118 F. 30 | 7th Cir. | 1902
November 18, 1899, a decree was entered foreclosing a first mortgage and ordering a sale of the Peoria, Decatur & Evansville Railroad. After publishing notice as directed, the master sold the road on February 6, 1900, to Adrian H. Joline for $1,586,000. February 12, 1900, the master filed his report of sale. April 21, 1900, appellant filed objections to confirmation, substantially as follows: Appellant, not a party to the foreclosure suit, but a stockholder in the railroad company, on behalf of himself and all other stockholders who might desire to take the benefit of his objections, charged that the purchase was made by Joline under an agreement between the Central Trust Company, trustee in the first mortgage, and the Colonial Trust Company, owner of a large amount of second mortgage bonds of the railroad company, whereby the Colonial Company, after paying the first mortgage bonds, was to be permitted to reorganize upon the plan proposed by the Colonial Company, which contemplated that the Colonial Company should procure to be issued upon the faith of the reorganized property first mortgage bonds and preferred stock involving the annual payment of interest and dividends of not more than $190,000, and the issue of common stock of the reorganized company to the‘extent of $3,000,000, par value, and the disposition of the first mortgage bonds and of the preferred stock in such manner as the Colonial Company should see fit, and the issue of so much of the common stock as should be re
The first ground relates to the validity of the decree. The question cannot be raised on objections to the sale. Appellant probably realized this when on January 30, 1900, he filed his intervening petition, in which he sought to open up the decree and to be let in to defend. For reasons stated in Central Trust Co. v. Peoria & D. E. Ry. Co., 43 C. C. A. 613, 104 Fed. 418, his petition was stricken from the files.
In his second' and third grounds, appellant fails to exhibit any valid objection to the confirmation of the sale. If Joline bought for the Colonial Company, instead of for the Central Company, how was appellant harmed? He does not shoyv how much less was realized at the sale than would have been if Joline had bid on behalf of the Central Company, nor the value of the property, nor that les's- than the full value was bid, nor that, after payment of the first mortgage, any surplus would be left for the second mortgage bondholders and other creditors, to say nothing of the stockholders, nor that there is any probability of a better bid at another sale, nor that-he was ignorant of or misled by the action of the Central Company, nor that he applied for a postponement of the sale to enable him' to get the stockholders together to protect their interests at the sale. Appellant does not even allege that he accepted the offer in the written contract between the Central Company and the first mortgage bondholders whereby the stockholders were- to be included in a reorganization plan. But if he had alleged and proven the fact, it might show a cause of action against the Central Company and the first mortgage bondholders for damages, but certainly it would furnish no reason why the circuit court should retake the property and sell it again, as the court would be compelled to do, under a decree that is unassailable by appellant.
The order is affirmed.