the basis for original jurisdiction. See Giles v. NYLCare Health Plans, Inc., 172 F.3d 332, 339 (5th Cir.1999) (“When deciding whether to remand supplemental claims, a court should examine economy, fairness, conven- ■ ience, and comity.”).
. Despite the district court‘s exclusive reliance on portions of Beiser — sections that indicate a discretionary remand occurs after an initial finding of jurisdiction — and other compelling indicia of a discretionary remand of supplemental state-law claims, the majority concludes that the district court’s remand order was unclear because it also, according to the majority, stated that it was remanding for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. It rests this finding upon a single phrase from the remand order; namely, the district court‘s statement that there were “no other grounds for federal jurisdiction.” Remand Order at *3. Taking the phrase out of context, the majority fails to acknowledge that the district court was quoting directly from Beiser and its lengthy discussion of discretionary remands.
If the district court decides that the arbitration clause does not provide a defense, and no other grounds for federal jurisdiction exist, the court must ordinarily remand the case back to state court. [See28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (granting district court discretion to remand all claims in which state law predominates); Parker & Parsley Petroleum Co. v. Dresser Indus., 972 F.2d 580, 585 (5th Cir.1992) (noting that when all federal claims are resolved early in a lawsuit and only state law claims remain, the district court almost always should remand to the state court); Wong v. Stripling, 881 F.2d 200, 204 (5th Cir.1989) (same).] Except for state law claims that turn out to be subject to arbitration,§ 205 will rarely permanently deprive a state court of the power to decide claims properly brought before it.
Remand Order at *3 (quoting Beiser, 284 F.3d at 675 (emphasis added)). Read in context, the district court‘s statement does not mean that it perceived a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction to proceed. To the contrary, it merely acknowledges that the original grounds for federal jurisdiction are absent, that no other independent ground for federal jurisdiction exist, and that the court was exercising its discretion to remand all matters in which State law predominates pursuant to