152 Iowa 692 | Iowa | 1911
In January, 1908, William B-. Wood, after examining tlie timber on an island in the Des Moines river, near Fraser, with a view of contracting to cut it, broke through the ice and wet his feet. Being unable to find a lodging place, after walking several miles, he crawled into a straw stack, and remained during the night. In the morning both feet were frozen. After walking two or three miles, he caught a ride into Boone. He then had but $1.50, and after procuring a lunch inquired for a physician. Being advised by the chief of police that the county physician was out of t'own, he remained at the police station until the next morning, and at about 11 o’clock a. m. was examined by the county physician, who seems to have properly dressed his feet, and said he “would have to get him into a hospital.” Hpon his return to the station, J. W. Keigley, a member of the board of supervisors to whom had been assigned the duty of looking after the poor in that vicinity, conversed with him concerning the care of his feet, and was told by Wood that the county physician had said he would get him into a hospital. To this the officer responded, “Did he say that?” His feet were painful throughout the day (Sunday), and at about 11 o’clock a. m. Monday the county physician, in response to a message, opened one or two blisters and dressed his feet again, and upon ascertaining he had formerly lived in Wisconsin inquired if he wished to return there, and said he would talk with the supervisor about it. At about 5 o’clock in the afternoon, the chief of police informed him, “We' are going to send you away on the 5:30 train,” took him to the depot, and gave him a ticket to Nevada, the county seat of Story county. Keigley paid the chief of police the
The story reads like the parable of the man who was wounded and left by the wayside half dead. The priest and the Levite passed by on, the other side; but the good Samaritan “had compassion on him, . . . bound up his wounds, pouring in oil and wine, . . . and brought him to an inn, and t.ook care of him.”
The showing as made was not at all complimentary to
The care of the poor was not a municipal function at the common law. Matters of charity were thought more appropriate for the church. It was ordained by the ancient kings that “the poor should be sustained by parsons, rectors of the church, and by parishioners, so that none of them die for want of sustenance.” Later, and supposedly about the time of Henry VIII, the law,, seems to have made paupers a charge on certain municipalities. Blackstone, in 1765, said: “The law not only regards life and member and protects every man in the enjoyment of them, but also furnishes him with everything necessary for their support. Bor tháre is no man so indigent or wretched, but he may demand a supply sufficient for all the necessaries of life from the more opulent part of the community, by means of the several statutes enacted for the relief of the poor.” 1 Blackstone Com. 131, (10th Eng. Ed.)
Bndou'btedly, the Legislature is endowed with power to create liability on the part of the county for the care of the poor, and to determine under what circumstances one county shall- be liable to another. Town of Fox v. Town of Kendall, 97 Ill., 72. But, in the. absence of such pror
But reimbursement for aid extended to a transient pauper is not directed, and, if plaintiff is entitled thereto, this must be owing to an implied promise on the part of Boone county to repay Cerro Gordo county. Cases may be found where an individual who has furnished the necessities of life to a pauper, after a municipality has omitted to discharge such duty, has been permitted to recover the value thereof, but in most of these this was contemplated by the statute authorizing the relief. Our statutes direct by what officers relief shall be furnished, and there is no ground for charging the county, unless it is supplied by these, or at their instance. Beetham v. Lincoln, 16 Me. 137; Hamilton County v. Meyers, 23 Neb. 718, (37 N. W. 623) ; Copple v. Davie County, 138 N. C. 127, (50 S. E. 574) ; Cantrell v. Clark County, 47 Ark. 239, (1 S. W. 200); Kittredge v. Newbury, 14 Mass. 448; Gourley v. Allen, 5 Cow. (N. Y.) 644. See note to Board of Commissioners of Sheridan County v. Denebrink, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1234; Patrick v. Baldwin, 109 Wis. 342, (85 N. W. 274, 53 L. R. A. 613) ; Overseers of Poor v. Overseers of Poor, 3 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 117. As well said in Patrick v. Baldwin, supra: “While an.implied contract is sufficient, as indicated, it must be established, if one endeavors to recover upon' it, the same as any other implied contract. The statute creates a liability to relieve destitute persons, but not a liability to individuals- who may voluntarily perform that service. It empowers appropriate agents of municipalities to make their liability effective by necessary contracts to that end, and imposes upon such agents the duty to exercise such power. If they refuse to do so, they are doubtless amenable in some way for such misconduct, but the law gives no private person the right to perform the duty of such officers. Otis v. Strafford, 10 N. H. 352. Performance of that duty by the person designated by
The cases holding to the contrary seem to overlook the circumstance that the relief is purely statutory; that the duty to extend relief is expressed in general terms, leaving the occasion, method, and extent of relief to the judgment and discretion of the local officers; and therefore, to create a binding pecuniary obligation, there must be a contract to that effect, or services must have- been rendered at the request of officers authorized to enter into the agreement. See Seagraves v. Alton, 13 Ill., 366; Ogden v. Weber County, 26 Utah 129, (72 Pac. 433) ; Shreve v. Budd, 7 N. J. Law, 431; Trustees of Cincinnati Township v. Ogden, 5 Ham. (Ohio) 23.
Doubtless some provision for emergencies exacting quick action should be made, but that is a matter for the Legislature and not the courts. It .is' not pretended that anything was done for Wood at the instance of the officers of Boone county, so that a promise to pay is not to be implied. Undoubtedly Boone county should have given him proper medical treatment. Brock v. Jones County, 145 Iowa, 397; Overseers of Poor v. Overseers of Poor, 114 Pa. 394, (6 Atl. 475). He there became helpless and a fit subject for relief. The duty to extend it was then immediately cast upon the defendant. But from its failure
By casting the unfortunate adrift, they avoided a manifest duty, and, though this may have resulted in putting the burden on another county, it cannot be said to have been assumed at the request of the officers of Boone county. The cause differs from those relied on by appellant. In Overseers of Poor of Pittstown v. Overseers of Plattsburgh, 15 Johns. (N. Y.) 436, the defendants procured an order of court, transferring a transient pauper to Pittstown, and, as a consequence, he was maintained by the overseers thereof. Subsequently the order was quashed, and the court held that recovery could be had against the overseers procuring the order, on the principle “that a burden has unjustly been thrown upon Pittstown by the procurement of the overseers of the poor of Plattsburgh; that, the pauper having no legal settlement in this state, it was their duty to have exonerated Pittstown of the burden they had cast upon them.”
In Sheldon v. Fairfax, 21 Vt. 102, several towns