23 F. 306 | U.S. Cir. Ct. | 1885
The petitioner prays for an order directing the receiver in this cause to pay over to it the sum of $50,000, in his hands, claimed to be due to it under a contract entered into January 13, 1883, between the petitioner, the Ohio Central .Railroad Company, and the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company. The contract is of that description known as pooling contracts, and had reference to the coal business of the several roads, in respect to which they were competitors. It provided that the business and earnings of the parties should be equalized upon the basis of per cent, to the petitioner, 27 per cent, to the Ohio Central, and 18^ per cent, to the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company, the prices of transportation being fixed by commissioners appointed under the contract, and at the end of each year the joint earnings from this business, of which a separate account should be kept, were to be divided according to the same percentage, any excess received by a party to be paid over, after deducting one-half for the cost of carriage.
This contract was in force and in operation between the parties when the bill was filed in this case, and the receiver was appointed. No specific directions in regard to it were given to the receiver at the time of his appointment, or since, and thinking the contract fair, reasonable, and probably beneficial, he has continued to act under it. The percentages for division agreed upon, it appears, fairly represent the proportions according to which the business had been previously divided between the roads, when operating in competition, and the object of the arrangement was to maintain what the parties should deem to be reasonable, but remunerative, prices of transportation by taking away the motive for cutting rates. In consequence of the strike among the miners in the coal region through which their roads run, the amount of coal transported during the past year over the petitioner’s road has been greatly reduced below its usual proportion, and that of the road of the Ohio Central relatively increased,
First, that contract is illegal, being in restraint of trade, and void, as contrary to public policy; second, that it is void as ultra vires, the Ohio Central Railroad Company having no corporate power to enter into it; third, that the, receiver was not authorized to recognize and continue it in operation. '
In my opinion the receiver was well warranted in recognizing, adopting, and continuing in operation the contract in question. As an officer of the company at the time it was made, he participated in its execution and entered into it orr behalf of his company, believing it to be a reasonable, just, and useful arrangement on behalf of all the interests he was bound to consult, both public and private. He was selected and appointed as a receiver in this cause at the instance of the complainant, and the bondholders whom it represents. It was not then thought necessary or expedient to limit his discretion in the practical management of the road, thus placed in his hands, by any express instructions. The existence of this contract, it must be presumed, was well known to those who are now seeking to repudiate it; if not, it might have been by the exercise of the slightest diligence. In consequence of casualties not foreseen at the beginning, it has eventuated in the accumulation of the cash balance now in controversy. The contract has been fully executed as to the transactions and business out of fahich that balance has grown.
The question now presented to me is not whether an unperformed and executory contract shall be enforced, nor whether damages shall be recovered against a party who refuses to operate under it. It is whether one party, who has received all the expected benefits to be derived from it, shall account for the fruits of its performance, which by its terms belong to another, and which, contrary to its terms, it retains. The contract, whether legal or not, was not binding on the complainant or the receiver; and if objected to in season, proper instruction would have been given in reference to its recognition and adoption. Failing to take proper steps to that end, the receiver was necessarily left at liberty to exercise his own judgment and discretion in reference to it. The contract itself was a customary one among railroads, and the receiver believed it to be reasonable and fair, and that it was expedient to continue it in force. This he has done with the result already stated. Good faith requires that the proceeds arising from its operation, and which by its terms belong to the petitioner, should be paid over to it, without regard to the questions now made as to the original validity of the contract. The receiver is accordingly directed to pay over to the petitioner the amount found to be due by the master, in accordance with the prayer of the petitioner.
