Plaintiffs-appellants (“Underwriters”) appeal a summary judgment for their insured, Defendant-appellee Oryx Energy Company in their suit for reimbursement fоr monies paid in settlement of a personal injury claim. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Henry Mote filed a personal claim against Oryx for compensatоry and punitive damages arising out of an injury he sustained while working on Oryx’s fixed platform located on the Outer Continental Shelf offshore Texas. A mеdiation involving Mote, Oryx and Underwriters-resulted in a $12,000,000 settlement of Mote’s claims. Underwriters paid $11,050,000 of the settlement and sued Oryx for reimbursement. Oryx sued Underwriters for a declaration that Underwriters owed full coverage.
The trial court initially entered judgment against Oryx on the coverage questiоn. This court reversed, holding that neither the terms of the policy nor the relevant Texas law
1
limited coverage for compensatory damages.
See Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London v. Oryx Energy Co.,
DISCUSSION
We review the grant of summary judgment
de novo,
affirming only if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
See H.E. Butt Grocery Co. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co.,
The Full and Final Release (“Release”) signed by all parties to the Mote settlement included the following language:
All sums set forth herein, be they lump sum payments or periodic payments from the annuities, constitute damages on account of personal injuries or sickness within the meaning of Section 104(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended.
It is well settled, and undisputed by the parties, that amounts paid “on account of
Under Texas law, a settlement agreement is a contract subject to the same rules оf construction as other contracts.
See Williams v. Glash,
Underwriters maintain that the district court erred in not taking into consideratiоn (1) the allegations in the underlying pleadings; (2) the evidence before the court in the underlying case; (3) the intent of the payor; and (4) the principle that a court should not unduly reward insureds who seek indemnification for actions they never insured, citing
Dotson v. U.S.,
The Underwriters, having participated fully in the settlement in this case, do nоt occupy a position analogous to the IRS or to an insurer absent from the negotiating table. Therefore, the district court did not err in focusing on the Release as the embodiment of the parties’ intent and declining to consider the Underwriters’ other proposed factors.
The Underwriters next contend that language in the release itself creates a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether the settlement included punitive as well as compensatory damages. The language in question reserves the Underwriters’ right to sue fоr reimbursement of “all sums paid in excess of reasonable compensatory damages sustained by Henry Mote ... in other words, for any and all punitive or exemplary damages which had to be paid to settle the case.” This argument fails. The reservation of rights merely preserves procedural avenues; it does not articulate any agreement or substantive position that could be read to confliсt with the express language “all sums set forth herein ... constitute damages on account of personal injuries or sickness.”
Underwriters also call our attention to the section of the Release where all defendants and counter-defendants and their insurers agree to rеlease their claims and potential claims against one another. At the end of that paragraph, the Underwriters added “it is the pоsition of [the Underwriters] that the foregoing is without prej
The other evidence Underwriters submitted, including written correspondence wherein they suggested amounts to be paid by Oryx for punitive damаges, Mote’s itemization of his damages prior to the mediation, the opinion of Oryx’s trial counsel as to the amount that should be alloсated to punitive damages and boilerplate disclaimers by Oryx and Underwriters regarding tax consequences cannot undermine the unambiguous allocation set forth in the Release.
We therefore affirm the summary judgment for Oryx.
AFFIRMED.
Notes
. Under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1349(b)(l)(A)(1986), the law of the state adjacent to where the accident occurred governs.
See Hodgen v. Forest Oil Corp.,
. Our determination on the record before us on the first appeal that the parties had raised a genuine issue of material fact regarding the amount attributable to punitive damages did not preclude summary judgment on remand based on settlement documents not previously before the court.