MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Cephalon, Inc., a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Pennsylvania, has sued Kathleen Sebelius, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, and Margaret Hamburg, the Commissioner of the Food and Drug Administration, in their official capacities. Plaintiff, the manufacturer of Fentora, a name brand or “pioneer” drug, brings this suit under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq., claiming that the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) erroneously approved a generic version of Fentora. Before the Court is defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the grounds that plaintiff lacks standing and its claims are not ripe. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will dismiss this case because it is not ripe.
BACKGROUND
I. REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
Under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 301 et seq., a pioneer drug may not be marketed until the FDA has approved a new drug application (“NDA”) that includes “full reports of investigations which have been made to show whether or not such drug is safe for use and whether such drug is effective in use” and “a full statement of the composition of such drug.” 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1). In addition, the pioneer manufacturer must provide the patent number and expiration date of any patent related to the drug. Id. If the FDA approves the pioneer drug, it is published in the FDA’s Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations (the “Orange Book”). See id. The pioneer’s listing in the Orange Book includes patents claiming the drug or its method of use. Id.
After a pioneer drug is approved, a generic manufacturer may obtain FDA approval to market a generic version by submitting an Abbreviated New Drug Application (“ANDA”). 21 U.S.C. § 355(j). Instead of relying on its own clinical studies to prove that the generic is effective, *214 the generic manufacturer can show, among other things, that its drug is the same as the pioneer drug in terms of active ingredient(s), route of administration, dosage form, and strength, and that the generic is bioequivalent to the pioneer drug. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A). If the pioneer contains a single active ingredient, the ANDA must include “information to show that the active ingredient of the new drug is the same as that of the listed drug.” 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(ii)(I).
Submission of an ANDA constitutes a patent infringement of patents claiming the pioneer drug. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2). Thus, if the generic manufacturer wants to market its drug before the requisite patent^) in the Orange Book expires, the generic manufacturer must show “that such patent is invalid or will not be infringed by the manufacture, use, or sale of the [generic] drug for which the application is submitted.” 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV).
II. FACTUAL HISTORY
Plaintiff manufactures the pioneer drug Fentora, which is a “potent opioid analgesic” that is used to treat breakthrough pain in cancer patients who have become tolerant to other opioids. (Complaint [“Compl.”] at ¶ 16.) Fentora contains a single active ingredient, fentanyl citrate, which is a Schedule II narcotic. (Id. at ¶ 17.) Fentora comes in a tablet, which is placed inside the patient’s mouth to allow the tablet to disintegrate and deliver the fentanyl citrate to the patient’s body. (Id.) Clinical studies have shown that pain relief occurs in patients from fifteen to thirty minutes after placing the tablet in the mouth. (Id.) Cephalon listed at least two patents for Fentora in the Orange Book. A third patent, U.S. Patent No. 6,264,981 (“the '981 patent”), was ineligible for listing in the Orange Book 1 but was filed with the United States Patent and Trade Office on October 27, 1999, and the patent will expire in 2019. (Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss [“Def.’s Mot.”] at 3-4 & nn. 4-5.) The FDA approved Fentora on September 25, 2006. (Compl. at ¶ 16.)
Watson Laboratories, Inc. (“Watson”) filed an ANDA for a generic version of Fentora (“the Watson generic”) on July 10, 2007, which was ultimately approved by the FDA on January 7, 2011.
(Id.
at ¶¶ 18, 25; Def.’s Mot. at 3.) Between the filing of the ANDA and its approval three and a half years later, plaintiff took a number of steps to delay or prevent approval. Plaintiff first attempted to block Watson’s ANDA by filing a patent infringement claim based on the two Orange Book patents on June 2, 2008, in federal court in Delaware. (Compl. at ¶ 18.) Plaintiff filed a second patent infringement claim based on the '981 patent in the same court on September 25, 2009.
(Id.)
The court consolidated both claims and held a bench trial.
Cephalon, Inc. v. Watson Pharms., Inc.,
During the trial, plaintiff learned that the manufacturing process for the Watson generic could potentially create a second active ingredient (in addition to fentanyl citrate) and that the FDA had knowledge of that possibility. (Compl. at ¶¶ 18, 19.) Based on that information, plaintiff filed a citizen petition with the FDA on July 13, 2010, arguing that the second active ingredient should have prevented the FDA from approving the Watson generic because the FDA’s regulations require that the pioneer and the generic have the same active ingredient. (Id. at ¶ 23.) Plaintiff filed a *215 second citizen petition on July 23, 2010. (Id. at ¶ 24.) In that petition, plaintiff asked the FDA “to revise its bioequivalence guidelines” to accommodate Fentora’s rapid release of fentanyl citrate by requiring generic manufacturers to prove that the generic could be absorbed into the body as quickly as Fentora. (Id.) On January 7, 2011 (the same day that the FDA approved the Watson generic), the FDA denied both petitions. (Id. at ¶ 25.)
On March 11, 2011, the Delaware court ruled against plaintiff in the first patent suit.
Cephalon I,
Plaintiff filed this suit on March 15, 2011. (Compl. at 1.) The Court granted an unopposed motion for Watson to intervene as a defendant on March 22, 2011. Now before the Court is defendants’ motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).
ANALYSIS
I. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Motion to Dismiss
On a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), plaintiff bears the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the court has subject matter jurisdiction.
See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
Further, a court “ ‘need not identify every ground for holding that a claim is not justiciable.’”
Fourth Branch Assocs. (Mechanicville) v. FERC,
II. RIPENESS
“ ‘Ripeness is a justiciability doctrine’ that is ‘drawn both from Article III limitations on judicial power and from prudential reasons for refusing to exercise jurisdiction.’ ”
Devia v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n,
A. The Fitness Analysis
“[T]he fitness analysis requires the court to consider both whether the context in which the issue is presented is sufficiently concrete and conducive to judicial determination, and whether deciding the issue now would violate principles of judicial restraint and efficiency.”
Alcoa Power Generating Inc. v. FERC,
Contrary to plaintiffs argument
(see
PL’s Opp. at 10), the fact that the agency has issued final approval of the ANDA submitted by a generic applicant does not establish ripeness.
3
Although the fitness
*217
prong of the ripeness test favors a plaintiff if the agency action is final, that determination is not dispositive either for the fitness prong, which entails other factors as well, or overall ripeness, as the second prong can predominate.
See Friends of Keeseville, Inc. v. FERC,
Here, the fitness factors arguably favor plaintiff. Because plaintiff challenges the FDA’s approval of the Watson generic’s ANDA, including the issue of whether a generic may contain multiple active ingredients when the pioneer contains only one, this is first, a purely legal dispute, and second, a dispute over a final agency action. However, “[e]ven though the legal issues may be clear, a case may not be ripe for review [under the second prong] when it would be inappropriate for a court to spend scarce resources on claims that, ‘though predominantly legal in character, depend[ ] on future events that may never come to pass, or that may not occur in the form forecasted.’ ”
Flint Hills Res. Alaska, LLC v. FERC,
B. Hardship to the Parties and Benefit to the Court
The second prong of the ripeness tests requires the Court to consider “ ‘not whether the parties have suffered any “direct hardship,” but rather whether
postponing
judicial review would impose an undue burden on them or would benefit the court.’ ”
Village of Bensenville v. FAA,
Plaintiff asserts that the case is ripe because postponing review will cause immediate, direct, and significant harm for several reasons. First, plaintiff contends that it will be forced to “alter its long-range financial planning ... and to divert resources to preparing customer-education strategies” for patients who might equate the Watson generic with Fentora. (Pl.’s Opp. at 11-12.) Second, plaintiff argues *218 that it will suffer direct hardship, including the loss of sales and reputational damage, should the present circumstances change in a way that causes the Delaware court to lift the injunction. (Id.) Third, plaintiff points to the hardship that will occur if another Fentora generic is approved under the FDA’s alleged erroneous interpretation of the law. (Id.) Each of these reasons is too speculative to establish an undue burden on plaintiff. Further, the Court would benefit from postponement of the ease.
1. Financial Planning
Plaintiff contends that it will suffer an immediate and direct burden because it must spend financial resources now to plan for the entry of the Watson generic into the market. (Pl.’s Opp. at 11-12.) This hardship, however, is not “sufficiently direct and immediate,” because it either relies on a future judicial proceeding or is too remote and speculative.
First, any financial planning undertaken in the short term would be based on the outcome of future speculative events that are neither direct nor immediate. In order for the Watson generic to enter the market before 2019 and financially damage plaintiff (either by competing directly with Fentora or damaging Fentora’s reputation as an effective drug), the injunction currently barring the Watson generic from entering the market would have to be rescinded. A plaintiffs claim of undue burden, however, cannot rely on the outcome of a future judicial proceeding to prove that it will suffer immediate harm should the Court fail to act. “ ‘It is not this court’s job to ferret out or even to speculate as to possible impacts of possible outcomes of existing lawsuits upon future litigation; it is the petitioner’s responsibility to show the specifics of the aggrievement alleged.’”
Friends of Keeseville,
Plaintiff cannot base an argument of undue burden from postponement of a judicial decision on its having to plan for a future event, as opposed to the actual event, if that event is too speculative in the first instance. If the Court were to adopt that reasoning, it would effectively create a rule where any future event, however remote or speculative, could constitute a burden when a plaintiff claims that it must prepare now for this future contingency. For example, plaintiff argues that it will have to undertake a consumer education campaign should the injunction be lifted.
(See
Pl.’s Opp. at 11-12.) But since the hardship prong cannot be based on a future court decision,
see Friends of Keeseville,
In this regard, the Court finds the D.C. Circuit’s decision in
Pfizer Inc. v. Shalala
to be particularly persuasive. In
Pfizer,
the plaintiff pioneer drug manufacturer challenged the FDA’s acceptance of an ANDA for processing.
Although the case before this Court also presents a final agency action, the situation as it currently exists will present no hardship to plaintiff until 2019, because the injunction bars the Watson generic from entering the market until then. Just as the thirty-month waiting period postponed the potential hardship to the plaintiff in Pfizer, so too does the injunction here. In fact, the present facts go further than Pfizer — if a thirty-month waiting period could allow for a number of events that could materially alter the case, then the ninety-six-month window offers even more possibilities. 6 In addition, just as the plaintiff in Pfizer could renew its challenge if the FDA eventually approved the ANDA, plaintiff can rebring this suit if the injunction is lifted.
In the alternative, plaintiff claims two types of financial damages in the long term: preparing for a substantial loss of earnings and preparing an education strategy to prevent reputational damage. (Pl.’s Opp. at 12.) Assuming that both of plaintiffs claims regarding damages are true, both are still too remote and speculative. Plaintiff’s first argument, that it will lose earnings, is based on the claim that a number of private and state insurance programs mandate the use of a generic if one is available. (Id. at 11-12; see Compl. at ¶ 17.) In 2019, however, when the '981 patent expires, if other Fentora generics exist, they too will enter the market and, regardless of whether the Watson generic is also being marketed, will affect plaintiffs financial well-being. Therefore, plaintiffs first claim that it must plan for entry of only the Watson generic may well never come to pass, for even plaintiff predicts that other generic versions of Fentora might be “eligible for approval as early as July 2012.” (PL’s Opp. at 6.)
Plaintiffs second long-term financial planning argument, that it will have to undertake an education campaign, suffers the same fate. An education campaign whose goal is to educate consumers now for the possible entry of a competitor generic at some future time is not the type of direct and immediate burden that makes a case ripe.
Finally, financial planning for speculative future events is not an activity that the FDA’s decision requires the plaintiff to engage in. For example, in
CTIA-The Wireless Ass’n v. FCC,
Although the approval of an ANDA is not a direct regulation of a pioneer manufacturer, the reasoning in CTIA is persuasive because, similar to the abeyance in that case, the injunction prevents the FDA’s approval of the Watson ANDA from taking effect until 2019. During that eight-year window, plaintiff would enjoy exclusivity and the burdens of planning for the future could be minimal or unquantifiable.
2.Changed Circumstances
Plaintiff contends that the circumstances underlying the stipulation that led to the injunction could change,
7
causing Watson to seek a rescission of the injunction. (Pl.’s Opp. at 11-12.) Plaintiff further argues that the rescission of the injunction could create a hardship because it would allow the Watson generic to enter the market, thus decreasing sales of Fentora and potentially damaging Fentora’s reputation.
(Id.)
This argument, however, relies on the outcome of a future judicial proceeding, and, as discussed above, the hardship prong of ripeness cannot rest on the outcome of a future judicial proceeding.
Friends of Keeseville,
3.FDA Approval of Another Fentora Generic
Plaintiff further contends that it could suffer hardship if the FDA approves another Fentora generic based on the FDA’s allegedly erroneous interpretation of the law
(ie.,
approving a generic that has two active ingredients to the pioneer’s one active ingredient). (PL’s Opp. at 11-12.) Just as reliance on a future judicial proceeding cannot create a direct and immediate burden, reliance on a future agency action does not satisfy the hardship prong of ripeness.
Atl. States Legal Found.,
For instance, in
Atlantic States Legal Foundation,
the plaintiffs challenged an EPA regulation that would have potentially allowed utility companies to accumulate hazardous waste at collection facilities without a permit.
4.Benefit to the Court
Balanced against this rather tenuous showing of hardship to the plaintiff, the Court would benefit from postponement of this case because a number of events could occur that could either make adjudication unnecessary or materially alter the complexion of the case. For example, if Ce *221 phalon II is affirmed, then plaintiffs short-term injury claims become even more speculative. If the FDA approves another generic version of Fentora that enters the market in July 2012, as plaintiff predicts (Pl.’s Opp. at 6), then plaintiffs current arguments could change since it cannot be known if the Watson generic would even be a competitor at that time.
Although the Court appreciates plaintiffs concern that postponing adjudication could result in a compressed TRO or PI proceeding
(see
PL’s Opp. at 2, 6-7), the argument has little legal merit in the ripeness context. The second prong of ripeness looks at the burden on the
parties
of postponing adjudication and the
benefit to the Court
of postponing adjudication.
Village of Bensenville,
Because “[t]he central judicial interest in deferring resolution ... lies in the possibility that if the issue is not adjudicated at this time, it may not require adjudication at all,”
Friends of Keeseville,
CONCLUSION
The Court grants defendants’ motion to dismiss, finding that the case lacks ripeness because postponing adjudication would cause plaintiff no undue burden and would benefit the Court. The case is dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. A separate order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
Notes
. Because the '981 patent describes manufacturing methods, and the Orange Book lists approved drug products, it cannot be listed in the Orange Book. (See Def.'s Mot. at 3 n.4.)
. Therefore, since the Court is resting its decision on ripeness grounds, it need not address the alternative jurisdictional argument of lack of standing.
. Moreover, the Circuit’s decision in
Pfizer Inc.
v.
Shalala,
. The D.C. Circuit’s decision in
Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sebelius,
. Standing and ripeness are closely related and "indeed not always clearly separable” from one another.
Wyo. Outdoor Council
v.
U.S. Forest Serv.,
. Similarly in the standing
context,
the
D.C.
Circuit, in
LaRoque v. Holder,
No. 10-5433,
. For instance, another Fentora generic could be approved, Watson could prevail on its appeal in the Federal Circuit, or there could be changes in the marketability of Fentora. (Pl.’s Opp. at 11-12.)
. For instance, the drug could be removed from the market, the manufacturer could go bankrupt, or some other competitive product could undercut the commercial value of Fentora.
