122 Ky. 65 | Ky. Ct. App. | 1906
OPINION by
Reversing.
A schism in the Presbyterian Church of the United States of America resulted in about 1865 in the with
In 1901 the financial condition of the Central University was far from promising. Indeed, in the opinion of its managers and most interested friends, it was believed to be unable to accomplish, with the income it was receiving and with the constituency back of it, the purpose for which it was established. Its failure was contemplated as a probability, unless new ways and means of support could be supplied. Negotiations between Central University and Centre College were opened, resulting. in an agreement for their consolidation. The agreement was submitted to the synods of the respective churches, and approved, and was finally executed in form by the official boards of the two institutions, so as to comply with the requirements of Kentucky Statutes concerning consolidation of corporations. The title of the new corporation is "Central University of Kentucky. ’ ’ The articles of consolidation provide: ‘‘ Said Central University of Kentucky shall be vested with and own all property, business, credits, assets,' and effects of said constituent corporations without further deed of transfer, and shall be bound for all the contracts and liabilities of each of the constituent corporations. * # * This transfer and conveyance are made subject to the trust herein declared respecting particular property. The object and pur
• This consoldation having been effected, it is conceded that the school formerly taught at Richmond under the auspices of old Central University, has been discontinued, but that the new institution has conducted and is conducting the school at Danville upon the lines indicated in the new charter, at which is maintained a chair of mathematics known as the “Henry Bell Walters Professorship of Mathe
The first question argued in briefs is -that of the jurisdiction of the Madison Circuit Court over the person of the appellant in this action. But that question we understand to have been waived by appellant upon the argument at the bar, and is consequently passed over by the court. The two original corporations were each creatures of the State, and, so far, at least, as the Central University was concerned, took the powers granted subject to the reserved right in the State, under the general statute of 1856, to alter,
"When the State, by the general law enacted in 1893, provided for the consolidation of corporations in this State, the statute became as it were a part of the charter of the Central University, ás if written therein originally. We do not mean to go further here than to decide the precise question presented, which is the power of the corporation to consolidate with another corporation having the same end to accomplish and using substantially the same means to accomplish it. So long as the consolidated- corporation undertook to do the thing originally undertaken by its constituents, we hold that the purpose of the original incorporators and of those whose means set the thing on foot was not being diverted. The only matter altered was the means by which it was to be accomplished. The statute (Carroll’s Ky. St. 1903, section 555) provides: “Any two or more corporations organized under this chapter or under the law of this State, may consolidate into a single corporation. ’ ’ This power of consolidation is conferred in amplest terms. It is not confined to any class of corporations. Though it will not include those public service corporations, prohibited from consolidating by section 201 of the Constitution, nor the consolidation of any corporations the effect of which would be
The donors to the corporation, who have given money or property to found it, are in no sense a part of the corporation, unless they have become members of its. alumni association. It is not contended that Mrs. Walters was such member. When, therefore, the corporation assented to the consolidation, and its directors — that is, its board of curators — executed the articles, the consolidation was effectual to pass its property and franchises to the new concern, as if they bad been originally granted to it. It is said this was in the nature of a new grant by the State, and not a continuing of the original grant, because the State only can grant corporate powers and create corporate existence. The fact is that the State had already granted the identical powers' to the two corporations. Ry the new statute it empowered them to consolidate their property and combine their efforts and resources; the State continuing the old separate existence in the new, so far as franchises and property rights were concerned. While the statute provides that the old corporations shall cease to exist upon such consolidation, it was never intended to destroy
Some courts, construing somewhat similar statutes, have noticed a distinction between consolidation and merger; the former term being used to describe the result of two corporations being combined into a new one, and the latter to describe the result where one corporation absorbs another. As corporate franchises are generally deemed unassignable without permission of the State, a merger is, after all, under our statute at least, a consolidation; for, although the old name of one may be retained and the other dropped, still the course to he pursued under the statute for one corporation to acquire the property and franchises of another is precisely the same as if an entirely new name were adopted. The result is a merging of corporate property and constituents, as where two streams flow together. At the junction they may be said to constitute a new stream, hut essentially the latter takes in and is made up of all that formerly flowed in and now flows out of the two from which it gets is being. ' To use another figure, it is a marriage of two, in which neither is lost, but in which the two are blended into one in contemplation of law. The original existence is merely a legal status. It is not a thing at all. The power that gave it its so-called existence is competent to change it into a new being, with all the rights and attributes of the old. No physical phenomenon is involved. The legislative purpose, and the practical application of it, will not stagger in execution at an imaginary difficulty in
The questions now recur, was there a sufficient consideration? And, if so, has it failed? One promise may be a valuable consideration to support another. Where the payee of a note promises, in consideration of its payment according to its terms, to do something that he otherwise was not bound to do, the undertaking is mutual, and this mutuality is a sufficient basis for enforcing the obligation against either party who may become derelict. Under the charter of the Central University, as well as under the charter of appellant, the university is bound to apply donations made for a particular p-urpose to that purpose alone. In the note in question it is stated, in addition, that the payee will apply it to the maintenance of the Henry Bell Walters Chair of Mathematics. Appellant was bound, upon accepting the note with that condition, to apply it to that purpose, and in addition is obligated by such acceptance to maintain perpetually, or so long as that fund will sustain it, a chair of that name in its university. Collier v. Baptist Educational Society, 8 B. Mon. 68; Carr’s Exr’s v. Robinson, 8 Bush, 269.
But it is most earnestly insisted that the real- con-
As there is nothing in the note, or in the contemporaneous transaction, binding the payee to apply the money otherwise than in the maintenance of a chair of mathematics in its university, being conducted for Christian education, there was no limitation upon the power of the payee to change the location of its school or schools, or to change the manner of their government, or the adoption of particular means of effectuating the general purpose for which the institution was founded. The very nature of the enterprise, on the contrary, looked to improvement. It contemplated, by every reasonable implication, that new methods, new people, even new ideas, would be employed, when approved by the governing body of the institution. A college means, ojr ought to mean, growth; the elimination of the false; the fostering of the true. As it is expected to be perpetual, in its service, it must conform to the changed condition of each new generation, possessing an elasticity of scope and work commensurate with the changing requirements of the times which it serves. For the past to bind it to unchange-ableness would be to prevent growth, applying the treatment to the head that the Chinese do to the feet. Presbyterians as a body have always been noted as patrons of education. This characteristic, shared signally by the Walterses, will not, upon mere conjecture, be restricted into the unnatural, self-destructive channel now contended for by appellees. Their subscriptions to this college, in the absence of some limitation in the agreement, must be conclusively deemed to have been in accord with the general purpose of the educational movement then udertaken by the body
"Wherefore the judgment of the circuit ( court is leversed, and cause remanded, with directions to overrule the demurrer to the answer, and for further proceedings not inconsistent herewith.